[Cite as Ragouzis v. Madison House Condominium Owners Assn., 2026-Ohio-290.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY
EDGAR T. RAGOUZIS, et al., :
Appellants, : APPEAL NO. C-240624 TRIAL NO. A 2204283 : - vs - : JUDGMENT ENTRY
THE MADISON HOUSE : CONDOMINIUM OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., :
Appellees.
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed for the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date.
Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs are taxed under App.R. 24.
The court further orders that 1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and 2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the Clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on January 30, 2026 per order of the court.
By: Robert A. Hendrickson, Presiding Judge
By: Mike Powell, Judge
By: Juergen A. Waldick, Judge [Cite as Ragouzis v. Madison House Condominium Owners Assn., 2026-Ohio-290.]
Appellants, : CASE NO. C-240624
: - vs - OPINION :
THE MADISON HOUSE : CONDOMINIUM OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., :
CIVIL APPEAL FROM HAMILTON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. A 2204283
Edward J. Collins, for appellant.
Williams & Strohm, LLC, and Nicholas R. Barnes and Brad J. Terman, for appellee, The Madison House Condominium Owners’ Association, Inc.
J.T. Riker Co. L.P.A., and J. Timothy Riker, for appellee, Michael Patterson d/b/a/ SRES, Inc.
OPINION
M. POWELL, J. Case No. C-240624
{¶ 1} Appellant, Edgar Ragouzis, appeals a decision of the Hamilton County
Court of Common Pleas dismissing his complaint with prejudice as a sanction for
Ragouzis' failure to follow the court's orders.
{¶ 2} This appeal arises from a decision in a case involving complex litigation with
a large number of parties, claims, and counterclaims. Our discussion below is limited to
the factual and procedural history relevant to this appeal.
{¶ 3} Ragouzis owns two units in the Madison House, a 175-unit high-rise
building located in Hyde Park, Ohio ("the Condominiums"). On November 21, 2022,
Ragouzis and six other condominium owners filed a 22-count complaint against a
multitude of parties1. The essence of the complaint was that The Madison House
Condominium Owners Association ("the Association") was failing to properly maintain and
repair the Condominiums and a conspiracy and a conflict of interest existed in
transactions. As relevant to this appeal, the complaint included claims against appellees,
the Association, and Michael Patterson, a professional engineer doing business as
SRES, Inc.
{¶ 4} The Association filed a counterclaim in the case, alleging Ragouzis and the
other plaintiffs had interfered with the Association's vendors and contractors and had
engaged in frivolous conduct in filing and pursuing their claims. The counterclaim also
included a claim for breach of a restrictive covenant alleging that Ragouzis had a
substantial and well-documented history of harassing and wrongfully interfering with
Association contractors and vendors. The Association alleged that because of the
interference, vendors had refused to do work and had threatened not to do work or to quit
working. The Association indicated it was sometimes unable to find another vendor to
1. The number of plaintiffs in the case has fluctuated as another plaintiff was added, then plaintiffs began settling their claims. -2- Case No. C-240624
perform the work. The counterclaims alleged that Ragouzis' conduct rose to the level of
nuisance, and that he had engaged in repeated trespass and forced entry into areas of
the Condominiums that he was not entitled to access.
HVAC Leak and the April 11, 2024 Conference
{¶ 5} During the course of the case, problems arose when the HVAC system in
the Condominiums needed repairs. At a case management conference on April 11, 2024,
counsel for the Association explained that in mid-March, a leak was discovered in the
HVAC piping in the unit below Ragouzis' units. Counsel explained that Ragouzis was
placing various conditions on the Association's attempts to gain access to his units to
repair the problem. The Association was able to gain access for an initial inspection but
was having repeated difficulty getting continued access to perform the necessary
additional inspections and repair work. Counsel explained that, despite the fact that the
Association had an easement to perform repairs in the unit upon 24-hours notice,
Ragouzis was placing conditions on access and creating a great deal of difficulty with
scheduling.
{¶ 6} Counsel informed the court that the current situation was related to the
Association's counterclaim alleging the plaintiffs had interfered with the ability of the
Association to perform its maintenance and repair obligations. Counsel asked the court if
it would prefer to facilitate access or if the Association should file a motion for a temporary
restraining order. The court stated that the parties should be able to "talk about and solve
what seems like a pretty simple problem."
{¶ 7} When the court asked Ragouzis why he was not allowing the Association
to repair the leak, Ragouzis initially responded that he had over one million dollars in art
and the Association had not provided a certificate of liability. When the court explained
that the Association did not have to provide that, Ragouzis argued that his insurance
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company required certain movers and that he take the art to certain places. The
Association explained that the companies performing the work were insured and qualified.
Ragouzis then argued that he believed there was asbestos in the wall. The Association
and court assured Ragouzis that if asbestos was encountered, it would be dealt with in a
manner that the law requires.
