[Cite as Hill v. Hikel, 2025-Ohio-2161.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
DEMETRIUS HILL, : APPEAL NO. C-240671 TRIAL NO. A-2302474 Plaintiff-Appellant, :
vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY CHRISTOPHER HIKEL, :
LIBERTY HILL RENTALS CORP B, : LLC, : LIBERTY HILL MANAGEMENT, LLC, : 34 E 14TH STREET, LLC, : 424 LH, LLC, : and : BURNETT HOLDINGS, LLC,
Defendants-Appellees. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, the briefs, and arguments. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed for the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs are taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that 1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and 2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27. To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 6/20/2025 per order of the court.
By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as Hill v. Hikel, 2025-Ohio-2161.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
DEMETRIUS HILL, : APPEAL NO. C-240671 TRIAL NO. A-2302474 Plaintiff-Appellant, :
vs. : OPINION CHRISTOPHER HIKEL, :
LIBERTY HILL RENTALS CORP B, : LLC, : LIBERTY HILL MANAGEMENT, LLC, : 34 E 14TH STREET, LLC, : 424 LH, LLC, : and : BURNETT HOLDINGS, LLC,
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 20, 2025
Demetrius Hill, pro se,
Rendigs, Fry, Kiely, & Dennis and James J. Englert, for Defendants-Appellees. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
NESTOR, Judge.
{¶1} This dispute arose from accusations by defendant-appellee Christopher
Hikel that plaintiff-appellant Demetrius Hill broke into his apartment and stole his
watch while Hill performed construction work on two lower units in the apartment
building. The Hamilton County Grand Jury did not indict Hill, and he filed this civil
suit against Hikel and his various limited liability companies (collectively
“Defendants”), alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress (“IIED”), among other things. The trial court ultimately
dismissed the malicious prosecution and false arrest claims and granted summary
judgment to Defendants on the sole remaining claim of IIED. Hill now appeals to this
court, asserting five assignments of error related to the trial court judge and the trial
court’s various judgments. After reviewing the record and relevant caselaw, we
overrule all five of Hill’s assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} Because the trial court disposed of this case at the summary judgment
stage, many of the facts remain unresolved and the parties disagree about how the
series of events unfolded. We detail the alleged facts below only to provide a sufficient
backdrop for this appeal, but our decision rests solely upon legal grounds.
{¶3} In early 2022, Hikel asserts that he contracted S.G. to do some
renovation work in two first-floor bathrooms within an apartment building. Hikel
“technically resided” in one of the upstairs units, but did not live there full-time and
only returned every couple of weeks. S.G. asked Hill to help with the project as a
subcontractor. Because there were so many contractors going in and out of the
building at the same time, Hill alleges that he and S.G. decided they would return at a OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
later date to avoid the chaos.
{¶4} Hikel alleged that between approximately April 21 and May 17, he
returned to his personal unit three times, only to find dirt, footprints, and hair that
was not his, scattered around the apartment. In his affidavit, Hikel was adamant that
he did not give any of the contractors the code to enter his unit. Each time he allegedly
found his apartment in this condition, he stated that he asked the cleaner to come and
do a deep cleaning of the apartment. After the second deep clean, he alleges that he
inspected the apartment to ensure its cleanliness.
{¶5} Hikel alleged that he returned to his personal unit in mid-May only to
find it in the same dirty condition. At this point, he asserted that he was worried
someone was entering the unit without his permission. After looking through the
apartment, Hikel alleged in his affidavit that he discovered a bookbag in the master
bedroom closet, and inside that bookbag was a journal with Hill’s name on it. Hill
disputes that he ever entered Hikel’s personal unit and asserts that he left the bookbag
on the first floor of the apartment building. After briefly texting with the cleaner and
S.G. about their knowledge of the alleged acts, Hikel called the police to report the
alleged break-in. Around that time, Hikel stated that he inventoried his belongings
and believed that an expensive watch was missing, which he also reported to police.
{¶6} Officers arrested Hill on June 7, 2022. Ultimately, the Hamilton County
Grand Jury did not indict Hill, and he was released from custody about four days after
his arrest. The events leading up to Hill’s arrest form the foundation of the dispute
before us now.
