Quantum Labs, Inc. v. Maxim Integrated Products Inc

District Court, N.D. California·Decided June 15, 2020·No. 5:18-cv-07598·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 QUANTUM LABS, INC., et al., Case No. 18-cv-07598-BLF

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 9 v. DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES 10 MAXIM INTEGRATED PRODUCTS INC, et al., [Re: ECF 75] 11 Defendants. 12 13 Before the Court is Maxim’s Request for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs at ECF 75. For the 14 reasons stated below, Maxim’s Request for Attorneys’ Fees is GRANTED IN PART. 15 I. BACKGROUND 16 On December 19, 2018, Plaintiff Quantum Labs, Inc. (“Quantum”) filed a Complaint against 17 Maxim Integrated Products Inc. (“Maxim”) and Maxim’s Chief Executive Officer, Tunc Doluca, 18 bringing eleven causes of action arising from an alleged release of hazardous waste incident to 19 Maxim’s operations at a facility operated by Quantum. See generally Compl., ECF 1. On April 22, 20 2019, the Court granted Maxim and Doluca’s first motion to dismiss with leave to amend in part 21 and without leave to amend in part. ECF 35. 22 On May 1, 2019, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint asserting eight claims on behalf 23 of Quantum and an additional plaintiff, Serban Porumbescu also known as Simon Planck. See 24 generally First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF 36. On November 18, 2019, the Court denied in part 25 and granted in part Maxim and Doluca’s second motion to dismiss. See Order Denying In Part and 26 Granting In Part Def. Mot. to Dismiss (“Dismissal Order”), ECF 55. In relevant part, claims against 27 Doluca were dismissed with prejudice, and fraud and waste claims were dismissed without leave to 1 permitted to add any claims without leave of the Court. Id. 2 On December 18, 2019, Quantum filed a timely Second Amended Complaint. See generally 3 Sec. Am. Compl. (“SAC”), ECF 56. The SAC removed Serban Porumbescu as plaintiff and Tunc 4 Doluca as defendant, but added HTE Labs, Inc. as plaintiff without leave. Id. The SAC also 5 reasserted the waste and fraud claims which the Court had dismissed with prejudice. Id. at ¶¶ 94- 6 103; 61-74. In response to these violations of the Court’s Dismissal Order, Maxim filed a motion 7 seeking an order dismissing or striking the SAC and requested sanctions in the form of attorneys’ 8 fees for the work required in responding to the noncompliant SAC. Motion, ECF 61. The Court 9 denied Maxim’s motion to dismiss all of Quantum’s claims in the SAC but granted Maxim’s motion 10 to strike the claims asserted in violation of the Court’s Dismissal Order. ECF 73. The Court also 11 granted reasonable attorneys’ fees and allowed Maxim to file a declaration setting out its requested 12 fees. Id. at 8. Maxim filed a declaration setting out the attorneys’ fees incurred in filings its Motion. 13 Declaration of Kevin W. Isaacson (“Isaacson Decl.”), ECF 75. Quantum filed a timely opposition. 14 Opp’n Re Fees, ECF 77. Maxim filed a reply. Reply Re Fees, ECF 79. 15 II. ATTORNEYS’ FEES 16 In calculating awards for attorneys’ fees, courts apply the “lodestar” method to the facts of 17 each case. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Hensley 18 v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). The lodestar amount is presumptively reasonable. See 19 Vogel v. Harbor Plaza Center, LLC, 893 F.3d 1152, 1161 (9th Cir. 2018). “The ‘lodestar’ is 20 calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the 21 litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 22 1996), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 108 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1997). Once calculated, the 23 lodestar amount may be further adjusted based on other factors not already subsumed in the initial 24 lodestar calculation. Morales, 96 F.3d at 363–64, 363 nn.3–4 (identifying factors) (citing Kerr v. 25 Screen Guild Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), abrogated on other grounds by City of 26 Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992)). 27 1 Here, Maxim seeks $21,702.50 for attorneys’ fees. 1 Isaacson Decl. ¶ 8, ECF 75. Three 2 attorneys worked for Maxim on this case: (1) Michael J. Ioannou (“Ioannou”), (2) Kevin W. 3 Isaacson (“Isaacson”), and (3) Michael Bedolla (“Bedolla”).2 Id. ¶¶ 6a–c. 4 Ioannou is a partner with forty (40) years of experience handling various complex 5 commercial litigation matters. Isaacson Decl. ¶ 6a. He bills at $425 per hour. See Isaacson Decl. 6 Exh. A. Ioannou spent a total of 1.3 hours reviewing Isaacson’s and Bedolla’s work. Id. 7 Isaacson is a partner with eight (8) years of experience handling a wide range of commercial 8 litigation matters. Isaacson Decl. ¶ 6b. As of counsel, he billed at $350 per hour, and now, as 9 partner, he bills at $400 per hour. See Isaacson Decl. Exh. A. Isaacson worked 2 hours on this 10 matter as Partner and 36.8 hours as Of Counsel. See Isaacson Decl. Exh. A. 11 Bedolla was an associate in Ropers’ commercial litigation practice until March 2020, 12 primarily doing business and commercial law, IP and employment law, and had experience in 13 complex ERISA litigation. Isaacson Decl. ¶ 6c. His billing rate was $300 an hour. See Isaacson 14 Decl. Exh. A. Bedolla worked 31.8 hours on the matter, but his hours were adjusted to 24.9. See 15 Isaacson Decl. Exh. A. 16 The attorneys’ work is summarized in this chart: Attorney Title Years Rate Hours Amount 17 Ioannou Partner > 40 $425 1.3 $552.50 18 Isaacson Partner ≈ 8 $400 2 $800 19 Isaacson Of Counsel ≈ 8 $350 36.8 $12,880.00 Bedolla Associate $300 24.9 $7,470.00 20 TOTAL 65 hours $21,702.50 21 As explained below, the Court finds that these hourly rates are reasonable given similar work 22 performed in the Northern District of California, but that the number of hours expended is excessive, 23

24 1 Maxim’s request for $22,062.50 (see Isaacson Decl. ¶ 8) appears to contain a mathematical error. In his declaration, Isaacson has billed $1,160.00 for his work as partner. Isaacson Decl. 25 Exh. A at 4. This math is incorrect, as two hours of work at $400 adds up to $800. The Court has accounted for this difference in the total attorneys’ fees sought. 26

2 It appears that either no paralegals worked on the case or Maxim was not billed for paralegal 27 work. See generally Isaacson Decl. Exh. A. 1 and therefore GRANTS IN PART Maxim’s request for attorneys’ fees. 2 A. Reasonableness of Rates 3 When determining an attorney’s reasonable hourly rate, courts weigh the “experience, skill, 4 and reputation of the attorney requesting fees,” and compare the requested rates to prevailing market 5 rates of the relevant community. Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210–11 (9th 6 Cir. 1986), op. am. on denial of reh’g, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Blum v. Stenson, 465 7 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984). The relevant community is typically the forum in which the district court 8 sits. Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979. To determine the prevailing market rate, courts may rely on 9 attorney affidavits as well as “decisions by other courts awarding similar rates for work in the same 10 geographical area by attorneys with comparable levels of experience.” Trujillo v. Orozco, No. 5:17- 11 cv-00566-EJD, 2018 WL 1142311, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2018); see also United Steelworkers of 12 Am. v.

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