{¶ 8} After listening to Ragouzis' various arguments, the court instructed, "Mr.
Ragouzis, let them into your house to fix the leak, all right?" The court told Ragouzis that
the Association had an easement to his units to do repairs and Ragouzis was not "going
to stand here and interfere with it so somebody below you has their place fill up with
water." The court told Ragouzis the Association was going to fully fix the issue and
advised the parties that if there was any dispute about the situation, to call and set up a
hearing and the court would deal with it right away. The court warned Ragouzis, "For now,
you will let them in and stop impeding the ability of the Association to do its job. I don't
see how you can simultaneously complain they don't do their job but then make it
impossible for them to do their job."
Ragouzis' Motion for a Protective Order
{¶ 9} The record indicates that after some difficulty, Ragouzis eventually let the
Association into his units on April 16 to perform an initial inspection. A little over a month
later, on May 26, Ragouzis filed a motion for a protective order for his property. He alleged
that the Association needed to do repairs to the HVAC water lines in his wall on May 29th
or 30th. Ragouzis stated that he had previously advised them regarding the concerns for
his artwork, that the Association must assume the risk, and asked for "renumeration" to
fully restore any areas damaged during the repair.
{¶ 10} In response, the Association argued that Ragouzis could not dictate how or
when the Association performs work and he could not deny access to contractors to make
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repairs. The Association explained that it sent Ragouzis a notice on May 16 that a
contractor was available to perform repairs on either May 22 & 23, or, if those dates did
not work, on May 29 & 30. Ragouzis did not respond and on May 20, the Association sent
an email requesting confirmation. Instead of responding with an agreeable date, Ragouzis
filed the motion for a protective order, then sent an email stating he had placed a "legal
notice" on his door prohibiting the Association and contractor access to perform repairs.
{¶ 11} The Association's response further reiterated that this issue had been
discussed at the April status conference and Ragouzis was again ignoring the
Association's attempts to perform the repairs. The trial court found the request for a
protective order not well-taken and denied Ragouzis' motion.
Preliminary Injunction Motion
{¶ 12} The Association attempted to schedule a hearing to address the ongoing
problems scheduling the HVAC repairs. Eventually on June 26, a status conference was
set for July 2 to discuss issues pertaining to the building repairs. However, Ragouzis filed
a request to continue the status conference, stating that he was not available until after
July 22. The Association responded and argued that the request was yet another attempt
to control and delay the case.
{¶ 13} Eventually, on July 10, 2024, the Association filed a request for a
preliminary injunction against Ragouzis. The motion alleged that despite the court's verbal
order at the April conference, Ragouzis repeatedly refused to allow the Association
access for repairs. The motion documented the refusal to allow access on May 22 & 23
or May 29 & 30 discussed above.
{¶ 14} The motion further alleged that after the denial of his motion for a protective
order, Ragouzis still continued to deny access. Repairs were scheduled for June 26 and
27. However, Ragouzis stated that June 26 would not work. Instead of allowing the
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Association to perform the needed repairs, Ragouzis registered a formal complaint with
the City of Cincinnati Buildings & Inspections Department ("the city") and gave inspectors
access to his units on June 26. He then followed up the city inspector's visit with an email,
relaying his understanding that the city would be issuing orders, demanding to receive
those orders by July 17, 2024, and threatening to add the city back into the lawsuit if it
did not meet his demands. As a result of the city's inspection of Ragouzis' units, the city
placed code violation orders on the Association related to the HVAC piping that the
Association had been attempting to repair.
{¶ 15} The Association reiterated that it needed immediate access to Ragouzis'
units to perform repairs to restore cooling to 18 units on the "03 stack" which could not
happen until the HVAC piping was repaired. The Association indicated it had received
numerous complaints from residents, most of whom are elderly, about their inability to
cool their units. The Association further indicated it needed access to comply with the city
orders and to meet its maintenance obligations under the Revised Code and the
Condominium's governing documents. The motion also stated that Ragouzis continued
to harass the Association's vendors, contractors, and attorneys, and attached copies of
emails sent to support this argument. Finally, the motion alleged that Ragouzis continued
to videorecord contractors working on the Condominium's' common elements.
{¶ 16} The motion requested the court order Ragouzis to (1) immediately allow the
Association and its contractors access to his units for HVAC repairs without interference;
(2) allow the Association access for inspections and repairs as necessary during the case;
and (3) refrain from approaching, interacting with, recording or otherwise interfering with
Association contractors and vendors during the case; and (4) refrain from engaging in
behavior on Condominium property that constitutes a nuisance under the governing
documents.
