Rafael Espinoza Mendoza v. Kristi Noem, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: March 11, 2026
• Docket: 1:26-cv-00702
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9

10 RAFAEL ESPINOZA MENDOZA, Case No. 1:26-cv-00702-JLT-EPG-HC

11 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PETITION FOR WRIT OF 12 v. HABEAS CORPUS AND DIRECT RESPONDENTS TO PROVIDE 13 KRISTI NOEM, et al., PETITIONER WITH A BOND HEARING BEFORE AN IMMIGRATION JUDGE 14 Respondents.

15 16 Petitioner, represented by counsel, is a federal immigration detainee proceeding with a 17 petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons set forth herein, 18 the undersigned recommends that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be granted and 19 Respondents be directed to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before an 20 immigration judge at which the government must justify Petitioner’s continued detention by 21 clear and convincing evidence. 22 I. 23 BACKGROUND 24 Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States in 1994.1 (ECF No. 15 at 25 21.2) Petitioner applied to adjust his status pursuant to section 245(i) of the Immigration and 26 1 The Form I-213 states that Petitioner admitted to an officer that he last entered the United States in 27 1994. (ECF No. 15 at 21.) The petition alleges that Petitioner has been in the United States for over 37 years. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) 1 Nationality Act (“INA”), and his application was denied in or around April 2025. Petitioner filed 2 a timely appeal in or around May 2025. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) 3 On June 29, 2025, an administrative warrant for Petitioner’s arrest was issued. (ECF No. 4 15 at 17.) On July 9, 2025, Petitioner was arrested. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) That same day, the 5 Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a notice to appear, charging Petitioner with 6 removability under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA. (ECF No. 15 at 10–12.) Petitioner is 7 pursuing relief from removal in the form of cancellation of removal. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Petitioner 8 “requested a custody redetermination pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236,” and on December 15, 2025, 9 an immigration judge (“IJ”) denied the request, stating: 10 The Court determines that [Petitioner] has not met his burden to show that he has been “waved-through” for purposes of 11 establishing jurisdiction. See Matter of YAJURE HURTADO, 298 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025); Matter of QUILANTAN, 25 I&N Dec. 12 285 (BIA 2010). Even if the Court did determine that it possessed jurisdiction over [Petitioner]’s request for bond in this case, the 13 Court would independently and additionally determine that Respondent is both a danger and a flight risk. 14 15 (ECF No. 15 at 24.) 16 On January 26, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting that 17 his prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates due process and the Eighth Amendment. 18 (ECF No. 1 at 16–17.) On January 29, 2026, Petitioner filed a motion for temporary restraining 19 order (“TRO”), which was denied as untimely. (ECF Nos. 9, 11.) On February 25, 2026, 20 Respondents filed a response, and Petitioner filed a reply on March 3, 2026. (ECF Nos. 15, 16.) 21 II. 22 DISCUSSION 23 A. Immigration Detention Statutes and Bond Hearings 24 Congress has enacted a complex statutory scheme governing the detention of noncitizens 25 during removal proceedings and following the issuance of a final order of removal. “Where an 26 alien falls within this statutory scheme can affect whether his detention is mandatory or 27 discretionary, as well as the kind of review process available to him if he wishes to contest the 1 Here, Respondents are subjecting Petitioner to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 2 § 1225(b),3 which the Supreme Court has described as follows: 3 Under § 302, 110 Stat. 3009–579, 8 U.S.C. § 1225, an alien who “arrives in the United States,” or “is present” in this country but 4 “has not been admitted,” is treated as “an applicant for admission.” § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission must “be inspected by 5 immigration officers” to ensure that they may be admitted into the country consistent with U.S. immigration law. § 1225(a)(3). 6 As relevant here, applicants for admission fall into one of two 7 categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2). Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens initially 8 determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation. See § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (citing 9 §§ 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7)). Section 1225(b)(1) also applies to certain other aliens designated by the Attorney General in his discretion. 10 See § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). Section 1225(b)(2) is broader. It serves as a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not 11 covered by § 1225(b)(1) (with specific exceptions not relevant here). See §§ 1225(b)(2)(A), (B). 12 Both § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2) authorize the detention of 13 certain aliens. Aliens covered by § 1225(b)(1) are normally ordered removed “without further hearing or review” pursuant to 14 an expedited removal process. