Raymond Gonzales v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 17, 2025
• Docket: 01-23-00544-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued July 17, 2025.

In The Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00544-CR ——————————— RAYMOND GONZALES, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 338th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1520615

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted the appellant of murder and assessed punishment at

confinement for life. The appellant raises four points of error: two related to

sufficiency, one related to his right to confront witnesses, and one regarding the trial

court reading the indictment to the panel during voir dire. We affirm. Background

The appellant and the complainant, Francisco Zamarripa, were homeless men

who frequented the same convenience store in northeast Houston. Surveillance

footage of a nearby strip mall from August 11, 2016, shows someone riding a bicycle

up to Zamarripa, having some sort of interaction, and then apparently stabbing him.

The bicyclist rode off. Zamarripa walked into the store and showed the clerk he had

been stabbed in the abdomen. Zamarripa said the assailant was “el guero flaco,” but

that moniker meant nothing to the cashier. The cashier called 911. Zamarripa died

at the hospital of blood loss. The medical examiner testified the stab wound was six

inches deep, three-fourths of an inch wide, and made by a single-edged blade.

Police learned that the appellant lived near the convenience store, was known

as “el guero,” and rode a bicycle. The appellant gave a thirty-six-minute interview

to police. For the first fifteen minutes the appellant maintained that, while he knew

Zamarripa and had had prior negative interactions with him, he was unaware of the

stabbing or Zamarripa’s death. After police revealed more details of what they knew,

the appellant admitted he stabbed Zamarripa but claimed he did so in self-defense.

The appellant claimed Zamarripa had assaulted him in the past, so when Zamarripa

approached him in an aggressive manner on August 11 he feared for his life and

stabbed Zamarripa. The appellant admitted to leaving the scene. He said he could

not remember what he used as a weapon or where he put it.

2 Sufficiency of the Evidence to Prove the Offense

In his first point the appellant claims “there was no evidence, circumstantial

or direct, to establish the required culpable mental state.”

The standards for sufficiency review for criminal convictions are well known.

The evidence is sufficient if a rational factfinder could find each element of the

charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Williams v. State, 582 S.W.3d 692, 700

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d). In assessing sufficiency, we must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, deferring to the

factfinder’s implicit credibility determinations. See Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341,

360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“The jury is the sole judge of credibility . . . .”).

The indictment charged two theories of murder. The first alleged the appellant

intentionally or knowingly caused Zamarripa’s death. The second alleged that, with

the intent to cause serious bodily injury to Zamarripa, the appellant committed an

act clearly dangerous to human life that caused Zamarripa’s death. See TEX. PENAL

CODE § 19.02(b)(1), (2). When, as here, the State alleges multiple manners of

committing an offense, the evidence is sufficient if it proves any of them. Kitchens

v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In homicide and assaultive cases, there is often no direct evidence of a

defendant’s state of mind. Factfinders often must infer state of mind from

circumstantial evidence. For instance, in the leading case about sufficiency review,

3 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 325 (1979), the Supreme Court upheld a murder

conviction by holding that the factfinder could have inferred an intent to kill from

the circumstances of the offense.

The evidence here supports an inference, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the

appellant intended to cause, at least, serious bodily injury. Although the exact nature

of the weapon is unknown, it was a sharp object large enough to penetrate six inches

into Zamarippa’s abdomen. The stab went through a rib and penetrated Zamarripa’s

liver, kidney, and diaphragm. In his interview with police, the appellant admitted the

stabbing was intentional, which was part of his self-defense claim.

In his brief, the appellant suggests that a self-defensive state of mind excludes

the relevant culpable mental states for Zamarripa’s death. The appellant cites no

authority suggesting that defending oneself is incompatible with intending to cause

death or serious bodily injury. Intentionally causing death or serious bodily injury is

often how self-defense works. Self-defense is a question of motive for the

defendant’s use of force; it is not a question of the defendant’s mental state regarding

the result of the conduct. See Alonzo v. State, 353 S.W.3d 778, 783 (Tex. Crim. App.

2011) (“The self-defense provisions in the Penal Code focus on the actor’s motives

and on the level of force used, not on the outcome of that use of force.”).

The appellant disposed of the weapon. When officers asked him what the

weapon was, his immediate answer was, “I can’t say nothing right now because I

4 don’t want to incriminate myself.” He later said he did not remember what the

weapon was or where he put it. “Attempts to conceal incriminating evidence,

inconsistent statements, and implausible explanations to the police are probative of

wrongful conduct and are also circumstances of guilt.” Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d

45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

Deferring to the jury’s implied credibility findings, the evidence here can

support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellant admitted to

intentionally stabbing Zamarripa, the wound is of a sort that creates an inference of

intent to cause, at least, serious bodily injury, and the consciousness of guilt

displayed in the interview supports an inference of guilt. We overrule the appellant’s

first point.

