Rand v. B. G. Pride Realty

350 A.2d 565, 78 A.L.R. 3d 873, 1976 Me. LEXIS 479
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedJanuary 20, 1976
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 350 A.2d 565 (Rand v. B. G. Pride Realty) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rand v. B. G. Pride Realty, 350 A.2d 565, 78 A.L.R. 3d 873, 1976 Me. LEXIS 479 (Me. 1976).

Opinion

*566 ARCHIBALD, Justice.

The plaintiffs initiated this action in an attempt to recover $10,000.00 which they had paid to B. G. Pride Realty, a real estate brokerage firm, as an initial payment under a contract for the purchase of real estate owned by Philip J. and Cynthia H. Murdock. As the trial progressed the issue evolved into whether the plaintiffs had made reasonable efforts to secure the financing required by this contract and a single interrogatory was presented to the jury on this issue. 1 The jury responded affirmatively to the question and the Justice presiding ordered judgments for the plaintiffs accordingly. The three defendants immediately filed motions for judgments n.o.v., which were granted, the Justice below ruling:

“After review of the evidence adduced before the jury and indulging all inferences in favor of the plaintiffs and resolving all questions of credibility in favor of the Plaintiffs, this court concludes that as a matter of law there is insufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that ■ the Plaintiffs made reasonable efforts to secure the financing required by their contract.”

The plaintiffs seasonably appealed from this ruling. We sustain the appeal and remand the case to the Superior Court for reinstatement of judgments for the plaintiffs.

The scope of our review is now well established, namely:

“The same rule is applied to granting a motion for judgment n.o.v. as is applied to granting a motion for a directed verdict. Manchester v. Dugan, 247 A.2d 827 (Me.1968). The party against whom a verdict is directed is entitled to every justifiable inference which the evidence in the record would reasonably support. When fair minded persons could draw different conclusions from the evidence, such party must be accorded the benefit of the most favorable view of such evidence. [Citations omitted.]”

Gowell v. Thompson, 341 A.2d 381, 382 (Me.1975); see also Schultz v. Gould Academy, 332 A.2d 368 (Me.1975); George v. Guerette, 306 A.2d 138 (Me.1973).

Having thus delineated the scope and* purpose of appellate review, we must necessarily revert to the facts.

The plaintiffs, both physicians, were owners of summer cottages in the town of Raymond located in close proximity to property owned by the Murdocks. Having been informed by John G. Shelley, an agent for B. G. Pride Realty which represented the owners, that this property was to be sold, plaintiffs negotiated through this agent for the purchase thereof. Ultimately the plaintiffs and the Murdocks signed a document entitled “Contract for Sale of Real Estate,” the total purchase price being $175,000.00. The contract required payment to be made by November 26, 1968, in the following manner:

“$2,000.00 upon signing of this contract. $8,000.00 on or before September 7, 1968. An additional $25,000.00 in cash. And the balance of $140,000.00 by a mortgage through a local lending institution. This sale is contingent on purchasers being able to receive a mortgage of $140,000.00 on the property. However, Mr. Mur-dock agrees to accept a 2nd mortgage of up to $25,000.00 if necessary, and the purchasers agree to accept said mortgage of $25,000.00 to make a total of $140,-000.00. This 2nd mortgage to be at an interest of 7y¡% and run not more than 10 years. This financing will be arranged within 30 days.” 2

*567 The Justice presiding construed the contract as (1) requiring the plaintiffs “to make reasonable efforts to secure the financing” specified in the contract, (2) which financing was to be “long term,” and (3) “the obligation of the plaintiffs to perform their contract was not conditioned upon their being able to use the land for any particular purpose.”

It is not urged on the plaintiffs’ appeal nor by cross-appeal of the defendants that this construction was erroneous, and our review of the contract document accords with this interpretation.

The issue evolves into whether there was any credible evidence to support the conclusion reached by the jury that the plaintiffs had made reasonable efforts to secure the long term financing required by the contract.

The contract was executed on August 26, 1968, and within a few days thereafter the initial payment of $10,000.00 was completed. Shortly after the contract was signed, the plaintiffs and Mr. Shelley met with a Mr. Tardiff, an officer of a commercial bank in Lewiston. Plaintiffs outlined their reason for the purchase of the property which was to prevent its commercial subdivision and to operate a summer boys camp thereon, using the anticipated income to liquidate the debt incurred for the purchase of this property. They were then informed that the commercial bank “would not be interested in large, long term financing of this type,” and it was suggested that the Maine Savings Bank might be an appropriate source of financing. A telephone call was then placed and a conversation was had by Mr. Tardiff with a loan officer of the Maine Savings Bank outlining the proposed plan: Plaintiffs were informed by Tardiff that although the Maine Savings Bank “considered that the value of the land was such that they would be willing to give a long term- mortgage of $100,000.00 on that basis,” it would be necessary for the plaintiffs to make a formal application for the loan requested, which would include personal financial statements and “a prospectus showing how [the plaintiffs] could operate a boys’ camp and make it pay off this mortgage.” It was then agreed that Dr. Edson, who lived in New York, would proceed to prepare the prospectus.

Having been assured by Mr. Tardiff that the anticipated loan was feasible and the agent for Pride Realty being aware of plaintiffs’ intentions, Dr. Edson left for New York. Although there was no detailed record of the activities of the plaintiffs in preparation for the submission of the loan application to the Maine Savings Bank, the prospectus 3 which was ultimately sent to Byron G. Pride, 4 the principal stockholder of the B. G. Pride Realty, indicated an appreciable effort at compilation of facts demonstrating the financial feasibility of a summer boys camp. It was at Mr. Pride’s suggestion that the prospectus and the financial statements of the plaintiffs were forwarded to him for his presentation to the Maine Savings Bank.

Mr Pride received the necessary statistical information shortly after November 4 and presented it to the loan officer of the Maine Savings Bank. Plaintiffs proposed to finance the purchase of the Murdock property in the following manner: $50,000.- *568 00 5

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Bluebook (online)
350 A.2d 565, 78 A.L.R. 3d 873, 1976 Me. LEXIS 479, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rand-v-b-g-pride-realty-me-1976.