Opinion of the Court
Ellis & Winters LLP, by Matthew W. Sawchak and Paul M. Cox; and F. Paul Calamita for North Carolina Water Quality Association, amicus curiae.
NEWBY, Justice.
In this case we consider whether the Town of Carthage exceeded its municipal
authority under the Public Enterprise Statutes, N.C.G.S. §§ 160A-311 to -338 (2015),
by adopting certain water and sewer “impact fee” ordinances. Upon approval of a
subdivision of real property, the ordinances trigger immediate charges for future
water and sewer system expansion, regardless of whether the landowner ever
connects to the system or whether Carthage ever expands the system. As creations
of the legislature, municipalities have only those powers delegated to them by the
General Assembly. When Carthage adopted the ordinances at issue here, it exercised
power that it had not been granted. The impact fee ordinances are therefore invalid
and, accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
In 2003, following a period of rapid population growth, Carthage adopted two
similar impact fee ordinances: one pertaining to its water system, and the other
pertaining to its sewer system. In their current form, the ordinances state that the
impact fees “shall be used to cover the costs of expanding the [water and sewer]
system[s].” Carthage, N.C., Code §§ 51.076(F) (water), 51.096(H) (sewer) (2015).
These costs include “water treatment plant expansion, elevated storage expansion,
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and transmission mains” for the water system, id. § 51.076(F), and “gravity mains,
force mains, and lift stations” for the sewer system, id. § 51.096(H).
Under both ordinances, a landowner who seeks to subdivide property and
receives “final plat approval,” id. §§ 51.076(C)(1), 51.096(B), must pay water and
sewer impact fees “based on water meter size according to the town’s fee schedule,”
id. §§ 51.076(B), 51.096(A), in amounts ranging from $1,000 to $30,000 per
connection. Carthage, N.C., Fee and Rate Schedule 4 (July 1, 2016). “If a [property]
has received its final plat, then the entire [water and sewer] impact fee[s] shall be
paid at the earliest or next occurrence of . . . [the] (a) Tap fee; or (b) Development
permit.” Id. §§ 51.076(C)(2), 51.096(C); see also Fee and Rate Schedule 4
(“Water/Sewer Impact Fees are due upon final plat approval for new subdivisions
(major or minor) or upon application for building permit, whichever occurs first.”).
Tap fees cover Carthage’s costs “to ‘tap’ or access” the “water and/or sewer line that
exists in front of the property,” whereas “impact fees offset . . . costs to expand the
system to accommodate development.”
Impact fees are assessed “in addition to the regular water and sewer tap fees,”
and the monthly service charges to water and sewer customers. If a property owner
does not pay the impact fees, Carthage “will refuse” to issue building permits. Certain
exceptions exist “for temporary or emergency service,” id. § 51.076(A)(2)(b), and any
service solely for “fire protection,” id. §§ 51.076(E), 51.096(G), but in all instances,
impact fees are assessed regardless of the property owner’s actual use of the systems
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or whether Carthage actually expands the systems. In 2014 Carthage’s Town
Manager reported that the Town had “neglected to make needed improvements to its
water and sewer systems for many years.”
Plaintiffs are North Carolina corporations engaged in residential
homebuilding. At the time of filing their action, plaintiffs had paid Carthage a total
of $123,000 in water and sewer impact fees.
On 28 October 2013, plaintiffs filed their complaint seeking, inter alia, a
declaratory judgment and monetary damages.1 Plaintiffs allege that “Carthage has
acted outside the scope of its legal authority” by “charging” the impact fees “without
a specific delegation of authority from the General Assembly” and that, accordingly,
plaintiffs are entitled to a return of all impact fees paid, plus interest and attorneys’
fees.
Carthage timely answered the complaint, contending that “the water and
sewer fees imposed by Defendant were authorized by North Carolina’s Public
Enterprise Statute” and asserting various affirmative defenses, including, inter alia,
the statute of limitations and estoppel. All parties moved for summary judgment.
On 17 October 2014, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment for
Carthage. Plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment order to the Court of Appeals.
