Ramirez-Rojas v. Bondi

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedApril 8, 2026
Docket25-9550
StatusUnpublished

This text of Ramirez-Rojas v. Bondi (Ramirez-Rojas v. Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ramirez-Rojas v. Bondi, (10th Cir. 2026).

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-9550 Document: 26 Date Filed: 04/08/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 8, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court LADY CARLINA RAMIREZ-ROJAS; JUAN RAUL MORA-RAMIREZ; LYANNE CELESTE MORA-RAMIREZ,

Petitioners,

v. No. 25-9550 (Petition for Review) TODD BLANCHE, ∗ Acting United States Attorney General,

Respondent. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT ∗∗ _________________________________

Before TYMKOVICH, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

On April 2, 2026, Todd Blanche became Acting Attorney General. ∗

Consequently, his name has been substituted for Pamela J. Bondi as Attorney General, per Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined ∗∗

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-9550 Document: 26 Date Filed: 04/08/2026 Page: 2

Lady Carlina Ramirez-Rojas petitions for review of the Board of Immigration

Appeals (BIA) order denying her motion to reopen her removal proceedings. 1 We

deny in part and dismiss in part her petition for review.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Colombia who entered the United States

without inspection in January 2023. The Department of Homeland Security

commenced removal proceedings against Petitioner by filing a Notice to Appear

(NTA) with the Denver Immigration Court. Through counsel, Petitioner admitted the

factual allegations and conceded removability as charged in the NTA. Based on her

admissions and concession, the immigration judge (IJ) found her removable. Seeking

relief from removal, Petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under the Convention Against Torture.

In 2024, the IJ held a hearing on the merits of Petitioner’s application. The IJ

subsequently denied relief and ordered her removal. Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA

was due by September 13, 2024. Her counsel attempted to file an appeal on the

deadline, but the BIA rejected it due to filing defects. A few days later, Petitioner’s

counsel again attempted to file an appeal, and the BIA again rejected it due to filing

defects.

On November 8, 2024, Petitioner’s counsel filed a corrected appeal and a

motion to accept the late filing. On December 5, 2024, finding that the motion failed

1 Petitioner’s minor son and daughter are derivative beneficiaries of her asylum application. They present no claims or arguments distinct from hers. 2 Appellate Case: 25-9550 Document: 26 Date Filed: 04/08/2026 Page: 3

to explain the delay in refiling and did not establish that equitable tolling was

warranted, the BIA denied the motion and summarily dismissed Petitioner’s untimely

appeal. The BIA’s dismissal order rendered the IJ’s removal order administratively

final.

Petitioner timely moved the BIA to reconsider its dismissal of her appeal,

which the BIA denied. The BIA explained that because the motion for

reconsideration provided arguments about the delay in refiling that Petitioner did not

present in her motion to accept the late filing, those arguments were not properly

before it on reconsideration. The BIA also said that even if it construed the motion

for reconsideration as a motion to reopen based on new evidence, the motion would

still be denied because Petitioner failed to provide supporting evidence.

On March 21, 2025, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen the BIA’s order

dismissing her appeal. The BIA denied the motion to reopen as untimely. The BIA

also declined to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen the proceedings.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Reopen

We have jurisdiction to review a noncitizen’s appeal of the BIA’s denial of a

motion to reopen removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (granting courts of

appeals jurisdiction to review “final order[s] of removal”); Mata v. Lynch, 576 U.S.

143, 147 (2015) (jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(1) “encompasses review of decisions

refusing to reopen or reconsider” final removal orders).

3 Appellate Case: 25-9550 Document: 26 Date Filed: 04/08/2026 Page: 4

We review the denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.

Maatougui v. Holder, 738 F.3d 1230, 1239 (10th Cir. 2013). “The BIA abuses its

discretion when its decision provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs

from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or

conclusory statements.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

In general, a motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the final

administrative removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). Here, the BIA entered

the final administrative removal order on December 5, 2024, so Petitioner needed to

file her motion to reopen by March 5, 2025, or demonstrate eligibility for an

exception to the deadline. But Petitioner did not file her motion to reopen until

March 21—over two weeks after the ninety-day deadline had passed—and did not

argue that an exception to the deadline applied. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its

discretion when it denied Petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely.

B. Sua Sponte Reopening

In general, we lack “jurisdiction to consider [a] petitioner’s claim that the

BIA should have exercised its sua sponte power to reopen” removal proceedings.

Belay-Gebru v. INS, 327 F.3d 998, 1000 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Jimenez v.

Sessions, 893 F.3d 704, 708–09 (10th Cir. 2018). The absence of regulatory

restrictions on this power means “we have no meaningful standard against which to

judge the BIA’s exercise of its discretion.” Belay-Gebru, 327 F.3d at 1001.

4 Appellate Case: 25-9550 Document: 26 Date Filed: 04/08/2026 Page: 5

Petitioner has not shown that her claim represents an exception to our general

lack of jurisdiction over the BIA’s discretionary decision not to reopen a case

sua sponte. Hence, we lack jurisdiction to review it.

III. CONCLUSION

As we lack jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s claim pertaining to the BIA’s

discretionary decision not to reopen her proceedings sua sponte, we dismiss in part

her petition for review.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Belay-Gebru v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
327 F.3d 998 (Tenth Circuit, 2003)
Maatougui v. Holder
738 F.3d 1230 (Tenth Circuit, 2013)
Reyes Mata v. Lynch
576 U.S. 143 (Supreme Court, 2015)
Lujan-Jimenez v. Sessions
893 F.3d 704 (Tenth Circuit, 2018)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Ramirez-Rojas v. Bondi, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ramirez-rojas-v-bondi-ca10-2026.