R & M Innovations LLC v. Alliance Sales & Marketing MW, Inc. and Does 1 to 20; Bright People Foods, Inc., DBA Dr. McDougall’s Right Foods v. Alliance Sales & Marketing MW, Inc. and Does 1 to 20

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: May 29, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00060
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 R & M INNOVATIONS LLC, No. 2:24-cv-0060 WBS AC 13 Plaintiff and Counterdefendant, 14 v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 15 THE PARTIES’ MOTIONS FOR ALLIANCE SALES & MARKETING MW, PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 16 INC., and DOES 1 TO 20,

17 Defendant and Counterclaimant. 18

19 BRIGHT PEOPLE FOODS, INC., DBA No. 2:24-cv-0058 WBS AC 20 DR. MCDOUGALL’S RIGHT FOODS, 21 Plaintiff and Counterdefendant, 22 v. 23 ALLIANCE SALES & MARKETING MW, 24 INC., and DOES 1 TO 20,

25 Defendant and Counterclaimant. 26

27 28 1 ----oo0oo---- 2 These now-related actions concern commercial disputes 3 between plaintiffs and counter-defendants Bright People Foods, 4 Inc. (“BPF”), R & M Innovations LLC (“R&M”), and defendants and 5 counterclaimants Alliance Sales and Marketing (“Alliance”). BPF 6 and R&M originally filed claims for breach of contract seeking 7 declaratory relief in state court in connection with Alliance’s 8 alleged failure to perform its contractual obligations. (Docket 9 No. 1.) After removing to this court, Alliance filed 10 counterclaims against plaintiffs for breach of contract and 11 violations of the Wholesale Sales Representative Act. (Docket 12 No. 22.) All parties move for partial summary judgment and to 13 exclude expert testimony. (Docket Nos. 54, 57, 62.)1 14 I. Motions to Exclude Expert Testimony 15 Both plaintiffs and Alliance have moved to exclude 16 testimony of their competing expert witnesses at trial. (Docket 17 Nos. 59, 63.) As explained to counsel at oral argument, the 18 motions to exclude expert testimony will be denied without 19 prejudice, with the parties instructed to renew their motions in 20 accordance with the procedure which will be set forth in the 21 Pretrial Order if they so wish. 22 II. The Motions for Partial Summary Judgment 23 Alliance moves for summary judgment on its claims that 24 (1) BPF and R&M materially breached the agreements, (2) those 25 material breaches excused Alliance’s performance, and (3) the 26 1 Plaintiffs BPF and R&M filed duplicate motions for 27 summary judgment containing identical arguments. (See generally Docket Nos. 54, 57.) For purposes of this order, the court will 28 analyze the motions together. 1 actions of BPF and R&M constitute violations of the Wholesale 2 Sales Representatives Act, California Civil Code Section 1738.10, 3 et seq. (Docket No. 62 at 6.) Plaintiffs make two threshold 4 arguments: (1) Alliance’s claims pre-dating August 2023 are 5 barred because of limitations in Section 19 of the agreement; and 6 (2) Alliance cannot bring claims under the Wholesale Sales 7 Representatives Act because it does not qualify as a “wholesale 8 sales representative.” (Docket No. 64.) 9 A. The Term “Dispute” in Section 19’s First Clause 10 Plaintiffs’ first argument concerns the first clause of 11 Section 19 of the agreements, which reads: “any disputes over 12 brokerage commissions due must be initiated within 60 days of 13 brokerage payment for that month.” (Docket No. 54-3 at 3.) 14 Plaintiffs argue that the term “dispute” denotes legal action and 15 required Alliance to bring such “an action within 60 days of [a] 16 payment or waive its right” to do so. (Docket No. 57 at 7.) 17 Alliance argues that plaintiffs’ interpretation improperly limits 18 the meaning of “dispute” to lawsuits. (Docket No. 70 at 12.) 19 Contract interpretation is a question of law, unless 20 “ascertaining the intent of the parties at the time the contract 21 was executed depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence,” 22 in which case the interpretive question is resolved by the 23 factfinder. City of Hope National Medical Center v. Genentech, 24 Inc., 43 Cal. 4th 375, 395 (2008). Words of a contract are to be 25 understood “in their ordinary and popular sense . . . unless used 26 by the parties in a technical sense[.]” Cal. Civ. Code § 1644. 27 Nowhere in the agreements is the term “dispute” defined 28 in any technical sense. (See Docket 54-3 at 3-5.) Plaintiffs’ 1 argument that the term requires legal action is thus unsupported 2 by the agreement, which contains no references to filing a 3 complaint or instituting an action. The Ninth Circuit has also 4 understood “dispute” to “mean[] [a] conflict or controversy, esp. 5 one that has given rise to a particular lawsuit . . . [and this] 6 definition is not limited to court proceedings.” Nomadix, Inc. 7 v. Guest-Tek Interactive Ent. Ltd., No. 20-55439, 2021 WL 8 4027807, at *2 (9th Cir. 2021). 