OPINION
WOMACK, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which OVERSTREET, MEYERS, MANSFIELD, PRICE, and HOLLAND, JJ., joined.
This case calls for us to reconsider the effect of a defendant’s admissions of guilt at the guilt stage and at the punishment stage of a bifurcated trial — the so-called “curative admissibility” and “DeGarmo ” doctrines.
I.
The appellant was indicted for possession of 28 grams or more of cocaine, a felony which at the time of the offense (November 24, 1993) was punishable by confinement for life or a term of 5 to 99 years and a fine not to exceed $50,000.1 His motion to suppress the cocaine and testimony about it, on grounds of unlawful search and seizure, was denied. The appellant pleaded not guilty, and the case was tried before a jury.
The State presented the evidence that the appellant had sought to suppress: The appellant was the passenger in a vehicle which a deputy constable stopped for speeding. The officer’s dog, which was trained to detect narcotics, began barking in the officer’s car. The driver asked if the dog would bite someone who had cocaine on their person. The officer said no. The driver asked the officer to take a bag oüt of her coat pocket in such a way that the appellant could see that she was not giving it willfully. The bag contained about 124 grams of “crack” cocaine. The driver and the appellant were arrested and taken to the constable’s office. After talking to the driver, the officer searched the appellant’s shoes and found about 28 more grams of “crack” cocaine.
After the State rested, the appellant testified that a long-time acquaintance in Dubaeh, Louisiana had given him $800 to go with the driver on a “drug run” to Houston. They [715]*715went to a McDonald’s where he gave a woman $9,800 and obtained the cocaine. The appellant was aware that he had the packages of cocaine in his shoes, but not that the driver had cocaine. He agreed with the prosecutor that he was not telling the jury that he was not guilty, but that he took issue with how the evidence was recovered. His testimony about the stop of the vehicle and the searches and arrests was different from that of the officers.
The jury was charged to disregard the evidence found in the search of the appellant if they had a reasonable doubt that the vehicle was properly stopped or that the officer had probable cause to arrest the appellant. See Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23. The verdict was “guilty.”
At the punishment stage of the trial, the appellant testified that he agreed to do the “drug run” for money he could use to repay a student loan. The jury assessed a punishment of 20 years’ confinement and a $20,000 fine.
On appeal the appellant argued in two points that the trial court erred in admitting the cocaine over his motion to suppress. In a supplemental brief, filed after the State’s brief, the appellant argued that his testimony was impelled by the illegal action of the State. The court of appeals said:
The record before us indicates appellant took the witness stand during both the guilt/innocence phase and the punishment phase. At both phases, appellant admitted to being in intentional and knowing possession of the contraband in question. Under the DeGarmo doctrine, which was reaffirmed in McGlothlin v. State, 896 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 882, 116 S.Ct. 219, 133 L.Ed.2d 150 (1995), any error occurring at the guilt/ innocence phase of the trial is deemed to be waived if the defendant admits his guilt to the charged offense during the punishment phase of the trial. We carried the DeGarmo doctrine a step further in McWhorter v. State, 911 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1995, no pet.), holding that a defendant’s admission to the offense during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial also waives any error occurring during that portion of the trial. In the instant case, having admitted to knowing possession of the cocaine in question during both phases of the trial, any error that occurred during the guilt/ innocence phase was waived. Points of error one and two are overruled.
Leday v. State, No. 09-95-361-CR, 1997 WL 354770 (Tex.App. — Beaumont, June 25, 1997) (unpublished) (footnotes omitted).
We granted the appellant’s petition for discretionary review to consider whether the appellant “waived error” under the “DeGar-mo doctrine.” See DeGarmo v. State, 691 S.W.2d 657 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 973, 106 S.Ct. 337, 88 L.Ed.2d 322 (1985).
II.
One question is common to the issues before us: how is the review of appellate points that complain of the admission of evidence affected by other evidence that was received without objection? Analysis of these issues is made more difficult by the terminology we have used; we have used the same term to refer to different situations, and different terms to refer to identical situations. We are not unique in these failings, which affect even academic writers.
