25CA0800 Rangel v Polis 08-27-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0800 City and County of Denver District Court No. 22CV30353 Honorable Jon J. Olafson, Judge
Patricia Vital Rangel and Colorado Jobs with Justice, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
Jared Polis, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Colorado; Colorado Department of Labor and Employment; Division of Labor Standards and Statistics, Colorado Department of Labor and Employment,
Defendants-Appellees.
APPEAL DISMISSED
Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE SCHOCK
Welling and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 27, 2026
Degolla Law P.C., Jenifer C. Rodriguez, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant Patricia Vital Rangel
Towards Justice, Toree R. Lindblad, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant Colorado Jobs with Justice
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Kyle M. Holter, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Jared Polis
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Krista Maher, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees Colorado Department of
Labor and Employment and Division of Labor Standards and Statistics, Colorado Department of Labor and Employment
¶1 Plaintiffs, Patricia Vital Rangel and Colorado Jobs with Justice, appeal the district court’s order upholding a rule setting overtime pay standards for agricultural employees, promulgated by the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment, Division of Labor Standards and Statistics (the Division). Because the enabling statute has been repealed and the regulatory framework has been replaced with a statutory one, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
I. Background
¶2 The Division has authority to promulgate rules regarding overtime pay standards for employees in Colorado. Those rules generally provide for wages of one and one-half an employee’s regular rate of pay for any work in excess of forty hours per workweek or twelve hours per workday. See Colo. Overtime & Minimum Pay Standards Ord. (COMPS Ord.) No. 40, Rule 4.1.1, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1103-1 (effective Feb. 1, 2026). But before 2022, agricultural employees were excluded from these protections. See COMPS Ord. No. 37, Rule 2.3.1, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1103-1 (effective Jan. 1, 2021).
¶3 In 2021, the General Assembly enacted section 8-6-120, C.R.S. 2021, which required the Division to “promulgate rules
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providing meaningful overtime and maximum hours protections to agricultural employees.” Ch. 337, sec. 4, § 8-6-120, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 2177. The enabling statute directed the Division, in promulgating those rules, to consider the following:
the inequity and racist origins of the exclusion of agricultural employees from overtime and maximum hours protections available to other employees, the fundamental right of all employees to overtime and maximum hours standards that protect the health and welfare of employees, and the unique difficulties agricultural employees have obtaining workplace conditions equal to those provided to other employees.
§ 8-6-120.
¶4 The Division initiated rulemaking proceedings and invited public comment. It received hundreds of written comments and heard three hours of testimony from a range of stakeholders, including agricultural employees and employers. The comments and testimony addressed several issues, including the racist origins of the agricultural employee exclusion, health and safety concerns specific to agricultural employees, and the increased labor costs that a new overtime rule would impose on agricultural employers.
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¶5 After these proceedings, the Division adopted a rule that extended some overtime protections to agricultural employees while continuing to exempt them from the general forty-hour-week and twelve-hour-day standards. See COMPS Ord. No. 38, Rule 2.3.2, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1103-1 (effective Jan. 1, 2022). The new rule phased in overtime pay for agricultural employees, beginning with a sixty-hour-per-week threshold for the first year and moving to a forty-eight- to fifty-six-hour threshold (depending on the seasonal nature of the employer) by year three. Id. In stating the basis and purpose of the rule, the Division explained that it had balanced its mandate to “redress” agricultural employees’ unequal working conditions and provide “‘meaningful’ protection of the ‘fundamental right’ to overtime” against “the reality that complying with new overtime requirements will be a major adjustment for Colorado agricultural employers.” Div. of Lab. Standards & Stat., Statement of Basis, Purpose, Specific Statutory Authority, & Findings: Colorado Overtime and Minimum Pay Standards Order (COMPS Order) #38, 7 CCR 1103-1 (2022) pt. IV.D.2 (Nov. 10, 2021) (quoting 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws at 2177), https://perma.cc/J3ZF-K3SQ.
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¶6 Shortly after the new rule was adopted, plaintiffs filed a complaint in district court to declare the rule invalid and require the Division to restart the rulemaking process.1 They asserted that the Division had exceeded its statutory authority and acted arbitrarily and capriciously by promulgating the rule without adequately considering the factors set forth in section 8-6-120. They also alleged that the rule discriminated against agricultural workers and denied them equal protection of the law in violation of the Colorado Constitution. In short, plaintiffs argued that the new rule did not go far enough to protect agricultural workers and improperly prioritized the interests of agricultural employers.
¶7 After receiving briefing from all parties, the district court denied plaintiffs’ claims and upheld the overtime rule. The court concluded that, in promulgating the rule, the Division properly considered the statutory factors and balanced those factors against other considerations, including the input of other stakeholders. The court also denied plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, finding that (1) the record did not reflect any discriminatory intent in the
1 The complaint named as defendants the Division, the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment, and the governor.
