In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00045-CV ___________________________
RAY DOUGLAS GRIFFITH, Appellant
V.
LINDSAY D. STEELE AND STEELE LAW FIRM PLLC, Appellees
On Appeal from the 348th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 348-370088-25
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr, J.; and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Ray Douglas Griffith sued his former bankruptcy attorney and her
firm, Appellees Lindsay D. Steele and Steele Law Firm PLLC (collectively Steele), for
legal malpractice and negligence when an involuntary dismissal of Griffith’s Chapter
13 bankruptcy case led to his losing his family ranch at a foreclosure sale in the gap
before his bankruptcy case was reinstated. Steele moved to dismiss Griffith’s claims
under Rule 91a—a motion the trial court granted. At issue in this appeal is whether
the trial court properly determined that limitations barred Griffith’s claims against
Steele. Because the trial court correctly ordered dismissal on that basis, we will affirm.
I. Background
A. The Alleged Legal Malpractice1
Over 20 years ago, Griffith bought around 200 acres in Cisco, Texas, that he
described as his “beloved family ranch” and that became his father’s “final resting
place.” Griffith financed the ranch’s purchase with a loan from Lone Star Bank.
In late 2018, Griffith began experiencing financial difficulties, and he engaged
Steele to file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case on November 4, 2019. Griffith filed for
bankruptcy primarily to protect his interest in his ranch. To that end, upon his filing,
1 The underlying facts are disputed, but because this appeal involves a Rule 91a motion, we take as true Griffith’s allegations about Steele’s malpractice. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a; City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. 2016).
2 the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic-stay provision successfully stopped a foreclosure
sale that Lone Star had scheduled for the next day. See 11 U.S.C. § 362.
But on December 4, 2019, the bankruptcy court dismissed Griffith’s Chapter
13 case after he missed a December 2 deadline to file certain documents with the
bankruptcy court. Griffith alleged that he had attempted to speak or meet with Steele
“to get her the information needed to continue with the bankruptcy,” and he further
alleged—“[u]pon information and belief”—that he had given her the needed
documents by the filing deadline. According to Griffith, despite his efforts, Steele
failed to meet the filing deadline or to seek a filing extension, resulting in the case’s
dismissal.
Regardless of who is to blame, the automatic stay ended upon the case’s
dismissal, and Lone Star resumed its foreclosure efforts. Steele moved on December
9 to reinstate the bankruptcy case, but she did not also request an expedited
reinstatement, so no bankruptcy stay existed to prevent Lone Star’s proceeding with a
foreclosure sale. Griffith’s ranch was sold at a January 7, 2020 foreclosure sale.2 Seven
days later, the bankruptcy court reinstated Griffith’s bankruptcy case, at which time
the automatic stay went back into effect.
Seeking to “undo the results of [Steele’s] negligence” and to recover what he
had lost during the “gap” in which the automatic stay was not in place, Griffith hired
The ranch sold for $102,000. It was valued at around $510,000, and Griffith 2
owed Lone Star around $94,000.
3 another attorney to initiate an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court against
Lone Star for breach of contract and wrongful foreclosure. The bankruptcy court
ruled in Lone Star’s favor. Griffith appealed first to the district court, which affirmed,
and he appealed next to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which also affirmed in a
January 30, 2023 decision. 3
Griffith’s pleadings do not indicate that Steele was involved in the adversary
proceeding, but he alleged that she represented him in his Chapter 13 case “in his
initial filing, through his bankruptcy’s reinstatement in mid-January 2020, and during
his bankruptcy plan, conveying information and maintaining [her] representation of
him.” When Griffith received the notice of his plan’s completion on November 13,
2024, Steele filed the motion for entry of a discharge order, which the bankruptcy
court signed on December 30, 2024.
B. The Legal-Malpractice Lawsuit
On September 11, 2025, Griffith sued Steele for legal malpractice and
negligence. In response, Steele filed a Rule 91a dismissal motion, arguing that the
two-year statute of limitations had expired before Griffith had filed suit. Specifically,
Steele argued that Griffith’s claims accrued on December 4, 2019, when the
bankruptcy court dismissed Griffith’s Chapter 13 case and the stay ended—the event
3 See Griffith v. Lone Star FLCA (In re Griffith), No. 19-44562-MXM-13, 2021 WL 2389671 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 10, 2021), aff’d sub nom. Griffith v. Lone Star FLCA, No. 4:21-cv-0825-P, 2022 WL 1289559 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2022), aff’d, No. 22-10527, 2023 WL 1095133 (5th Cir. Jan. 30, 2023) (per curiam).