{¶7} On June 9, 2023, Hill filed this case against Defendants, alleging IIED,
several 42 U.S.C. claims (including a Fourth Amendment personal property claim,
false arrest claim, malicious prosecution claim, and a civil rights violation), and a state
5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
false arrest claim. Defendants initially filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court
partially granted. It dismissed the state false arrest claim and all 42 U.S.C. claims,
leaving only the IIED claim to be litigated. During discovery, Defendants took Hill’s
deposition while he was incarcerated for an unrelated matter. Hill filed several of his
own motions for reconsideration on the dismissed issues and a motion to strike his
deposition, both of which the trial court denied. After discovery concluded,
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining IIED claim, which the
trial court granted.
{¶8} Hill now appeals to this court, asserting five assignments of error. He
first argues that the trial court judge exhibited bias towards him by referencing
previous criminal dealings Hill had with the court. He also alleges that the trial court
erred in dismissing the malicious prosecution and false arrest claims, denying his
motions for reconsideration and to strike his deposition, and granting Defendants’
motion for summary judgment.
{¶9} Again, the parties heavily dispute how the events detailed above
unfolded (and if they ever happened at all). But ultimately, we need not resolve the
facts alleged in this case because the trial court correctly disposed of Hill’s claims on
legal grounds.
II. Analysis
A. First Assignment of Error
{¶10} In his first assignment of error, Hill asserts that the trial court judge
exhibited bias when it made comments during a hearing for this case about Hill’s
unrelated prior criminal matters.
{¶11} While these comments may be concerning, Hill never filed an affidavit
for disqualification of the judge before the Supreme Court of Ohio. Therefore, insofar
6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
as Hill argues that the trial court judge should have recused, we are unable to provide
him any relief. “The Ohio Constitution vests the sole authority for determining the
disqualification of a judge of a court of common pleas in the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Ohio.” Grace v. Perkins Restaurant, 2025-Ohio-213, ¶ 34 (7th
Dist.), citing Ohio Const., art. IV, § 5(C). To properly raise the disqualification of a
judge, “the party must file an affidavit of disqualification with the clerk of the Supreme
Court of Ohio pursuant to R.C. 2701.03.” Id. We are “without authority to consider
an error regarding the recusal or disqualification of a judge of the court of common
pleas.” Id., citing State v. Ramos, 88 Ohio App.3d 394, 398 (9th Dist. 1993), citing
Beer v. Griffith, 54 Ohio St.2d 440, 441-442 (1978).
{¶12} However, we may consider Hill’s claim as part of a due process
argument. “We do have jurisdiction to review a claim of judicial bias that is alleged to
result in a violation of a defendant’s due process rights.” State v. Loudermilk, 2017-
Ohio-7378, ¶ 19-20 (1st Dist.). To the extent we can consider the merits of Hill’s
argument, we still do not believe the trial court exhibited judicial bias. “The
demonstration of judicial bias is a high bar [and] ‘we presume that [judges are]
unbiased and unprejudiced in the matters over which [they] preside[] . . . .’” State v.
Terry, 2025-Ohio-1195, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Escobar, 2021-Ohio-4001, ¶
37 (1st Dist.), quoting Cleveland v. Goodman, 2020-Ohio-2713, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.).
“‘[T]he appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling in order to overcome the
presumption.’” Id., quoting Escobar at ¶ 37, quoting Goodman at ¶ 18. Even if
statements “‘by the trial court “[] are critical or disapproving [], or even hostile to []
the parties . . . [the statements] ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality
challenge.”’” Id., quoting Escobar at ¶ 38, quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S.
540, 555 (1994). Such comments may suffice to demonstrate judicial bias only when
7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
they “‘reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so
if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment
impossible.’” Id., quoting Escobar at ¶ 38, citing Liteky at 555.
{¶13} While the trial court’s statements pertaining to its dealings with Hill in
unrelated criminal matters were uncalled for, they do not overcome the high bar of
showing judicial bias. Throughout the lengthy litigation below, the trial court gave
Hill every chance to present his position. It considered his arguments each time. At
the start of litigation, the trial court asked Hill if he had a problem with the court
presiding over the case due to the prior dealings. Hill said no. At oral argument, Hill
admitted that he did not believe that the trial court judge exhibited bias until much
later in the case. That is not sufficient to overcome the high bar to demonstrate judicial
bias.