Once the objector has made a timely, specific objection of record in compliance with [Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 103(a)(1), he has done all the Rules require to preserve the point for review. There are, however, a number of doctrines that an opponent may dredge up from the books to defeat review, despite compliance with the Rule. In considering the vitality of these doctrines, analysis must be quite tentative for there is little agreement among commentators on the nomenclature, much less the substantive effect of these doctrines. They are variously referred to as “waiver,” “estoppel,” “opening the door,” “fighting fire with fire,” and “curative admissibility.”
21 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure § 5039 (1977).
We have gone the commentators one better (or worse) by using “waiver” not only to [716]*716refer to doctrines that defeat review of a ruling on a timely, specific objection, but also to refer to the failure to make a timely, specific objection. See, e.g., Lagrone v. State, 942 S.W.2d 602, 618 (Tex.Cr.App.1997); McCain v. State, 139 Tex.Crim. 539, 141 S.W.2d 613, 616 (1940). As we shall explain below, “waiver” is not the best term to use in this area, although it has its academic defenders.
We also have muddied the waters by misusing the term “curative admissibility.” See Steven Goode, Olin Guy Wellborn, III, & M. Michael Sharlot, 1 Texas Practice — Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence, Civil and Criminal § 103.1 (2d ed.1993). In the common law of evidence, the doctrine of curative admissibility allows one party to introduce evidence that might otherwise be excluded, to counter the unfair prejudicial use of the same evidence by the opposing party. 21 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure § 5039 n. 4 (1977). In his Treatise on Evidence § 15 (3d ed.1940), Wigmore stated the issue that underlies the doctrine of curative admissibility:
Does one inadmissibility justify or excuse another? If the one party offers an inadmissible fact which is received, may the opponent afterwards offer similar facts whose only claim to admission is that they negative or explain or counter-balance the prior inadmissible fact?
In such a situation, the admissibility of the opponent’s evidence is based on the need to cure the earlier error in receiving evidence— literally, “curative admissibility.” McCormick used the homelier terms, “fighting fire with fire” and “opening the door.” See McCormick on Evidence § 57 (3d ed.1972).
Thus, the doctrine of curative admissibility, correctly identified, is closely related to the doctrine of optional completeness codified in Texas [Rule of Evidence] 107. Curative admissibility, as the term itself suggests, is a doctrine of admissibility, not of harmless error. In the cases where the Court of Criminal Appeals misuses the term, admissibility of the defendant’s responsive evidence is not challenged. If it were, the true doctrine of curative admissibility would apply and provide admissibility. The issue in these cases is whether the evidence presented by the defendant in response to inadmissible evidence improperly admitted over his objection has the effect of rendering the error harmless, or of “waiving” it. This is a matter quite distinct from curative admissibility.
Steven Goode et at, supra, at 12. Since the rule of harmless error (or “waiver”) in admitting evidence is quite different from the common law doctrine of curative admissibility, how is it that we gave the former rule the latter name?
So far as we can tell, the first use by a Texas appellate court of the term “curative admissibility” was in Thomas v. State, 572 S.W.2d 507, 513 (Tex.Cr.App.1978):
It has long been the rule of this state that the admission of improper evidence cannot be urged as grounds for reversal where the defendant gives testimony on direct examination which establishes the same facts as those objected to. [Citations omitted.] This principle is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of curative admissibility. 5A C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1724[ (c) ](3)(b) at 954 (1958).
At the cited page of Corpus Juris Secundum is a black-letter statement of law which supports the rule stated in the Thomas opinion: “The conduct of parties or counsel may be such as to render error in admitting evidence harmless, as where the party complaining introduces, or fails to object to the admission of, improper evidence.” And just under that black-letter statement, the words “curative admissibility” do appear as a boldface catch-line in a long footnote. But the footnote is to a preceding section of the article, not to the section that contains the relevant rule. It therefore seems likely that the misuse of the term “curative admissibility” to describe this rule stems from a misreading of the cited page in the legal encyclopedia.