Sufficiency of the Evidence to Reject Self-Defense

In his second point the appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to

support the jury’s rejection of his self-defense claim.

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s rejection of

self-defense, we do not look at whether the State presented evidence directly

rebutting self-defense, but rather we determine whether, viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found against

the appellant on the issue of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Braughton v.

State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). As the law applies here, an

5 individual is justified in using deadly force against another when he reasonably

believes that the use of deadly force is immediately necessary to prevent the other’s

use of deadly force. TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 9.31(a), 9.32(a)(2)(A). Thus, self-dense

has subjective and objective elements: The defendant must subjectively believe in

the immediate necessity of the use of force, and that belief must be objectively

reasonable. Lozano v. State, 636 S.W.3d 25, 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

As a starting point, the appellant’s self-defense claim was marginal because

he never explained why he believed Zamarripa was about to use deadly force. In his

interview with police the appellant claimed he believed Zamarripa came at him in

an aggressive manner, and was going to “assault” him. In a recorded jail call

admitted at trial, the appellant claimed he believed Zamarripa was going to “beat the

f— out of me.” The caller stated his understanding that the appellant stabbed

Zamarripa “because he started beating on you, right?” The appellant responded, “No,

he didn’t.” He explained that on the night of the killing, Zamarippa walked up to

him with the intent to “strike” him, but the appellant “beat him to the draw” by

stabbing him. The appellant said that whenever Zamarripa got drunk he always

wanted to assault the appellant. While the appellant claimed that he feared for his

life, he never said he thought Zamarripa was armed or explained how Zamarripa

assaulting him would be something that qualifies as deadly force. See Dearborn v.

State, 420 S.W.3d 366, 378 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.)

6 (holding evidence did not support defendant’s claim of self-defense where he shot

victim who was “armed” only with his fists, and noting courts have “not treated

blows with fists as deadly force.”).

We agree with the State that the jury, in its role as factfinder, could have

rationally rejected the appellant’s self-defense claim based on credibility.

“Defensive evidence which is merely consistent with the physical evidence at the

scene of the alleged offense will not render the State’s evidence insufficient since

the credibility determination of such evidence is solely within the jury’s province

and the jury is free to accept or reject the defensive evidence.” Saxton v. State, 804

S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), quoted in Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 609.

“A jury is permitted to reject even uncontradicted defensive testimony, so

long as its rejection of that evidence was rational in light of the remaining evidence

in the record and is not contradicted by indisputable objective facts.” Braughton, 596

S..W.3d at 612. Here, there were no indisputable objective facts showing the

appellant’s subjective mental state. The jury could have reasonably rejected the

appellant’s unsworn self-serving statements in light of the remaining evidence in the

record.

The record contains at least a couple objective bases for finding the appellant

did not have a defensive state of mind. First, the appellant discarded the murder

weapon, which supports an inference he did not have a state of mind consistent with

7 lawful self-defense. See Whipple v. State, 281 S.W.3d 482, 498 (Tex. App.—El Paso

2008, pet. ref’d) (concealment is evidence of guilt that rebuts self-defense). Second,

the appellant’s statements to police that Zamarripa was a bully and the appellant was

tired of Zamarripa assaulting him—statements the appellant claims support

self-defense—suggest the motive for the stabbing was revenge.

Accepting the appellant’s self-defense claim would require accepting his

statements as true. The jury did not do that. We cannot substitute our judgment for

that of the jury. Braughton v. State, 522 S.W.3d 714, 726 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2017), aff’d, 569 S.W.3d 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We overrule the

appellant’s second point.

Sixth Amendment Claim

In his third point, the appellant argues that his Sixth Amendment right to

confrontation was violated by his absence from part of an evidentiary hearing

conducted outside the presence of the jury.

One clue the police used to identify the appellant as a person of interest was

his bicycle. The surveillance video showed the assailant riding a bicycle, the

appellant was known to ride a bicycle, and police found a bicycle at a location where

the appellant had slept. But the officer who took the bicycle into evidence, Officer

Don, had no memory of taking the bicycle into evidence. Invoking Rule of Evidence

803(5) (commonly called “past recollection recorded”), the State sought to have read

8 into evidence a report Officer Don wrote contemporaneous with taking the bicycle

into evidence.

The trial court held a mid-trial hearing on this request. The first part of Officer

Don’s testimony at the hearing takes up four pages in the transcript. She said that

she did not remember collecting the bicycle but she recognized the offense report as

one of hers because it had her name and payroll number on it. She said that Houston

Police Department policy was to write reports the same day as the events they

described.

