Ramiro Trujillo Hernandez v. Warden of the Golden State Annex ICE Detention Facility, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RAMIRO TRUJILLO HERNANDEZ, No. 1:25-cv-01711 WBS SCR 12 Petitioner, 13 v. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 14 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE ANNEX ICE DETENTION FACILITY, et 15 al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner is a federal immigration detainee proceeding through appointed counsel in this 19 habeas corpus action filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This action was referred to the 20 undersigned by operation of Local Rule 302 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 21 I. Factual and Procedural History 22 Petitioner, a Mexican national, is currently detained in the Golden State Annex Detention 23 Facility within this judicial district. ECF No. 1 at 5. Petitioner was admitted to the United States 24 as a lawful permanent resident on April 25, 1988. Declaration of Deportation Officer A. Parra 25 Jaimes (“Parra Jaimes Decl.”), Exh. 2, ECF No. 14-2 at 9. On August 31, 2007, petitioner was 26 convicted in the Superior Court of California, San Bernardino County, of attempted murder in 27 violation of Cal. Penal Code §§ 664/187. Id., Exh. 3, ECF No. 14-2 at 14-30. The Superior 28 Court sentenced petitioner to 27 years in prison. Id. at 17-20. 1 Petitioner was paroled from state prison on May 20, 2025. ECF No. 1 at 5, ¶ 23. That 2 same day, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) took petitioner into custody and 3 administratively charged him as subject to removal pursuant to INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) [8 U.S.C. 4 § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)] for having been convicted of aggravated felonies as defined by INA §§ 5 101(a)(43)(F) and (U) [8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F) and (U)]. Id.; Parra Jaimes Decl., Exh. 1, ECF 6 No. 14-2 at 5. Petitioner remains detained at the Golden State Annex. ECF No. 1. 7 Initially proceeding pro se, petitioner filed the instant § 2241 petition on December 2, 8 2025. ECF No. 1. Petitioner argued that his detention (of more than six months at that time) 9 without a bond hearing violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1, 16-17. 10 Petitioner also stated that he is pursuing cancellation of removal and has filed a motion to vacate 11 his conviction. Id. at 5. He requested that the Court issue a writ of habeas corpus and order his 12 immediate release. Id. at 17. In the alternative, petitioner asks the Court to order his release 13 within 30 days unless respondents schedule a hearing before an immigration judge (“IJ”) during 14 which the government must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that he presents a risk of 15 flight or danger. Id. The undersigned appointed counsel on December 11, 2025. ECF No. 5. 16 Respondents filed a return to the petition, requesting that it be denied. Respondents assert 17 petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) based on having committed 18 offenses covered by 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). ECF No. 14 at 4. Respondents further argue 19 that § 1226(c) provides no statutory right to a bond hearing, and any facial challenge to the 20 constitutionality of § 1226(c) is foreclosed by Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 515 (2003) and Jennings 21 v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018). Id. 4-5. Respondents also maintain that an as-applied 22 challenge to petitioner’s mandatory detention fails because petitioner did not acquire a protected 23 liberty interest upon his release from state prison, and his detention is not unreasonably 24 prolonged. Id. at 8-10. Regarding the latter point, respondents submit evidence that since May 25 2025, petitioner has requested and received five continuances of his merits hearing, which was 26 scheduled for April 22, 2026, at the time they filed their return. Parra Jaimes Decl., ¶¶ 10-11, 14, 27 16-18, 20, ECF No. 14-2 at 3-5. Per petitioner’s EOIR Case Information webpage, that hearing is 28 1 now scheduled for May 11, 2026.1 See https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation. 