We disapprove the mistaken use of the term “curative admissibility” in our opinions2 [717]*717and in the opinions of the courts of appeals,3 when it has been misapplied in cases in which error in admitting evidence has been held to be harmless (or “waived”) because similar evidence was introduced without objection.
Our disapproval of the use of a term such as “curative admissibility” or “waiver” in an opinion does not imply that the doctrine so named was unsound or misapplied. We are mindful that the soundness of any of these doctrines depends, not on the label that it bears, but on the specific situation in which it is used. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 175 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 439, 102 L.Ed.2d 445 (1988) (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).4
III.
One such situation in which the doctrine of harmless error (or “waiver”) is used is a court’s overruling an objection to evidence after the same evidence has been admitted without objection. The effect of the earlier-admitted evidence on appellate review of the ruling is clear: Overruling the objection usually will not be reversible error. “It is well established that the improper admission of evidence does not constitute reversible error if the same facts are shown by other evidence which is not challenged.” Crocker v. State, 573 S.W.2d 190, 201 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (declining to address admissibility of a psychiatrist’s opinion after a psychologist had given similar opinion without objection).
The converse situation leads to the same result. That is, when a court has overruled an objection to evidence, the ruling usually will not be reversible error when the same evidence is subsequently admitted without objection. See, e.g., Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141, 149 (Tex.Cr.App.1996). In requiring an objection every time the objectionable evidence is offered, we are in a minority [718]*718of courts which do not follow the general rule that the repetition of an objection is needless when the court’s ruling has indicated that an objection to such evidence will definitely be overruled. See Wigmore on Evidence § 18 (Peter Tillers rev.1983). Our rule which requires objection to every offer is sometimes called “the ‘futility rule’; that is, despite ruling of judge that evidence is admissible, party must keep making futile objections on pain of waiver.” 21 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure § 5039 n. 11.1 (Supp.1998) (citing Texas cases).5 We have found that the general application of this rule has not proven to be burdensome for defense counsel in many cases. Ethington v. State, 819 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex.Cr.App.1991).
Our rule, therefore, is that overruling an objection to evidence will not result in reversal when other such evidence was received without objection, either before or after the complained-of ruling. This rule applies whether the other evidence was introduced by the defendant or the State. See, e.g., Rogers v. State, 853 S.W.2d 29, 35 (Tex.Cr.App.1993); Stoker v. State, 788 S.W.2d 1, 12 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 951, 111 S.Ct. 371, 112 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990). The rule has never been otherwise, so far as we know. In Wagner v. State, 53 Tex. Crim. 306, 307, 109 S.W. 169, 169 (1908), we said, “It is well settled in this state that the erroneous admission of testimony is not cause for reversal, if the same fact is proven by other testimony not objected to. See .... West v. State, 2 Tex.App. 460 [1877].”
The cases and treatises are not clear whether this result is based on a concept of waiver, or on the theory that any error in the ruling is rendered harmless. See Jones v. State, 843 S.W.2d 487, 493 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (observing that Court has held that defendant’s testimony waives error and that defendant’s testimony makes error harmless). Compare, e.g., Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d 415, 430 (Tex.Cr.App.1992),6 cert. denied, 507 U.S. 975, 113 S.Ct. 1422, 122 L.Ed.2d 791 (1993), with, e.g., Anderson v. State, 717 S.W.2d 622, 628 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).7 See generally 21 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure § 5039 (1977).8 It seems doubtful that a waiver of an objection was intended in all cases in which a defendant objects to some but not all of the State’s evidence of a fact— at least in the sense that “waiver” is often used in criminal litigation. “A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). But when a defendant offers the other evidence, we have recognized exceptions to the rule which are appropriate to a rule of waiver. Two of these exceptions apply in this case.9
One exception is that the defendant’s testimony, which constituted other evidence of the fact that was proved over the defendant’s objection, was impelled by the State’s introduction of evidence that was ob[719]*719tained in violation of the law. See Sweeten v. State, 693 S.W.2d 454 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Thomas v. State, 572 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.Cr. App.1978). The reason for this exception is that if the defendant’s decision to testify was made in order to overcome the impact of such evidence, the testimony is tainted by the same illegality as was the prosecution’s evidence. Sweeten v. State, 693 S.W.2d at 457 (quoting Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 223, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968)); Thomas v. State, 572 S.W.2d at 516 (same). This exception, we believe, would extend to all evidence subject to exclusion under Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23.10 To remove itself from this exception, the State has the burden to show that its illegal action did not impel the defendant’s testimony. Sweeten v. State, 693 S.W.2d at 458-59; Sherlock v. State, 632 S.W.2d 604, 606-07 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). In determining whether the State met its burden the following factors are relevant:
(1) evidence that defendant’s counsel would not have called [the] client to the stand but for the overruling of [the defense] objection to illegally obtained evidence;
(2) even if [defendant’s counsel] would have called the defendant to the stand, evidence that [the] client would have testified in the same manner but for the introduction of that evidence;
(3) whether the State introduced other evidence of guilt, and the strength of that evidence; and,
(4) whether there is other evidence, aside from the evidence objected to, that would have induced the defendant to testify in the same manner.