4 that enabled Lone Star to sell the ranch at foreclosure during the gap created by
Steele’s not requesting the case’s expedited reinstatement. She alternatively argued that
Griffith’s claims accrued “at the latest” on January 7, 2020—the date of the
foreclosure sale.
Steele’s Rule 91a motion also preemptively addressed the potential applicability
of the tolling doctrine recognized in Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d
154 (Tex. 1991). Steele quoted from Hughes: “[W]hen an attorney commits malpractice
in the prosecution or defense of a claim that results in litigation, the statute of
limitations on the malpractice claim against the attorney is tolled until all appeals on
the underlying claim are exhausted.” Id. at 157. She argued that the adversary
proceeding in the bankruptcy case was the litigation resulting from the alleged
malpractice and that the Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling on
January 30, 2023. Steele thus argued that even if the Hughes tolling doctrine applied,
Griffith’s September 11, 2025 filing came too late.
Griffith amended his petition to plead the Hughes tolling doctrine and
responded to Steele’s Rule 91a motion. Among other things, he argued that the
reinstated bankruptcy case was the resulting litigation under Hughes, that Steele had
represented Griffith through the bankruptcy court’s December 30, 2024 discharge
order, and that he had filed the underlying malpractice suit within two years of that
date. Griffith replied and among other things (1) distinguished the adversary
proceeding from the overall bankruptcy case and (2) argued that Steele’s continued
5 representation of Griffith in the bankruptcy case after he had exhausted his appeals in
the adversary proceeding did not impact the limitations analysis.
After considering the parties’ filings, the trial court determined that Griffith’s
claims were “barred by the statute of limitations,” granted Steele’s Rule 91a motion,
and dismissed Griffith’s claims against Steele with prejudice. Griffith appealed.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Griffith raises a single issue: whether “Steele’s continuing
representation of Griffith, throughout the bankruptcy in which he contends
malpractice occurred, toll[ed] the statute of limitations on his legal[-]malpractice
claim.” He maintains that “[s]o long as [Steele was] representing [him] in the same
bankruptcy case from which his malpractice claim arose, the statute of limitations was
tolled as to such claim.” Thus, he argues that the trial court erred by granting Steele’s
Rule 91a motion. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review Governing Rule 91a Motions
A party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the grounds that it has no
basis in law or fact. Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1. A court may also grant a Rule 91a motion
on limitations grounds. See Quinn v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 02-22-00191-CV,
2023 WL 3749932, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 1, 2023, no pet.). Such
motions are permissible when the limitations affirmative defense is “conclusively
established by the facts in a plaintiff’s petition.” Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds,
Winslett & Moser, P.C., 595 S.W.3d 651, 656 (Tex. 2020).
6 Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 91a “if the allegations, taken as true,
together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to
the relief sought . . . [or if] no reasonable person could believe the facts pleaded.”
Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d at 724 (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a). We review a Rule 91a motion’s
merits de novo because the availability of a remedy under the facts alleged is a
question of law and because the rule’s factual-plausibility standard is akin to a
legal-sufficiency review. Id.
Rule 91a.6 does not allow a trial court to consider evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P.
91a.6; Galindo v. Peterson, No. 02-23-00268-CV, 2024 WL 1792377, at *2, *5, *6 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Apr. 25, 2024, pet. denied). The trial court’s factual inquiry is
limited to “the pleading of the cause of action” and any pleading exhibits permitted by
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Tex. R. Civ. P. 59, 91a.6; see Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at
656; Fiamma Statler, LP v. Challis, No. 02-18-00374-CV, 2020 WL 6334470, at *8 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Oct. 29, 2020, pet. denied). If a claimant’s factual allegations in his
pleadings, taken as true, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from those
allegations do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought, then the claim has no basis
in law. Fiamma Statler, 2020 WL 6334470, at *8. But the trial court’s legal inquiry is not
as limited. See Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 656. In its legal inquiry, a trial court may
additionally consider the substance of the dismissal motion and any arguments
presented at the hearing. See id. at 655.