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Preliminary Injunction Hearing
{¶ 17} At the July 24 hearing on the preliminary injunction motion, the Association
explained that after the April status conference discussion, the contractor was finally able
to access Ragouzis' units on April 16. The purpose of this visit was exploratory: to locate
the leak and determine what was necessary to fix it. The second step required access to
the unit to perform repairs, which would take about two days. The Association reached
out to Ragouzis to schedule the repairs but did not hear back. Eventually, the Association
sent a notice scheduling the repairs for May 22 & 23, with May 29 & 30 as an alternative
dates. Ragouzis did not respond, so the Association planned to proceed on the 29th, but
Ragouzis filed the motion for a protective order on May 26.
{¶ 18} After the denial of Ragouzis protection order, the Association then tried to
schedule for June 26 & 27. On the 25th, Ragouzis stated he was not available on the 26th
and instead called the city. The Association explained that after this second step was
completed, a third step would be needed to close the walls. The Association explained
that the constant cancelling and rescheduling was affecting its relationship with the
contractor performing the piping repairs.
{¶ 19} The Association argued that Ragouzis' behavior was part of a bigger issue
that included interference with vendors. The attorney indicated that at the initial case
management conference on March 6, Ragouzis was told not to videorecord and watch
vendors who were doing work in the common elements, but on May 20, Ragouzis had a
videographer walking through the common areas recording the workers on a façade
project.
{¶ 20} The court questioned counsel, asking if the Association had made efforts to
alleviate Ragouzis' concerns. Counsel indicated that Ragouzis initially asked for details
on how the work was to be done and the details were promptly explained to him. However,
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Ragouzis continued to assert an "evolution of demands" regarding the repairs. Ragouzis
demanded to know who was going to be in the unit, attempted to restrict access to certain
workers, demanded that work be performed within a specific time frame, and only on
certain days and times, but did not provide agreeable dates/times. Ragouzis demanded
identification, qualifications and insurance information, and demanded a payment of
$100. The attorney indicated that the conditions changed every time the Association
attempted to gain access to the units.
Preliminary Injunction Order
{¶ 21} On July 30, 2024, the trial court granted the preliminary injunction and
specifically ordered Ragouzis to allow the Association and contractor access on July 31
and August 1, and subsequently as needed on 24-hours notice. The preliminary injunction
further prohibited Ragouzis from approaching, interacting with, recording, and otherwise
interfering with any Association contractor or vendor and enjoined Ragouzis from
conducting future inspections of Condominium property without seven-days notice or
court permission.
Show Cause Motion
{¶ 22} On August 19, less than three weeks after the preliminary injunction was
issued, the Association filed a motion to show cause, alleging that Ragouzis had denied
access to his units on August 15 and was also scraping and manipulating the pipes to
perform his own inspection.
{¶ 23} The motion explained that in an e-mail on August 1, Ragouzis was given
notice of repairs on August 5. He said he was unavailable and tried to push the repairs to
August 6. After some back-and-forth, Ragouzis failed to confirm he would allow access,
but when contractors arrived on August 5, he eventually allowed access. The contractor
was able to complete the HVAC repairs and the repairs passed a city inspection. The next
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steps were insulation and another inspection before walls could be closed.
{¶ 24} On August 13, Ragouzis was given notice of an August 15 date for
completion of the repairs, but when workers arrived at 8:30 am and knocked on the door,
Ragouzis did not answer. When a maintenance worker called, Ragouzis stated that he
would come back at 11:00 a.m. Workers returned at 11:00, but Ragouzis did not answer
or provide access. When the worker again called, Ragouzis stated that he would not allow
workers to access his units because he was meeting with city inspectors that afternoon.
Ragouzis had again contacted city inspectors and insisted they inspect the HVAC piping
and other items in the building.
{¶ 25} City inspectors did not find any of the issues Ragouzis complained of on
August 15. However, Ragouzis sent the city emails, stating that he had not seen orders,
asking what the city was going to do and stating, "I am watching." After the city inspection,
Ragouzis stated that he would "not be letting the Association in to insulate the HVAC
piping or close the walls in the open shaft." Once again, the Association stated that
without access to Ragouzis' units, it was not able to complete the insulation and wall
repairs, and it could not turn the repaired riser on and restore air conditioning.
{¶ 26} The show cause motion also alleged that on August 14, 2024, after the
Association gave Ragouzis notice of the scheduled repairs, the Association received
complaints that debris was entering unit 1403 in the Condominium building. This unit is
directly below Ragouzis' unit and on the same HVAC chase that was being repaired.
When a maintenance worker responded to the complaint and went to the hole in the wall
along the 03 chase, he heard noises from above and observed Ragouzis scraping and
manipulating the HVAC piping and other areas of the wall for over 30 minutes.
{¶ 27} The Association's motion further indicated that Ragouzis was observed
communicating with workers on the façade project on August 15 and that Ragouzis had
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threatened the Association's counsel in an email. The motion requested that the court
dismiss all of Ragouzis' claims in the complaint with prejudice because of these violations.
Patterson filed a motion and memorandum, joining in the Association's show cause
motion. Patterson's motion also requested dismissal of Ragouzis' claims.
