Ramirez-Rojas v. Bondi
This text of Ramirez-Rojas v. Bondi (Ramirez-Rojas v. Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Appellate Case: 25-9550 Document: 26 Date Filed: 04/08/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 8, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court LADY CARLINA RAMIREZ-ROJAS; JUAN RAUL MORA-RAMIREZ; LYANNE CELESTE MORA-RAMIREZ,
Petitioners,
v. No. 25-9550 (Petition for Review) TODD BLANCHE, ∗ Acting United States Attorney General,
Respondent. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT ∗∗ _________________________________
Before TYMKOVICH, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
On April 2, 2026, Todd Blanche became Acting Attorney General. ∗
Consequently, his name has been substituted for Pamela J. Bondi as Attorney General, per Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined ∗∗
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-9550 Document: 26 Date Filed: 04/08/2026 Page: 2
Lady Carlina Ramirez-Rojas petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) order denying her motion to reopen her removal proceedings. 1 We
deny in part and dismiss in part her petition for review.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Colombia who entered the United States
without inspection in January 2023. The Department of Homeland Security
commenced removal proceedings against Petitioner by filing a Notice to Appear
(NTA) with the Denver Immigration Court. Through counsel, Petitioner admitted the
factual allegations and conceded removability as charged in the NTA. Based on her
admissions and concession, the immigration judge (IJ) found her removable. Seeking
relief from removal, Petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture.
In 2024, the IJ held a hearing on the merits of Petitioner’s application. The IJ
subsequently denied relief and ordered her removal. Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA
was due by September 13, 2024. Her counsel attempted to file an appeal on the
deadline, but the BIA rejected it due to filing defects. A few days later, Petitioner’s
counsel again attempted to file an appeal, and the BIA again rejected it due to filing
defects.
On November 8, 2024, Petitioner’s counsel filed a corrected appeal and a
motion to accept the late filing. On December 5, 2024, finding that the motion failed
1 Petitioner’s minor son and daughter are derivative beneficiaries of her asylum application. They present no claims or arguments distinct from hers. 2 Appellate Case: 25-9550 Document: 26 Date Filed: 04/08/2026 Page: 3
to explain the delay in refiling and did not establish that equitable tolling was
warranted, the BIA denied the motion and summarily dismissed Petitioner’s untimely
appeal. The BIA’s dismissal order rendered the IJ’s removal order administratively
final.
Petitioner timely moved the BIA to reconsider its dismissal of her appeal,
which the BIA denied. The BIA explained that because the motion for
reconsideration provided arguments about the delay in refiling that Petitioner did not
present in her motion to accept the late filing, those arguments were not properly
before it on reconsideration. The BIA also said that even if it construed the motion
for reconsideration as a motion to reopen based on new evidence, the motion would
still be denied because Petitioner failed to provide supporting evidence.
On March 21, 2025, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen the BIA’s order
dismissing her appeal. The BIA denied the motion to reopen as untimely. The BIA
also declined to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen the proceedings.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Reopen
We have jurisdiction to review a noncitizen’s appeal of the BIA’s denial of a
motion to reopen removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (granting courts of
appeals jurisdiction to review “final order[s] of removal”); Mata v. Lynch, 576 U.S.
143, 147 (2015) (jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(1) “encompasses review of decisions
refusing to reopen or reconsider” final removal orders).
3 Appellate Case: 25-9550 Document: 26 Date Filed: 04/08/2026 Page: 4
We review the denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.
Maatougui v. Holder, 738 F.3d 1230, 1239 (10th Cir. 2013). “The BIA abuses its
discretion when its decision provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs
from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or
conclusory statements.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In general, a motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the final
administrative removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). Here, the BIA entered
the final administrative removal order on December 5, 2024, so Petitioner needed to
file her motion to reopen by March 5, 2025, or demonstrate eligibility for an
exception to the deadline. But Petitioner did not file her motion to reopen until
March 21—over two weeks after the ninety-day deadline had passed—and did not
argue that an exception to the deadline applied. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely.
B. Sua Sponte Reopening
In general, we lack “jurisdiction to consider [a] petitioner’s claim that the
BIA should have exercised its sua sponte power to reopen” removal proceedings.
Belay-Gebru v. INS, 327 F.3d 998, 1000 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Jimenez v.
Sessions, 893 F.3d 704, 708–09 (10th Cir. 2018). The absence of regulatory
restrictions on this power means “we have no meaningful standard against which to
judge the BIA’s exercise of its discretion.” Belay-Gebru, 327 F.3d at 1001.
4 Appellate Case: 25-9550 Document: 26 Date Filed: 04/08/2026 Page: 5
Petitioner has not shown that her claim represents an exception to our general
lack of jurisdiction over the BIA’s discretionary decision not to reopen a case
sua sponte. Hence, we lack jurisdiction to review it.
III. CONCLUSION
As we lack jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s claim pertaining to the BIA’s
discretionary decision not to reopen her proceedings sua sponte, we dismiss in part
her petition for review.
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