2 In the counseled traverse, petitioner does not dispute that “§ 1226(c) authorizes his initial 3 detention upon release from criminal custody” but maintains the Due Process Clause requires 4 individualized review now that his prolonged detention has far exceeded the brief period 5 contemplated in Demore. ECF No. 17 at 2-3. For support, petitioner points to the absence of a 6 bond hearing to date as well as the fact of the “early procedural posture” of his removal 7 proceedings. Id. at 3. Regarding respondents’ argument that petitioner prolonged his own 8 detention, petitioner counters that he requested continuances to obtain counsel and prepare his 9 case—rights that are “fundamental to removal proceedings.” Id. Moreover, petitioner argues the 10 IJ granted the continuances over DHS objection in some instances. Id. at 4.2 11 II. As-Applied Framework 12 The parties agree that petitioner remains subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 13 1226(c). That provision states that the Attorney General “shall take into custody any [noncitizen] 14 who” falls into one of the enumerated categories involving criminal offenses. 8 U.S.C. § 15 1226(c)(1)(A)-(E). Based on his administrative charge, petitioner’s detention appears to fall 16 under § 1226(c)(1)(B), which requires the Attorney General to take into custody noncitizens like 17 petitioner who have committed an “aggravated felony” offense covered in § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 8 18 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B). 19 The petition raises an as-applied, procedural due process challenge to the constitutionality 20 of petitioner’s prolonged, mandatory detention without a bond hearing. See ECF No. 1 at 10-13 21 (addressing procedural due process test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 22 An as-applied challenge “contends that the law is unconstitutional as applied to the litigant’s 23 particular [circumstances], even though the law may be capable of valid application to others.” 24 Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). ICE has

25 1 The undersigned takes judicial notice of petitioner’s EOIR case information. See Fed. R. Evid. 26 201(b)-(c) (a court “may take judicial notice on its own” of facts that “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”). 27 2 On the same day appointed counsel filed the traverse, petitioner filed a pro se motion for temporary restraining order (“TRO”). ECF No. 15. Petitioner, through counsel, subsequently 28 filed a notice withdrawing the TRO motion. ECF No. 18. 1 detained petitioner since May 20, 2025 – for nearly ten months. ECF No. 1 at 5, ¶ 19. Petitioner 2 alleges, and respondents do not dispute, that petitioner has never received a bond hearing to 3 determine whether his detention is justified based on danger or flight risk. Id., ¶¶ 2-3; ECF No. 4 14 at 3. 5 As respondents note, the Supreme Court upheld the facial constitutionality of mandatory 6 detention under § 1226(c) in Demore, 538 U.S. at 531.3 ECF No. 14 at 5. The Supreme Court 7 did so with the understanding that § 1226(c) detention is relatively “brief” and “limited,” and 8 “lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases” and “about five months in the 9 minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 513, 529 n.12, 530. 10 Justice Kennedy joined the opinion in full, but wrote a concurring opinion recognizing the 11 viability of as-applied challenges under the majority’s framework: “[S]ince the Due Process 12 Clause prohibits arbitrary deprivations of liberty, a lawful permanent resident [noncitizen] . . . 13 could be entitled to an individualized determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if 14 the continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified.” Id. at 532 (Kennedy, J., 15 concurring). Later, in Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019), the Supreme Court recognized the 16 right to bring such as-applied challenges: “Our decision today on the meaning of that statutory 17 provision [8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)] does not foreclose as-applied challenges—that is, constitutional 18 challenges to applications of the statute as we have now read it.” Preap, 586 U.S. at 420. 19 While observing that “district courts throughout this circuit have ordered immigration 20 courts to conduct bond hearings for noncitizens held for prolonged periods under § 1226(c),” the 21 Ninth Circuit has expressly declined to address “[w]hether due process requires a bond hearing” 22 in such situations. Martinez v. Clark, 36 F.4th 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. granted, 23 judgment vacated, 144 S. Ct. 1339 (2024). Indeed, “essentially all district courts that have 24 considered the issue agree that prolonged mandatory detention pending removal proceedings,