Show Cause Hearing
{¶ 28} The court issued a show cause order on August 26 and set a hearing for
August 30. At the hearing, the Association indicated that Ragouzis had denied access for
HVAC repairs after the required notice and had indicated he was not going to allow the
Association any additional access for repairs. The Association explained that the owners
on the "03 stack" continue to suffer from the heat because the Association cannot turn on
the riser until the pipes inside Ragouzis' unit are insulated. The Association further
explained that it could not comply with the city orders without access to Ragouzis' units
and had to file an appeal of the city's orders to avoid a sanction because they were unable
to address the issue.
{¶ 29} As discussed in the motion, the Association also explained that Ragouzis
was observed scraping and manipulating the concrete and pipes inside the walls for over
three hours, causing debris to enter the units below. Issues regarding Ragouzis' email
harassment of attorneys and parties was also presented.
{¶ 30} The Association stated that nothing had changed after the show cause
motions were filed, or after the show cause order was issued, and no further work was
able to be completed. Instead, after the show cause motion was filed, Ragouzis contacted
a professional who conducted an inspection of the HVAC chases on August 25. Ragouzis
did not give notice of this inspection to the Association or court as required. The
Association stated that it was requesting Ragouzis' complaint be dismissed with prejudice
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under Civ.R. 41 as a sanction for his failure to comply with the court's orders.
{¶ 31} The court addressed Ragouzis, who did not dispute that he had refused
access to his units. Instead, Ragouzis attempted to put the refusal into context, arguing
that his refusal was just for that day. He admitted that he talked to workers but
characterized the interactions differently. He further admitted to using a selfie-stick to take
pictures inside the walls and to sending emails and texts. When questioned why he did
not allow the Association to access his units after the show cause motion was filed, or
after it was granted, Ragouzis stated that he still had not let the Association into his units
because a hearing had been scheduled and he felt it would be handled by the court then.
{¶ 32} After hearing from all the parties, the court stated that it had "not heard one
iota of recalcitrance or responsibility or acknowledgement from Ragouzis that his actions
were impeding getting air conditioning to a tower of people." The court found Ragouzis'
actions "reprehensible" and reiterated that Ragouzis had no right to manage the
Condominium repairs or to dictate how they were done. The court concluded that there
was no dispute on the basic facts and no question that Ragouzis had acted contrary to
the court's orders. The court reiterated that it was extremely disappointing and frustrating
that Ragouzis showed no remorse, did not apologize or accept responsibility, and there
was no indication Ragouzis would comply. The court took the matter of what sanction to
impose under advisement.
Order Dismissing Claims
{¶ 33} On September 5, 2024, the court issued a decision and entry finding
Ragouzis in contempt and dismissing his complaint with prejudice. The court's decision
summarized the events discussed above. The court found that at the hearing, Ragouzis
acknowledged that although proper notice had been given, he refused to permit the
Association access on August 15. The court further found that after the motion seeking
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dismissal of his claims and the show cause order were issued, rather than act affirmatively
to correct his violation of the court's order and allow access, Ragouzis decided to wait
until the hearing.
{¶ 34} The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Ragouzis failed to
follow the court's orders and that the appropriate remedy for Ragouzis "egregious and
outrageous behavior" was dismissal of his claims with prejudice. The court stated that
Ragouzis had "delayed and impeded repairs to the Madison House for months despite
this Court's repeated directives, up to and including the issuance of a preliminary
injunction." The trial court continued, stating that "[b]y the time August 15, 2024 rolled
around, there can be no question that Mr. Ragouzis was well aware of what was required
and expected of him with respect to permitting access to his units." The court found
Ragouzis "was cautioned and warned repeatedly" but knowingly and willfully chose not
to comply, knowing his actions allowed a dangerous fire hazard that threatened the safety
of hundreds of other residents." The court further found that Ragouzis "persisted in
making threatening and demeaning statements to counsel."
{¶ 35} The court indicated it had been "exceedingly patient with Mr. Ragouzis, but
he has repeatedly refused to comply with the court's directives or comport himself in an
appropriate manner" and placing the safety of other residents at risk by refusing to allow
access was "the last straw." The court indicated that although Ragouzis stated that he
would have allowed the Association inside to complete work after his refusal on August
14, the court "simply does not buy it" and Ragouzis lacks credibility.
{¶ 36} With regard to dismissal of the complaint, the court stated that its authority
to impose a sanction of dismissal was found in Civ.R. 41(B)(1). The court indicated
Ragouzis was on actual notice that the Association was requesting dismissal as a
sanction because the show cause motion explicitly requested dismissal of the complaint.
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The court found Ragouzis received additional notice when Patterson filed a motion and
also expressly requested dismissal of Ragouzis claims with prejudice.
{¶ 37} The trial court found that despite receiving both filings requesting dismissal,
Ragouzis came to the hearing "having done nothing whatsoever to cure his contempt."
