UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
NE’KOLE RAWLINGS, et al.,
Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 24- 2122 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
N.W. is a student diagnosed with oppositional defiant disorder. In November 2023, N.W.
and N.W.’s mother brought an administrative action alleging that the District of Columbia Public
Schools (DCPS) failed to provide N.W. with a free and appropriate public education in violation
of the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA). The Plaintiffs prevailed and then brought this
lawsuit to recover $121,277.19 in attorneys’ fees and costs. For the reasons that follow, the Court
grants the Plaintiffs $71,545.10 in attorneys’ fees and costs.
BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ne’Kole Rawlings is the mother of N.W., a twelve-year-old diagnosed with oppositional
defiant disorder. See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 2 at 4, Hearing Officer’s Determination (HOD), ECF No. 7-1.
On November 6, 2023, Ms. Rawlings filed an administrative complaint alleging that DCPS had
deprived N.W. of a free and appropriate public education in four ways: (1) failing to provide
Ms. Rawlings with access to N.W.’s educational records in June 2023 and August 2023, (2) failing
to provide the behavioral support services guaranteed under N.W.’s 2021–2022 and 2022–2023
Individualized Education Plans (IEPs), (3) failing to reevaluate N.W. during the 2021–2022 school year, and (4) failing to provide N.W. with an appropriate IEP on or about December 2, 2021, and/or
on or about November 9, 2022. See id. at 3.
On January 2, 2024, DCPS made a settlement offer to the Plaintiffs, which included 600
hours of independent tutoring services, 50 hours of counseling services by a licensed social worker,
a comprehensive psychological evaluation not to exceed $2,500, and up to $6,000 in attorneys’
fees. See Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 1, ECF No. 9-1; Ex. 2., ECF No. 9-2. The record does not tell us
whether the Plaintiffs formally rejected DCPS’s offer or simply did not respond.
After a trial, see HOD at 2, a hearing officer made a final determination in the Plaintiffs’
favor, see HOD at 2, 29–31. The hearing officer found that DCPS did not deny N.W. a free and
appropriate education by failing to provide access to educational records, but nevertheless ordered
DCPS to provide Ms. Rawlings with all of N.W.’s missing records. See id. at 13–16. And he found
that DCPS failed to provide N.W. with a free and appropriate education because N.W. missed 25%
of N.W.’s behavioral support services required under the relevant IEPs, see id. at 16–18, the school
failed to conduct a required reevaluation of N.W. during the 2021–2022 school year, see id. at
18–22, and DCPS failed to provide N.W. with appropriate IEPs on December 2, 2021, and
November 9, 2022, respectively, see id. at 22–26. To remedy these violations, the hearing officer
ordered DCPS to pay for 576 hours of academic tutoring by a special education teacher with
transportation to and from the tutoring, and for 40 hours of counseling by a licensed psychologist
or social worker with at least five years of experience. Id. at 29. He also ordered DCPS to provide
Ms. Rawlings with the requested educational records. Id. at 29.
The Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit to recover $121,277.19 in attorneys’ fees and costs. See
Pls.’ Mot. at 5, ECF No. 7. The District of Columbia agrees that the Plaintiffs are entitled to
2 attorneys’ fees and costs, but it urges the Court to limit those fees and costs to $29,568.98. See
Def.’s Opp’n at 20, ECF No. 9. The Plaintiffs’ motion is now fully briefed.
LEGAL STANDARD
The IDEA was enacted “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them
a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed
to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent
living[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). Courts may “award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the
costs to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability” in IDEA litigation.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). An IDEA plaintiff may “recover for work when there is ‘a clear
showing that the time was expended in pursuit of a successful resolution of the case in which fees
are being claimed.’” J.T. v. District of Columbia, No. 19-cv-989, 2023 WL 355940, at *18–19
(D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2023) (quoting Baylor v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Assocs., P.C., 735 F. App’x 733,
736 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (per curiam)). Courts must determine (1) whether the party seeking the fees
is a “prevailing party” entitled to fees, and (2) what fees are “reasonable” in terms of the hours
expended and the hourly rate claimed. See Robinson v. District of Columbia, 61 F. Supp. 3d 54,
58 (D.D.C. 2014).
To assess reasonableness, courts conduct a three-part analysis to (1) determine the
“numbers of hours reasonably expended in litigation,” (2) set a “reasonable hour rate,” and
(3) assess whether “a multiplier is warranted.” Eley v. District of Columbia, 793 F.3d 97, 100 (D.C.
Cir. 2015). The IDEA plaintiff bears the burden of proving both the reasonableness of the hours
expended and the requested hourly rate. See Dobbins v. District of Columbia, No. 16-cv-1789,
2017 WL 4417591, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2017); Wood v. District of Columbia, 72 F. Supp. 3d
13, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2014).