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Division’s promulgation of the new rule (as opposed to the origin of the agricultural employee exclusion itself), and (2) the rule was rationally related to the legitimate purpose of providing meaningful overtime protections for agricultural workers while addressing “the innate difficulties within the agricultural industry.”
¶8 Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s ruling, reiterating their arguments that (1) the Division exceeded its authority and acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to appropriately consider the statutory factors and improperly prioritizing the interests of employers, and (2) the rule violates the right of agricultural employees’ to equal protection of the law because it stems from a racially discriminatory purpose and lacks a rational basis.
II. Mootness
¶9 After the parties filed their briefs in this appeal, the General Assembly repealed section 8-6-120 — the enabling statute for the rule at issue — and reenacted a new version of the statute. See Ch. 84, sec. 1, § 8-6-120, 2026 Colo. Sess. Laws. 334-35. The new statute eliminates the Division’s mandate to promulgate overtime rules for agricultural employees and replaces it with a statutory overtime standard that takes effect on January 1, 2027. § 8-6-
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120(2), C.R.S. 2026. Under the statute, agricultural employees are generally entitled to receive overtime pay for any time worked in excess of fifty-six hours in a workweek. Id. The act was signed into law by the governor on May 4, 2026, and provides that it “applies to time worked and contracts entered into or renewed on or after the effective date of [the] act.” Secs. 3-4, 2026 Colo. Sess. Laws. at 336.
¶ 10 We requested supplemental briefs addressing whether this new legislation renders this appeal moot. Plaintiffs asserted that it does, reasoning that the new legislation “supersedes and materially changes the statutory framework challenged in the action,” and that “any further judicial review would necessarily concern the new statutory scheme.”2 Defendants took the contrary position. They argued that the appeal is not moot because (1) the new version of section 8-6-120 applies only prospectively, meaning the overtime rule remains in effect until January 1, 2027; and (2) a ruling that the overtime rule is invalid could affect an agricultural employee’s attempt to collect unpaid wages for the period when the rule was in effect. We agree with plaintiffs.
2 Plaintiffs did not, however, move to dismiss the appeal. See C.A.R. 42.
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A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
¶ 11 A case is moot when “the relief sought, if granted, would have no practical legal effect on the controversy.” Castillo v. Stem Sch. Highlands Ranch, 2025 COA 88, ¶ 25. The focus of the mootness inquiry must be on the “existing controversy” between the parties, not some hypothetical controversy that might arise in the future. Diehl v. Weiser, 2019 CO 70, ¶ 10; see also Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 43 (“A court has no jurisdiction . . . to decide a case on a speculative, hypothetical, or contingent set of facts.” (citation omitted)). New legislation can cause a case to become moot when it forecloses the prospect of any meaningful relief. Giuliani v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2012 COA 190, ¶ 14.
¶ 12 Mootness — or more accurately, the lack of mootness — is a “jurisdictional prerequisite.” Diehl, ¶ 9. Thus, subject to exceptions not implicated here, if an event occurs while an appeal is pending that makes it “impossible for the court to grant ‘any effectual relief’ . . . to a prevailing party,” the appeal must be dismissed as moot. DePriest v. People, 2021 CO 40, ¶ 8 (quoting Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)); see also Giuliani, ¶ 15
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(“Where a claim is moot on appeal, we decline to address its merits[] and instead dismiss the claim.”).
¶ 13 We review de novo whether an appeal is moot. DePriest, ¶ 8.
B. Analysis
¶ 14 We will assume, without deciding, that the overtime rule at issue remains in effect until January 1, 2027, when the statutory standard in section 8-6-120 takes effect.3 Even so, our granting
3 This assumption, however, is not a given. Although the legislation provides that the new overtime standard will take effect on January 1, 2027, Ch. 84, sec. 1, § 8-6-120(2), 2026 Colo. Sess. Laws. 334- 35, it does not provide an effective date for the act as a whole — including the repeal of the enabling statute. And ordinarily, an act with a safety clause but without a stated effective date takes effect when it is signed into law, which occurred here on May 4, 2026. See sec. 4, 2026 Colo. Sess. Laws at 336; Colo. Const. art. 5, § 19; see also Tacorante v. People, 624 P.2d 1324, 1331 (Colo. 1981) (noting that “a statute not yet in effect [may] nevertheless become law for purposes of repeal”). Moreover, other courts have held that a repeal of an enabling statute generally repeals the underlying regulation. See Reese v. Pennsylvanians for Union Reform, 173 A.3d 1143, 1156 (Pa. 2017); S.C. Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. McDonald, 626 S.E.2d 816, 817-19 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006). If the challenged rule were no longer in effect, this appeal would surely be moot. See Air Pollution Control Comm’n of Colo. Dep’t of Health v. Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass’n, 672 P.2d 993, 997 (Colo. 1983). But because no party argues that the overtime rule was repealed upon enactment of the new statute, and because we conclude that the appeal is moot even if the rule is still in effect, we do not decide this issue.