The court stated that Ragouzis had an opportunity to defend his actions at the August 30,
2024 hearing. The court concluded that Ragouzis' "persistent, flagrant and substantial
disregard for the court's rules and orders clearly warrant dismissal" and ordered the
claims dismissed with prejudice.
{¶ 38} Ragouzis now appeals the trial court's decision to dismiss his claims with
prejudice. He raises the following three assignments of error for our review.
{¶ 39} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SEVERE SANCTION OF
DISMISSAL WITHOUT ANY PROGRESSIVE DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES
{¶ 40} THE COURT'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER APPELLANT'S PRO SE
STATUS[ ] RESULTED IN UNFAIR PREJUDICE.
{¶ 41} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND VIOLATED MR. RAGOUZIS' DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS BY DISMISSING HIS CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT
PROVIDING ADEQUATE NOTICE THAT DISMISSAL WAS A POSSIBLE SANCTION
FOR CONTEMPT AND WITHOUT AFFORDING HIM A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY
TO RESPOND TO THE ASSOCIATION'S MOTION TO SHOW CAUSE.
Dismissal Under Civ.R. 41(B)(1)
{¶ 42} As mentioned above, the trial court dismissed Ragouzis' complaint under
Civ.R. 41(B). This rule provides that "where the plaintiff fails to . . . comply with . . . any
court order, the court may, after notice to the plaintiff's counsel, dismiss an action or
claim." Civ.R. 41(B)(1); Quonset Hut Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 80 Ohio St.3d 46, 48 (1997).
{¶ 43} Because the decision to dismiss a case pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(1) is within
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the sound discretion of the trial court, an appellate court reviews the decision under an
abuse of discretion standard. Quonset Hut at 47. "While our review of the trial court's
judgment is deferential, a heighten[ed] abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to
a trial court's decision to dismiss a case with prejudice for the failure to comply with a
court's order." Five Star Fin. Corp. v. Merchs. Bank & Trust Co., 2013-Ohio-3097, ¶ 10
(1st Dist.), citing Jones v. Hartranft,1997 Ohio 203, ¶ 17.
{¶ 44} Notwithstanding the heightened scrutiny, it is not an abuse of discretion for
a trial court to order dismissal where the conduct of the sanctioned party was "'so
negligent, irresponsible, contumacious or dilatory as to outweigh the policy that
disposition of litigation should be upon its merits.'" Goodpaster v. Banker, 2016-Ohio-
1077, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.), quoting Evans v. Smith, 75 Ohio App.3d 160, 163 (1st Dist. 1991);
Ostigny v. France, 2025-Ohio-4885, ¶ 83 (1st Dist.); Quonset Hut at 48. "A trial court may
look to the entire history of the case when making such a ruling." Five Star Fin. Corp. at
¶ 10.
Lack of Progressive Disciplinary Procedures
{¶ 45} In his first assignment of error, Ragouzis argues that the court erred in
imposing the severe sanction of dismissal without any progressive disciplinary
procedures. In this assignment of error, he argues both that the sanction was too severe
and that the court should have first imposed lesser sanctions.
{¶ 46} Ragouzis argues that he attended August 30 hearing and provided
explanation for his alleged non-compliance with the court's order. He contends he only
denied access on August 15 because city officials had scheduled an inspection for the
same day. He further argues that he made it clear he was willing to grant access after
that date, but the Association did not contact him and moved to hold him in contempt. He
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further argues that the court wrongly concluded that he violated the injunction order in
multiple ways, because he had legal access to the common areas where the alleged
inspections occurred and his interaction with workers was a casual conversation with a
worker he had once known and had offered water to drink.
{¶ 47} Ragouzis does not deny that he was aware of the court's orders in the
preliminary injunction. Likewise, he does not deny that he denied access to his unit on
August 15, that he spoke with workers, or that he conducted an investigation on his own.
Instead, he characterizes the events and interactions differently. Our review of the facts
of this case supports the trial court's determination that Ragouzis' conduct was egregious
and outrageous.
{¶ 48} As mentioned above, the issues with gaining access to Ragouzis units in
order to perform the HVAC system repairs began in March. Ragouzis was admonished
by the court at the status hearing in April and told in no uncertain terms to allow access
to his units. Ragouzis allowed access on one occasion, but when the Association tried to
schedule repairs in May, Ragouzis failed to respond to the requests and instead filed a
protective order, alleging essentially the same issues the court had addressed at the April
status conference. Ragouzis denied access and placed a notice on his door prohibiting
entrance. After denial of the protective order, Ragouzis refused to allow access for repairs
scheduled on June 25 and 26, and instead, called the city who issued orders for
essentially the same work the Association had been attempting to complete.