Sherlock v. State, 632 S.W.2d at 607.
The other exception which is applicable to this case is that the harmful effect of improperly admitted evidence is not cured by the fact that the defendant sought to meet, destroy, or explain it by introducing rebutting evidence. Thomas v. State, 572 S.W.2d at 512. This exception appeared in our law over a century ago. See id. at 513.
The Court of Appeals’ holding that, when the appellant took the stand to prove that the evidence against him was illegally seized, he waived his objection that the evidence was illegally seized, contravenes these exceptions. It creates for defendants a cruel trilemma of waiver, perjury, or loss of rebuttal evidence.
One of these exceptions is based on a public policy first declared in 1925 when article 38.23 was enacted11 — a policy that illegally obtained evidence should not be received in criminal trials, and that the jury which decides guilt also should decide the issues of fact about the legality of the State’s evidence. Four other legislatures, and four other governors, have reenacted the statute.12 It has been slightly amended, but the basic policy has never changed. A judicially created doctrine of waiver should not negate that public policy.
We also believe that, as a matter of logic, neither exception should be subjected to a doctrine that a party waives an error in the admission of evidence by rising to rebut the evidence.
[720]*720We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in deeming the appellant’s point of error waived by his testimony at the guilt stage under an extension of the “DeGarmo doctrine.”
IV.
The Court of Appeals also held that, under the “DeGarmo doctrine,” the appellant’s point of error was waived by his testimony at the punishment stage of the trial in which he admitted his guilt.
A
The “DeGarmo doctrine” arose only after the enactment of Code of Criminal Procedure article 37.07, effective on January 1, 1966.13 This article was the first authority for criminal trials to be held in two parts, the first concerned only with the guilt of the defendant, and the second only with the punishment. Of this “bifurcated” trial procedure, we said in Brumfield v. State, 445 S.W.2d 732, 738 (Tex.Cr.App.1969):
Such procedure was obviously designed to take the blindfolds off the judge or jury when it came to assessing punishment. It authorized the introduction of evidence on punishment not heretofore held to be generally admissible. It did, however, limit such introduction to the penalty stage to prevent the accused from being tried as a criminal generally prior to the determination of the issue of guilt. It thus allowed evidence critical to an enlightened determination of punishment but avoided the possibility of prejudice on the issue of guilt.
Further, it had long been recognized that jury verdicts of the unitary system were often the product of compromise, i.e., a finding of guilty in exchanging for moderate punishment, or a finding of not guilty because of the severity of the punishment. Some commentators also believed that a constitutional due process question was involved in the practice of reading the allegations of the indictments as to prior convictions and permitting proof of the same before the determination of guilt or innocence. [Footnote omitted.]