{¶14} Therefore, we overrule Hill’s first assignment of error.
B. Second Assignment of Error
{¶15} In his second assignment of error, Hill argues that the trial court
improperly granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss his false arrest and malicious
prosecution claims. We disagree.
{¶16} We review the trial court’s grant of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss
under a de novo standard of review. Menorah Park Ctr. for Senior Living v. Rolston,
2020-Ohio-6658, ¶ 12, citing Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, LLC, 2020-Ohio-4193, ¶
22. “‘In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, we accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint.’” Id., quoting
Lunsford at ¶ 22, citing Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192 (1988).
“‘A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears “beyond doubt from the
complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to recovery.”’” Id.,
8 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
quoting Lunsford at ¶ 22, quoting O’Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc.,
42 Ohio St.2d 242 (1975), syllabus.
{¶17} In its entry partially granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the trial
court explained that Hill filed the false arrest claim beyond the one-year statute of
limitations, and it held that he failed to plead any facts that Defendants acted under
“color of state law” to prove his malicious prosecution claims.
{¶18} A false arrest claim has a one-year statute of limitations that begins to
run on the date of the arrest. See Daly v. Certo, 2025-Ohio-293, ¶ 54 (2d Dist.),
quoting Aaron v. Venator Group, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 464, *2 (6th Dist. Feb. 8,
2022), citing Mayes v. Columbus, 105 Ohio App.3d 728, 746 (10th Dist. 1995) (“‘A
cause of action for false arrest accrues on the date of the complainant’s arrest.’”). Hill
was arrested on June 7, 2022, and he filed suit on June 9, 2023. His filing fell outside
the one-year statute of limitations. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing Hill’s
false arrest claim.
{¶19} Hill filed a malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. “To
maintain a Section 1983 cause of action, ‘two elements are required: (1) the conduct in
controversy must be committed by a person acting under color of state law, and (2)
the conduct must deprive the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States.’” Henderson v. Dewine, 2022-Ohio-
1025, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.), quoting Crosset v. Marquette, 2007-Ohio-550, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.),
quoting 1946 St. Clair Corp. v. Cleveland, 49 Ohio St.3d 33, 34 (1990).
{¶20} Hill asserts that the trial court dismissed his malicious prosecution
claims for failure to file them within the statute of limitations. But as stated previously,
the trial court dismissed Hill’s malicious prosecution claims because he did not plead
any facts that Defendants acted under “color of state law.” “A person is acting under
9 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
the color of state law if ‘the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right
can be fairly attributed to the State.’” (Cleaned up.) Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Ryan,
2010-Ohio-4601, ¶ 48 (10th Dist.), quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S.
922, 937 (1982). The person who acted wrongfully “‘must be a person who may fairly
be said to be a state actor.’” Id., quoting Lugar at 937. To be a state actor, the
individual “‘may be . . . a state official, [one who] acted together with or has obtained
significant aid from state officials, or [one whose] conduct is otherwise chargeable to
the State.’” Id., quoting Lugar at 937.
{¶21} Defendants are an individual property owner and various limited
liability companies related to the development property. Hill made no assertions that
any of them acted under color of state law. He never alleged that they were state actors
by way of their status as state officials, or that they acted in concert with or with the
aid of state officials. Even if we take Hill’s allegations as true, nowhere in his complaint
did he allege that Defendants acted under color of state law. Therefore, there is no set
of facts entitling him to relief on his Section 1983 claim.
{¶22} Based on the reasoning above, we overrule Hill’s second assignment of
error.
C. Third Assignment of Error
{¶23} In Hill’s third assignment of error, he asserts that the trial court erred
in denying his motion to strike his deposition that was taken while he was incarcerated
because he did not receive proper notice of the deposition and he did not have
adequate time to prepare and obtain an attorney if he wished to do so.
{¶24} We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to strike
under an abuse of discretion standard. Derrick v. Budget Car Mart, LLC, 2023-Ohio-
2756, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.), quoting Wicks v. Lover’s Lane Market, 2022-Ohio-2652, ¶ 7
10 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
(9th Dist.). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court “exercise[es] its
judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary
authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.