25 3 Respondents also emphasize that the Supreme Court in Jennings rejected the Ninth Circuit’s 26 prior interpretation in Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1) and 1226(c) include “an implicit 6–month time limit on the length of mandatory 27 detention.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 292–94, 298. Pursuant to Demore and Jennings, the undersigned rejects the petition’s alternative argument that petitioner’s detention is per se 28 unconstitutional because it has reached six months. See ECF No. 1 at 8-9. 1 without a bond hearing, will—at some point—violate the right to due process.” Lopez v. 2 Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 877 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (quotation omitted); see also Doe v. Becerra, 3 732 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (“[D]ue process protections do not disappear simply 4 because mandatory detention under Section 1226(c) is at least initially permissible.”). In other 5 words, the Supreme Court’s “conclusion [in Demore] that § 1226(c) is constitutional in some of 6 its applications does not mean that the Court ‘does not have the power to grant petitions for 7 habeas corpus raising as-applied constitutional challenges to [ ] detention without a bond 8 hearing.’” Carballo v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-0978 KES EPG (HC), 2025 WL 2381464, at *4 9 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025) (quoting Perera v. Jennings, 598 F. Supp. 3d 736, 744 (N.D. Cal. 10 2022)) (emphasis in original). 11 Other Circuit Courts of Appeal have also concluded that Demore does not foreclose as- 12 applied challenges to prolonged detention under § 1226(c). See German Santos v. Warden Pike 13 Correctional Facility, 965 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2020); Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2021). 14 Most recently, the Second Circuit held that “[t]he Constitution does not permit the Executive to 15 detain a noncitizen for an unreasonably prolonged period under section 1226(c) without a bond 16 hearing; at some point, additional procedural protections—like a bond hearing—become 17 necessary.” Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 145 (2d Cir. 2024). The undersigned finds these 18 authorities persuasive and agrees that Demore does not bar an as-applied challenge to his 19 prolonged detention without a hearing. Accordingly, the undersigned will proceed to the 20 procedural due process analysis. 21 III. Legal Standard 22 The Due Process Clause protects persons in the United States from being deprived of life, 23 liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. The Supreme Court has 24 concluded that “the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, 25 including [non-citizens], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or 26 permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). Courts examine procedural due 27 process claims in two steps: the first step is determining whether there exists a protected liberty 28 interest under the Due Process Clause. The second step examines the procedures necessary to 1 ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. See 2 Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Morrissey v. Brewer, 3 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains 4 what process is due.”). 5 To determine what process is due here, petitioner urges the Court to apply the test from 6 Mathews, 424 U.S. 319, or the multi-factor reasonableness test the Third Circuit adopted in 7 German Santos, 965 F.3d 203.4 ECF No. 1 at 9. Respondents address the Mathews factors in 8 their return but argue that the application of those factors “in the context of mandatory detention 9 under Section 1226(c) is unsupported by Supreme Court authority.” ECF No. 14 at 7 (citing, 10 inter alia, Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002) (“[W]e have never viewed 11 Mathews as announcing an all-embracing test for deciding due process claims.”)). Instead, 12 respondents ask the Court to follow Keo v. Warden of the Mesa Verde ICE Processing Center, 13 No. 1:24-cv-0919 HBK (HC), 2025 WL 1029392 (E.D. Cal., Apr. 7, 2025), where a fellow judge 14 of this District declined to apply any of the “myriad of overlapping balancing tests” used by 15 district courts within the Ninth Circuit and instead held the “threshold question in considering 16 Petitioner’s claims of unreasonably prolonged detention under § 1226(c) without a bond hearing 17 is whether Petitioner’s continued detention serves the purported immigration purpose and has a 18 definite termination point[.]” Keo, 2025 WL 1029392, at *5, *7. Respondents also point the 19 Court to Banyee v. Garland, 115 F.4th 928 (8th Cir. 2024), where the Eighth Circuit interpreted 20 Demore as adopting a “bright-line rule” that “the government can detain an alien for as long as 21 deportation proceedings are still ‘pending.’” Banyee, 115 F.4th at 933 (emphasis in original). 22 The undersigned has considered the parties’ arguments and finds that Mathews provides 23 the appropriate framework for due process challenges to prolonged detention under § 1226(c). 24 See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Mathews remains a 25