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). But if a § 1225(b)(1) alien “indicates either an intention to apply for 15 asylum ... or a fear of persecution,” then that alien is referred for an asylum interview. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). If an immigration officer 16 determines after that interview that the alien has a credible fear of persecution, “the alien shall be detained for further consideration 17 of the application for asylum.” § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). Aliens who are instead covered by § 1225(b)(2) are detained pursuant to a 18 different process. Those aliens “shall be detained for a [removal] proceeding” if an immigration officer “determines that [they are] 19 not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” into the country. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 20 Regardless of which of those two sections authorizes their 21 detention, applicants for admission may be temporarily released on parole “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public 22 benefit.” § 1182(d)(5)(A); see also 8 C.F.R §§ 212.5(b), 235.3 (2017). Such parole, however, “shall not be regarded as an 23

24 3 “District courts around the country have rejected the government’s position that section 1225(b)(2) permits it to pursue mandatory detention against noncitizens who have not been lawfully admitted but 25 have been present in the country for years.” Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser, 801 F. Supp. 3d 919, 936 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citing Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 2637503, at *8 26 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025)). “Respondents acknowledge that the weight of authority is not in their favor in section 1225(b)(2) cases[.]” (ECF No. 15 at 2.) However, the petition does not raise a claim challenging 27 the statutory authority of Petitioner’s detention, and “the Court’s conclusion in this case is based on the length of [Petitioner]’s detention without a hearing, not the statutory basis for his detention.” Doe v. 1 admission of the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Instead, when the purpose of the parole has been served, “the alien shall forthwith 2 return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same 3 manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” Ibid. 4 5 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287–88 (2018). 6 In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to 7 prolonged detention under § 1231(a)(6) by noncitizens who “had been ordered removed by the 8 government and all administrative and judicial review was exhausted, but their removal could 9 not be effectuated because their designated countries either refused to accept them or the United 10 States lacked a repatriation treaty with the receiving country.” Prieto–Romero, 534 F.3d at 1062 11 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–86). The Supreme Court held that § 1231(a)(6) does not 12 authorize indefinite detention and “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period 13 reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” Zadvydas, 533 14 U.S. at 689. Thus, after a presumptively reasonable detention period of six months, a noncitizen 15 was entitled to release if “it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal 16 in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701. 17 In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to 18 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The Supreme Court upheld its “longstanding 19 view that the Government may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited period 20 necessary for their removal proceedings.” Id. at 526. The Supreme Court distinguished Zadvydas 21 by emphasizing that mandatory detention under § 1226(c) has “a definite termination point” and 22 “in the majority of cases it lasts for less than the 90 days . . . considered presumptively valid in 23 Zadvydas.” Id. at 529. However, Justice Kennedy specifically noted that “a lawful permanent 24 resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to an individualized determination as to his 25 risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified.” 26 Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 27 “In a series of decisions, the [Ninth Circuit] . . . grappled in piece-meal fashion with whether the various immigration detention statutes may authorize indefinite or prolonged 1 detention of detainees and, if so, may do so without providing a bond hearing.” Rodriguez v. 2 Hayes (Rodriguez I), 591 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010). This culminated in Rodriguez v. 3 Robbins (Rodriguez III), 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), in which the Ninth Circuit held that for 4 noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c), “the government must 5 provide periodic bond hearings every six months so that noncitizens may challenge their 6 continued detention as ‘the period of . . . confinement grows.’” 804 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Diouf 7 v. Napolitano (Diouf II), 634 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011)). Importantly, the Ninth Circuit 8 applied the canon of constitutional avoidance to interpret these immigration detention provisions 9 as providing a statutory right to a bond hearing once detention become prolonged. See Rodriguez 10 Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2022). 