The DeGarmo doctrine applies to the defendant’s testimony of guilt at the punishment phase of the trial. Such testimony is given after the jury has heard all the evidence relevant to the issue of guilt and has returned a verdict of guilt. Because the defendant’s testimony comes after the verdict of guilt, the DeGarmo doctrine is conceptually different from the doctrine of harmless error (from 1973 until today mistakenly called “curative admissibility”) or “waiver” which has been discussed above at III.
In all the “unitary” trials which were held before 1966, a defendant’s testimony of guilt would have been received while the issue of guilt was before the jury. Under the traditional doctrine of harmless error (or “waiver”), such testimony might very well “cure” the harm of evidence erroneously received from other witnesses.
But testimony of guilt given at the punishment phase of the trial cannot be said to have rendered harmless the introduction of similar testimony at the guilt stage of trial— at least not in the sense we have thought of harmless error in the admission of similar evidence at the guilt phase. Any harmftd effects of the introduction of inadmissible testimony were on the jury’s decision of guilt. They cannot be ameliorated by the defendant’s testimony which follows that decision.
Our statement in McGlothlin v. State, 896 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex.Cr.App.1995), that the DeGarmo doctrine is “a doctrine of waiver akin to the doctrine of curative admissibility” must not be misunderstood. The kinship between these doctrines is distant. As we have said (Part III, above) the doctrine that was misnamed “curative admissibility” is not a doctrine of true waiver. And the DeGarmo doctrine is more like estoppel than waiver, as shall appear below.
B.
Appeals from bifurcated trials in which the appellant complained of the erroneous admission of evidence at the guilt stage, which was not cured by any similar evidence at the guilt stage, but which was followed by the defen[721]*721dant’s admission of guilt at the punishment stage, brought a new question to this Court. Our first consideration of the question was in Richardson v. State, 458 S.W.2d 665 (Tex.Cr.App.1970), an appeal from a conviction for rape. Richardson appealed a ruling that allowed the victim to identify him in court after an allegedly suggestive lineup. We noted that Richardson had not testified at the guilt stage, but had voluntarily testified on direct examination at the punishment phase that he was guilty. We said that, “by [his] employing such trial strategy, we can only logically say that on appeal such an appellant cannot question the sufficiency of the evidence or question the in-court identification of the prosecutrix.” Id. at 666. We did allow Richardson to raise a complaint about the admission of hearsay evidence. Ibid.
In Richardson we did not explain why an appellant who admitted his guilt at the punishment phase could not question the sufficiency of the evidence. The explanation came in the next case to take up the question, Boothe v. State, 474 S.W.2d 219 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). Although we considered the merits of the appellant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient, we also said:
It would be an exercise in futility to reverse such a case for insufficient evidence where the testimony of the appellant could be used against him on a retrial.
In Richardson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 458 S.W.2d 665 we noted that where the appellant did not testify at the hearing on guilt but did so voluntarily at the hearing on punishment admitting his mistake he cannot on appeal question the sufficiency of the evidence.
Id. at 221. The Boothe Court also considered, and overruled, the appellant’s complaints about the admission of evidence and the court’s charge at the guilt stage.
These earliest cases held that an appellant who had admitted his guilt at the punishment stage could not appeal the sufficiency of evidence, but the Court allowed appeal of other errors that were committed at the guilt stage. Accord, Dugger v. State, 543 S.W.2d 374 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Garcia v. State, 522 S.W.2d 203 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Jones v. State, 518 S.W.2d 245 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). The stated reason for refusing to reverse a conviction of such an appellant for insufficient evidence was that on the retrial the State would certainly obtain conviction by using the appellant’s testimony from the first trial. If that reason ever had validity, it disappeared after the Supreme Court’s holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment would be violated by a retrial after an appellate court held that the evidence of guilt was legally insufficient. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978). Insofar as these early precedents which underly our “DeGarmo doctrine” held that appellate complaints about insufficient evidence of guilt would be futile when the appellant admitted his guilt at the punishment phase, they cannot be relied on.
C.