9 In light of the above, the court agrees with Alliance 10 and interprets “dispute” within the meaning of Section 19 to 11 encompass a “conflict or controversy” over commission payments, 12 including written communications asserting that the other party 13 is in breach of its obligations. Nomadix, Inc., 2021 WL 4027807, 14 at *2. The record here contains more than a dozen instances of 15 such communications, wherein Alliance informed BPF and R&M of 16 late payments and missing documentation, at times using urgent 17 language suggesting that the commercial relationship was in 18 jeopardy. (See generally Declaration of Erik C. Olson (“Olson 19 Decl.”) (Docket No. 62-2.) These communications fall within the 20 meaning of the term “dispute” as used in Section 19, which 21 defeats plaintiffs’ argument at summary judgment that Alliance’s 22 claims are barred by this provision. Accordingly, the court will 23 not grant summary judgment in plaintiffs’ favor on this basis. 24 B. Section 19’s Second Clause 25 Plaintiffs also argue that the second clause of Section 26 19 -- providing that “both parties agree ongoing that there are 27 no disputes over brokerages for any sales 60 days prior to last 28 month for which brokerage check was cashed” -- operates as an 1 independent waiver of Alliance’s right to bring its claims. 2 (Docket No. 73 at 16-17.) Counsel for Alliance emphasized at 3 oral argument that “there are no disputes” should be read as a 4 prospective phrase that does not apply to disputes raised prior 5 to the cashing of checks. 6 California courts disfavor interpretations that produce 7 commercially unreasonable results or that defeat the parties’ 8 reasonable expectations. See MacKinnon v. Truck Insurance 9 Exchange, 31 Cal. 4th 635, 648 (2003). The courts also favor 10 interpretations consistent with the parties’ course of 11 performance. See Employers Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct., 161 12 Cal. App. 4th 906, 920-21 (2008). 13 Plaintiffs’ reading raises both concerns. For one, it 14 forces Alliance into the impractical choice between accepting 15 payment on a contested commission and preserving its objections. 16 Section 19 read this way operates as a forfeiture clause, which 17 California courts “have rather consistently held [are] not 18 favored in contract law and . . . should be explicitly and 19 clearly stated.” In re Crown Corp., 679 F.2d 774, 776-77 (9th 20 Cir. 1982); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1442 (“A condition 21 involving a forfeiture must be strictly interpreted against the 22 party for whose benefit it is created.”). Plaintiffs’ reading is 23 also difficult to reconcile with the parties’ performance, under 24 which plaintiffs continually engaged with Alliance’s commission 25 concerns rather than treating those concerns as extinguished by 26 payment. 27 Moreover, the phrase “there are no disputes” does not 28 by its terms apply to disputes initiated before checks are 1 cashed. Cf. Morse v. ServiceMaster Global Holdings, Inc., No. 2 10cv-0628 SI, 2012 WL 4755035, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2012) 3 (declining to apply agreement provision retroactively because 4 “the clause refers to the material scope of the agreement, not 5 temporal scope” (emphasis in original)). Read prospectively, the 6 second clause bars the initiation of new disputes about old 7 commissions once payment has been completed and the limitations 8 window has closed, while leaving timely raised disputes intact. 9 Because Alliance’s reading better accords with the 10 commercially reasonable expectations of the parties, their 11 performance, and the agreement’s text, the court interprets the 12 second clause of Section 19 to bar the initiation of new disputes 13 about commissions after a check is cashed, but not to extinguish 14 prior disputes that were timely raised. Accordingly, plaintiffs 15 are not entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that 16 Alliance’s claims are barred by this provision, and their motion 17 will not be granted on that basis either. 18 C. Whether Alliance is a “Wholesale Sales Representative” 19 Section 1738.12 of the Wholesale Sales Representative 20 Act defines a “wholesale sales representative” as “any person who 21 contracts with a manufacturer, jobber, or distributor for the 22 purpose of soliciting wholesale orders, is compensated, in whole 23 or part, by commission[.]” Cal. Civ. Code § 1738.12(e). 24 “Wholesale” generally means sales of a larger “quantity usually 25 for resale (as by a retail merchant),” and is understood to be 26 the opposite of “retail,” which is the sale of smaller quantities 27 directly to consumers. Reilly v. Inquest Tech., Inc., 218 Cal. 28 App. 4th 536, 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 236 (2013). It is undisputed 1 that all relevant orders here were wholesale orders. 