3 DISCUSSION
The District does not dispute that the Plaintiffs prevailed and are entitled to an award of
attorneys’ fees and costs for the underlying administrative proceedings. Def.’s Opp’n at 1. It argues
only that the Plaintiffs “are not entitled to the full amount they seek,” id., and asks the Court to
exclude certain categories of fees and costs from the award, id. at 20. The Court agrees that the
Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover $121,277.19. But it is not convinced by all of the District’s
arguments. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs may recover attorneys’ fees incurred after the District
made its settlement offer, though it excludes and reduces certain time entries during that time
period as unreasonable. The Court awards the Plaintiffs $71,545.10 in attorneys’ fees and costs.
A. Eligibility for Post-Offer Costs
As a threshold matter, the District argues that the Plaintiffs may not recover attorneys’ fees
and costs incurred after the settlement offer on January 2, 2024, because the relief ordered by the
hearing officer was not more favorable than the settlement offer. See Def.’s Opp’n at 3–7. The
Court disagrees. The Plaintiffs were justified in rejecting DCPS’s settlement offer, so they may
recover post-offer attorneys’ fees and costs.
Although a prevailing parent in IDEA litigation is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees,
see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I), courts may not award attorneys’ fees for services performed
after a written settlement offer if: (1) the offer is made more than 10 days before the administrative
proceeding begins, (2) the offer is not accepted within 10 days, (3) and the court finds that the
relief obtained through the administrative proceedings is not more favorable than the settlement
offer, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i). But attorneys’ fees and costs may be awarded to a prevailing
parent who was “substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer.” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(E).
DCPS made a settlement offer on January 2, 2024, more than ten days before the start of
the administrative proceeding. See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 3 at 17, ECF No. 7-1 (billing records referencing
4 DCPS’s settlement offer on January 2, 2024); id. Ex. 2 at 2, ECF No. 7-1 (“The matter proceeded
to trial on January 19, 2024[.]”). And while the record does not reveal whether the Plaintiffs
rejected the offer or failed to respond to it in a timely manner, it is clear that they did not accept it.
See B.L. Through Lax v. District of Columbia, 517 F. Supp. 2d 57, 61 n.8 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding
that the distinction between rejecting a settlement offer and failing to respond “is immaterial to the
statute”).
Turning then to a comparison between the relief obtained in the administrative proceedings
and DCPS’s settlement offer, the relief obtained was not more favorable than DCPS’s offer. In its
settlement offer, DCPS agreed to fund 600 hours of independent tutoring, 50 hours of counseling
services by a licensed social worker, and an independent comprehensive psychological evaluation
costing no more than $2,500. See Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 1 at 1–2. The hearing officer ultimately
awarded the Plaintiffs 576 hours of tutoring by a certified special education teacher with
transportation to and from tutoring, 40 hours of counseling by a licensed psychologist or social
worker with at least five years of experience, and all requested educational records. See Pls.’ Mot.,
Ex. 2 at 29.
The Plaintiffs argue that the relief granted was more favorable because the hearing officer
ordered transportation to and from the independent tutoring sessions and required that a licensed
psychologist or social worker with at least five years of experience provide the counseling services.
See Pls.’ Reply at 3, ECF No. 10. But nothing in the record suggests that the Plaintiffs affirmatively
requested either transportation or an experienced psychologist or social worker. Thus, those
differences do not render the hearing officer’s determination more favorable to the Plaintiffs. See,
e.g., Daniel v. District of Columbia, 174 F. Supp. 3d 532, 544 (2014) (finding a plaintiffs’ request
for independent evaluations throughout administrative proceedings “genuine” and “not a post hoc
5 rationalization . . . to avoid section 1415(i)(3)(D)(i)”); T.B. ex rel. Brenneise v. San Diego Unified
School Dist., 806 F.3d 451, 480 (9th Cir. 2015) (reversing a denial of fees by the district court
where the administrative record showed the parents “were genuinely interested in a district[-
school] placement” awarded by the hearing officer but not included in the settlement offer); Staton
v. District of Columbia, No. 13-cv-773, 2014 WL 2700894, at *6–7 (D.D.C. June 11, 2014)
(finding that relief including independent evaluations was more favorable because the plaintiffs
expressed a clear preference for that form of relief throughout the administrative proceedings).
Without the transportation and limitation on the experience of the psychologist or social
worker, the hearing officer’s determination was substantially similar to DCPS’s settlement offer.
In fact, DCPS offered 24 more hours of tutoring and 10 more hours of counseling. And it offered
to provide N.W. with an independent psychological evaluation costing $2,500 or less. Def.’s
Opp’n, Ex. 1 at 1–2. Where a settlement offer and a hearing officer determination provide
“substantially the same” relief, it cannot be said that the relief obtained is more favorable under
the statute. See, e.g., Davis v. District of Columbia, 71 F. Supp. 3d 141, 148–49 (D.D.C. 2014);
Dicks v. District of Columbia, 109 F. Supp. 3d 126, 131 (D.D.C. 2015).
