Rambus Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc.

628 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104537, 2008 WL 5234043
District Court, N.D. California·Decided December 15, 2008·No. C-05-00334 RMW, C-05-02298 RMW, C-06-00244 RMW·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART RAMBUS’S MOTION TO STRIKE; DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT No. 1 OF INVALIDITY; AND STRIKING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT No. 2 OF INVALIDITY

RONALD M. WHYTE, District Judge.

Rambus has accused the Manufactur *1119 ers 1 of infringing various patents. Trial is scheduled for January 19, 2009. Pursuant to a case management deadline for filing summary judgment motions, the Manufacturers have filed two motions for summary judgment of invalidity pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Rambus opposes both motions. Rambus also moves to strike the two motions for violating a case management order. The court has reviewed the papers and considered the arguments of counsel. For the following reasons, the court grants Rambus’s motion to strike the Manufacturers’ summary judgment motion no. 2 and the court does not consider it. The court denies Rambus’s motion to strike the Manufacturers’ summary judgment motion no. 1. The court denies the Manufacturers’ motion for summary judgment no. 1.

I. RAMBUS’S MOTION TO STRIKE

Before turning to the Manufacturers’ motions for summary judgment of invalidity, the court must address Rambus’s motion to strike those motions.

A. Background

On April 24, 2007, the court entered a joint case management order “to adopt special procedures for managing the complex issues and multiple parties in future proceedings” in these cases. E.g., Rambus Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor, Inc., C-05-00334, Docket No. 174 at 1 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 24, 2007). The order included a schedule for trying Rambus’s patent claims and the Manufacturers’ defenses. Id., at 2 & Attach. C. The schedule set deadlines for filing infringement contentions, a joint claim construction statement, claim construction briefs, and “summary judgment motions that depend on claim-construction issues.” Id., Attach. C. At the deadline for filing such summary judgment motions, Rambus filed motions for summary judgment of infringement and the Manufacturers filed motions for summary judgment of non-infringement and invalidity pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112.

The court issued another scheduling order as the trial date approached. See Docket No. 1963 (Jul. 16, 2008). The order set a deadline for dispositive motions. It explained that:

Given these cases’ histories, a few deadlines may require clarification. A “dispositive motion” is a motion for summary judgment that disposes of a portion of the case. The court will not entertain any dispositive motion that turns on an issue of claim construction. Such motions were supposed to be filed on October 5, 2007. See Joint Case Management Order, Attachment C (Apr. 24, 2007).

Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).

On October 24, the Manufacturers filed two motions for summary judgment of invalidity pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). The first motion’s introduction argues that:

Rambus asked the Court to construe its claims broadly. Under the constructions it requested, and which the Court adopted, the five claims at issue on this motion indisputably read directly on the Bennett prior art. Because there is no genuine issue of fact for the jury, the Court should resolve these claims against Rambus before trial.

Docket No. 2406, 2:5-8 (Oct. 24, 2008). The second motion similarly argues that “each and every limitation of the asserted claims are present in the Novak patent. ... There is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the disclosure of the *1120 relevant limitations in Novak.” Docket No. 2458,1:8-13 (Oct. 24, 2008).

B. Analysis

Rambus moves to strike the Manufacturers’ two motions for summary judgment for violating the court’s scheduling orders. The Manufacturers first argue that the motions do not “turn on issues of claim construction” because the motions “do not require the Court to resolve an issue of claim construction.” The court disagrees. “[I]t is axiomatic that that which would literally infringe if later anticipates if earlier.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2001). The parties clearly understood that the court’s order set a deadline for filing motions for summary judgment of infringement and non-infringement that turn on the interpretation of a claim term. Anticipation involves the same inquiry as infringement; there is no reason to believe that one “turns on issues of claim construction” while the other does not.

The Manufacturers next argue that the court’s order could not have contemplated its motions for summary judgment of invalidity because as of the court’s deadline final invalidity contentions were not yet due and discovery had not yet closed. The Manufacturers argue that even if this interpretation is wrong, it was reasonable and their failure to file their two motions timely should be forgiven. This argument fails because there is noting inherently unfair about requiring motions that depend on how claims are interpreted to be filed before final contentions or before all discovery is completed. If the Manufacturers believed they needed additional time, they could have filed a motion asking for relief from the deadline. This argument also cannot explain why the parties acted as though motions for summary judgment of infringement and non-infringement were due in October 2007. Finally, and most importantly, the argument overlooks the court’s well-known desire to grapple with issues of infringement and validity while simultaneously addressing claim construction. Indeed, the court remarked on the Manufacturers’ failure to file motions for summary judgment of invalidity and the difficulties that failure created in understanding the scope of the parties’ claim construction dispute. Rambus Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor, Inc., 569 F.Supp.2d 946, 971 (N.D.Cal.2008) (“This leaves the court to speculate as to why this dispute is material. Either this dispute is about nothing, or the Manufacturers are suggesting that the court construe a claim so broadly that it is invalid. This uncertainty defeats the purpose of the court’s case management order.”). If there could be any doubt about the meaning of the court’s case management order, this passage in the claim construction order made it clear that the deadline for filing such motions had passed. Because the Manufacturers’ interpretation of the court’s order is not reasonable, the court rejects it.

Of course, a party may seek relief from a case management order upon a showing of good cause. Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087-88 (9th Cir.2002);

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Rambus Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., 628 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104537, 2008 WL 5234043 (N.D. Cal. 2008).

628 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (Rambus Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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