2 Plaintiffs argue that Alliance does not qualify as a 3 wholesale sales representative because Alliance’s contractual 4 duties are tangential to direct order-taking and fall outside the 5 Act’s scope. (Docket No. 83 at 13-14.) Alliance argues that the 6 phrase “for the purpose of soliciting wholesale orders” reaches 7 commercial services more broadly and encompasses Alliance’s 8 obligations per the agreements. (Docket No. 70 at 14-21.) 9 Nowhere in the agreements is the phrase “soliciting 10 wholesale orders” used. (Docket No. 73 at 28.) The agreements 11 provide that Alliance “will represent [BPF’s] product line to 12 distributors and retailers,” and ties Alliance’s compensation to 13 a 3% commission, which suggests Alliance’s role was a sales 14 representative facilitating transactions. (Docket No. 54-3 at 15 3.) At the same time, the agreement routes all sales orders 16 directly to plaintiffs “via EDI [electronic data interchange], 17 email, or fax,” with plaintiffs exclusively handling order 18 approval, revisions, shipment availability, and delivery 19 appointments. (Id. at 4.) This provision removes Alliance from 20 the order-placement and fulfillment processes and thus supports 21 plaintiffs’ characterization of Alliance as a promotional and 22 administrative services provider with no operative role in the 23 order process. Taken together, these provisions create a tension 24 within the contract as to Alliance’s role. 25 The agreements are therefore ambiguous as to whether 26 Alliance was contracted “for the purpose of soliciting wholesale 27 orders,” and where contractual language is ambiguous and the 28 parties have offered extrinsic evidence bearing on its meaning, 1 the court considers that evidence to ascertain intent. See 2 Thomson, 150 F.4th at 1103; Cal. Com. Code § 1303(a). If 3 interpretation depends on the credibility of the conflicting 4 evidence, then the interpretative question cannot be resolved as 5 a matter of law at summary judgment. City of Hope, 43 Cal. 4th 6 at 395. 7 The record of Alliance’s actual performance presents 8 competing evidence. Alliance has produced evidence demonstrating 9 occasional visits and pitches to buyers. (Docket No. 70 at 3-4, 10 19-21.) However, that Alliance may have incidentally performed 11 activities resembling order solicitation does not necessarily 12 qualify them as a wholesale sales representative as a matter of 13 law. The Act’s usage of “the purpose” as opposed to “a purpose” 14 suggests the statute was intended to protect sales 15 representatives whose principal or primary purpose was direct 16 order solicitation. Cf. Madain v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 20-cv- 17 0038 JAK, 2020 WL 13250489, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2020) (“The 18 use of the term ‘a’ instead of ‘the’ supports the view that the 19 entry and terms of a contract can be motivated by more than one 20 purpose.”) 21 Plaintiffs, in contrast, have produced evidence 22 emphasizing the promotional aspects of Alliance’s role: they 23 point to deposition testimony establishing that Alliance was 24 responsible for analyzing promotional spending and for submitting 25 promotions that plaintiffs had created. (Nguyen Decl., Ex. 4, at 26 88-93; SUF ¶ 16.) Under plaintiffs’ account, Alliance’s function 27 was to evaluate and transmit promotional decisions rather than to 28 solicit purchasing commitments. Additional evidence from 1 Alliance’s own representatives is consistent with that account: 2 when asked to describe its performance, Alliance described 3 coordinating meetings between plaintiffs and retailers or 4 promotional activity rather than explicit sales or order 5 solicitation. (Docket No. 54-2 Ex. 6.) 6 Because the agreements are ambiguous as to Alliance’s 7 purpose and the extrinsic evidence of Alliance’s performance is 8 in conflict, the court cannot determine as a matter of law that 9 Alliance qualifies as a wholesale sales representative under the 10 Act. City of Hope, 43 Cal. 4th at 395. Accordingly, the court 11 will not grant summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs, or in 12 favor of Alliance, on the issue of whether Alliance was a 13 wholesale sales representative. 14 D. Willfulness Under the Act 15 Alliance also asks the court to find that plaintiffs 16 willfully failed to pay commissions and provide documentation in 17 violation of the Act. Section 1738.15 of the Act states that 18 “[a] manufacturer, jobber, or distributor who . . . willfully 19 fails to pay commissions as provided in the written contract 20 shall be liable to the sales representative in a civil action for 21 treble the damages proved at trial.” Cal. Civ. Code. § 1738.15. 