11 In Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Supreme held that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the 12 constitutional avoidance canon to find that §§ 1225(b)(1), (b)(2), and 1226(c) “contain an 13 implicit 6–month limit on the length of detention” and “[o]nce that 6–month period elapses, 14 respondents contend, aliens previously detained under those provisions must instead be detained 15 under the authority of § 1226(a), which allows for bond hearings in certain circumstances.” 583 16 U.S. at 297–98, 304–305. Jennings also rejected the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of a statutory 17 right under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to “periodic bond hearings every six months in which the 18 Attorney General must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the alien’s continued 19 detention is necessary.” Id. at 306. The case was remanded to the Ninth Circuit “to consider [the] 20 constitutional arguments on their merits.” Id. at 312. The Ninth Circuit likewise remanded the 21 case to the district court to consider the constitutional arguments in the first instance but 22 observed that it had “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention 23 without any process is constitutional or that those who founded our democracy precisely to 24 protect against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so.” Rodriguez v. Marin, 25 909 F.3d 252, 255, 256 (9th Cir. 2018). 26 There has been a dearth of guidance regarding the point at which an immigration 27 detainee’s continued mandatory detention becomes unconstitutional. See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 1 declined to decide constitutional challenges to bond hearing procedures in the immigration 2 detention context”). The Ninth Circuit has yet to take a position on whether due process requires 3 a bond hearing for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), but it has recognized that 4 “district courts throughout this circuit have ordered immigration courts to conduct bond hearings 5 for noncitizens held for prolonged periods under § 1226(c)” based on due process and noted that 6 “[a]ccording to one such court order, the ‘prolonged mandatory detention pending removal 7 proceedings, without a bond hearing, will—at some point—violate the right to due process.’” 8 Martinez v. Clark, 36 F.4th 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted), vacated on other 9 grounds, 144 S. Ct. 1339 (2024). 10 As noted above, the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to mandatory detention 11 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) in Demore. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 514 (“Respondent . . . filed a 12 habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 . . . challenging the constitutionality of 13 § 1226(c) itself.” (emphasis added)); Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 149 n.22 (2d Cir. 2024) 14 (“Demore ruled on a due process challenge to the facial constitutionality of section 1226(c)[.]”). 15 In Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019), the Supreme Court expressly preserved the right to 16 bring an as-applied challenge: “Our decision today on the meaning of that statutory provision 17 [§ 1226(c)] does not foreclose as-applied challenges—that is, constitutional challenges to 18 applications of the statute as we have now read it.” Preap, 586 U.S. at 420. See Black, 103 F.4th 19 at 149 (Demore “said nothing about whether due process may eventually require a hearing. If 20 Demore had, in fact, foreclosed the due process challenge now before us, the Jennings Court 21 would have had no reason to remand to the Ninth Circuit ‘to consider ... in the first instance’ the 22 detainees’ argument that ‘[a]bsent ... a bond-hearing requirement, ... [section 1226(c)] would 23 violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.’” (alterations in original) (quoting 24 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 291, 312)). As noted above, Jennings held the Ninth Circuit erred in 25 finding a statutory right to periodic bond hearings under § 1225(b) and § 1226(a) but did not 26 address the constitutional arguments. 27 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Petitioner’s as-applied constitutional 1 B. Procedural Due Process 2 Courts in the Ninth Circuit have taken a variety of approaches to determine whether due 3 process requires a bond hearing in a particular immigration detention case. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 4 2019 WL 7491555, at *6 (applying bright-line rule that “detention becomes prolonged after six 5 months and entitles [the petitioner] to a bond hearing” in § 1226(c) context); Banda v. 6 McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1117 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (considering six factors, which 7 include: “(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future detention; (3) 8 the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) 9 delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood that the 10 removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal” in § 1225(b) context); Juarez v. 11 Wolf, No. C20-1660-RJB-MLP, 2021 WL 2323436, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 2021) 12 (considering, in addition to six factors set forth above, “whether the detention will exceed the 13 time the petitioner spent in prison for the crime that made him [or her] removable” and “the 14 nature of the crimes the petitioner committed” in § 1226(c) context), report and recommendation 15 adopted, 2021 WL 2322823 (W.D. Wash. June 7, 2021); Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 16 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (considering “the total length of detention to date, the likely duration of 17 future detention, and the delays in the removal proceedings caused by the petitioner and the 18 government” in § 1226(c) context). 