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plaintiffs their requested relief would have no practical effect on the existing controversy between the parties. See Diehl, ¶ 10.
¶ 15 The only relief that plaintiffs sought by this action was (1) a declaration that the agricultural employee overtime rule was void and (2) an order requiring the Division to restart the rulemaking process. We cannot provide them that relief — at least not in any practical or meaningful sense. First, the General Assembly has replaced the rule by statute, leaving it with, at most, four more months of vitality. The imminent sunset of that rule drastically limits any practical effect of a ruling that it is (or was) void for failing to comply with an enabling statute that has itself been repealed. Indeed, plaintiffs have disclaimed any interest in seeking an answer to that question, noting that “any further judicial review would necessarily concern the new statutory scheme.”4
¶ 16 Second, if we were to issue an opinion declaring the overtime rule void, neither we nor the district court could order the Division to begin a new rulemaking process because the statute mandating such rulemaking has been repealed. Certainly, we could not order
4 It is noteworthy that defendants argue that plaintiffs could get meaningful relief, while plaintiffs concede that they could not.
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rulemaking in accordance with the former version of section 8-6-120. Thus, by prevailing in this appeal, plaintiffs could find themselves (for the four months until the statutory standard takes effect) with no overtime protections for agricultural employees — exactly the opposite of what they sought in this action. Invalidating a rule that provided some overtime protections without a process for attaining more would not be meaningful relief. See Giuliani, ¶ 14.
¶ 17 Defendants contend that the case is not moot because a decision invalidating the rule could affect an agricultural worker’s attempt to collect unpaid wages or backpay for the period when the rule was in effect. See Colo. Citizens for Ethics in Gov’t v. Comm. for Am. Dream, 187 P.3d 1207, 1213 (Colo. App. 2008) (holding that new rule did not moot challenge to penalty imposed under old rule). But plaintiffs did not seek unpaid wages or backpay, or any other form of damages, in this action. Nor did they challenge “the validity of any specific past application” of the rule. Air Pollution Control Comm’n of Colo. Dep’t of Health v. Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass’n, 672 P.2d 993, 997 (Colo. 1983). They sought only a new rule — one they can no longer get in light of the new statute.
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¶ 18 The theoretical possibility of a future conflict over unpaid wages under the rule does not give rise to a “practical legal effect on the existing controversy” between the parties — which concerns only declaratory relief. Diehl, ¶ 10 (emphasis added); see also Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass’n, 672 P.2d at 997 (holding that a challenge to the validity of a since-repealed regulation was moot despite the possibility that “the validity of [the regulation] might be presented in some future litigation”). Our jurisdiction in declaratory judgment actions is limited to resolving “a currently justiciable issue or an existing legal controversy, rather than the mere possibility of a future claim.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Park Cnty. Sportsmen’s Ranch, LLP, 45 P.3d 693, 698 (Colo. 2002).
¶ 19 Finally, even if we were to conclude that the short-lived survival of the rule is sufficient to preserve a live controversy, this case would be a prime candidate for application of the prudential mootness doctrine. Under that doctrine, a court may decline to resolve a case that is not strictly moot — particularly one involving nonmonetary relief against the government — when the controversy is “so attenuated that considerations of prudence and comity for coordinate branches of government counsel the court to stay its
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hand, and to withhold relief it has the power to grant.” S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Smith, 110 F.3d 724, 727 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).5
¶ 20 That is the case here. The General Assembly has made a legislative decision to replace the allegedly problematic rule — and the factors required to be taken into account in promulgating that rule — with a statutory standard that makes no reference to those factors. The new standard will take effect in four months, superseding the rule and statutory framework that are at issue in this appeal. While the new statute may give rise to other disputes, it has resolved the existing one. Under these circumstances, “considerations of prudence and comity” for the legislative branch counsel in favor of “stay[ing] [our] hand” and declining to rule on the validity of the soon-to-be-defunct regulatory regime. Id. (citation omitted).
¶ 21 Thus, because we conclude that the repeal of the old version of section 8-6-120 and the enactment of a new version has made
5 Though no published Colorado opinion has adopted the prudential
mootness doctrine, we may look to federal law as guidance. See Van Schaack Holdings, Ltd. v. Fulenwider, 798 P.2d 424, 427 (Colo. 1990).
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plaintiffs’ challenge to the overtime rule moot, we do not address the merits of the appeal and instead dismiss it. See Giuliani, ¶ 15.
III. Disposition
¶ 22 The appeal is dismissed.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE LUM concur.