22 The existence of a good-faith and reasonable belief 23 that the facts imposing the Act’s obligations were not present 24 may defeat willfulness. Elia v. Roberts, No. 1:16-cv-0557 AWI 25 EPG, 2018 WL 4849653, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2018). “For 26 example, a failure to comply would not be willful if the 27 manufacturer reasonably and in good faith believed that a person 28 did not qualify as a ‘wholesale sales representative’ within the 1 meaning of the Act.” Id. at *4. Willfulness has been deemed a 2 “factual determination[] that must be made by a jury rather than 3 the court.” Id. at *5. 4 Plaintiffs argue that a finding of willfulness is 5 negated by two good faith beliefs: that Alliance was not a 6 wholesale sales representative, and that plaintiffs were not 7 required to make the final payments because of Alliance’s prior 8 material breach. (Docket No. 73 at 25-26.) 9 The court has already concluded that the question of 10 Alliance’s qualification as a wholesale sales representative is 11 uncertain at this juncture, which bolsters plaintiffs’ assertion 12 that they reasonably believed the Act may not apply. And as 13 explained below, the basis of plaintiffs’ second belief -- that 14 the August through October 2023 commissions were not owed because 15 of Alliance’s prior material breach -- remains an open question. 16 The court cannot therefore conclude as a matter of law that 17 plaintiffs willfully violated the Act, and Alliance’s request for 18 summary adjudication on this issue must fail. 19 E. The Breach Claims 20 i. Which Party Materially Breached First 21 “Under California law, a claim for breach of contract 22 includes four elements: that a contract exists between the 23 parties, that the plaintiff performed his contractual duties or 24 was excused from nonperformance, that the defendant breached 25 those contractual duties, and that plaintiff’s damages were a 26 result of the breach.” Boland, Inc. v. Rolf C. Hagen (USA) 27 Corp., 685 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1101 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (Karlton, J.). 28 “When a party’s failure to perform a contractual 1 obligation constitutes a material breach . . . the other party 2 may be discharged from its duty to perform[.]” Brown v. Grimes, 3 192 Cal. App. 4th 265, 277, (4th Dist. 2011). Whether a breach 4 is material depends on “the importance or seriousness thereof and 5 the probability of the injured party getting substantial 6 performance.” Id. at 278. Materiality of breach may only be 7 resolved as a matter of law “if reasonable minds cannot differ on 8 the issue[.]” Brown, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 277-78. 9 Alliance argues that plaintiffs’ failures to timely 10 make payments and provide backup documentation throughout the 11 parties’ commercial relationship constituted material breaches, 12 which excused Alliance’s subsequent performance. (See Docket No. 13 62 at 23-24.) Alliance then argues that plaintiffs’ failure to 14 pay their final three commissions constituted a second material 15 breach. (Id. at 20.) Plaintiffs argue that their first 16 purported material breaches were immaterial or, alternatively, 17 waived by Alliance’s continued performance; their second material 18 breach, plaintiffs argue, was excused by Alliance’s material 19 breaches. (Docket No. 73 at 11.) 20 The evidence does not support a finding that 21 plaintiffs’ failure to make timely payments constituted a 22 material breach that excused Alliance’s subsequent performance. 23 If a contract does not contain a “time is of the essence” clause, 24 “the number and amount of late payments does not, by itself, 25 decide the issue of materiality.” Urica, Inc. v. Pharmaplast 26 S.A.E., No. 11-cv-02476 MMM RZX, 2013 WL 12123230, at *7 (C.D. 27 Cal. May 6, 2013); see also, McLellan v. Fitbit, Inc., No. 3:16- 28 cv-00036-JD, 2018 WL 3549042, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2018) 1 (“Aside from a special circumstance where the contract specifies 2 that time is of the essence, a short delay in performance 3 typically does not result in a material breach excusing the other 4 side from its obligations.”). 5 But even assuming plaintiffs’ late payments were 6 material, Alliance waived its right to treat them as such through 7 its continued performance. “Waiver is the intentional 8 relinquishment of a known right after knowledge of the facts,” 9 and “may be either express . . . or implied, based on conduct 10 indicating an intent to relinquish the right.” Waller v. Truck 11 Insurance Exchange, Inc., 11 Cal.4th 1, 31 (1995). “Accepting a 12 late or insufficient payment is an affirmation of the contract, 13 and the right to rescind the contract for material breach may be 14 waived by this conduct.” World Mix Ent., Ltd. v. Bone Thugs 15 Harmony, Inc., No. 07-cv-02159 DDP, 2009 WL 10671949, at *4 (C.D. 16 Cal. Mar. 3, 2009). 