{¶25} Under Civ.R. 30(A), “any party may take the testimony of any person,
including a party, by deposition . . . .” “The attendance of a party deponent may be
compelled by the use of notice of examination as provided by division (B) of this rule.”
Civ.R. 30(A). Civ.R. 30(B)(1) requires the party requesting to depose an individual to
give “reasonable notice” in writing to each party.
{¶26} Initially, on April 24, 2024, Defendants sent a notice of their intention
to take Hill’s deposition to his listed residential address. However, they were unaware
that at that time, he was incarcerated for an unrelated matter. Under Civ.R. 30(A),
“[t]he deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on
such terms as the court prescribes.” Hill filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion.
Once Defendants discovered Hill’s incarceration, they moved the trial court on May
17, 2024, to allow them to take Hill’s deposition while he was incarcerated and
requested the court to order his transportation to the courthouse for it.
{¶27} Defendants then sent a notice to Hill (at the Hamilton County Justice
Center (“Justice Center”)) on June 14, 2024, to inform him that they intended to
depose him on June 25, 2024, and they included all the necessary information per the
Civil Rule. Officers transported Hill to the courthouse, but the deposition never took
place. Defendants then sent a second notice to Hill at the Justice Center on June 26,
2024, informing him of their intent to take his deposition on July 2, 2024. Hill claims
that he never received these notices, and therefore, he did not have time to properly
prepare for the deposition or retain an attorney if he wished.
{¶28} But the record tells a different story. Hill responded in opposition to
11 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Defendants’ motion to the trial court to allow them to take his deposition. He was also
transported by officers to the first noticed deposition. Therefore, he had notice of
Defendants’ intent to take his deposition. Hill alleges that officers from the Justice
Center informed the trial court that Hill never received the notices. However, when
asked about Hill’s allegations by the trial court, a Justice Center officer said that he
delivers several pieces of legal mail to Hill each day, so he could not say exactly what
Hill received or did not receive. Looking at all of this, there is no indication that Hill
did not have notice of Defendants’ intent to take his deposition. Thus, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it denied his motion to strike his deposition.
{¶29} In a separate but related argument, Hill asserts that the trial court erred
in denying his motion to strike because, as a result of not receiving the proper notice,
he was unable to properly prepare for the deposition or retain counsel for it if he
wished. But for the same failure to point to anywhere in the record supporting this
assertion, we disagree with Hill on this point. Hill knew of Defendants’ intent to take
his deposition as early as June 4, 2024, when he responded in opposition to their
motion to the trial court to take his deposition while incarcerated. That was almost an
entire month before the deposition took place.
{¶30} Furthermore, Civ.R. 30(B)(2) states that “[i]f any party shows that when
the party was served with notice the party was unable, through the exercise of
diligence, to obtain counsel to represent the party at the taking of the deposition, the
deposition may not be used against the party.” There is no evidence that Hill ever
sought or requested time to seek counsel, nor does he make any developed argument
on the point that demonstrates that he is entitled to relief from this court. See
McGowan v. Stoyer, 2002-Ohio-5410, ¶ 23 (10th Dist.) (“Appellant makes a
convoluted and undeveloped argument that under Civ.R. 30(B)(2) and 37, the trial
12 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
court should not have decided appellee’s motion . . . . However, we see no application
of those rules . . . to the present case . . . [as] there is no evidence or argument that
appellant ever actively sought to obtain counsel at any time during the relevant
period.”).
{¶31} All other arguments that Hill makes pertaining to this assignment are
essentially a reiteration of his argument that he did not receive proper notice.
Therefore, they are resolved in the above discussion. Without pointing to any error
evidenced in the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion.
Therefore, we overrule Hill’s third assignment of error.
D. Fourth Assignment of Error
{¶32} In his fourth assignment of error, Hill argues that the trial court erred
when it decided Defendants’ motion for summary judgment prior to resolving his
motion to reconsider the dismissed false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.
{¶33} Hill’s characterization of the record on this point is inaccurate. The trial
court denied Hill’s motion for reconsideration on October 29, 2024. It did not enter a
judgment on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment until October 31, 2024.