A second line of eases soon arose, which held that an appellant who admitted guilt at the punishment phase could not question the lawfulness of a search for, and seizure of, evidence. The first case in the line was Palmer v. State, 475 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). After setting out the holdings of Richardson, supra, and Boothe, supra, the Court simply said, “The appellant having voluntarily taken the stand at the penalty stage and admitted having heroin in his possession cannot question the lawfulness of the search in which the heroin was seized.” Palmer v. State, 475 S.W.2d at 798. The statement was only an alternative holding, for the Court went on to hold that the evidence was lawfully seized. Id. at 798-99. The Court also entertained other complaints about the admission of evidence at the guilt stage. See id. at 799-80. The Court did not explain how Richardson and Boothe supported its statement or why the appellant could not complain of the admission of the heroin but could complain of the admission of other evidence.
In Sheridan v. State, 485 S.W.2d 920, 921 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), the Court said:
The appellant, having voluntarily taken the stand at the penalty stage and on direct examination admitted having marihuana in his possession, cannot question the lawful[722]*722ness of the search wherein the marihuana was seized. Palmer v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 475 S.W.2d 797. See also Boothe v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 474 S.W.2d 219; Richardson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 458 S.W.2d 665. In Bradley v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 478 S.W.2d 527, it was said, “This Court has held many times that the legality of the search need not be considered when the defendant testifies to or otherwise produces evidence of the same facts or if such facts are in the record without objection.” See Jones v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 484 S.W.2d 745 (1972).
Here the Court did three things, two of which were not new. It cited Palmer, which contained no reasoning, as we have seen. And, like the Palmer Court, it cited opinions (Boothe, Richardson, and Jones) which held that sufficiency of evidence could not be challenged, but other errors could. But it added a third leg of support: the citation to Bradley, which is an application of the ancient rule that error in admitting evidence at the guilt stage is cured by the defendant’s introduction of the same evidence at the guilt stage. As we have seen, this ancient rule provides no logical support for the “DeGar-mo doctrine.”
Subsequent cases held that the appellant who confessed at the punishment stage could not complain of illegally seized evidence, but they gave no reasons. See Hunnicutt v. State, 531 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Downey v. State, 505 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Sims v. State, 502 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); McKenzie v. State, 487 S.W.2d 65, 66 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). Especially remarkable is Downey v. State, supra, in which the Court held that the appellant was foreclosed from questioning the legality of the search, but not from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The opinion was written by the same judge who had written in the leading case, Richardson v. State, 458 S.W.2d 665 (Tex.Cr.App.1970), a nearly opposite holding: that such an appellant could not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, but could have his evidence point considered.
The holding that an admission of guilt at the punishment stage would prevent an appellant from questioning the legality of a seizure of evidence has been applied to prevent review of the admission of other kinds of evidence. See, e.g., Gordon v. State, 651 S.W.2d 793 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (impeachment evidence); Evans v. State, 480 S.W.2d 387 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) (oral statement to bystander) (alternative holding). These expansions have not been explained in the opinions.
We have already pointed out in many of these cases, while the defendant’s admission of guilt at the punishment stage was said to bar consideration of some complaints about errors at the guilt stage, other complaints about guilt-stage error were not barred from appellate review. Examples are plentiful. See, e.g., Reeves v. State, 566 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (Court considered points about charging instrument and discovery); Dugger v. State, 543 S.W.2d 374 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) (Court considered evidence points and other, unspecified errors); Garcia v. State, 522 S.W.2d 203 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (Court considered jury charge points, motion to exhume body, and charging instrument); Jones v. State, 518 S.W.2d 245 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (Court considered jury charge points); McKenzie v. State, 487 S.W.2d 65, 66 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) (Court considered reading of testimony to jury); Downey v. State, 505 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) (Court considered evidence points and jury charge); Evans v. State, 480 S.W.2d 387 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) (Court considered evidence points and alleged denial of cross-examination); Boothe v. State, 474 S.W.2d 219 (Tex.Cr.App.1971) (Court considered evidence and jury charge points).