The Plaintiffs may nonetheless obtain post-offer attorneys’ fees if they were substantially
justified in rejecting DCPS’s settlement offer. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(E). The fee shifting
provision in IDEA “ensure[s] that qualified counsel is available to enforce parents’ rights.” Dicks,
109 F. Supp. 3d at 131. For this reason, the failure to include reasonable attorneys’ fees in an IDEA
settlement offer justifies a plaintiff’s rejection of that offer. Brighthaupt v. District of Columbia,
36 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8–9 (D.D.C. 2014); see, e.g., Davis, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 150–151 (finding that
parents were substantially justified in rejecting a settlement offer because it did not include any
attorney’s fees); Dicks, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 131 (finding that plaintiffs were substantially justified
6 in rejecting a settlement offer that included only $400 in attorneys’ fees where counsel had
expended 33.5 hours on the case as of the date of the offer).
Here, the District concedes that the Plaintiffs are entitled to $29,568.98 in attorneys’ fees
and costs for work performed before DCPS’s settlement offer. See Def.’s Opp’n at 20. But the
settlement offer included only $6,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs, which is one-fifth of that
amount. Id., Ex. 1 at 4. The Court finds that DCPS’s $6,000 offer was low enough to justify the
Plaintiffs’ rejection of the offer. See, e.g., Queen–Brown v. District of Columbia, No. 14-cv-2001,
Report & Recommendation, Docket No. 20 (D.D.C. July 2, 2015), at 13 (finding a settlement offer
of $1,200 in attorney’s fees when the parents had incurred $10,741.13 in costs to be “so obviously
insincere as to be destined for rejection”), report and recommendation adopted in full, No. 14-cv-
2001, Order, Docket No. 21 (D.D.C. July 20, 2015); S. H. v. Mount Diablo Unified School District,
No. 16-cv-4308, 2018 WL 510167, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2018) (citing Brighthaupt to find a
settlement offer of $10,000 in attorney’s fees was “unreasonable” because it offered less than 50%
of what the plaintiff’s counsel would likely obtain if the plaintiff prevailed); Brighthaupt, 36 F.
Supp. 3d at 9 (“An unreasonable offer does not advance [the] goals [of the IDEA] and it would be
a pernicious and self-defeating interpretation of the IDEA to say that any offer of fees, no matter
how unreasonable, must be accepted at the risk of losing all compensation from the date the
settlement offer was made until the date the case is concluded.”). The Plaintiffs may therefore
recover for post-offer attorneys’ fees and costs.
B. Reasonable Fees
The District next challenges the reasonableness of the Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees
and costs. An attorneys’ fee award is determined by the “number of hours reasonably expended on
the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433
7 (1983). Attorneys’ fees are permitted when the hours billed are consistent with “the number of
hours reasonably expended in litigation” and are charged at a “reasonable hourly rate.” Reed v.
District of Columbia, 843 F.3d 517, 520 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Eley, 793 F.3d at 100). While
the “fee applicant bears the burden of . . . documenting the appropriate hours,” “the opposing party
remains free to rebut a fee claim.” Eley, 793 F.3d at 100 (citation omitted). Here, both the hours
expended and the hourly rate are unreasonable.
1. Reasonable Hours Expended
Starting with the number of hours expended, a plaintiff may “submit[] an invoice that is
sufficiently detailed to permit the District Court to make an independent determination whether or
not the hours claimed are justified.” Wood, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 18. If the plaintiff does this
satisfactorily, the court presumes the reasonableness of the hours expended and “the burden then
shifts to the [opposing party] to rebut this presumption.” Dobbins, 2017 WL 4417591, at *3
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A district court retains discretion to reduce awards
of attorneys’ fees if “the time spent and legal services furnished were excessive considering the
nature of the action or proceeding.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(F)(iii). Courts generally exclude “hours
that were not ‘reasonably expended,’ such as for work that is ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise
unnecessary.’” Merrick v. District of Columbia, 316 F. Supp. 3d 498, 517 (2018) (quoting Hensley,
461 U.S. at 434).
The District challenges the hours expended as unreasonable for three reasons. First, it
challenges fifteen entries for case file review or case status meetings, arguing that the “Plaintiffs’
attorneys devoted excessive amounts of time” to those tasks and “billed for multiple attorneys
performing the same work.” Def.’s Opp’n at 16. But case file review charges are compensable,
see, e.g., Thomas ex rel. A.T. v. District of Columbia, No. 03-cv-1791, 2007 WL 891367, at *10–11
8 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2007) (citing Dorsett v. District of Columbia, No. 00-cv-212 (Sept. 13, 2000,
Mem. Op. at 6, ECF No. 26) (“Bi-weekly status reviews . . . evidence diligent legal representation,
not unreasonable or excessive use of time, particularly when dealing with the challenges presented
when litigating with the District of Columbia Public Schools.”), as are case status meetings, cf.,
e.g., Joaquin v. Friendship Public Charter School, 188 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Time
spent in consultations with co-counsel in an IDEA case is compensable.” (citation omitted)). And
the Court finds no evidence that multiple attorneys unnecessarily billed for the same work. See
Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 3 at 8 (time entry for Nov. 1, 2023, for work to ensure “compliance with the high
standards for complaint imposed by DCPS and the requirements of IDEA” as well as “[r]eview . . .
to make sure that the request of the parent and the needs of the student required a request for a
hearing”); id. at 9 (time entry for Nov. 3, 2023, for “review of [the] file to ensure that [the]
complaint was ready for filing”); cf. Role Models America, Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 972
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding it was a duplication of effort where two associates billed time for filing
the same brief on three separate occasions).
