Palmer, J.
The issue presented by this appeal is whether an employer who properly intervenes pursuant [372] to General Statutes § 31-293 (a)1 in an action brought by its employee against a municipality under General [373] Statutes § 13a-149,* 2 the “highway defect” statute, may obtain reimbursement from the municipality for workers’ compensation payments made to the employee for injuries suffered by the employee as a result of a defective highway. The defendant, the city of Stamford, moved for summary judgment on the complaint of the intervening plaintiff, United Parcel Service (UPS), and the trial court granted the defendant’s motion. UPS thereafter appealed the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The relevant undisputed facts and procedural history are as follows. On May 18, 1987, while acting in the [374] course of his employment with UPS, the named plaintiff, Derrick C. Quire (plaintiff), came to stand on the curb portion of a catch basin located on the westerly side of Greenwich Avenue in Stamford. The catch basin collapsed, causing the plaintiff to fall and suffer injuries to his neck, back and knee. The plaintiff timely served on the defendant a written statement describing the accident and his injuries as required by § 13a-149. The plaintiff thereafter brought an action against the defendant under § 13a-149, alleging that his injuries were the result of the defendant’s failure to maintain the curb and catch basin in a safe condition.3 UPS filed a motion to intervene pursuant to § 31-293 (a), seeking reimbursement for benefits it had paid or had become obligated to pay to the plaintiff under the Workers’ Compensation Act,4 and the trial court, Hickey, J., granted the motion.
The defendant moved for summary judgment against UPS, alleging that only a “traveler” may maintain an action under § 13a-149 and, in the alternative, that UPS had failed to file with the defendant the notice required by § 13a-149. The trial court, Dean, J., granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that UPS itself could not maintain its action against the defendant in view of the fact that UPS was not a “traveler” on the allegedly defective road.5
[375] UPS claims that the trial court improperly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because § 31-293 (a), not § 13a-149, defines an employer’s right to join in its employee’s action against a third party tortfeasor to obtain reimbursement for workers’ compensation payments made to its employee. UPS concedes that only a “traveler” may recover damages against a municipality under § 13a-149. See, e.g., Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179, 199, 592 A.2d 912 (1991); Aerotec Corp. v. Greenwich, 138 Conn. 116, 119, 82 A.2d 356 (1951). UPS contends, however, that having properly joined in the plaintiff’s action, it may maintain a derivative claim against the defendant under § 13a-149, solely to obtain reimbursement for workers’ compensation benefits, because it has complied with the requirements of § 31-293 (a) and the injured employee has complied with the requirements of § 13a-149. We agree.
Section 31-293 (a) authorizes an employer to obtain reimbursement for workers’ compensation benefits from a third party tortfeasor and, in so doing, implements the public policies of preventing double recovery by an injured employee; Durniak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc., 222 Conn. 775, 779-80, 610 A.2d 1277 (1992); and thereby containing the cost of workers’ compensation insurance. In accomplishing these objectives, the statute unconditionally and unambiguously authorizes reimbursement to the employer when the employer properly intervenes in the employee’s action against the third party tortfeasor and damages are recovered. Id., 780. There is no suggestion either in the plain language of § 31-293 (a) or in its legislative history that the legislature sought to limit the subrogation rights of an employer who otherwise complies with the requirements of that statute.
Moreover, “[w]e have repeatedly observed that our [Workers’ Compensation Act] represents a complex and [376] comprehensive statutory scheme balancing the rights and claims of the employer and the employee arising out of work-related personal injuries. Because of the comprehensive nature of the act, the responsibility for carving out exceptions from any one of its provisions belongs to the legislature and not to the courts.” Dur-niak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc., supra, 222 Conn. 781. In the absence of such express legislative intervention, we will not assume that the legislature intended to create an exception for actions brought under the “highway defect” statute. See id.
Similarly, there is no support for the defendant’s claim that the legislature intended § 13a-149 to serve as a bar to an employer’s right to reimbursement pursuant to § 31-293 (a) in connection with a claim by an injured employee against a municipality under the “highway defect” statute. In no respect is the right of UPS under § 31-293 (a) to obtain reimbursement from the defendant inconsistent with the requirement that only the plaintiff, as the injured “traveler,” may recover damages under § 13a-149. The employer’s claim against a municipality under § 13a-149, brought solely for the purpose of obtaining reimbursement for the payment of workers’ compensation benefits under § 31-293 (a), is derived entirely from the plaintiff’s right to recover damages against the municipality under § 13a-149. The injured “traveler,” therefore, retains the exclusive right to recover damages against a municipality for injuries sustained by virtue of a defective highway.
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Palmer, J.
The issue presented by this appeal is whether an employer who properly intervenes pursuant [372] to General Statutes § 31-293 (a)1 in an action brought by its employee against a municipality under General [373] Statutes § 13a-149,* 2 the “highway defect” statute, may obtain reimbursement from the municipality for workers’ compensation payments made to the employee for injuries suffered by the employee as a result of a defective highway. The defendant, the city of Stamford, moved for summary judgment on the complaint of the intervening plaintiff, United Parcel Service (UPS), and the trial court granted the defendant’s motion. UPS thereafter appealed the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The relevant undisputed facts and procedural history are as follows. On May 18, 1987, while acting in the [374] course of his employment with UPS, the named plaintiff, Derrick C. Quire (plaintiff), came to stand on the curb portion of a catch basin located on the westerly side of Greenwich Avenue in Stamford. The catch basin collapsed, causing the plaintiff to fall and suffer injuries to his neck, back and knee. The plaintiff timely served on the defendant a written statement describing the accident and his injuries as required by § 13a-149. The plaintiff thereafter brought an action against the defendant under § 13a-149, alleging that his injuries were the result of the defendant’s failure to maintain the curb and catch basin in a safe condition.3 UPS filed a motion to intervene pursuant to § 31-293 (a), seeking reimbursement for benefits it had paid or had become obligated to pay to the plaintiff under the Workers’ Compensation Act,4 and the trial court, Hickey, J., granted the motion.