26 4 In German Santos, the Third Circuit declined to adopt a presumption of reasonableness or unreasonableness of any duration and instead evaluated duration along with three other factors: 27 (1) whether the detention is likely to continue; (2) the reasons for the delay, such as a detainee's request for continuances; and (3) whether the noncitizen’s conditions of confinement are 28 “meaningfully different[ ]” from criminal punishment. 965 F.3d at 211. 1 flexible test that can and must account for the heightened governmental interest in the 2 immigration detention context.”). The undersigned is particularly persuaded by the Second 3 Circuit’s reasoning in Black, 103 F.4th at 145-49, that the Mathews test is flexible enough to 4 account for the additional factors identified by the Third Circuit in German Santos and district 5 courts when deciding whether detention under § 1226(c) has become unreasonably prolonged. 6 The undersigned declines to adopt Keo or Banyee, which are inconsistent with the majority view 7 described above that detention pending removal proceedings and without a detention hearing may 8 become unconstitutionally prolonged. See Lopez, 631 F. Supp. 3d at 877; Tijani v. Willis, 430 9 F.3d 1241, 1242 (9th Cir. 2005) (observing that it is “constitutionally doubtful that Congress may 10 authorize imprisonment of this duration” where petitioner was detained under § 1226(c) for two 11 years and eighth months pending removal proceedings); Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256 12 (9th Cir. 2018) (expressing “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged 13 detention without any process is constitutional”). 14 The undersigned is also aware of the test developed by the assigned district judge in Uulu 15 v. Warden, No. 1:25-cv-1812 WBS CKD, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2026 WL 412204, at *7 (E.D. Cal. 16 Feb. 13, 2026), a case involving a noncitizen’s challenge to prolonged mandatory detention under 17 § 1225(b): 18 [T]o determine if a petitioner’s detention appears to be indefinite, courts look to whether: (1) the petitioner’s immigration proceedings have been infected with 19 “bad faith or undue delay by the agency,” (2) the petitioner’s detention is “directly associated with a judicial review process that has a definite and evidently 20 impending termination point,” and is thus “akin to detention during the administrative review process [that] was upheld [by the Supreme Court] in 21 [Demore] (3) there is “evidence that [the petitioner] is unremovable because the destination country will not accept him or his removal is barred by our own laws . 22 . .. 23 Uulu, 2026 WL 412204, at *7 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The undersigned 24 respectfully declines to adopt this test. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “‘indefinite and 25 potentially permanent’ civil detention . . . clearly pose[s] serious substantive due process 26 concerns.” Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1064 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Zadvydas, 533 27 U.S. at 696); see also Martinez v. Larose, 968 F.3d 555, 564-66 (6th Cir. 2020) (rejecting 28 substantive due process challenge to allegedly indefinite detention under § 1231, which applies to 1 final orders of removal, where petitioner’s removal was reasonably foreseeable). The question 2 presented here is not whether petitioner’s detention “appears to be indefinite,” but whether his 3 prolonged, mandatory detention without bond violates procedural due process. Courts entertain 4 such as-applied, procedural due process claims despite the Supreme Court’s finding in Demore, 5 538 U.S. at 529, that § 1226 detention has a “definite termination point.” See Black, 103 F.4th at 6 149 (“Demore upheld the government’s authority under section 1226(c) to detain noncitizens 7 without an initial bond hearing for the brief period necessary for their removal proceedings. It 8 said nothing about whether due process may eventually require a hearing.”) (internal quotations 9 and citations omitted). While prolonged and indefinite detention is necessary to show entitlement 10 to outright release under the Zadvydas framework, prolonged detention—even if not indefinite— 11 may be sufficient to require a detention hearing. 12 Accordingly, the undersigned will apply the Mathews framework to petitioner’s claim. 13 Under Mathews, the court considers three factors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of 14 an erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest involved including any 15 fiscal or administrative burden that additional procedures would include. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 16 335. 17 IV. Analysis 18 A. Petitioner Has a Liberty Interest in Freedom from Prolonged Detention 19 Before addressing the Mathews factors in their return, respondents raise the alternative 20 argument that petitioner lacks a protected liberty interest because he “transferred to ICE custody 21 on the same day his criminal incarceration ended.” ECF No. 14 at 10. Respondents rely on the 22 following excerpt from Carballo, 2025 WL 2381464, for support: 23 There is also a meaningful distinction between a challenge to an initial period of detention, at issue in Demore, and a challenge to re-detention after a court has 24 previously granted release on bond pending immigration proceedings. “[T]he liberty interests of [an individual] who is re-arrested differ from the liberty 25 interests of a detained person.” Guillermo M.R. v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-05436-RFL, 2025 WL 1810076, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2025). In the former situation, 26 where ICE detains an individual upon their release from a correctional facility, without any substantial intervening period of release, that individual has no 27 opportunity “to form the [ ] enduring attachments of normal life.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). In contrast, a person who has been released 28 from physical restraint gains a “liberty [interest that] is valuable and must be seen 1 as within the protection of the” Due Process Clause. Id. 2 Carballo, 2025 WL 2381464, at *4. Petitioner counters that the fact he was “transferred directly 3 from criminal custody to ICE detention does not eliminate constitutional limits on the duration of 4 civil confinement.” ECF No. 17 at 3. 5 The undersigned agrees with petitioner. Carballo is factually distinguishable in that “the 6 petitioner’s challenge [wa]s based not on the present length of his re-detention, but rather, on the 7 fact that he was previously ordered released and was then re-detained five years later with 8 insufficient process.” Carballo, 2025 WL 2381464, at *7. By contrast, petitioner here plainly 9 raises a due process challenge to his “prolonged detention without a hearing on danger or flight 10 risk[.]” ECF No. 1, ¶ 3. Thus, while Demore forecloses a due process challenge to petitioner’s 11 “initial period of detention,” Carballo, 2025 WL 2381464, at *4, petitioner has a separate liberty 12 interest in “‘freedom from prolonged detention’ [that] is ‘unquestionably substantial.’” 13 Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207 (quoting Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011) 14 (emphasis added)); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“Freedom from imprisonment-from 15 government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint-lies at the heart of the liberty 16 [the Due Process Clause] protects.”). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that petitioner has a 17 protected liberty interest in freedom from prolonged civil detention and will proceed to the 18 Mathews analysis to determine whether procedural due process warrants a bond hearing. 19 B. Mathews Analysis 20 Private Interest: Petitioner again has a “substantial” private interest in freedom from 21 prolonged detention. Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207. Courts have generally declined to adopt 22 a specific threshold for when detention under § 1226(c) becomes prolonged. See, e.g., German 23 Santos, 965 F.3d at 211; Black, 103 F.4th at 150; Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th at 7–9. While the 24 Ninth Circuit has not addressed this question, it has observed that it “previously referred to 25 detentions longer than six months as ‘prolonged’ . . . in the context of detentions for which no 26 individualized bond hearings had taken place at all because the statutes on their faces did not 27 allow for them.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207 (citations omitted). Because petitioner’s 28 1 mandatory detention has reached nearly ten months at this point, the undersigned finds that the 2 duration of his duration, by itself, favors additional procedural protections. See Cabral v. Decker, 3 331 F. Supp. 3d 255, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (noting that petitioner’s nine-month detention under § 4 1226(c) was “within the range . . . sufficient to show a due process violation.”); Chen v. Aitken, 5 917 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding petitioner’s seven-month detention under § 6 1225(b) was “prolonged” because it “has lasted well beyond the typical period described in 7 Demore” and “neither release nor removal are imminent”). 