Second, the District asks the Court to exclude attorneys’ fees for time spent attending IEP
meetings and other meetings not ordered by the hearing officer in the administrative proceedings.
See Def.’s Opp’n at 16. The District is correct that attorneys’ fees may not be awarded for IEP or
other meetings unless those meetings are the result of an administrative proceeding. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii); Tillman v. District of Columbia, 123 F. Supp. 3d 49, 60 (D.D.C. 2015) (“This
Court has repeatedly found, however, that legal services for such IEP-related purposes are not
compensable under the IDEA”); A.S. v. District of Columbia, 842 F. Supp. 2d 40, 50 (D.D.C. 2012)
(disallowing fees for scheduling and preparing for IEP meeting). And the Plaintiffs have not met
their burden to demonstrate that the “30-Day Review Meetings” were unrelated to the IEPs or
9 convened as a result of an administrative proceeding or judicial action. See Simms v. District of
Columbia, No. 17-cv-970, 2018 WL 4761625 (D.D.C. July 26, 2018) (suggesting that 30-day
review meetings are related to IEPs); see also District of Columbia Public Schools, Opportunities
Academies: Special Education Programming at 1, https://perma.cc/T3KK-S7AD (“[A]ll students
with IEPs will undergo a 30-day review meeting to ensure that the services provided at the
Opportunity Academies are appropriate[.]”).The Court thus excludes the relevant time entries on
October 25, 2023, March 15, 2024, and March 21, 2024. See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 3 at 7 (time entry for
Oct. 25, 2023; 0.33 hours to message legal assistant to schedule the 30-Day Review Meeting); id.
at 26 (time entry for Mar. 15, 2024; 0.33 hours to schedule the student’s IEP meeting); id. at 27
(time entry for Mar. 21, 2024; 0.17 hours to email the school about the 30-Day Review Meeting).
But according to the Plaintiffs, the time on November 29, 2024, “relate[s] to a conference
between the parent and [the] law firm to discuss both an IEP meeting and [an] upcoming due
process hearing.” Pls.’ Reply at 9; see Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 3 at 13–14 (time entries for Nov. 29, 2023).
When time entries “reflect time spent on a mix of tasks, some of which [are] IEP-related and some
of which are not, courts tend to award fees for half the time sought.” Tillman, 123 F. Supp. 3d at
62¬63 (D.D.C. 2015) (reducing such entries by half); see, e.g., G.M. v. Saddleback Valley School
District, No. 11-1449, 2012 WL 5947213, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2012) (same). The Court will
follow that approach here and award half the time sought on November 29, 2023, where counsel
performed both IEP and non-IEP-work. See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 3 at 14 (time entry for Nov. 29, 2023;
2.50 hours to “discuss hearings and . . . today’s scheduled meeting for the student”).
Third, the District argues that the Plaintiffs cannot recover for “time related to a resolution
session meeting.” Def.’s Opp’n at 17 (referring to “time entries dated November 28, 30, 2023;
January 3, 4, 11, 12, 2024”). The statute makes clear that time spent on “resolution meetings” are
10 not reimbursable. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(iii); see also D.D. ex rel. Davis v. District of
Columbia, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2007) (“It is undisputed that attorneys’ fees for time
actually spent at a resolution session pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i) generally are not
compensable under the IDEA.”); see also Howard v. Achievement Preparatory Academy Public
Charter School, No. 15-cv-199, 2016 WL 1212409, at *14 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2016) (excluding time
for “preparing for, scheduling, discussing, attending, and debriefing from the resolution session”).
So the Court excludes these time entries. See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 3 at 13 (time entry for Nov. 28, 2023;
0.17 hours spent preparing form for resolution team); id. at 14 (time entry for Nov. 30, 2023; 0.33
hours on emailing the resolution specialist); id. at 18 (time entry for Jan. 3, 2024; 0.33 hours on
discussing settlement offer from the Resolution team), (time entries for Jan. 4, 2024; 0.50 hours
on discussing settlement offer); id. at 20 (time entries for Jan. 11, 2024; 1.16 hours on discussing
settlement offer), (time entry for Jan. 12, 2024; 0.33 hours discussing the settlement offer).