The attorneys and trial court had a series of exchanges that take up

two-and-a-half pages in the reporter’s record, at which point defense counsel said

that the appellant was “not in the courtroom.” The trial court replied, “Let’s bring

out [the appellant],” then the record notes his presence.

The attorneys and trial court had a further discussion about the mechanics of

admitting the report, then Officer Don testified for four more pages of transcript,

during which she identified State’s Exhibit 27 as being a bicycle that matched the

description of the bicycle in her report. The trial court admitted State’s Exhibit 27.

When the jury was brought back in, Officer Don’s report was read into evidence.

In his third point of error the appellant claims that his absence from part of

Officer Don’s testimony at this evidentiary hearing violated his Sixth Amendment

right to confrontation. We need not address the merits of this claim because, as the

9 State argues, even if the trial court committed error, the error would not warrant

reversal.

Constitutional error requires reversal unless the appellate court determines,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error “did not contribute to the conviction or

punishment.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a). Here, the bicycle had no bearing on whether

the stabbing was justified, which was the only question presented to the jury. The

appellant admitted stabbing Zamarripa, both in the police interview and in letters

and jail calls admitted into evidence.

Also, Officer Don was not the only source of testimony about the bicycle.

Another witness testified, without objection, that police recovered a bicycle as part

of this investigation.

We conclude the admission of the bicycle and Officer Don’s report did not

contribute to the appellant’s conviction or sentence. The appellant advances no

argument the bicycle itself, or anything in Officer Don’s report, was more harmful

than testimony to the bare fact that a bicycle had been recovered. “It is well

established that the improper admission of evidence does not constitute reversible

error if the same facts are shown by other evidence which is not challenged.”

Crocker v. State, 573 S.W.2d 190, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), quoted in Leday v.

State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

10 The only harm the appellant alleges in his brief is the admission of the bicycle.

It’s unclear how the appellant’s presence for more of the hearing would have resulted

in the exclusion of the bicycle. In any event, because the bicycle was such a marginal

piece of evidence, we conclude any error in its admission would be harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt. We overrule the appellant’s third point.

Reading the Indictment During Voir Dire

In his fourth point the appellant alleges the trial court erred by reading the

indictment to the jury panel during voir dire. The appellant claims this violated his

Texas constitutional right to an impartial jury.

The appellant cites no authority showing this was error. He cites cases holding

a trial court may prohibit a party from using the facts of the case as the basis for

questions during voir dire, but that’s not what happened here. And he cites Code of

Criminal Procedure Article 36.01, which requires the trial court to read the charging

instrument to the jury at the beginning of trial. This, however, is not a prohibition on

reading it during voir dire.1 Indeed, the State directs us to Lara v. State, where we

held a trial court’s failure to read the indictment at the beginning of trial was

1 The appellant frames the preservation and harm portions of his argument as though the complained-of error is constitutional. If the trial court’s act was a violation merely of Article 36.01, that is not a constitutional error. The appellant makes no argument about why he would be allowed to raise an Article 36.01 complaint on appeal without having objected in the trial court. 11 harmless because the trial court had read the indictment during voir dire. 740 S.W.2d

823, 829 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, pet. ref’d).

The appellant offers no argument about how reading the indictment in voir

dire makes the jury partial if reading the same document to them at trial does not.

The jury here, as in virtually every criminal case, was instructed that the indictment

was not evidence of guilt.

Even if reading the indictment in voir dire somehow made the jury partial, the

right to an impartial jury, under either the federal constitution or the Texas

constitution, is subject to ordinary rules of forfeiture. State v. Morales, 253 S.W.3d

686, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see Delrio v. State, 840 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1992). The appellant claims his complaint is not subject to forfeiture, but

the only authority he cites for this regards the right to a jury. The appellant had a

jury trial. A complaint of partiality regards the composition of the jury, a different

complaint than the lack of a jury. Compare Franklin v. State, 138 S.W.3d 351, 354

(Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (right to impartial jury includes adequate voir dire to identify

unqualified jurors) with Rios v. State, 665 S.W.3d 467, 479–82 (Tex. Crim. App.

2022) (waiver of right to jury trial must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent). As

we and our sister court have done before with identical arguments, we reject the

appellant’s fourth point because he forfeited it by not raising a contemporaneous

objection. Baptiste v. State, No. 01-23-00504-CR, 2025 WL 1298310, at *4 (Tex.

12 App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 6, 2025, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for

publication); Allen v. State, No. 14-23-00761-CR, 2025 WL 978216, at *9 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 1, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op. not designated for

publication).

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court court’s judgment.

Clint Morgan Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Malloy, Guiney, and Morgan.

Do Not Publish.