19 There are also some courts that apply the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 20 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Zagal-Alcaraz v. ICE Field Off., No. 3:19-cv-01358-SB, 2020 WL 21 1862254, at *3–4 (D. Or. Mar. 25, 2020) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 22 2020 WL 1855189 (D. Or. Apr. 13, 2020). In Rodriguez Diaz, which concerned a noncitizen 23 detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and whether “continued detention was unconstitutional 24 because under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, he is entitled to a second bond 25 hearing at which the government bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence,” 26 the panel majority “assume[d] without deciding” that the Mathews test applied, noting that the 27 Ninth Circuit has “regularly applied Mathews to due process challenges to removal 1 heightened governmental interest in the immigration detention context.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 2 F.4th at 1193, 1206. Similarly, the dissent “agree[d] that the test developed in Mathews v. 3 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), is the appropriate legal framework 4 to determine whether there was a due process violation.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1219 5 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting). See also Black, 103 F.4th at 147 (“conclud[ing] that due process 6 challenges to prolonged detention under section 1226(c) should also be reviewed under 7 Mathews”); A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 1424382 (E.D. Cal. 8 May 16, 2025) (applying Mathews test to determine whether due process entitled petitioner to a 9 bond hearing in § 1225(b) context), findings and recommendations adopted, 2025 WL 1808676 10 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2025). 11 In the petition, Petitioner applies a reasonableness test with three main factors (good faith 12 challenge to removal, length of detention, and likelihood detention will continue pending future 13 proceedings) and the Mathews test. (ECF No. 1 at 7–13.) Given that the Ninth Circuit has 14 “regularly applied Mathews to due process challenges to removal proceedings,” Rodriguez Diaz, 15 53 F.4th at 1193, the Court will apply the Mathews test. 16 In Mathews, the Supreme Court held that “identification of the specific dictates of due 17 process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors”: 18 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through 19 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 20 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 21 requirements would entail. 22 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334. 23 1. Private Interest 24 Respondents argue that “Petitioner does not possess the right to freedom from 25 immigration detention in any form other than the form provided by Congress.” (ECF No. 15 at 3 26 (citing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)).) However, Mezei 27 addressed due process rights with respect to admission, and here, Petitioner is not raising claims 1 1163, 1171 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (“Defendants ask the Court to extract from Thuraissigiam a 2 broad rule that any inadmissible noncitizen possesses only those due process rights afforded to 3 them by statute, regardless of the nature of their status or the relief they seek. But such a 4 conclusion is untethered to the claim in Thuraissigiam and the Court’s reasoning. 5 Thuraissigiam’s discussion of due process is necessarily constrained to challenges to 6 admissibility to the United States.”), appeal filed, No. 24-2801 (9th Cir. argued May 21, 2025). 7 With respect to the first factor, the Court finds that the private interest at issue here is 8 fundamental. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other 9 forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process] Clause 10 protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. The Ninth Circuit has held that it “is beyond dispute” an 11 immigration detainee’s “private interest at issue here is ‘fundamental’: freedom from 12 imprisonment is at the ‘core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.’” Hernandez v. 13 Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 14 (1992)). See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207 (“We have also held, more generally, that an 15 individual’s private interest in ‘freedom from prolonged detention’ is ‘unquestionably 16 substantial.’ . . . Rodriguez Diaz has a legitimate and reasonably strong private liberty interest 17 under Mathews.” (quoting Singh, 638 F.3d at 1208)). Accordingly, the first Mathews factor 18 weighs in favor of Petitioner. 