2. Reasonable Hourly Rate
Whether an hourly rate is reasonable turns on “(1) the attorney’s billing practices, (2) the
attorney’s skill, experience, and reputation and (3) the prevailing market rates in the relevant
community.” Eley, 793 F.3d at 100 (cleaned up). The Court will address these in reverse order.
a. Prevailing Market Rates
A plaintiff may establish the prevailing market rate through “two separate but inter-
related[] approaches.” Reed, 843 F.3d at 521. The plaintiff may demonstrate that IDEA litigation
qualifies as “complex federal litigation” or can “provid[e] evidence of the fees charged, and
received, by IDEA litigators.” Id.; see also Flood v. District of Columbia, 172 F. Supp. 3d 197,
210 (D.D.C. 2016). The Plaintiffs appear to offer evidence of both in requesting an hourly rate
11 based on the Fitzpatrick Matrix.1 The District argues that the Plaintiffs should receive only 75%
of the applicable rates on the Fitzpatrick Matrix because the underlying IDEA administrative
proceedings were not complex. The Court agrees.
“IDEA litigation is presumptively not complex.” Harrell ex rel. J.W. v. District of
Columbia, No. 24-cv-3611, 2024 WL 3640033, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2024) (citing DL v. District
of Columbia, 924 F.3d 585, 594 (D.C. Cir. 2019)). But the Plaintiffs ask the Court to find that
IDEA cases are “complex federal litigation” to which the full Fitzpatrick Matrix applies. See Pl.’s
Mot. at 7–13; J.T. v. District of Columbia, 652 F. Supp. 3d 11, 32 (2023). They offer three
affidavits to support this contention. See Pls.’ Mot. Exs. 11, 12, 13.
An affidavit from Diana M. Savit states that IDEA litigation is “at least as complex as
employment discrimination” because it requires expertise in “specialized disciplines, including
psychology, speech and language pathology, occupational therapy, physical therapy, and
medicine.” Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 11 ¶¶ 6–7. But this Circuit has already rejected that argument. See Reed,
843 F.3d at 525 (holding that while “attorneys who litigate IDEA cases may have specialized non-
legal knowledge,” it “is insufficient to demonstrate that IDEA cases involve complex federal
litigation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And the other two affidavits from Douglas Tyrka
and Alana Hecht explain that IDEA litigation is complex because “there is very limited discovery
1 The Fitzpatrick Matrix was generated in 2021 by the United States Attorney’s Office (USAO) for the District of Columbia and reflects the average hourly rates of lawyers handling complex federal litigation in the District Court for the District of Columbia. J.T. v. District of Columbia, 652 F. Supp. 3d 11, 16 (D.D.C. 2023). The Parties agree that the Fitzpatrick Matrix is the appropriate measure of the prevailing market rate in this case. See Pls.’ Mot. at 12 (“For attorneys, time is sought at a rate discounted from the Fitzpatrick Matrix.”); Def.’s Opp’n at 13 (“[T]he District proposes that the Court award rates at 3/4 of the applicable annual rated outlined in the USAO Fitzpatrick Matrix”). Most older cases rely on the Laffey Matrix, a predecessor of the Fitzpatrick Matrix. But this Court agrees that the Fitzpatrick Matrix “offers a superior measure of the prevailing market rate for complex federal litigation in the District as compared to the Laffey Matrix.” J.T., 652 F. Supp. 3d at 32.
12 and pretrial exchange between the parties in IDEA cases,” leading to a lack of information and
“respondents [] spontaneously adjust[ing] defenses.” Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 12 ¶ 21; see id. Ex. 13 ¶ 6
(similar). But the absence of discovery is not a point in the Plaintiffs’ favor. Reed, 843 F.3d at 525
(“[T]he absence of discovery may suggest that IDEA cases are not as complex as cases in which
discovery is extensive.”).
Nothing in these affidavits suggests that IDEA litigation is categorically complex. They
contain only “conclusory statements that IDEA litigation is ‘as complex’ as other types of cases
deemed by [the D.C. Circuit] to be ‘complex federal litigation,’” and “absent an explanation of
why this is so, [they] cannot suffice to meet [the Plaintiffs’] burden.” Reed, 843 F.3d at 525
(finding that “affidavits includ[ing] statements noting that practitioners have found ‘legal work
under the IDEA to be far more complex than Title VII work and civil rights work’” did not
demonstrate IDEA litigation was complex federal litigation); Snead v. District of Columbia, 139
F. Supp. 3d 375, 379 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting that courts in this District have interpreted Circuit law
“as strongly suggesting that IDEA matters are infrequently comparable to complex federal
litigation, and therefore, full [Matrix] rates should not be awarded in such cases”); Rooths v.
District of Columbia, 802 F. Supp. 2d 56, 62–63 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding that “[l]ike most IDEA
cases, the claim on which the plaintiff prevailed . . . involved very simple facts, little evidence, and
no novel or complicated questions of law”). “Accordingly, following the lead of other courts in
this jurisdiction . . . the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that IDEA
litigation in general is sufficiently complex to justify the presumptive application of [Matrix]
rates.” Dobbins, 2017 WL 7510879, at *6.
