Ray v. Cobb County Board of Education

138 S.E.2d 392, 110 Ga. App. 258, 1964 Ga. App. LEXIS 589

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: September 14, 1964
• Docket: 40671
• Status: Published

Opinions

Frankum, Judge.

1. By the terms of § 56-2437 of the Georgia Insurance Code, as enacted by the Act approved March 8, 1960 (Ga. L. 1960, pp. 289, 673), municipal corporations, counties and other political subdivisions of this State are authorized to secure and provide insurance to cover liability for damages on account of the negligence of any employee in the operation of any motor vehicle owned, maintained or operated by such political subdivision, and the governmental immunity of such political subdivision shall be waived to the extent of the amount of insurance so purchased. Nothing in this Act authorizes the bringing of a suit on account of the negligence of an employee of any such political subdivision against any one other than the political subdivision itself. Nothing in this Act purports to change the established law with respect to what are political subdivisions and bodies corporate subject to sue and be sued.

2. “Under the law of this State, a county board of education is not a natural person, a partnership, or a body corporate with authority to sue or be sued, in the ordinary sense.” Verner v. Board of Ed. of Haralson County, 203 Ga. 521 (2) (47 SE2d 500). This is true except in those cases where an Act of the legislature making a county board of education a body corporate with authority to sue and be sued has been passed. Norman v. Board of Ed. of Richmond County, 218 Ga. 48, 49 (1) (126 SE2d 217). Under the foregoing authorities and a long line of cases cited therein, the school district of each county is one of the “other political subdivisions” referred to in § 56-2437 of the Georgia Insurance Code, which may be sued in any case coming within the terms of that law. A school board is not such a “political subdivision.” Code Ann. § 32-1101 provides: “Pursuant to the amendment to the Constitution adopted in 1945, each county of this State, exclusive of any independent school system now in existence in a county, shall compose one school district and shall be confined to the control and management of a county board of education.” (Emphasis ours.) (Ga. L. 1946, pp. 206, 209). The language of this Code section requires the conclusion that a county board of education is not a political subdivision and not a body corporate liable to suit in the ordinary sense (except in cases made so by an Act of the legislature), and that the Board of Education of Cobb County through its members merely has the control and management of the Cobb County school district. See Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Keefe, 215 Ga. 830, 834 (1) (113 SE2d 774). See also Board of Ed. of Baker County v. Hall, 189 Ga. 615, 617 (2) (7 SE2d 183).

3. It follows that the judge of the superior court did not err in sustaining the general demurrer of the defendant named in the petition, “The Cobb County Board of Education, acting by and through its duly appointed members in their representative and official capacities,” where the sole basis upon which the petition sought to fix liability was the alleged negligence of a school bus driver in failing to use proper care in permitting the plaintiff to alight from the bus at an allegedly dangerous place, and in failing to take sufficient measures to protect the plaintiff from the negligence of the drivers of other motor vehicles using the road at the time and place in question.

Decided September 14, 1964. Howell C. Ravan, for plaintiff in error. Edwards, Bentley, Awtrey & Parker, Fred D. Bentley, Sr., A. Sidney Parker, contra.

Judgment affirmed.

Felton, C. J., concurs. Pannell, J., concurs specially.