Therefore, despite Hill’s assertions, the trial court did dispose of his motion to
reconsider prior to its decision on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
{¶34} Accordingly, we overrule his fourth assignment of error.
E. Fifth Assignment of Error
{¶35} In his fifth and final assignment of error, Hill asserts that the trial court
erred in granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on his IIED claim, which
was the only remaining claim after Defendants’ prior motion to dismiss. Hill only
asserted this claim against defendant-appellee Hikel.
{¶36} We review a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary
13 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
judgment de novo. Ingram v. Progressive Motors, Inc., 2024-Ohio-4996, ¶ 13 (5th
Dist.), citing Doe v. Shaffer, 2000-Ohio-186 (2000). Trial courts “should enter
summary judgment only if it appears that no material fact is genuinely disputed, and,
after construing the allegations most favorably towards the non-moving party, it
determines that reasonable minds could draw only one conclusion from the disputed
facts.” Id. at ¶ 11, citing Hounshell v. Am. States Ins. Co., 67 Ohio St.2d 427 (1981).
To be considered material, “[a] fact . . . [must] affect[] the outcome of the case under
the applicable substantive law.” Id., citing Guernsey Cty. Community Dev. Corp. v.
Speedy, 2023-Ohio-1796, ¶ 24 (5th Dist.), citing Russell v. Interim Personnel, Inc.,
135 Ohio App.3d 301 (6th Dist. 1999).
{¶37} In order to prove IIED, a plaintiff must show “‘(1) that the defendant
intended to cause the plaintiff serious emotional distress, (2) that the defendant’s
conduct was extreme and outrageous, and (3) that the defendant’s conduct was the
proximate cause of plaintiff’s serious emotional distress.’” (Emphasis added.) Licitri
v. Dibaggio, 2024-Ohio-1154, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.), quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 2014-Ohio-
1714, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.), quoting Phung v. Waste Mgt., Inc., 71 Ohio St.3d 408, 410 (1994).
Here, Hikel filed his motion for summary judgment and highlighted specific
statements from Hill’s deposition in support of the motion. Additionally, he filed an
affidavit in support of his motion, where he alleged that the unit was dirty (despite
being cleaned several times), that he found Hill’s bookbag in a closet in the unit, and
that he reported the incident to police. Hikel also stated in his affidavit that he did not
intend to injure Hill and that he only intended to report a suspected crime.
{¶38} After the moving party supports their motion, “‘an adverse party may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party’s pleadings, but the party’s
response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
14 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Ingram at ¶ 12, quoting Civ.R. 56(E).
“Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and
written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in this action, show that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Id. at ¶ 10, quoting Civ.R. 56(E).
{¶39} Upon Hikel’s motion, Hill filed an opposition and attached to it text
messages between Hikel and S.G., and Hikel and the cleaner, in which Hikel
discovered that Hill was a convicted felon and recounted his alleged discoveries in his
unit. But Hill did not attach an affidavit or any other appropriate evidence under
Civ.R. 56(E) that created a genuine dispute as to any material facts. He rested only
upon his allegations and assertions as to Hikel’s intent. Hill failed to set forth “‘specific
facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.’” See Ingram, 2024-Ohio-4996, at ¶ 12
(5th Dist.).
{¶40} Even if we were to consider the text messages attached to Hill’s
opposition to the summary judgment motion, they were still insufficient to create
genuine disputes of material fact. At best, the text messages (and what Hill claims
they showed) were speculative. See Adkins v. City of Middletown, 2025-Ohio-317, ¶
82 (12th Dist.), citing Baldwin v. Church of God of Trenton, 2024-Ohio-1726, ¶ 33
(12th Dist.) (“Speculation does not generate a question of material fact necessary to
defeat summary judgment.”). He put forth no assertions as to what the text messages
demonstrated. Furthermore, the texts do not offer any insight as to what Hikel’s
intentions were. Thus, even if we did consider the texts, they did not create a genuine
issue of material fact.
{¶41} Based on the above reasons, we overrule Hill’s fifth and final assignment
15 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
of error.
III. Conclusion
{¶42} Based on the foregoing analysis, we overrule all five of Hill’s
assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
KINSLEY, P.J., and ZAYAS, J., concur.