Not at issue here, on 23 June 2014, plaintiffs amended their complaint to, inter alia, 1
add equal protection and due process claims.
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The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Carthage. Quality Built Homes Inc. v. Town of Carthage, ___ N.C. App. ___,
776 S.E.2d 897, 2015 WL 4620404 (2015) (unpublished). Applying “broad
construction” interpretation principles under N.C.G.S. § 160A-4, the Court of Appeals
concluded that Carthage acted within its delegated municipal authority to impose
and collect the impact fees under the Public Enterprise Statutes, Quality Built
Homes, 2015 WL 4620404, at *4-5 (citing, inter alia, N.C.G.S. § 160A-4 (2013);
Homebuilders Ass’n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 336 N.C. 37, 43-44, 442 S.E.2d
45, 50 (1994); and Town of Spring Hope v. Bissette, 305 N.C. 248, 252, 287 S.E.2d 851,
854 (1982)), which enable municipalities to “establish and revise . . . schedules of
rents, rates, fees, charges, and penalties for the use of or the services furnished by
any public enterprise,” N.C.G.S. § 160A-314(a).2
We allowed both plaintiffs’ petition and defendant’s conditional petition for
discretionary review. We review matters of statutory interpretation de novo, In re
Ernst & Young, LLP, 363 N.C. 612, 616, 684 S.E.2d 151, 154 (2009) (citations
omitted), as well as orders granting summary judgment, viewing the allegations as
true and “the presented evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party,”
Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 651, 548 S.E.2d 704, 707 (2001) (citation omitted).
2 Because of its resolution of the matter, the Court of Appeals did not reach the statute of limitations or estoppel issues. Quality Built Homes, 2015 WL 4620404 at *5. Moreover, the court overruled plaintiffs’ argument that they are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. at *6.
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From the very formation of our State government, municipalities, in their
various forms, have been considered “creatures of the legislative will, and are subject
to its control.” Lutterloh v. City of Fayetteville, 149 N.C. 65, 69, 62 S.E. 758, 760
(1908); see King v. Chapel Hill, 367 N.C. 400, 405, 758 S.E.2d 364, 369 (2014); Bd. of
Trs. of Youngsville Twp. v. Webb, 155 N.C. 379, 384-85, 71 S.E. 520, 522 (1911).
Fundamental to our system is the legislature’s ability to confer upon municipalities
certain authority needed to effectuate the purposes of government. N.C. Const. art.
VII, § 1 (“The General Assembly shall provide for the organization and government
. . . of counties, cities and towns, and . . . may give such powers and duties to . . .
[them] as it may deem advisable.”); White v. Comm’rs of Chowan Cty., 90 N.C. 437,
438 (1884) (“[Municipalities] contribute largely to the life-principle of American
liberty, and are . . . invested with appropriate corporate functions . . . [which] may be
enlarged, abridged or modified at the will of the legislature . . . .”); see also 1 William
Blackstone, Commentaries *470 (“[Municipalities] are erected for the good
government of a town or particular district . . . .”)
The General Assembly delegates express power to municipalities by adopting
an enabling statute, which includes “implied powers . . . essential to the exercise of
those which are expressly conferred.” O’Neal v. Wake County, 196 N.C. 184, 187, 145
S.E. 28, 29 (1928); see Lanvale Props., LLC v. County of Cabarrus, 366 N.C. 142, 150,
731 S.E.2d 800, 807 (2012); Town of Saluda v. County of Polk, 207 N.C. 180, 186, 176
S.E. 298, 301-02 (1934). “All acts beyond the scope of the powers granted to a
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municipality are [invalid].” City of Asheville v. Herbert, 190 N.C. 732, 735, 130 S.E.
861, 863 (1925) (citations omitted).
