Rajpal v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.

Opinion

OPVINDER S. RAJPAL, Case No. 21-cv-05066-EMC

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS Docket No. 9 Defendant.

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant Delta Air Lines, Inc.’s (“Delta’s”) pending motion to dismiss Plaintiff Opvinder S. Rajpal’s complaint. Docket No. 9 (“Mot.”). Plaintiff, an Indiana resident, alleges that two crewmembers manipulated carry-on luggage in an overhead compartment causing a metal water bottle to drop on his head while he was boarding a San Francisco-bound Delta flight at John F. Kennedy (JFK) airport in Queens, New York. See Docket No. 1-1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 1, 17–19. Plaintiff was taken to a nearby hospital after the incident. Id. ¶¶ 19–21. On May 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint in San Francisco County Superior Court1 raising three California2 causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) premises liability, and (3) common 1 Although Plaintiff never stepped foot in California, Defendant “waived any defense” for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) “by omitting [that defense] from [its] motion.” See Moser v. Benefytt, Inc., --- F.4th ---, 2021 WL 3504041, at *4 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1)(A)). carrier liability. Id. ¶¶ 22–34. Defendant removed the case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction on June 30, 2021. See Docket No. 1 (“Notice of Removal”). It is undisputed that Delta is an out-of-state Defendant incorporated in Delaware with a principal place of business in Georgia. Compl. ¶ 2. On July 7, 2021, Defendant filed the pending motion to dismiss the second (premises liability) and third (common carrier liability) causes of action for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mot. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), a plaintiff’s “factual allegations [in the complaint] ‘must . . . suggest that the claim has at least a plausible chance of success.’” Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014). The court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). But “allegations in a complaint . . . may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action [and] must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Levitt, 765 F.3d at 1135 (quoting Eclectic Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2014)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the Defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A. Premises Liability In California, “[t]he proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others.” Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968). “The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” Kesner v. Sup. Ct., 384 P.2d 283, 300 (Cal. 2016). The only difference is that “[p]remises liability ‘is grounded in the possession of the premises and the attendant right to control and manage the premises;’” such that “mere possession with its attendant right to control conditions on the premises is a sufficient basis for the imposition of an affirmative duty to act.” Id. at 301 (quoting Preston v. Goldman, 720 P.2d 476, 482 (Cal. 1986)). Defendant argues it is not liable for Plaintiff’s injuries under a premises liability theory because “an airplane is not a premises for purposes of premises liability [as] such liability relates to ownership of land.” Thompson v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., No. CV094515CASPLAX, 2010 WL 11515431, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2010) (emphasis added); see also Rowland, 443 P.2d at 568 (“The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land . . . is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others.” (emphasis added)); Kesner, 384 P.2d at 301 (“[T]he duty of care encompasses a duty to avoid exposing persons to risks of injury that occur off site if the landowner’s property.” (emphasis added)). Plaintiff does not dispute that premises liability only applies to injuries that arise from the ownership or possession of land. See Docket No. 19 (“Opp’n”) at 2. Instead, he argues Defendant is liable because “it is undisputed” Defendant was in possession of, and had control over, the airport terminal, gate, and runway area where its airplane was parked at the time of the accident. Id. at 3. The problem, however, is that the entirety of the incident here occurred on board the airplane, a mobile vehicle, not land. There was nothing about the airport terminal, gate, or runway that contributed to the accident. landowners liability;” rather “the duty of care encompasses a duty to avoid exposing persons to risks of injury that occur off site if the landowner’s property is maintained in such a manner as to expose persons to an unreasonable risk of injury offsite.” Kesner, 384 P.2d at 301 (quoting Barnes v. Black, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 634, 637 (Ct. App. 1999)). In Kesner, for example, the California Supreme Court held a landowner could be held liable for harm caused by asbestos fibers carried on the plaintiff’s husband’s clothing from the landowner’s property to the plaintiff’s home. Id. In McDaniel v. Sunset Manor Co., the Court of Appeal held the owner of an apartment complex could be liable for injuries a toddler suffered from almost drowning in a creek adjacent to the landowner’s property because “the most direct route [to the creek] would have been through the fence on the south side of the [property].” See 269 Cal. Rptr. 196, 197 (Ct. App. 1990). Similarly, the Barnes Court held the owner of an apartment complex was liable for the death of a child who was struck by a vehicle in a public avenue adjacent to the complex after his tricycle veered off the complex’s driveway because the landlord had failed to install a gate. 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636. These cases are distinguishable from the instant case, however, because the landowners there “maintained [their properties] in such a manner as to expose persons to an unreasonable risk of injury offsite.” Kesner, 384 P.2d at 301. The landowner in Kesner, for example, failed to remove the asbestos from his land, and the landlords in McDaniel and Barnes failed to erect fences or other barriers on their land to prevent children from stumbling into the neighboring creek and avenue, respectively. Here, by contrast, there was nothing about the land (e.g., the terminal as distinct from the airplane) which caused the injury. Indeed, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges his injury was caused by the negligence of Defendant’s crew members, not from the way Defendant maintained its airplane, terminal, gate, or runway area. Cf. Garcia v. Paramount Citrus Ass’n, Inc., 80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 512, 514 (Ct. App. 2008) (landowner “had no duty to [the plaintiff] arising from the nonpermissive, negligent use of its property by a third party”). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s second cause of action for premises liability without leave to amend. B. Common Carrier Liability Section 2100 of the California Civil Code establishes a heightened duty of care for common carriers: “[a] carrier of persons for reward must use the utmost care and diligence for their safe carriage, must provide everything necessary for that purpose, and must exercise to that end a reasonable degree of skill.” Cal. Civil Code § 2100 (emphasis added). Under section 2100, common “carriers are responsible for any, even the slightest, negligence and are required to do all that human care, vigilance, and foresight reasonably 0can do under all the circumstances.” Acosta v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 72, 77 (Cal. 1970). This heightened duty of care is owed only “while the passengers are in transitu, and until they have safely departed the carrier’s vehicle.” McGettigan v. Bay Area Rapid Transit. Dist., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516, 520 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Marshall v. United Airlines, 110 Cal. Rptr. 416, 418 (Ct. App. 1973)). In other words, common carriers must exercise “utmost care and diligence” toward passengers within “the sphere of any activity of the carrier which might reasonably constitute a mobile or animated hazard to the passenger,” such as “moving vehicles and the jet and propeller air blasts of an airline’s landing area[.]” Marshall, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 419. Outside of that “sphere of activity,” a carrier owes its passengers only “ordinary or reasonable care.” Id.; see also McGettigan, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 521 (“[T]here are no mobile hazards on a train platform similar to those of an airline landing area. . . . Accordingly, we conclude that appellant was not within a ‘sphere of activity’ as envisioned by the Marshall court.”). Defendant argues that it did not owe Plaintiff a heightened duty of care as a common carrier because section 2100 is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act of 1958 (FAA). 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101–50105. The FAA provides a general administrative enforcement scheme whereby “[a] person may file a complaint in writing with the Secretary of Transportation . . . about a person violating th[e FAA] or a requirement prescribed under th[e FAA].” 49 U.S.C. § 46101(a)(1). After an investigation,3 notice, and an opportunity for a hearing, the Secretary can “issue an order to compel compliance with th[e FAA] if the Secretary . . . finds . . . that a person is violating th[e FAA]” and its implementing regulations. Id. §§ 46101(a)(2)–(4). The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) may also obtain “a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 for violating” the FAA. Id. § 46301. Pursuant to certain procedural requirements, any person “disclosing a substantial interest in an order issued by the Secretary” may appeal that order to a United States court of appeals. Id. § 46110. Importantly, the FAA cautions that these remedies are not exclusive: “[a] remedy under th[e FAA] is in addition to any other remedies provided by law,” which is why air carriers are required to maintain liability insurance to pay for tort damages “resulting from the operation or maintenance of the aircraft.” Id. §§ 40120(c) (emphasis added), 41112. Congress has the power under the Supremacy Clause to preempt state law in three ways. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. First, “Congress may withdraw specified powers from the States by enacting a statute containing an express preemption provision.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012). Second, “[s]tates are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its proper authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance.” Id. Finally, “state laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law.” Id. These three forms of preemption are known as, respectively, express, field, and conflict preemption. Here, the Court needs to address only field preemption because Defendant is not arguing Plaintiff’s section 2100 claim is barred by express or conflict preemption. See Mot. at 8. The Ninth Circuit “divi[des] the FAA’s field preemptive effect into two components: state standards of care, which may be field-preempted by pervasive regulations, and state remedies, which may survive even if the standard of care is so preempted.” Gilstrap v. United Air Lines, 709 F.3d 995, 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999)). In other words, “the scope of field preemption” under the FAA “extends only to the standard of care,” such that “[l]ocal law still govern[s] the other elements (breach, causation, and damages), as well as the choice and availability of remedies.” Id. (quoting Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119 (3d Cir. 2010)). To apply the Gilstrap framework, this Court must “first ask whether the particular area of regulations.’ If so, then any applicable state standard of care is preempted.” Id. (quoting Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806, 808 (9th Cir. 2009)). If the defendant did “all [that] is required under the [FAA] and its implementing regulations, then [it] cannot be held liable under state law for failing to do anything further.” Id. at 1007. But “if [the defendant] fell short of compliance with the [FAA] and its implementing regulations, then whether [a plaintiff] may recover for any injuries . . . caused by [the defendant’s] breach will depend [on whether] California tort law recognizes the FAA standard of care as applicable in negligence and common carrier claims.” Id. Put simply, FAA regulations act as a ceiling to the applicable duty of care under state tort law. Here, section 2100’s “utmost care and diligence” standard is not preempted by the FAA because “the area of aviation commerce and safety at issue in this case” is far from “pervasively regulated.” Id. Plaintiff’s complaint involves two “areas” of aviation safety: (1) how crewmembers should store carry-on luggage in overhead compartments, and (2) how air carriers should train and supervise crewmembers on how to do so. See Compl. ¶ 32. The regulations Defendant cites only state that “each passenger must comply with instructions by crewmembers regarding” what carry-on luggage is allowed aboard an aircraft and how to store it. 14 C.F.R. § 121.589(b). They also state that “entry doors of an airplane [cannot] be closed in preparation for taxi or pushback unless at least one required crewmember has verified that each article of baggage is stowed” in accordance with FAA regulations. See Id. § 121.589 (e). These regulations do not indicate that crewmembers should store carry-on luggage themselves, let alone specify what standard of care they should use while doing so. Moreover, although FAA regulations have entire subparts devoted to “airman and crewmember requirements,” “training program,” and “crewmember qualifications,” none of them discuss how air carriers should train their crewmembers on how to store carry-on luggage in overhead compartments. Id. §§ 121.381– 121.459. The panel in Gilstrap separately applied the “pervasively regulated” framework to each of the “areas” or “activities” that formed the factual basis for the plaintiff’s tort claims. 709 F.3d at allegations that United agents were “repeatedly hostile to her throughout her travels” were not preempted because FAA regulations—like here—“say nothing about how airline agents should interact with passengers.” Id. at 1008. By contrast, the claims based on “United’s failure to provide her with assistance at all in traversing the air terminal before, between, and after flights” were preempted because “[t]he FAA and its implementing regulations establish the standard of care—or duty—that United owed [the plaintiff] regarding that activity”:

The regulations spell out in detail that air carriers must provide assistance when a passenger with a disability requests it for moving “between gates to make a connection to another flight,” 14 C.F.R. § 382.91(a); “moving from the terminal entrance (or a vehicle drop- off point adjacent to the entrance) through the airport to the gate for a departing flight, or from the gate to the terminal entrance (or a vehicle pick-up point adjacent to the entrance after arriving flight),” including “accessing key functional areas of the terminal, such as ticket counters and baggage claim,” id. § 382.91(b); and for “enplaning and deplaning,” id. § 382.95(a). “This assistance must include, as needed, the services of personnel and the use of ground wheelchairs, accessible motorized carts, boarding wheelchairs, and/or on-board wheelchairs . . . , and ramps or mechanical lifts.” Id. Id. at 1007. In Summers v. Delta Airlines, Inc., Judge Koh likewise concluded the plaintiff’s tort claims based on crewmembers’ failure to assist her with boarding and deplaning were preempted because the FAA “provides comprehensive regulations regarding carriers’ obligations to provide boarding and deplaning assistance” and “regarding the training carriers must provide for personnel involved in providing boarding and deplaning assistance.” 805 F. Supp. 2d 874, 883 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing 14 C.F.R. §§ 382.141, 382.143, 382.145). Based on these precedents, the Court concludes Plaintiff’s section 2100 common carrier liability claim is not preempted by the FAA because the federal government has not issued regulations governing how crewmembers must store carry-on luggage in overhead compartments and how airlines should train crewmembers on how to do so. /// /// /// For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff’s premises liability claim, without leave to amend. The Court also DENIES in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff’s section 2100 common carrier claim. This order disposes of Docket No. 9. Dated: September 13, 2021 ______________________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN United States District Judge