8 But “under the first prong of the Mathews analysis, we cannot simply count his months of 9 detention and leave it at that.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208. Courts must consider other 10 factors, including whether the petitioner’s “detention was prolonged due to his decision to 11 challenge his removal order.” Id. Respondents’ core argument is that petitioner’s detention is not 12 “unreasonably prolonged” because he has sought and received continuances that have extended 13 his detention. ECF No. 14 at 9-10. Respondents acknowledge petitioner is “within his rights to 14 request time to seek counsel and to prepare his case,” but argue the delays resulting from his 15 requests for repeated continuances “cut against [his] argument that his detention has become 16 unreasonably prolonged.” Id. 17 Of the eleven continuances of petitioner’s removal proceedings, it appears that seven were 18 the result of petitioner’s requests as he sought counsel and prepared to file a request for relief and 19 four were the result of the IJ initiating continuances. Parra Jaimes Decl., ECF No. 14-1 at 3-5. 20 While courts must be sensitive to “dilatory tactics” by noncitizens seeking to put off their 21 deportation, 22 appeals and petitions for relief are to be expected as a natural part of the process. A [noncitizen] who would not normally be subject to indefinite detention cannot 23 be so detained merely because he seeks to explore avenues of relief that the law makes available to him. Further, although a [noncitizen] may be responsible for 24 seeking relief, he is not responsible for the amount of time that such determinations may take. The mere fact that a [noncitizen] has sought relief from 25 deportation does not authorize the INS to drag its heels indefinitely in making a decision. The entire process, not merely the original deportation hearing, is 26 subject to the constitutional requirement of reasonability. 27 Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 272 (6th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings, 583 28 U.S. 281; see also German Santos, 965 F.3d at 211 (“[W]e do not hold a [noncitizen’s] good-faith 1 challenge to his removal against him, even if his appeals or applications for relief have drawn out 2 the proceeding.”). 3 In an apparent suggestion of delay tactics, respondents repeatedly point out that no 4 counsel has appeared on petitioner’s behalf despite his assurances to the immigration court. Parra 5 Jaimes Decl., ¶¶ 14, 16-17. The undersigned will not infer bad faith simply because petitioner— 6 an individual proceeding in forma pauperis and who recently completed a lengthy prison 7 sentence—has not yet obtained counsel. “The duration and frequency of these requests do not 8 diminish his significant liberty interest in his release or his irreparable injury of continued 9 detention without a bond hearing.” Hernandez Gomez v. Becerra, No. 23-CV-01330-WHO, 2023 10 WL 2802230, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2023); see also Lopez, 631 F. Supp. 3d at 881-82 (finding 11 four-month delay proceedings to adjudicate petitioner’s Form I-130 a “neutral” factor in due 12 process analysis). Accordingly, the first Mathews factor favors petitioner. 13 Risk of Erroneous Deprivation: The second Mathews factor is “the risk of an erroneous 14 deprivation of [petitioner’s] interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, 15 of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. This factor favors 16 petitioner. It is undisputed that petitioner has not received a bonding hearing at any point, and 17 “[i]n the absence of any meaningful initial procedural safeguards, it appears to us that almost any 18 additional procedural safeguards at some point in the detention would add value.” Black, 103 19 F.4th at 153 (emphasis in original); see also Jimenez v. Wolf, No. 19-cv-7996 NC, 2020 WL 20 510347, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2020) (finding “high” risk of an erroneous deprivation where 21 petitioner had not received any bond or custody redetermination hearing during his one-year 22 detention under § 1226(c)). 23 Respondents argue that this factor favors them given petitioner’s merits hearing is 24 scheduled to take place in a few months, marking a “definite termination point for Petitioner’s 25 detention.” ECF No. 14 at 11. But the “definite termination point” language in Demore was 26 premised on the understanding that even cases involving appeals resolve in about five months. 