7 B. Legal Malpractice and the Statute of Limitations
Negligence and legal-malpractice claims are governed by a two-year statute of
limitations. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(a); Zive v. Sandberg, 644 S.W.3d
169, 174 (Tex. 2022). Limitations begin to run when the claim accrues, see Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(a), and other than in cases governed by the discovery
rule, a claim accrues when the claimant sustains a legal injury, see Hughes, 821 S.W.2d at
156; see also Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d 118, 120 (Tex. 2001). A claim’s accrual
date is a legal question. Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann, 359 S.W.3d 620, 623 (Tex. 2011).
In addition to determining accrual, we also consider whether the limitations
period has been tolled. In Hughes and Apex, the supreme court announced an
equitable-tolling rule governing an attorney’s malpractice “in the prosecution or
defense of a claim that results in litigation”: “[T]he statute of limitations on the
malpractice claim against the attorney is tolled until all appeals on the underlying claim
are exhausted,” Hughes, 821 S.W.2d at 157, “or the litigation is otherwise finally
concluded,” Apex, 41 S.W.3d at 119.4 Adding to this general rule, in Zive, the court
enunciated that “Hughes tolling applies only to all appeals in which the malpractice
plaintiff participates.” Zive, 644 S.W.3d at 179. Accordingly, Hughes tolling ends on the
4 The court later extended the Hughes rule to toll limitations during the pendency of a third-party suit. See Gulf Coast Inv. Corp. v. Brown, 821 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Tex. 1991) (involving a client’s suit against its lawyers based on the lawyer’s actions in a foreclosure sale that had precipitated a wrongful-foreclosure suit against the client).
8 date on which the court where the underlying claim is pending rules on the
malpractice plaintiff’s last action regarding that claim. See id.
C. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Overview
Griffith’s legal-malpractice case concerns his bankruptcy attorney’s conduct
leading up to and during the gap between the dismissal and reinstatement of his
Chapter 13 bankruptcy case. “Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code affords individuals
receiving regular income an opportunity to obtain some relief from their debts while
retaining their property,” Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 498, 135 S. Ct. 1686,
1690 (2015), and a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan is “an exchanged for bargain between
the debtor and the debtor’s creditors,” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Oparaji (In re Oparaji),
698 F.3d 231, 238 (5th Cir. 2012). A debtor “must propose a plan to use future
income to repay a portion (or in the rare case all) of his debts over the next three to
five years.” Bullard, 575 U.S. at 498, 135 S. Ct. at 1690. In exchange, the debtor can
retain his property, and, “[i]f the bankruptcy court confirms the plan and the debtor
successfully carries it out, he receives a discharge of his debts[,]” id., giving the debtor
a “fresh start,” Harris v. Viegelahn, 575 U.S. 510, 513, 135 S. Ct. 1829, 1835 (2015).
We mention three other pertinent aspects of the process:
First, once a debtor files for bankruptcy, an automatic stay arises in the
debtor’s favor. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); Campbell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 545 F.3d
348, 353 (5th Cir. 2008). The stay prohibits “all entities” from making collection
efforts against the debtor or his bankruptcy estate’s property. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). In
9 essence, the automatic stay guarantees “‘breathing room’ for a debtor and the
bankruptcy court to institute an organized repayment plan,” Brown v. Chesnut (In re
Chesnut), 422 F.3d 298, 301 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Chase Manhattan Bank USA NA v.
Stembridge (In re Stembridge), 394 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2004)), and “[i]t allows for the
equitable disbursement of estate property among creditors,” id. (citing Reliant Energy
Servs., Inc. v. Enron Can. Corp., 349 F.3d 816, 825 (5th Cir. 2003)).
But if a Chapter 13 case is closed or dismissed, “the automatic stay terminates.”