{¶ 49} After the court granted the preliminary injunction, Ragouzis continued to
create problems with the repair scheduled for August 5 by stating he was unavailable and
failing to confirm he would allow access. Although he eventually allowed access on
August 5, Ragouzis did not answer the door for scheduled repairs at 8:00 on August 15,
then told a maintenance worker he would allow access at 11:00, but did not do so.
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Instead, Ragouzis met with city inspectors that afternoon, insisting they perform an
inspection and issue orders.
{¶ 50} In addition, after the preliminary injunction was granted prohibiting contact
with workers and independent inspections without prior approval, Ragouzis was observed
scraping and manipulating the pipes and was observed communicating with workers on
the façade project. Moreover, after the show cause order was issued, Ragouzis had an
inspection performed by an independent party.
{¶ 51} Ragouzis' actions during this time not only inconvenienced the Association
and its vendors, but also the residents of the building, as the air conditioning to the units
on the 03 stack was impacted. As noted above, many of these residents were elderly and
complained to the Association. Moreover, the open walls created a fire hazard to the
building residents. Given the facts of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in dismissing Ragouzis' claims pursuant to Civ.R. 41 as his conduct was so negligent,
irresponsible, contumacious or dilatory as to outweigh the policy that disposition of
litigation should be upon its merits. See Ostigny, 2025-Ohio-4885, at ¶ 83; Quonset Hut,
80 Ohio St.3d at 48.
{¶ 52} Ragouzis also argues that the court should have considered lesser
alternatives, such as intermediate disciplinary procedures, but the court "skipped all
intermediate steps." Ragouzis characterizes the court's sanction as the result of first time,
single violation. However, the record indicates the sanction was the result of a months-
long, ongoing process to get Ragouzis to allow access to his units for repairs. As
discussed above, after the parties tried to work with Ragouzis, the court began its
involvement with informal discussion at the status conference and ordered Ragouzis in
no uncertain terms that he was required to let the contractors in to perform repairs.
Instead, Ragouzis repeatedly delayed and denied access prior to the Association's
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request for injunctive relief. The preliminary injunction, like the court's verbal admonition,
clearly ordered Ragouzis to allow access to his units. Yet, Ragouzis not only failed to
allow access, but also violated the preliminary injunction in other ways by conducting an
inspection, talking to workers, and by scraping and manipulating the pipes.
{¶ 53} Although the court did not impose lesser sanctions, it employed several
intermediate efforts to obtain compliance with its orders and with Ragouzis' duties under
the Condominium documents. Moreover, nothing in the language of Civ.R. 41 requires a
court to employ lesser sanctions before dismissing a party's complaint.2
{¶ 54} As this court has previously noted, "[i]n Quonset Hut, 80 Ohio St.3d at 49,
the Ohio Supreme Court held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a
complaint with prejudice where the party had notice and an ample opportunity to explain
its default and/or correct its default, yet it did not, and there was no reason for the trial
court to expect that one more warning would have prompted the party to comply with the
discovery order it had ignored for over four months . . ." Ostigny, 2025-Ohio-4885, at ¶
93. Likewise, in the case before us, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that Ragouzis' repeated violations of the court's orders were not going to end,
and the only viable option was to dismiss his claims.
{¶ 55} Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Ragouzis
complaint, his first assignment of error is overruled.
2. We note that Ragouzis does not challenge the trial court's use of Civ.R. 41 to dismiss his claims. However, in his reply brief, for the first time, Ragouzis presents other arguments and legal theories in this assignment of error. Under App.R. 16(C), an "appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee." As noted by the Tenth District, "[t]he purpose of a reply brief is to afford the appellant an opportunity to respond to the brief of the appellee, not to raise a new argument for the first time." Russell v. Ryan, 2021- Ohio-2505, ¶ 34 (10th Dist.). Accordingly, this court has not considered those arguments raised for the first time in the reply brief. Loc.R. 16.1(C); Cincinnati v. Triton Servs., Inc., 2022-Ohio-3832, ¶ 23 (1st Dist.).
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Pro Se Status
{¶ 56} Ragouzis argues in his second assignment of error that the trial court erred
in failing to consider his pro se status and he contends that this failure resulted in unfair
prejudice. He argues that the court "failed to acknowledge his pro se status and imposed
an excessively harsh sanction-dismissal with prejudice without progressive sanctions."
He further argues that the trial court "demonstrated clear prejudice" against him when it
dismissed his claims despite mitigating circumstances.
{¶ 57} When the complaint was filed, Ragouzis and the other plaintiffs were all
represented by the same counsel. In February 22, 2024, counsel filed a motion to
withdraw from representation of the plaintiffs.3 The motion to withdraw was granted at a
hearing on February 27, 2024. After counsel withdrew, Ragouzis represented himself,
although at various times during the case indicated that although he did not officially have
counsel, he was acting with the advice/counsel of attorneys in the background.
