Rapisarda v. Banco

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Rapisarda v. Banco

69 A.D.2d 876, 415 N.Y.S.2d 686, 1979 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11602

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 23, 1979

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 69 A.D.2d 876 (Rapisarda v. Banco) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rapisarda v. Banco, 69 A.D.2d 876, 415 N.Y.S.2d 686, 1979 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11602 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1979).

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Opinion

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the infant plaintiff as the result of an automobile accident, defendant Banco appeals, and defendants Rowan and Good Humor Corp. cross-appeal, from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, dated January 3, 1978, which granted plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss defendant Banco’s third-party complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Order reversed, on the law, with one bill of $50 costs and disbursements, and motion denied. The motion to dismiss, being predicated on the alleged status of the third-party defendant as the equivalent of a "primary parent” to the infant plaintiff (see Holodook v Spencer, 36 NY2d 35), is premature. Although perhaps subject to defeasance upon a proper showing, as drawn, the third-party complaint states a cause of action for indémnity or contribution (see Broome v Horton, 53 AD2d 1030; Barrera v General Elec. 'Co., 84 Mise 2d 901). Rabin, J. P., Gulotta, Margett and Martuscello, JJ., concur.

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In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the infant plaintiff as the result of an automobile accident, defendant Banco appeals, and defendants Rowan and Good Humor Corp. cross-appeal, from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, dated January 3, 1978, which granted plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss defendant Banco’s third-party complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Order reversed, on the law, with one bill of $50 costs and disbursements, and motion denied. The motion to dismiss, being predicated on the alleged status of the third-party defendant as the equivalent of a "primary parent” to the infant plaintiff (see Holodook v Spencer, 36 NY2d 35), is premature. Although perhaps subject to defeasance upon a proper showing, as drawn, the third-party complaint states a cause of action for indémnity or contribution (see Broome v Horton, 53 AD2d 1030; Barrera v General Elec. 'Co., 84 Mise 2d 901). Rabin, J. P., Gulotta, Margett and Martuscello, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

69 A.D.2d 876, 415 N.Y.S.2d 686, 1979 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11602, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rapisarda-v-banco-nyappdiv-1979.

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