The Plaintiffs also offer no evidence suggesting that this particular case is complex. They
raised no novel legal issues in the administrative proceedings, see, e.g., Rooths, 802 F. Supp. 2d
13 56, 63 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding no novel questions of law in a similar IDEA challenge); Harrell ex
rel. J.W., 2024 WL 3640033, at *4 (same), which involved “run-of-the-mill issues involved in
many IDEA cases,” Wilhite v. District of Columbia, 110 F. Supp. 3d 77, 89 (D.D.C. 2015) (internal
citations and quotations marks omitted). In arguing otherwise, the Plaintiffs point to other cases in
this District. Pls.’ Mot. at 9–10. But one of these cases is not even an IDEA case, Salazar ex rel.
Salazar v. District of Columbia, 809 F.3d 58, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (considering Section 1983 class
action and noting that in“ IDEA claims, there is a submarket in which attorneys’ hourly fees are
generally lower than the [USAO rates]”), and the other was more complex and time-consuming
than this one, J.T., 2023 WL 355940, at *16–18, 28–29 (case involving two administrative matters
resulting in years-long federal litigation). In the third case, the court was persuaded by the
plaintiff’s declarations from several practitioners in support of the requested prevailing market
rate. See Merrick, 316 F. Supp. 3d at 512–13 (weighing five declarations from comparable
practitioners).
Alternatively, a plaintiff may establish the prevailing market rate by relying on rates
charged by other IDEA litigators in the community. The Plaintiffs provide two attorney affidavits
in support of their requested hourly rate, which address rates charged in 2015 and 2020,
respectively. See Pls.’ Mot., Exs. 11, 12. But an affidavit about rates charged in 2015 is insufficient
to establish a prevailing market rate for work performed in 2024. See Ex. 11; Joaquin v. Friendship
Public Charter School, 188 F. Supp. 3d 1, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2016) (finding that settlements from
eight to ten years ago are not “evidence of recent fees awarded . . . through settlement”) (emphasis
in original) (quoting Eley, 793 F. 3d at 101). And the other affidavit tracks the Laffey Matrix, see
Ex. 12 ¶ 8, which the Court declines to apply here. Moreover, the declarant, Mr. Tyrka, reached
settlement agreements with the District for many of his IDEA cases, see Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 12 ¶¶ 11,
14 13, and “the amount of fees that the District agrees to pay an attorney as part of a bulk settlement
is not determined by market forces,” Rooths, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 62; see also Joaquin v. Friendship
Public Charter School, 188 F. Supp. 3d 1, 19 n.14 (D.D.C. 2016) (same).
The Plaintiffs also submit affidavits from their own attorneys to support the requested rates.
But the Plaintiffs’ attorneys do not charge clients, see Pls.’ Reply at 5, and attorneys must show
what they “actually billed . . . in other cases during the [relevant] period,” Nat’l Ass’n of
Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def., 675 F.2d 1319, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Considering these
affidavits with the affidavits from Mr. Tyrka and Ms. Savit, the Plaintiffs have not done enough to
establish their requested prevailing market rate. See, e.g., Merrick, 316 F. Supp. 3d at 512–13
(weighing five declarations on complexity of IDEA litigation and reasonable rate); Wimbish v.
District of Columbia, 251 F. Supp. 3d 187, 192 (D.D.C. 2017) (considering “in addition to
affidavits from [the plaintiff’s] attorneys . . . nine affidavits from IDEA practitioners in this
jurisdiction”); Copeland v. District of Columbia, 208 F. Supp. 3d 255, 257 (D.D.C. 2016)
(weighing “in addition to detailed affidavits from [the plaintiff’s] own attorneys, . . . affidavits
from five IDEA practitioners, unaffiliated with this litigation, all of which support [the] Plaintiff’s
contention that IDEA litigators commonly charge and are awarded standard Laffey rates, and that
rates significantly below that measure in this case would be insufficient”).
***
At bottom, the Plaintiffs’ submissions do not support application of the full Fitzpatrick
Matrix rates in this relatively straightforward IDEA case. The Court thus joins scores of other
courts in this District in applying 75% of the rates in the matrix. See, e.g., James v. District of
Columbia, 302 F. Supp. 3d 213, 221–22 (D.D.C. 2018) (“‘[A]n overwhelming number of cases’
in this district have awarded ‘IDEA fees [that] adopt rates equivalent to seventy-five percent of
15 [USAO] Matrix rates.’”) (quoting Cox v. District of Columbia, 264 F. Supp. 3d 131, 145 (D.D.C.
2017) (other internal citations omitted); Bond ex rel. K.M. v. Friendship Public Charter School
Board of Trustees, No, 23-cv-367, 2023 WL 8710370, at *6 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 2023); Snead v.