{¶ 58} We begin our discussion "with the principle that 'some leniency toward pro
se litigants might be appropriate at times.'" Borthwick v. Dept. of Bldg. & Inspections,
2022-Ohio-1335, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.), quoting Chase Manhattan Mtge. Corp. v. Smith, 2007-
Ohio-5874, ¶ 30 (1st Dist.). However, it is well established that pro se litigants are
presumed to have knowledge of the law and that they are held to the same standard as
litigants represented by counsel. Souders v. Lazor, 2025-Ohio-4649, ¶ 27.
{¶ 59} Ragouzis' argument regarding the trial court's failure to grant him leniency
as a pro se litigant does not arise out of Ragouzis failure to comply with court procedure
or rules, such as a missed deadline or misunderstanding of the law. See Mitchell v. Holzer
Med. Ctr. 2017-Ohio-8244, ¶ 7 (4th Dist.) (leniency in briefing); Robb v. Smallwood, 2005-
3. The request to withdraw from representation was based in part by threats from Ragouzis toward counsel. - 18 - Case No. C-240624
Ohio-5863, ¶ 5 (4th Dist.) (leniency in determining assignments of error). Instead, his
argument is essentially that the court failed to be lenient on him in its sanction.
{¶ 60} Ragouzis does not explain why he needed an attorney to follow clear and
direct court orders, or how pro se status contributed to decision to ignore orders. A party's
pro se status does not generally excuse the failure to follow court orders. See Unger v.
Unger, 2004-Ohio-7136, ¶ 22 (12th Dist.); Ransom v. Aldi, Inc., 2017-Ohio-6993 (2nd
Dist.). In this case, Ragouzis' pro se status does not excuse his failure to follow clear and
direct court orders. Moreover, as discussed above, the trial court's decision to dismiss the
complaint as a sanction for failing to follow the court's orders was not error.
{¶ 61} In addition, Ragouzis argues that the trial court was biased against him. As
support, he cites instances where the trial court muted him at an online hearing stating
that it wanted to "focus on being productive" and where the court indicated items would
have been resolved "months and months ago" if Ragouzis had not put everyone through
the "mishigas of these various ups and downs." He argues that he filed an affidavit of
disqualification of the judge, who later recused from the case on February 27, 2025. 4
{¶ 62} This court has recognized a distinction between a claim of judicial bias
relating to the formal process used to remove a judge from hearing a case because the
judge has an interest in the matter or is prejudiced in favor of one party and a claim
relating to the instance where a judge's conduct in overseeing a case prevents a party
from receiving a fair trial. State v. Findler, 2021-Ohio-449, ¶ 20; State v. Loudermilk, 2017-
Ohio-7378, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.). An appellate court has "the authority to review a claim of
judicial bias as it impacts the outcome of the case." Loudermilk at ¶ 19.
4. A new judge was assigned the case after the recusal. The second judge later declared Ragouzis a vexatious litigator.
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{¶ 63} "Judicial bias is demonstrated by 'a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will or undue
friendship or favoritism toward one of the litigants or his attorney, with the formation of a
fixed anticipatory judgment on the part of the judge, as contradistinguished from an open
state of mind which will be governed by the law and the facts.''' Loudermilk at ¶ 21, quoting
State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt, 164 Ohio St. 463, (1956), paragraph four of the syllabus.
"The demonstration of judicial bias is a high bar and we presume that judges are unbiased
and unprejudiced in the matters over which they preside" and "the appearance of bias or
prejudice must be compelling in order to overcome the presumption." (Cleaned up.) Hill
v. Hikel, 2025-Ohio-2161, ¶ 12. "Comments by the trial court 'that are critical or
disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not
support a bias or partiality challenge.''' Escobar, 2021-Ohio-4001, ¶ 38 (1st Dist.), quoting
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
{¶ 64} We have reviewed the record, including the transcripts in this case and find
that the court was exceedingly patient with Ragouzis and that dismissal of Ragouzis
complaint was the result of his actions, not his pro se status or judicial bias. The second
assignment of error is overruled.
Reasonable Opportunity to Respond
{¶ 65} Finally, in his third assignment of error, Ragouzis argues that the court
violated his due process rights because it dismissed his complaint without providing
adequate notice that dismissal was a possible sanction and without affording him an
opportunity to respond to the motion to show cause. Ragouzis argues that Civ. R. 6 allows
responses to a written motion within 14 days and the trial court did not allow him 14 days
to respond. He further argues that neither the preliminary injunction order nor the show
cause order gave him notice that his complaint could be dismissed as a result of non-
compliance.