19 2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation 20 With respect to the second factor, “[i]n evaluating the risk of erroneous deprivation in the 21 context of noncitizen detention, the Ninth Circuit has looked to whether the detainee has a 22 statutory right to procedural protections, such as individualized custody determinations and the 23 right to seek additional bond hearings throughout detention.” Jensen v. Garland, No. 5:21-cv- 24 01195-CAS (AFM), 2023 WL 3246522, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2023) (citing Rodriguez Diaz, 25 53 F.4th at 1209–10 (finding a small risk of erroneous deprivation where petitioner was detained 26 under § 1226(a) and thus received numerous procedural protections, including individualized 27 custody determinations and right to seek additional bond hearings)). 1 Although the Supreme Court has rejected the Ninth Circuit’s application of the 2 constitutional avoidance canon and its statutory interpretation of § 1225(b), the Court finds 3 Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013), informative regarding the 4 constitutional issues before this Court. The Ninth Circuit “note[d] that the discretionary parole 5 system available to § 1225(b) detainees is not sufficient to overcome the constitutional concerns 6 raised by prolonged mandatory detention” because the “parole process is purely discretionary 7 and its results are unreviewable by IJs” and “release decisions are based on humanitarian 8 considerations and the public interest.” Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d at 1144. See Padilla v. U.S. 9 Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1174 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (finding Plaintiffs 10 “allege[d] a viable due process claim” because “the parole process available to them under 8 11 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) is not a constitutionally adequate substitute for a bond hearing 12 particularly since it does not test the necessity of detention,” “does not afford the noncitizen an 13 in-person adversarial hearing before a neutral decisionmaker where he or she may present 14 witness testimony or evidence,” does not require “the ICE detention officer [to] make any factual 15 findings or provide their reasoning, and there is no apparent right to an administrative appeal”). 16 Petitioner has been detained since July 9, 2025, (ECF No. 1 at 5), a period of eight 17 months, and has not received any bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker with authority to 18 grant bond. Accordingly, the Court finds that the risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s 19 liberty interest and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards is high. See Jimenez v. 20 Wolf, No. 19-cv-07996-NC, 2020 WL 510347, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2020) (“[T]he risk of an 21 erroneous deprivation of Landeros Jimenez’s liberty interest is high. He has not received any 22 bond or custody redetermination hearing during his one-year detention. Thus, the probable value 23 of additional procedural safeguards—a bond hearing—is high, because Respondents have 24 provided virtually no procedural safeguards at all.”). Therefore, the second Mathews factor 25 weighs in favor of Petitioner. 26 3. Government’s Interest 27 With respect to the third and final factor, the Court recognizes that “the government 1 violation of our law’” and “has an obvious interest in ‘protecting the public from dangerous 2 criminal aliens.’” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 (quoting Demore, 538 U.S. at 518, 515). The 3 Ninth Circuit has stated that “[t]hese are interests of the highest order that only increase with the 4 passage of time,” noting that “[t]he longer detention lasts and the longer the challenges to an IJ’s 5 order of removal take, the more resources the government devotes to securing an alien’s ultimate 6 removal” and “[t]he risk of a detainee absconding also inevitably escalates as the time for 7 removal becomes more imminent.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208. 8 However, it is important to stress that the “government interest at stake here is not the 9 continued detention of Petitioner, but the government’s ability to detain him without a bond 10 hearing.” Zagal-Alcaraz, 2020 WL 1862254, at *7. See Zerezghi v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. 11 Servs., 955 F.3d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting that “the question [under the third Mathews 12 factor] is not the government’s interest in immigration enforcement” “in general” (emphasis 13 added)); Henriquez v. Garland, No. 5:22-cv-00869-EJD, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 14 June 14, 2022) (“Although the Government has a strong interest in enforcing the immigration 15 laws and in ensuring that lawfully issued removal orders are promptly executed, the 16 Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without providing an individualized bond hearing 17 is low.”). 18 Courts generally have found that the cost of providing a bond hearing is relatively 19 minimal, and there is nothing in the record before this Court demonstrating that providing 20 Petitioner with a bond hearing would be fiscally or administratively burdensome. See Marroquin 21 Ambriz v. Barr, 420 F. Supp. 3d 953, 964 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (noting in context of a § 1226(a) 22 detention, the parties did not contest “that the cost of conducting a bond hearing, to determine 23 whether the continued detention of Petitioner is justified, is minimal”); Singh v. Barr, 400 F. 24 Supp. 3d 1005, 1021 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (noting in the context of § 1226(a) detention that “[t]he 25 government has not offered any indication that a [ ] bond hearing would have outside effects on 26 its coffers”). Accordingly, the third Mathews factor weighs in favor of Petitioner. 