It was, then, breathtaking to read in DeGarmo v. State, 691 S.W.2d 657, 660-61 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), that “appellant acknowledges that the present law in Texas is that if a defendant does not testify at the guilt stage of the trial, but does testify at the punishment stage of the trial, and admits his guilt to [sic ] the crime for which [sic ] he has been found guilty, he...not only waives a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, but he also waives any error that might have occurred during the guilt stage of the trial.” (Emphasis added.) Having made, without citation of authority, this sweeping state[723]*723ment, DeGarmo has a justifiable claim to its eponymous status in this area of law.14
The DeGarmo opinion is also noteworthy for its attempt to supply a reason to support the doctrine. The DeGarmo Court said that when a defendant admits guilt at the punishment stage, “he has, for legal purposes, entered the equivalent of a plea of guilty.” 691 S.W.2d at 661. The implication seems to be that the admission of guilt waives guilt-stage errors, just as a voluntaiy and knowing plea of guilty is said to waive all previous non-jurisdictional errors. See Helms v. State, 484 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). The analogy fails because a defendant’s admission of guilt at the punishment stage is not a knowing and voluntary waiver like a plea of guilty.
To begin with, there is an statutory procedure to insure that a plea of guilty in a felony case involves a knowing waiver of appeal. A defendant who pleads guilty to a felony loses the right to appeal many points if the punishment does not exceed the recommended sentence to which the defendant has agreed. See Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(b)(3).15 The court must advise a defendant that such a guilty plea will have that result.16 There is no procedure to require a court to advise a defendant who takes the stand at the punishment phase that an admission of guilt will waive appellate consideration of errors at the guilt phase. Of course defense counsel may advise a defendant of this hazard, although it is difficult to believe that the appellants in all these cases knew in advance that their testimony would result in waivers on appeal.
Even if this knowledge is imparted to the defendant, there is a more important reason why the analogy to the guilty plea fails: The decision whether to testify is not voluntary. It must be remembered that the DeGarmo doctrine has consequences only if the trial court committed reversible error at the guilt stage. (If there was no reversible error, the DeGarmo waiver is inconsequential.) Therefore every appellant who is subjected to a meaningful consequence of the DeGarmo doctrine is a defendant whose verdict of guilty was infected with reversible error. Without such a tainted verdict of guilt, there would be no punishment stage, and there would be no occasion for the defendant to face the decision whether to testify. This taint alone spoils the analogy to a voluntary guilty plea.
The decision whether to testify is made even less voluntary by the cruel trilemma in which the defendant is placed. If the defendant testifies truthfully and admits guilt, DeGarmo waiver results. If the defendant testifies untruthfully and denies guilt, the consequences are exposure to punishment for aggravated perjury and, of more immediate consequence, an increased punishment on account of the perjury. Cf. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993) (sentencing [724]*724guideline which requires increased sentence for defendant’s perjury in denying guilt at trial does not violate constitutional right to testify in own behalf). And if the defendant does not testify, the opportunity is lost for the defendant to give the senteneer information that only the defendant can provide. This would exclude in every ease some information that is relevant to two important objectives of the system of criminal punishment: a penalty that will prevent this offender from committing other crimes, and a recognition of the possibility of rehabilitating the individual defendant.17 And it will in many cases exclude information that is necessary for a defendant to carry burdens of proof. The defendant has the burden to prove eligibility for probation if the case is tried to a jury. See Walker v. State, 108 Tex.Crim. 190, 299 S.W. 417 (1927) (when defendant did not testify, evidence was insufficient to prove he had never been convicted of felony); Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.12, § 4(d)(3) & (e) (defendant must file sworn motion and jury must find that defendant has not been previously convicted of felony). The defendant also has the burden to prove certain mitigating issues.18
The analogy to the guilty plea does not justify the DeGarmo doctrine.
D.