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{¶ 66} Unless otherwise indicated, a dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B) is an
adjudication on the merits. Civ.R. 41(B)(3). "A dismissal on the merits is a harsh remedy
that calls for the due process guarantee of prior notice." Ohio Furniture Co. v. Mindala,
22 Ohio St.3d 99, 101 (1986). "Civ.R. 41(B)(1)'s notice requirement is satisfied where
plaintiff 'has been informed that dismissal is a possibility and has had a reasonable
opportunity to defend against dismissal.'" Harmon v. Walters, 2025-Ohio-1037, ¶ 19 (1st
Dist.), quoting Quonset Hut, 80 Ohio St.3d at 49. "The purpose of notice is to 'provide the
party in default an opportunity to explain the default or to correct it, or to explain why the
case should not be dismissed with prejudice.'" Logsdon v. Nichols, 1995-Ohio-225, ¶ 22,
quoting McCormac, Ohio Civil Rules Practice, § 13.07, at 356-357 (2d Ed. 1992); Ostigny,
2025-Ohio-4885, at ¶ 86. "Thus, both notice of the possibility of dismissal and a
reasonable opportunity to explain or correct the default or to explain why dismissal is not
warranted are required before a Civ.R. 41(B)(1) dismissal is proper." Harmon, at ¶ 19.
{¶ 67} Civ.R. 6(C)(1) provides that "[r]esponses to a written motion, other than
motions for summary judgment, may be served within fourteen days after service of the
motion." As mentioned, the motion for a show cause order was filed on August 19, the
court's show cause order was issued on August 26, scheduling a hearing for August 30.
Ragouzis claims he was not afforded the 14 days to respond provided in Civ.R. 6. Instead,
he argues he was only given four days before the hearing to respond. First, we note that
Ragouzis had 11 days, from August 19 filing of the show cause motion until the hearing
on August 30, to respond to the Association's motion.
{¶ 68} In addition, Ragouzis failed to raise this issue below and any error would be
subject to a plain error analysis. Calloway v. McKenna, 2023-Ohio-3130, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.).
In an appeal of a civil case, "the plain error doctrine is not favored and may be applied
only in the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which
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no objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the
underlying judicial process itself." Goldfuss v. Davidson, 1997-Ohio-401, syllabus;
Calloway at ¶ 14.
{¶ 69} With regard to Civ R. 41 dismissals, "[t]he purpose of notice is to give the
party who is in jeopardy of having his or her action or claim dismissed one last chance to
comply with the order or to explain the default." Sazima v. Chalko, 1999-Ohio-92, ¶ 13;
Harmon, 2025-Ohio-1037, at ¶ 19.
{¶ 70} In this case, both the Association's show cause motion and Patterson's
motion requested that the court dismiss Ragouzis' complaint as a sanction for his failure
to comply with the court's orders. The Ohio Supreme Court has determined that a party
has adequate notice that dismissal is a possible sanction when the opposing party's
motion requests dismissal. Quonset Hut, 80 Ohio St.3d at 48; Sazima at ¶ 14. Therefore,
Ragouzis had adequate notice that dismissal of his claims was a possible sanction.
{¶ 71} With regard to an opportunity to respond, Ragouzis appeared at the show
cause hearing, participated, and offered evidence. Early in the hearing, the court clarified
that the Association was requesting dismissal of Ragouzis' complaint. Later in the
hearing, the court directly asked Ragouzis why his complaint should not be dismissed
and gave him an opportunity to present arguments for a lesser sanction.
{¶ 72} Moreover, the court asked Ragouzis at the show cause hearing whether he
had filed anything in response to the motions. Ragouzis responded that he had not filed
a response but had reviewed the motions. Shortly after this exchange, Ragouzis indicated
he did not feel it was necessary to file a response to the Association's motion "since we
were having this hearing today." Therefore, we find Ragouzis had both adequate notice
and an opportunity to respond.
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{¶ 73} Although Ragouzis argues that the facts of an Ohio Supreme Court case
are similar to this case, we find the facts differ greatly. See Hillabrand v. Drypers Corp.,
2000-Ohio-468. In Hillabrand, the trial court granted a motion for sanctions two days after
it was filed and before the party had an opportunity to respond in any manner. Id. at ¶ 12.
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, finding the party did not have a reasonable
opportunity to defend against dismissal. Id. The party in Hillabrand had no opportunity to
respond, unlike the case before us. As mentioned, Ragouzis was present at the hearing,
indicated he did not file a response to the motion because "we were having this hearing,"
and was able to fully respond to the allegations and to defend against dismissal.
{¶ 74} Because Ragouzis had adequate notice and an opportunity to respond, his
third assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶ 75} After reviewing Ragouzis' assignments of error, we find no merit to his
arguments. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court to dismiss Ragouzis' complaint as
a sanction for his failure to follow the court's orders is hereby affirmed.
HENDRICKSON, P.J. and WALDICK, JJ., concur.
____________________________
Judges Robert A. Hendrickson and Mike Powell of the Twelfth Appellate District, and Judge Juergen A. Waldick of the Third Appellate District, sitting by assignment in the First Appellate District pursuant to Ohio Const., art. IV, § 5(A)(3).
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