In re Carlsson, No. 24-51952, 2024 WL 4806638, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Nov. 1,
2024) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)); Richard D. Davis, L.L.P. v. Knott,
No. 14-17-00257-CV, 2019 WL 438788, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
Feb. 5, 2019, pet. denied). A “pre-discharge dismissal . . . returns the parties to the
positions they were in before the case was initiated.” Oparaji, 698 F.3d at 238 (citation
modified). Thus, the “return to pre-bankruptcy rights enables creditors to resume
debt collection and other acts to protect their interests.” In re Orosco, No. 19-60038,
2020 WL 6054695, at *8 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2020).
Although the Bankruptcy Code and Rules do not expressly provide for the
reinstatement of a dismissed case, debtors can seek reinstatement as “a judicially
created fiction . . . to spare [them] the burden of filing a new case.” Id. at *5 (quoting
In re Murphy, 493 B.R. 576, 579 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2013)). One consequence of a
Chapter 13 case’s being dismissed and later reinstated is that if a secured creditor took
action against a debtor’s property in the gap before reinstatement, the automatic stay
10 will not be retroactively applied to undo the creditor’s actions. Id.; Frank v. Gulf States
Fin. Co. (In re Frank), 254 B.R. 368, 374 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2000). This “balance[s] the
rights of both the debtor and the creditors.” Orosco, 2020 WL 6054695, at *8 (quoting
Murphy, 493 B.R. at 580).
Second, bankruptcy disputes take two distinct forms: (1) contested matters
initiated by filing a motion in the main bankruptcy case; and (2) adversary proceedings
initiated by filing a complaint creating “a separate lawsuit treated similarly to a civil
suit outside of bankruptcy.” In re CTLI, LLC, 534 B.R. 895, 905 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2015) (citing Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746, 762–63 (5th Cir. 1995)).
Bankruptcy Rule 7001 lists the types of disputes that can be resolved in an adversary
proceeding, including a proceeding to recover money or property. Fed. R. Bankr. P.
7001(a).
Treated as “free[]standing lawsuit[s]” that are “totally separate from the
bankruptcy case,” In re Roberts, 570 B.R. 532, 537 n.12 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2017),
[a]dversary proceedings are not filed in bankruptcy cases. Adversary proceedings are filed separately from a bankruptcy case. An adversary proceeding can be filed long after a bankruptcy case has been filed and even after a bankruptcy case has been closed. An adversary proceeding is given its own adversary proceeding number[,]
Rodriguez v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Rodriguez), 396 B.R. 436, 454–55 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 2008). “Consistent with adversary proceedings being distinct from the
underlying bankruptcy [case], an order disposing of an adversary proceeding is
appealable as a final order, even though the bankruptcy case has not ended.” Cox v.
11 Richards, No. 3:16-CV-00668, 2017 WL 7693446, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 26, 2017)
(citing Smith v. Seaside Lanes (In re Moody), 825 F.2d 81, 85 (5th Cir. 1987)), aff’d, 761 F.
App’x 244 (5th Cir. 2019); Tiburon Land & Cattle, LP. v. Stephens, 675 B.R. 14, 16 (N.D.
Tex. 2025).
Because “adversary proceedings are discreet judicial units,” a litigant must
appeal the adversary proceeding’s final ruling and cannot wait to appeal it in the main
bankruptcy case. Kreit v. Quinn (In re Cleveland Imaging & Surgical Hosp., L.L.C.),
26 F.4th 285, 293 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Dorsey v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Dorsey),
870 F.3d 359, 362 (5th Cir. 2017)). Once final, bankruptcy-court orders generally
operate to preclude relitigating the decided issues. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323,
334, 86 S. Ct. 467, 475 (1966) (“The normal rules of res judicata and collateral
estoppel apply to the decisions of bankruptcy courts.”); Blum v. Restland of Dall., Inc.,
971 S.W.2d 546, 550–51 & nn.12–17 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, pet. denied)
(discussing the finality of bankruptcy-court orders and their potential preclusive
effect).
