Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co.

310 U.S. 573, 60 S. Ct. 1021, 84 L. Ed. 1368, 1940 U.S. LEXIS 1079
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJune 3, 1940
Docket681
StatusPublished
Cited by163 cases

This text of 310 U.S. 573 (Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 60 S. Ct. 1021, 84 L. Ed. 1368, 1940 U.S. LEXIS 1079 (1940).

Opinions

[577]*577Mr. Justice Frankfurter

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question before us is the validity, when challenged by appeal to the Fourteenth Amendment, of an oil proration order promulgated by the Railroad Commission of Texas, insofar as it applies to the respondent’s wells.

To safeguard its oil resources Texas has devised a regulatory scheme for their production, and has placed its administration in the Railroad Commission’s hands. Revised Civil Statutes, Arts. 6014 et seq. In conformity with this statute, which has familiar procedural provisions, the Commission in the fall of 1938 issued the assailed proration order covering the East Texas oil field, where respondent’s wells are located. By this order each well was allowed to produce 2.32% of its “hourly potential” — that is, 2.32% -of its hourly productive capacity under unrestricted flow. But the practical operation of this order was largely cut across by allowances made to “'marginal wells.” These are wells which, if their low productive capacity were legally curtailed, would have to be prematurely abandoned. Therefore the Texas statute gives them a special status. In accord with its policy toward these marginal wells, the Commission freed them from the burden of its hourly potential formula by allowing them production up to twenty barrels a day. Because of the large number of these low capacity units in the East Texas field, approximately 385,000 barrels out of a total daily “allowable” of 522,000 barrels were exempt from the restricting formula, leaving only about 136,000 for the class within which respondent’s wells fell. Application to them of the hourly potential formula resulted in an allotment of only about twenty-two barrels a day to each well. Claiming that such a mode of regulation disregarded its right to the oil in place beneath its leases, respondent sought and obtained a decree from the District [578]*578Court for the Western District of Texas enjoining the Commission from carrying its proration plan into effect. 28 E. Supp. 131. With modification not here relevant the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decree. 107 F. 2d 70. We brought the case here by certiorari, 309 U. S. 646, because of the importance of the matter in the administration of the Texas law and kindred conservation statutes.

As sustained by the findings of the District Court and accepted by the Circuit Court of Appeals, respondent’s claims may be summarized by what follows. The Commission’s proration formula as applied permits other leaseholders, more leniently treated, to capture oil at a more rapid rate than is possible for the respondent, thereby draining away oil which underlies respondent’s leased lands. This is due both to the allocating formula itself, and more especially to the permission granted marginal wells to produce without limit up to twenty barrels a day. The “potential” method of allocation fails to give sufficient weight to relevant factors in the measurement of oil in place, especially to the depth of respondent’s reserves situated in the “Fairway,” a deep and rich portion of the East Texas field. Only an allocation based upon acre-feet of sand or its equivalent would be a reasonable means of measuring the oil in place beneath respondent’s leases; and any formula failing to do this takes respondent’s property without due process of law. Moreover, the allowance made to marginal wells absorbs so much of the total “allowable” as to make the Commission’s order in effect an allocation on a flat per well basis, regardless of great variation in the capacity of the wells and the density with which different leases have been drilled. An important factor in producing this result is the permission frequently granted by the Commission, under power conferred upon it by statute, for departure from its spacing and drilling rules whereby the field has [579]*579been drilled with an irregular density. As a consequence, the more densely drilled tracts adjoining respondent’s leases may, by virtue of their marginal allowances, produce oil in such quantities as to drain away respondent’s reserves. Such is the basis for respondent’s resistance to the order.

Underlying these claims is as thorny a problem as has challenged the ingenuity and wisdom of legislatures. In major part it was created by the discovery of vast oil resources and by their development under rules of law fashioned in the first instance by courts on the basis of analogies drawn from other fields of the common law. In Texas, according to conventional doctrine, the holder of an oil lease “owns” the oil in place beneath the surface. Lemar v. Garner, 121 Tex. 502; 50 S. W. 2d 769; Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160; 254 S. W. 290; 1 Summers, Oil and Gas (2nd ed.), p. 16. But equally recognized is the “rule of capture” which subjects the lessee’s interest to his neighbors’ power to drain his oil away. Therefore, to speak of ownership in its relation to oil, is to imply a contingency of control not applicable to ordinary interests in realty. See Ely, The Conservation of Oil, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1209, 1218-22. Each leaseholder, that is to say, is at the mercy of all those who adjoin him, since oil is a fugacious mineral, the movements of which are not confined by the artificial boundaries of surface tracts. This gap between the geological nature of the oil pool and the formal surface rights of the lessees is frequently bridged by the drilling of “offset wells” at the boundary of each surface tract, so that owners may protect themselves against the exercise of one another’s capture rights. Partly to mitigate the undesirable consequences of this unsystematized development, the oil-producing states, Texas among them, have enacted conservation laws with appropriate administrative mechanisms to control drilling and production. The [580]*580general scheme of the Texas statute is not challenged. Its constitutionality is here settled. Champlin Refining Co. v. Commission, 286 U. S. 210.

But merely writing laws is only the beginning of the matter. The administration of these laws is full of perplexities. State agencies have encountered innumerable difficulties in trying to adjust the many conflicting interests which grow out of the rule of capture and its implications. The experience of Texas illustrates that a brood of litigation almost inevitably follows the inherent empiricism of these attempted solutions. See Ely, op. dt. supra, at pp. 1225-29; Marshall and Meyers, The Legal Planning of Petroleum Production: Two Years of Proration, 42 Yale L. J. 701. For some years the Texas Commission has been engaged in experimental endeavor to devise appropriate formulas for a fair allotment of the allowable production. The commitment of such a delicate task to the administrative process has not escaped challenge in the courts, and at times the challenge has been successful. Compare MacMillan v. Railroad Commission, 51 F. 2d 400; Constantin v. Smith, 57 F. 2d 227; Peoples’ Petroleum Producers v. Smith, 1 F. Supp. 361; Amazon Petroleum Corp. v. Railroad Commission, 5 F. Supp. 633. But such cases are only episodes in the evolution of adjustment among private interests and in the reconciliation of all these private ■ interests with the underlying public interest in such a vital source of energy for our day as oil.

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Bluebook (online)
310 U.S. 573, 60 S. Ct. 1021, 84 L. Ed. 1368, 1940 U.S. LEXIS 1079, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/railroad-commission-of-texas-v-rowan-nichols-oil-co-scotus-1940.