District of Columbia, 139 F. Supp. 3d 375, 381 (D.D.C. 2015) (collecting an “overwhelming
number” cases finding 75% of prior USAO Matrix to approximate the prevailing rate for IDEA
administrative proceedings).
b. Attorney’s Skill, Experience, and Reputation
The District next takes issue with the requested Fitzpatrick Matrix rate for the Plaintiffs’
attorney, Ruzzel Castañeda. It argues that Mr. Castañeda should receive a lower rate because he
had only practiced law in the United States for five to six years when the underlying administrative
proceeding took place. Def.’s Opp’n at 14–15. The Court agrees.
Mr. Castañeda graduated from St. Louis University School of Law in the Philippines in
2002, but he has only been practicing law in the United States since 2018 when he received his
license in the District. See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 4, Declaration of Ruzzel E. Castañeda ¶¶ 6, 8, 15–17,
ECF No. 7-2. Although Mr. Castaneda previously worked as a legal researcher in 2005 at the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Philippines, and as an intern in 2015 at the Judicial College
of Maryland, see Pls.’ Reply at 7, Mr. Castaneda was not practicing law in the United States in
either of these roles, see Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 4, Declaration of Ruzzel Castañeda ¶ 14; cf. EPIC v. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 999 F. Supp. 2d 61, 70-71 (D.D.C. 2013) (attorney not admitted to bar
compensated at “Paralegals & Law Clerks” rate). The Court awards attorneys’ fees for
Mr. Castañeda’s work at 75% of the rate for attorneys with five years of experience for the time
worked in 2023 and six years for the time worked in 2024. See Tillman, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 59
(“When there is a significant gap between the date an attorney graduated from law school and
16 when he or she actually began practicing law, it is the latter date that should control in setting his
or her [USAO Matrix] rate.”); Salmeron v. District of Columbia, 195 F. Supp. 3d 153, 167 (D.D.C.
2016) (same).
c. Attorney’s Billing Practices
The District challenges three aspects of the billing practices in this case. The Court finds
merit in some of its arguments and excludes expert fees and attorney time spent on scheduling.
First, the District challenges $6,000 in expert fees paid to Wilma Gaines. See Def.’s Opp’n
at 18. While the IDEA itself does not support the recovery of expert fees, “under District of
Columbia [l]aw, a Court ‘may award reasonable expert witness fees as part of the costs to a
prevailing party’ in IDEA cases.” Wright ex rel J.J. v. District of Columbia, No. 18-cv-2818, 2019
WL 4737699, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2019) (quoting D.C. Code § 38-2571.03(7)(A)). But the
party seeking expert fees must show that the claimed rates “are based on the rates prevailing in the
community for other experts providing similar services in similar cases.” Id. at *7 (internal
quotation marks omitted). To justify the fees paid to Dr. Gaines, the Plaintiffs provide her resume
and argue that her hourly rate of $245 is “reasonable, given [her] qualifications and expertise.”
Pls.’ Mot. at 13; id. Ex. 8. But they provide nothing whatsoever to support the conclusion that her
rates “are based on the rates prevailing in the community” for other experts providing similar
services in similar cases. See D.C. Code § 38-2571.03(7)(B). Without more, the Court cannot
award expert fees. See, e.g., Wright, 2019 WL 4737699, at *7; Burks v. District of Columbia, No.
18-cv-2726, 2019 WL 2189488, at *8 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 2019), R. & R. adopted, No. 18-cv-02726,
2019 WL 2185371 (D.D.C. May 1, 2019) (recommending a denial of award for expert fees because
the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence concerning “rates prevailing in the community” and
similarly just produced experts’ resumes); see also Lynn v. District of Columbia, No. 24-cv-2648,
17 2024 WL 3967286, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2024). (denying expert fees where plaintiffs “failed to
provide any evidence whatsoever supporting the reasonableness of the expert’s fees in this case”).
Second, the District argues that the Plaintiffs cannot bill Valaree Willcox, Dr. Gaines’
“educational assistant,” as a paralegal. See Def.’s Opp’n at 19. A paralegal or legal assistant is a
person “qualified by education, training or work experience who is employed or retained by a
lawyer, law office, corporation, governmental agency or other entity and who performs specifically
delegated substantive legal work for which a lawyer is responsible.” McAllister v. District of
Columbia, 21 F. Supp. 3d 94, 105 (D.D.C. 2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, the Plaintiffs’ counsel retained Ms. Willcox (through Dr. Gaines) to complete paralegal
work, see Pls.’ Reply at 12 (“Her title denotes that her assigned supervisor is Dr. Gaines, but her
work is that of a paralegal.”), and billed her time for quintessential paralegal work, including
recording information for other employees, taking notes during client meetings, and finalizing
documents for disclosure, see Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 3 at 7, 10, 18; see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S.
274, 288 n.10 (1989) (listing tasks that paralegals perform, such as factual investigation; assistance
with depositions, interrogatories, and document production; compilation of statistical and financial
data; checking legal citations; and drafting correspondence); see also Bachman v. Pertschuk, No.
76-cv-0079, 1979 WL 162, at *13 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 1979) (finding that certain tasks such as
indexing and numbering documents would have been more appropriately performed by trained
paralegals). It is therefore appropriate to bill Ms. Willcox’s work at a paralegal rate.