27 /// 1 In sum, each of the Mathews factors weighs in favor of Petitioner. Accordingly, the 2 undersigned recommends finding that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing.4 3 C. Exhaustion 4 Respondents contend in the alternative that Petitioner has failed to exhaust administrative 5 remedies. (ECF No. 15 at 3–4.) Petitioner argues: 6 Respondents’ arguments are contradictory. First, they claim that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention, using a case that 7 concludes that the IJ lacks the jurisdiction to hear 1225(b)(2) petitioner bond requests, only to then say that this Court should not 8 grant Petitioner relief because he has not exhausted his remedies with the IJ and the BIA, the very same IJ and BIA that supposedly 9 lack jurisdiction under Hurtado. 10 (ECF No. 16 at 2.) 11 “As a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available 12 judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Ward v. Chavez, 678 13 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). However, because it is not a jurisdictional 14 prerequisite, exhaustion can be waived. Id. (citations omitted). “Courts may require prudential 15 exhaustion if”: 16 (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation 17 of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to 18 allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review. 19 20 Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted)). “Nonetheless, even if 21 the three Puga factors weigh in favor of prudential exhaustion, a court may waive the prudential 22 exhaustion requirement if ‘administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of 23 administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the 24 administrative proceedings would be void.’” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 25 2017) (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)). 26 Here, the Court finds that prudential exhaustion can be waived. “[W]here the agency’s 27 position on the question at issue ‘appears already set,’ and it is ‘very likely’ what the result of 1 recourse to administrative remedies would be, such recourse would be futile and is not required.” 2 El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Exec. Off. of Immigr. Rev., 959 F.2d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 1991) 3 (quoting SAIF Corp./Oregon Ship v. Johnson, 908 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th Cir. 1990)). “The Court 4 joins the multitude of district courts to consider this issue recently in the context of habeas 5 petitions filed by immigrant detainees and finds ‘pursuit of administrative remedies would 6 almost certainly be futile given the BIA’s recent holding that all noncitizens detained in the 7 United States without admission are “seeking admission” for purposes of 8 U.S.C. 8 § 1225(b)(2)(A) and must be detained.’” Cerro Huerta v. Bondi, No. 1:25-cv-00941-JLT-HBK 9 (HC), 2026 WL 74152, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2026) (quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv- 10 01543-DCJ-SCR, 2025 WL 3523057, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025)) (collecting cases). See 11 Prem S. v. Warden of Golden State Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:25-cv-01869-TLN-SCR, 2025 12 WL 3724854, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 2025) (“fundamentally disagree[ing]” with government’s 13 exhaustion argument because “it is clear any immigration judge and the BIA would accept 14 § 1225(b)(2) applies to Petitioner given the BIA’s recent decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 15 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), which upheld the legal interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) that 16 Respondents put forth” and therefore declining to “subject Petitioner to a fruitless exercise where 17 this [is] a predetermined outcome”); Estrada-Samayoa v. Cruz, No. 1:25-CV-01565-EFB (HC), 18 2025 WL 3268280, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025) (“The Court agrees that waiver of 19 petitioner’s exhaustion of administrative remedies is appropriate. Petitioner has demonstrated 20 that presentation of his claims to the BIA would be futile in light of the BIA’s decision in Matter 21 of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 20025).”). 22 D. Appropriate Remedy 23 Petitioner requests this Court to hold a hearing to determine whether Petitioner’s 24 detention is warranted. (ECF No. 1 at 17.) “The Court finds, consistent with other post-Jennings 25 cases, that the appropriate remedy is a bond hearing before an immigration judge[.]” Lopez, 631 26 F. Supp. 3d at 882. The Court now turns to the burden of proof at the bond hearing and which 27 party should bear such burden. 1 Having “previously applied the canon of constitutional avoidance to interpret . . . 