We made our most recent attempt to provide a reasoned justification for the DeGarmo doctrine in McGlothlin v. State, 896 S.W.2d 183, 187 (1995):
The DeGarmo doctrine has been described as a “common-sense rule of procedure,” Bodde v. State, 568 S.W.2d 344, 348 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), because “the function of trial is to sift out the truth from a mass of contradictory evidence_” In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227, 66 S.Ct. 78, 80, 90 L.Ed. 30 (1945). Stated another way, “The basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth.” Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 86 S.Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453 (1966). See also, Duggan v. State, 778 S.W.2d 465 (Tex.Cr.App.1989); Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 127, 111 S.Ct. 1723, 1733, 114 L.Ed.2d 173 (1991); Brown v. Wainwright, 537 F.2d 154 (5th Cir.1976). When the defendant testifies and judicially confesses to the charged offense, the purpose of the trial process has been served — the truth has been determined and the purpose of the guilt/innocence phase of the trial has been satisfied. No reversible error should occur where the defendant has satisfied the necessity of the trial process. [Footnote 6:] Without explanation, the dissent contends the DeGarmo doctrine threatens the fairness and efficacy of our adversary process. Post, at 190. However, we fail to see how a conviction of an admittedly guilty person is an unfair result. Nor do understand how the efficacy of process is threatened when an individual is precluded from challenging a result that he admitted was correct.
This statement brings into view the other side of the DeGarmo coin. Just as the De-Garmo doctrine is consequential only when the guilty verdict is infected with reversible error, so too is it consequential only when an admittedly guilty person has been convicted. Recalling that a purpose of trial is to reach a true verdict is undoubtedly necessary to the resolution of the issue before us. But it can only begin our consideration. It cannot end it, because the ascertainment of truth is not the only objective of our law of criminal procedure. We as a people have deliberately chosen to adopt laws which interfere with the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial. [725]*725“Due process and those individual rights that are fundamental to our quality of life co-exist with, and at times override, the truth-finding function.” Morrison v. State, 845 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Tex.Cr.App.1992).
• Through the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Americans require that the judgment in a criminal trial be supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Win-ship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). We do so knowing that some people who seem to be guilty will be acquitted.
• Through the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Americans say that a person may not be subjected to a second trial after an acquittal even when there is clear evidence of guilt. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977).
• Through the Self-incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment our people have required that a defendant may not be required to give incriminating testimony against himself, and that there be no comment on a defendant’s failure to testify. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965).
• Through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Americans have decided that truthful confessions obtained as a result of coercion or improper inducement may not be introduced in criminal trials. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961).
• Through the Fourth Amendment our nation has forbidden the government to acquire evidence through unreasonable search or seizure, or by general warrants, and it has decided that evidence so obtained be excluded from criminal trials. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). The people of Texas have repeatedly decided that illegally obtained evidence be excluded from criminal trials.19
• Through a delegation of legislative authority to this Court, the people of our state have decided that privileged evidence should be excluded from criminal trials. See Rules of Evidence, article V.
• Texans also have decided through their legislatures that statements made as a result of custodial interrogation not be admitted in criminal trials if they do not meet certain formal requirements. See Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22. They have decided that criminal defendants may not be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an adult victim of a sexual offense who did not make outcry within a year, or the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. See id., articles 38.07, 38.14.
• By exercising the judicial authority given this Court in the Texas Constitution, we have held that jurors should not be allowed to propound questions to witnesses because such a procedure would endanger the adversary system. Morrison v. State, 845 S.W.2d 882 (Tex.Cr.App.1992).
Each of these decisions was made to preserve a value that was seen to be more important than the discovery of the truth in a trial. This list of examples may not be complete, and it cannot be final. The agonia, the constant struggle in American criminal procedure, is between truth-finding and other values.
Insofar as the DeGarmo doctrine estops a defendant from raising on appeal a violation of any of these guaranties, it cannot be justified on the ground that the verdict of guilt was correct.
E.
The appellant in this case seeks appellate review of the trial court’s decision to admit evidence that he says was illegally seized. None of the reasons for the DeGarmo doctrine that we have examined can justify an appellate court’s estopping him or holding that he has waived review or that such an error at the guilt stage would always be harmless. We hold that the DeGarmo doc[726]*726trine cannot be invoked to prevent such appellate review.
Y.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for consideration of the appellant’s points of error.
BAIRD, J., filed a concurring opinion.
MeCORMICK, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KELLER, J., joined.