The defendant moved for summary judgment against UPS, alleging that only a “traveler” may maintain an action under § 13a-149 and, in the alternative, that UPS had failed to file with the defendant the notice required by § 13a-149. The trial court, Dean, J., granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that UPS itself could not maintain its action against the defendant in view of the fact that UPS was not a “traveler” on the allegedly defective road.5
[375] UPS claims that the trial court improperly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because § 31-293 (a), not § 13a-149, defines an employer’s right to join in its employee’s action against a third party tortfeasor to obtain reimbursement for workers’ compensation payments made to its employee. UPS concedes that only a “traveler” may recover damages against a municipality under § 13a-149. See, e.g., Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179, 199, 592 A.2d 912 (1991); Aerotec Corp. v. Greenwich, 138 Conn. 116, 119, 82 A.2d 356 (1951). UPS contends, however, that having properly joined in the plaintiff’s action, it may maintain a derivative claim against the defendant under § 13a-149, solely to obtain reimbursement for workers’ compensation benefits, because it has complied with the requirements of § 31-293 (a) and the injured employee has complied with the requirements of § 13a-149. We agree.
Section 31-293 (a) authorizes an employer to obtain reimbursement for workers’ compensation benefits from a third party tortfeasor and, in so doing, implements the public policies of preventing double recovery by an injured employee; Durniak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc., 222 Conn. 775, 779-80, 610 A.2d 1277 (1992); and thereby containing the cost of workers’ compensation insurance. In accomplishing these objectives, the statute unconditionally and unambiguously authorizes reimbursement to the employer when the employer properly intervenes in the employee’s action against the third party tortfeasor and damages are recovered. Id., 780. There is no suggestion either in the plain language of § 31-293 (a) or in its legislative history that the legislature sought to limit the subrogation rights of an employer who otherwise complies with the requirements of that statute.
Moreover, “[w]e have repeatedly observed that our [Workers’ Compensation Act] represents a complex and [376] comprehensive statutory scheme balancing the rights and claims of the employer and the employee arising out of work-related personal injuries. Because of the comprehensive nature of the act, the responsibility for carving out exceptions from any one of its provisions belongs to the legislature and not to the courts.” Dur-niak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc., supra, 222 Conn. 781. In the absence of such express legislative intervention, we will not assume that the legislature intended to create an exception for actions brought under the “highway defect” statute. See id.
Similarly, there is no support for the defendant’s claim that the legislature intended § 13a-149 to serve as a bar to an employer’s right to reimbursement pursuant to § 31-293 (a) in connection with a claim by an injured employee against a municipality under the “highway defect” statute. In no respect is the right of UPS under § 31-293 (a) to obtain reimbursement from the defendant inconsistent with the requirement that only the plaintiff, as the injured “traveler,” may recover damages under § 13a-149. The employer’s claim against a municipality under § 13a-149, brought solely for the purpose of obtaining reimbursement for the payment of workers’ compensation benefits under § 31-293 (a), is derived entirely from the plaintiff’s right to recover damages against the municipality under § 13a-149. The injured “traveler,” therefore, retains the exclusive right to recover damages against a municipality for injuries sustained by virtue of a defective highway.
Contrary to the defendant’s arguments, moreover, our decision in Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, supra, 219 Conn. 179, does not suggest a different result. We concluded in Sanzone that the spouse of an injured “traveler” may not maintain a loss of consortium claim against a municipality under § 13a-149, noting that such a claim under the “highway defect” [377] statute is implicitly barred by General Statutes § 52-557n.6 Id., 200. There is, however, no comparable statutory prohibition against an employer’s seeking reimbursement for workers’ compensation benefits paid to an employee who has initiated an action against a third party tortfeasor under § 13a-149. Indeed, § 31-293 (a) expressly affords an employer the right to do so. Moreover, unlike the spouse who seeks damages for loss of consortium, the employer who intervenes in its employee’s action as authorized by § 31-293 (a) does not enlarge the amount of the recovery against the municipality. Rather, the employer may only obtain reimbursement for workers’ compensation benefits paid to its employee from any damages recovered by the employee. We conclude, therefore, that § 13a-149 does not bar UPS from seeking reimbursement from the defendant under § 31-293 (a).
The defendant maintains, as an alternative basis upon which to affirm the judgment; see Practice Book § 4013 (a);7 that the trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because UPS failed to provide notice of its claim against the defendant pursuant to § 13a-149. Although the defendant does not dispute that the plaintiff properly filed the notice mandated by § 13a-149, it argues that UPS was required to file a notice of its own. This claim also lacks merit.
[378] The plaintiff, as the injured “traveler” alleging a violation of § 13a-149, had an obligation under that statute to file with the defendant a proper description of the accident and his injuries within ninety days from the date of the accident.8 The plaintiff having done so, the defendant received in a timely manner the information to which it was entitled under § 13a-149.9 Because the statute requires nothing more, UPS was under no obligation to provide any additional notice to the defendant.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.