2 immigration provisions—8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(c), and 1231(a)(6)—as providing a statutory 3 right to a bond hearing once detention becomes prolonged,” the Ninth Circuit in Singh 4 “concluded that for these hearings to comply with due process, the government had to bear the 5 burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the alien poses a flight risk or a danger 6 to the community.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1196 (citing Singh, 638 F.3d at 1203–05). 7 Although Rodriguez Diaz may have declined to impose the standard articulated in Singh, the 8 panel majority specifically stated that it was not “decid[ing] whether Singh remains good law in 9 any respect following Jennings” and even recognized that Singh was based “on general 10 principles of procedural due process, reasoning that a detained person’s liberty interest is 11 substantial.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1202 n.4, 1199. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has 12 suggested post-Jennings that Singh remains good law in Martinez v. Clark, which took “no 13 position” on “[w]hether due process requires a bond hearing for aliens detained under 14 § 1226(c),” but did address “the scope of federal court review of those bond determinations” and 15 found with respect to a bond hearing for a noncitizen detained under § 1226(c) that “the BIA 16 properly noted that the government bore the burden to establish by clear and convincing 17 evidence that Martinez is a danger to the community.” Martinez, 36 F.4th at 1223, 1231. On 18 remand, and after Rodriguez Diaz was decided, the Martinez panel reconfirmed “that the 19 government bore the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Martinez is a 20 danger to the community” and “that the BIA applied the correct burden of proof.” Martinez v. 21 Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785, 786 (9th Cir. 2024). 22 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the government must justify Petitioner’s 23 continued confinement by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or a 24 danger to the community. See A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00107-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 25 1808676, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2025) (directing respondent “to schedule a bond hearing before 26 an immigration judge . . . wherein respondent must justify petitioner’s continued detention by 27 clear and convincing evidence” in § 1225(b) context); Sanchez-Rivera v. Matuszewski, No. 22- 1 overwhelming majority of courts that have held that the government must justify the continued 2 confinement of a non-citizen detainee under § 1226(c) by clear and convincing evidence that the 3 non-citizen is a flight risk or a danger to the community”). 4 Further, in the event Petitioner is determined not to be a danger to the community and not 5 to be so great a flight risk as to require detention without bond, the IJ should consider 6 Petitioner’s financial circumstances or alternative conditions of release. See Hernandez v. 7 Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 1000 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their challenge 8 under the Due Process Clause to the government’s policy of allowing ICE and IJs to set 9 immigration bond amounts without considering the detainees’ financial circumstances or 10 alternative conditions of release.”); Black, 103 F.4th at 138 (The district court “correctly directed 11 the immigration judge (‘IJ’), in setting his bond and establishing appropriate terms for his 12 potential release, to consider his ability to pay and alternative means of assuring appearance.”). 13 III. 14 RECOMMENDATION 15 Accordingly, the undersigned HEREBY RECOMMENDS that: 16 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be granted on the first claim for relief; 17 and 18 2. Respondents be directed to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing before an immigration 19 judge to be held within THIRTY (30) days that complies with the requirements set forth 20 in Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011), at which 21 a. “the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that [Petitioner] is 22 a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond,” Singh, 638 23 F.3d at 1203, and 24 b. the IJ should consider Petitioner’s financial circumstances or alternative 25 conditions of release in the event Petitioner is determined not to be a danger to the 26 community and not to be so great a flight risk as to require detention without 27 bond. ] This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 2 | Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 3 | Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 4 | FOURTEEN (14) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 5 | written objections, no longer than fifteen (15) pages, including exhibits, with the Court and 6 | serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 7 | Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed 8 | within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The assigned United States District 9 | Court Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 10 | The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 11 | right to appeal the District Court’s order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 12 | 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 13 14 IT IS SO ORDERED.

15} Dated: _Marech 10, 2026 [see heey — 16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28