27 Demore, 538 U.S. at 530. Even assuming the May 11, 2026, hearing resolves petitioner’s 28 applications, he likely “faces an undetermined, but likely significant, period of mandatory 1 detention through the appeals process.” Gao v. LaRose, 805 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1111 (S.D. Cal. 2 2025); see also German Santos, 965 F.3d at 212 (noting that an appeal of a cancellation of 3 removal order with the BIA “could take months” and potential review in the Court of Appeal 4 “would add months more in prison” such that “the likelihood that [petitioner’s] detention will 5 continue strongly supports a finding of unreasonableness”). Accordingly, the second factor 6 favors petitioner. 7 Government Interest: Under this factor, the Court weighs the government’s interest, 8 “including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 9 substitute requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Respondents argue this factor 10 tilts in their favor based on the government’s interests in (1) “preventing aliens from ‘remain[ing] 11 in the United States in violation of our law’”; and (2) “seek[ing] to ‘increas[e] the chance that, if 12 ordered removed, the aliens will be successfully removed.’” ECF No. 14 at 11 (quoting 13 Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208). “[T]he additional procedural safeguards we would allow here 14 under Mathews do nothing to undercut those interests. At any ordered bond hearing, the IJ would 15 assess on an individualized basis whether the noncitizen presents a flight risk or a danger to the 16 community, as IJs routinely do for other noncitizen detainees.” Black, 103 F.4th at 153–54; see 17 also Jimenez, 2020 WL 510347, at *3 (“Providing a bond hearing would not undercut the 18 government’s asserted interest in effecting removal. After all, the purpose of a bond hearing is to 19 inquire whether the alien represents a flight risk or danger to the community.”) (citing In re 20 Guerra, 24 I.&N. Dec. 37 (B.I.A. 2006)). Thus, in petitioner’s case, the government’s interest in 21 further detaining him without a hearing to determine whether such detention is justified is 22 minimal. 23 Administrative burden is a legally cognizable interest under Mathews. But respondents’ 24 interest is further diminished by the low fiscal and administrative burdens associated with a bond 25 hearing. See Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (“The effort and cost 26 required to provide Petitioner with procedural safeguards is minimal[.]”). Accordingly, the final 27 factor favors petitioner. 28 //// 1 C. Remedy 2 The undersigned finds that the Mathews factors all tilt toward petitioner. Accordingly, the 3 undersigned recommends that the petition be granted and petitioner receive a bond hearing before 4 a neutral adjudicator at which the government bears the burden of showing by clear and 5 convincing evidence that he is either a flight risk or a threat to safety to justify his continued 6 detention. See Black, 103 F.4th at 157 (“[O]nce detention under section 1226(c) has become so 7 prolonged that due process warrants a bond hearing . . . the government must justify continued 8 detention at such a hearing . . .by clear and convincing evidence.”). 9 CONCLUSION 10 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 11 1. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED. 12 2. Respondents be ordered to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing before an 13 immigration judge at which the government shall bear the burden of justifying Petitioner's 14 continued detention by clear and convincing evidence, within fourteen (14) days of issuance of 15 the order. 16 3. Respondent be further directed to file a notice certifying compliance with the 17 above provision within seven (7) days from the date of the bond hearing. 18 4. If petitioner is granted release on bond, respondents be ordered to return all of 19 petitioner’s documents and possessions at the time of release. 20 5. Petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order (ECF No. 15) be denied as 21 moot. 22 6. Judgement be entered in petitioner’s favor and this case closed. 23 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 24 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within seven days after 25 being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with 26 the court and serve a copy on all parties. The undersigned finds that a shortened objection period 27 is warranted in this case given the nature of the relief at issue as well as the fact that the parties 28 have had sufficient time to submit all of their arguments in written briefs. See United States v. 1 Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) sets 2 the maximum objection period and not the minimum); see also Local Rule 304(b). The parties 3 are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal 4 the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 5 Dated: March 15, 2026 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28