Third, the District points out that counsel spent time performing clerical work like
scheduling calls and preparing disclosures. See Def.’s Opp’n at 17–18. The Court agrees that time
spent on scheduling tasks are not reimbursable at attorney rates. See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 3 at 11 (time
entry for Nov. 16, 2023; 0.17 hours “[p]laced phone call to parent to obtain her available dates for
18 the due process hearing”); id. at 12 (time entry for Nov. 21, 2023; 0.17 hours on scheduling call);
id. at 13 (time entry for Nov. 22, 2023; 0.33 hours for scheduling email); id. at 16 (time entry for
Dec. 14, 2023; 0.17 hours on scheduling phone call); id. at 21 (time entry for Jan. 17, 2023; 0.50
for scheduling phone call); id. at 22 (time entry for Jan. 18, 2024; 0.33 for scheduling phone call);
id. at 23 (time entry for Jan. 19, 2024; 0.17 hours for scheduling phone call); and id. at 26 (time
entry for March 15; 0.17 hours for scheduling phone call). Those time entries comprise clerical
tasks that do not require legal expertise. See, e.g., Rapu v. D.C. Pub. Schools, 793 F. Supp. 2d 419,
427 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Charging attorneys’ rates for a phone call to simply confirm attendance at a
meeting is unreasonable.”); Robinson, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 66–67 (“reducing by half because of the
clerical nature of the tasks. . . appears reasonable, and, in fact, somewhat conservative”). The
Court will reduce counsel’s rate by 50% for those time entries. See Robinson, 61 F. Supp. 3d at
66–67; Lynn, 2024 WL 3967286, at *3.
But the District does not explain why the preparation of disclosures is clerical in nature.
These tasks appear to require legal expertise and are a far cry from the type of tasks at issue in
Lynn, the case the District relies on. See Def.’s Mot. at 17–18. Compare Pls. Mot., Ex. 3 at 20
(time entry for Jan. 11, 2024; 4.33 hours in “[p]reparation included checking each of the documents
in the PDF and determining what documents needs to be added.”), and id. at 21 (time entry for
Jan. 17, 2024; 2.33 hours to “review[] the disclosure from both parties”), with Lynn, 2024 WL
3967286, at *3 (finding plaintiffs’ counsel could not charge full rates for “copying, tabbing, [and]
labeling” and “[g]o[ing] through all emails, organiz[ing], print[ing], summariz[ing] for
disclosures”). The Court will therefore reimburse these charges at the rate for an attorney.
19 C. Partial Success
Finally, the District argues that the Court should reduce the total award to account for the
Plaintiffs’ partial success, as they won only three of their four claims in the administrative
proceeding. Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 2 at 3, 27–30. The “product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate
does not end the inquiry,” as the court can “adjust” the fee award based on the “results
obtained.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. “There is no precise rule or formula for making these
determinations.” Id. at 436–37. Rather, courts “may attempt to identify specific hours that should
be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success.” Id. District
courts “necessarily ha[ve] discretion in making this equitable judgment.” Id. at 437. A court may
exercise its discretion to reduce a prevailing party’s attorney’s fee “if the relief . . . is limited in
comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole.” Id. at 440. “[T]he most critical factor is the
degree of success obtained.” Id. at 436.When there are “both successful and unsuccessful claims,
if ‘the unsuccessful claim could not have given relief beyond the scope of the successful claim,
the fact of failure is not an independent basis for a reduction.’” Merrick v. District of Columbia,
134 F. Supp. 3d 328, 335 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Goos v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, 68 F.3d 1380,
1387 n. 12 (D.C. Cir. 1995), decision clarified on denial of reh’g, 74 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
In this case, the Plaintiffs received all of the relief they sought at the administrative hearing.
While the hearing officer found that DCPS’s failure to provide N.W.’s educational records did not
amount to failure to provide a free and appropriate education, he nevertheless found a procedural
violation and ordered DCPS to produce the missing records. See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 2 at 15. Even
viewing the first claim as unsuccessful, the Plaintiffs’ “unsuccessful claim could not have given
relief beyond the scope of the successful claim[s].” Merrick, 134 F. Supp. 3d at 335 (cleaned up);
see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The Court therefore declines to reduce the Plaintiffs’ total fee
20 award on this basis. See, e.g., Merrick, 134 F. Supp. 3d at 335–36 (finding “[a] 10% reduction is
not warranted because plaintiff won all of the relief she sought”); cf., e.g., Brown v. District of
Columbia, 80 F. Supp. 3d 90, 101 (D.D.C. 2015) (reducing the overall fee award by 10% where
the plaintiff lost on four claims in the administrative proceedings, including one substantive claim).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part the Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Attorney’s Fees, ECF No. 7. The Court awards the Plaintiffs $71,545.10 in attorneys’ fees and
costs.
A separate order will issue.
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge
Date: May 19, 2025