Third, and finally, Chapter 13 “[d]ebtors have an affirmative, ongoing duty to
disclose all assets, including contingent and unliquidated claims and potential causes
of action.” U.S. ex rel. Long v. GSD&M Idea City LLC, No. 3:11-CV-1154-O,
2014 WL 11320447, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 10, 2014), aff’d sub nom. U.S. ex rel. Long v.
GSDMIdea City, L.L.C., 798 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2015). When a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
case is filed, “the bankruptcy estate includes, among other property, ‘all legal or
12 equitable interests of the debtor in property.’” In re Hazlewood, 570 B.R. 557, 560–
61 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2017) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)). Chapter 13 estates also
include “all property . . . that the debtor acquires after the commencement of the case
but before the case is closed, dismissed[,] or converted . . . whichever occurs first.” Id.
at 561 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)).
Thus, a Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate includes any causes of action belonging
to the debtor before and after filing the bankruptcy case but before it is closed,
dismissed, or converted. 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1), 1306(a); La. World Exposition v. Fed.
Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 233, 245 (5th Cir. 1988) (concerning pre-petition claims); Hazlewood,
570 B.R. at 561 (discussing post-petition claims); see also In re Wilson, 555 B.R. 547,
550 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2016). And this would include the debtor’s legal-malpractice
claims—potentially even those involving the debtor’s bankruptcy counsel. See, e.g.,
Jackson v. Marlette (In re Jackson), 317 B.R. 573, 575 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004) (concluding
that debtor’s malpractice claim against his former bankruptcy counsel—whether it
arose pre-petition or post-petition—was property of the Chapter 13 bankruptcy
estate); cf. Johnson, Blakely, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns, P.A. v. Alvarez (In re Alvarez),
224 F.3d 1273, 1277, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that a legal-malpractice claim
arising from Chapter 7 bankruptcy counsel’s alleged pre-petition negligence accrued at
the moment of filing and was the estate’s property); Macon v. Meredith (In re Macon),
669 B.R. 626, 650–59 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2025) (analyzing post-petition
13 legal-malpractice claim and determining that it was not Chapter 13 estate property
because of the case’s closure).
D. Analysis
Both parties agree that Griffith’s legal-malpractice claim is governed by a
two-year statute of limitations. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(a); Zive,
644 S.W.3d at 174. In addition, they do not dispute when Griffith’s legal-malpractice
claim accrued. Steele argued in his Rule 91a motion that the claim arose either on
December 4, 2019—the date the bankruptcy case was first dismissed—or at the latest
on January 7, 2020—the date of the foreclosure sale, and Griffith offered no
counter-position. Because the accrual date is not disputed, we assume without
deciding that the trial court correctly applied the later January 7, 2020 accrual date. See
Shield v. Bio-Synthesis, Inc., No. 02-21-00160-CV, 2022 WL 2840111, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth July 21, 2022, no pet.).
Turning to the Hughes tolling doctrine’s application, we consider Griffith’s
contention that “Steele’s continuing representation of [him] throughout the
bankruptcy [case] in which he contends malpractice occurred[] toll[ed] the statute of
limitations on his legal-malpractice claim.” The flaw in Griffith’s position is that the
adversary proceeding he initiated to “undo the results of [Steele’s] negligence” was a
freestanding lawsuit, totally separate from the overall bankruptcy case. See Zale Corp.,
62 F.3d at 762–63; Roberts, 570 B.R. at 538; CTLI, 534 B.R. at 905; Rodriguez, 396 B.R.
at 454–55.
14 The bankruptcy court’s order in the adversary proceeding was a final,
appealable order that operated to preclude relitigating the issues decided concerning
the ranch foreclosure sale. See Cleveland Imaging & Surgical Hosp., 26 F.4th at 293;
Moody, 825 F.2d at 85; Tiburon Land & Cattle, 675 B.R. at 16. Applying the Hughes rule
“categorically” in a “clear and strict manner”—as we must—when the Fifth Circuit
issued its January 30, 2023 decision, Griffith had exhausted his appeals on the
underlying claim resulting from Steele’s alleged malpractice, and that litigation—the
adversary proceeding—was finally concluded. See Zive, 644 S.W.3d at 179; Apex,
41 S.W.3d at 119; Hughes, 821 S.W.2d at 157.
Griffith insists that the trial court should have looked beyond the adversary
proceeding and to the overall bankruptcy case, in which Steele continued to represent
him through his December 30, 2024 discharge. He argues that “[t]here is no precedent
for determining that a Chapter 13 debtor must sue his own attorney to keep the
statute of limitations from running on his malpractice claim.” But this is not entirely
accurate.