17 It is undisputed that the agreements at issue do not 18 contain a “time is of the essence” clause. It is also undisputed 19 that Alliance eventually received and accepted all requested 20 payments and backup documentation, continued doing business with 21 plaintiffs for years despite what Alliance now claims were 22 material breaches, and signed an identical contract with R&M five 23 years into the BPF relationship. Based on these undisputed 24 facts, Alliance is not entitled to treat plaintiffs’ late 25 payments as material breaches that excused Alliance’s subsequent 26 performance. See Urica, Inc. v. Pharmaplast S.A.E., No. 11-cv- 27 02476 MMM, 2013 WL 12123230, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2013) 28 (“Given the absence of [a ‘time is of the essence’] provision . . 1 . [and] the fact that [defendant] consistently accepted late 2 payments . . . the court cannot [determine materiality] as a 3 matter of law.”). Alliance was therefore not excused from its 4 contractual obligations. 5 None of the parties have moved for summary judgment on 6 the issue of whether Alliance materially breached the contract. 7 In response to plaintiffs’ allegations of Alliance’s breaches 8 (Docket No. 73 at 24-27), Alliance states only that the breaches 9 “occurred when Plaintiffs were first in breach” for their late 10 payments, thus excusing Alliance’s performance. (Docket No. 84 11 at 12.) The court has now rejected that premise. Beyond it, 12 Alliance offers nothing to negate the breaches plaintiffs allege, 13 stating only that it “strongly disputes” that they occurred. 14 (Docket No. 84 at 12.) Alliance accordingly is not entitled to 15 summary judgment on plaintiffs’ breach claim or its counterclaim. 16 ii. Causation 17 Alliance alternatively argues that plaintiffs cannot 18 establish that any purported breach by Alliance caused their 19 losses. (Docket No. 62 at 29.) Causation of contract damages is 20 assessed using the substantial factor standard, which requires 21 “something that is more than a slight, trivial, negligible, or 22 theoretical factor in producing a particular result.” Haley v. 23 Casa Del Rey Homeowners Assn., 153 Cal. App. 4th 863, 871-72 24 (2007). Substantial-factor causation may exist even where other 25 concurrent factors contribute to the loss and is “ordinarily a 26 question of fact.” See Jenni Rivera Enterprises, LLC v. Latin 27 World Entertainment Holdings, Inc., 36 Cal. App. 5th 766, 792 28 (2019). 1 Alliance argues that plaintiffs’ purported losses are 2 tied to the purchasing decisions of third-party grocers and 3 distributors and identifies a series of independent factors it 4 contends drove plaintiffs’ decline in sales. (Docket No. 62 at 5 29-32.) In response, plaintiffs offer evidence that Alliance 6 failed to provide in-depth business review and category 7 preparation services in advance of a major grocer’s annual 8 category review and failed to inform plaintiffs of 9 contemporaneous developments with that grocer’s distribution 10 partner that bore directly on plaintiffs’ submission. (Nguyen 11 Decl., Ex. 4.) Alliance also failed entirely, on several 12 occasions, to submit promotions that plaintiffs had prepared, 13 despite Alliance’s CEO conceding at deposition that promotions 14 ordinarily produce measurable increases in sales volume. (Nguyen 15 Decl., Exs. 4, 20, 21.) 16 Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence that 17 Alliance’s alleged failures were substantial factors in causing 18 their losses, even accepting Alliance’s evidence of concurrent 19 contributing causes. The categories of nonperformance plaintiffs 20 identify track Alliance’s contractual duties, and they correspond 21 to commercial outcomes within the period plaintiffs have placed 22 at issue. Whether those failures rose to the level of 23 substantial factors, given the concurrent causes Alliance 24 identifies, requires weighing the relative contribution of each 25 cause; that weighing is for the trier of fact. See Anderson v. 26 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“Credibility 27 determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of 28 legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not EI IERIE RS IE OD

1 those of a judge.”). 2 Because the court cannot conclude as a matter of law 3 that Alliance’s alleged failures were not substantial factors in 4 | plaintiffs’ losses, Alliance is not entitled to summary judgment 5 | on the issue of causation. 6 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the parties’ motions for 7 partial summary judgment (Docket Nos. 54, 57, 62) be, and the 8 same hereby are, DENIED. 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties’ motions to 10 exclude (Docket Nos. 59, 63) be, and the same hereby are, DENIED 11 without prejudice. 12 Dated: May 29, 2026 13 hth A, (lh. be □ WILLIAM B. SHUBB 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15