Neither party has found a case similar to this one in which a Texas court has
addressed a legal-malpractice claim after the conclusion of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
case in which a party initiated an adversary proceeding to undo his bankruptcy
counsel’s alleged negligence occurring in the Chapter 13 bankruptcy case. 5 Nor have
5 Griffith cites Guillot v. Smith for the proposition that we should look to the conclusion of his Chapter 13 bankruptcy case as the operative date under Hughes, but
15 we. But because Chapter 13 debtors have an affirmative, ongoing duty to disclose
estate assets—including both pre-petition and post-petition legal-malpractice claims—
Griffith was required to disclose any alleged legal-malpractice claim against Steele
arising out of the foreclosure sale during the pre-reinstatement gap period. 6 See
11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1), 1306(a); Alvarez, 224 F.3d at 1277, 1279–80; La. World
Exposition, 858 F.2d at 245; Hazlewood, 570 B.R. at 561; Wilson, 555 B.R. at 550; Jackson,
317 B.R. at 575.
Griffith also predicates his argument on whether Hughes’s policy aims would be
served by applying its tolling rule to the bankruptcy case’s final conclusion instead of
the adversary proceeding’s final conclusion.7 But the supreme court has rejected such
the debtor in Guillot—a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case—did not initiate an adversary proceeding to litigate the issue that the debtor’s lawyer had allegedly caused through post-petition conduct. 998 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). In addition to this critical procedural difference, we also note that Chapter 13 estates are broader than Chapter 7 estates and include post-petition property. In re Easley-Brooks, 487 B.R. 400, 408 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). So the theoretical conflicts concerns that the court outlined in Guillot are dissimilar to what confronted Griffith, who was required in his Chapter 13 case to disclose his potential claim against his bankruptcy counsel in that case. 998 S.W.2d at 633. 6 We do not know whether Griffith disclosed such a claim. 7 He argues that
[i]f Griffith had initiated a lawsuit against his bankruptcy counsel while the Chapter 13 was still pending, with Steele representing him, she would almost certainly have withdrawn, because the continuing representation presented her with a conflict between (1) acting in Griffith’s interest and ensuring he completed his plan, and (2) acting in her own interests, where her exposure for malpractice could be mitigated by Griffith’s
16 an approach, advising that “without re-examining whether the policy reasons behind
the tolling rule apply in each legal-malpractice case matching the Hughes paradigm,
courts should simply apply the Hughes tolling rule to the category of legal-malpractice
cases encompassed within its definition.” Apex, 41 S.W.3d at 122. So too, we similarly
reject Griffith’s suggestion that we decide whether use of the Hughes rule is justified
for policy reasons. See J.M.K. 6, Inc. v. Gregg & Gregg, P.C., 192 S.W.3d 189, 198 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
Here, once the adversary proceeding reached its final conclusion, resulting in
the loss of the ranch, Griffith had exhausted his appeals and had no further legal
options against Lone Star in the adversary proceeding or in the overall bankruptcy
case. See Zive, 644 S.W.3d at 175. As Steele points out, Griffith “offers no explanation
of how any ruling in the Chapter 13 bankruptcy [case] could have altered the outcome
of the adversary proceeding or the resulting damages.” Thus, if Griffith believed that
Steele’s negligence caused him to lose the ranch—in addition to his affirmative,
ongoing obligation to disclose that potential claim against Steele in his bankruptcy
case—when the adversary proceeding concluded, he was on the clock to file a
legal-malpractice case against Steele.
Because Griffith delayed filing suit until more than two years from the
adversary proceeding’s final conclusion, he sued too late. We thus conclude that the
default on his plan, and dismissal of his case without discharge of his debts.
17 trial court correctly determined that his claims were barred by limitations and properly
granted Steele’s Rule 91a motion. We overrule Griffith’s sole issue.
III. Conclusion
Having overruled Griffith’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s order granting
Steele’s Rule 91a motion and dismissing Griffith’s claims against Steele with prejudice.
/s/ Elizabeth Kerr Elizabeth Kerr Justice
Delivered: June 18, 2026