When determining the extent of legislative power conferred upon a
municipality, the plain language of the enabling statute governs. Smith Chapel
Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 350 N.C. 805, 811, 517 S.E.2d 874, 878 (1999)
(citation omitted). If the “language of [the enabling] statute is clear and
unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction, and the courts must give it
its plain and definite meaning.” Id. at 811, 517 S.E.2d at 878 (quoting Lemons v. Old
Hickory Council, BSA, 322 N.C. 271, 276, 367 S.E.2d 655, 658 (1988)). “[A] statute
clear on its face must be enforced as written.” Bowers v. City of High Point, 339 N.C.
413, 419-20, 451 S.E.2d 284, 289 (1994) (citation omitted).
If the enabling statute is ambiguous, the “legislation ‘shall be broadly
construed . . . to include any additional and supplementary powers that are
reasonably necessary or expedient to carry them into execution and effect.’ ” King,
367 N.C. at 405, 758 S.E.2d at 369 (citation omitted) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 160A-4).
The “broad construction” mandate of section 160A-4 is “a rule of statutory
construction rather than a general directive,” Lanvale Props., 366 N.C. at 154, 731
S.E.2d at 809, and, as such, is inoperative when the enabling statute is clear and
unambiguous on its face, see id. at 154-55, 731 S.E.2d at 809-10 (citations omitted).
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Carthage asserts that under the Public Enterprise Statutes it has broad
authority to “collect monies” for the “operation, maintenance and expansion” of its
water and sewer systems, and that such authority extends to the collection of impact
fees. Carthage claims that “impact fees” fall squarely within its “authority to charge
‘fees’ or ‘charges’ ” under N.C.G.S. § 160A-314. We disagree. While the enabling
statutes allow Carthage to charge for the contemporaneous use of its water and sewer
systems, the plain language of the Public Enterprise Statutes clearly fails to empower
the Town to impose impact fees for future services.
The enabling statutes at issue here provide, in pertinent part, that “[a] city
may establish and revise . . . rents, rates, fees, charges, and penalties for the use of
or the services furnished by any public enterprise,” N.C.G.S. § 160A-314(a), that “[a]
city shall have authority to acquire, construct, establish, enlarge, improve, maintain,
own, operate, and contract for the operation of any or all of the public enterprises . . .
to furnish services,” id. § 160A-312(a), and that “a city shall have full authority to
finance the cost of any public enterprise by levying taxes, borrowing money, and
appropriating any other revenues therefor,” id. § 160A-313.
These enabling statutes clearly and unambiguously empower Carthage to
charge for the contemporaneous use of water and sewer services—not to collect fees
for future discretionary spending. See Smith Chapel, 350 N.C. at 811, 517 S.E.2d at
878 (finding that the “plain language” of N.C.G.S. § 160A-314 is “clear and
unambiguous”). A municipality’s ability to “establish and revise” its various “fees” is
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limited to “the use of” or “the services furnished by” the enterprise, which provisions
are operative in the present tense. See Dunn v. Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 129,
134, 418 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1992) (“Ordinary rules of grammar apply when ascertaining
the meaning of a statute . . . .” (citations omitted)).
Though the enabling statutes allow municipalities to charge for “services
furnished,” unlike similar county water and sewer district enabling statutes, the
language at issue here fails to authorize Carthage to charge for services “to be
furnished.” See McNeill v. Harnett County, 327 N.C. 552, 570, 398 S.E.2d 475, 485
(1990) (holding that the latter part of the enabling phrase “services furnished or to be
furnished,” N.C.G.S. § 162A-88 (1987) (emphasis added) (governing county water and
sewer districts), plainly allowed the charge for prospective services, which are “not
limited to the financing of maintenance and improvements of existing customers”).3
Since 1982 this Court has cautioned that municipalities may lack the power to charge
for prospective services absent the essential “to be” language. Bissette, 305 N.C. at
251, 287 S.E.2d at 853 (dictum) (“[W]e agree that under [N.C.G.S. § 160A-314(a)] a
municipality may not charge for services ‘to be furnished.’ ”). We simply cannot read
3 Enabling statutes pertaining to other entities employ the same “to be furnished”
prospective language, which section 160A-314(a) does not. E.g., N.C.G.S. § 162A-9 (2015) (enabling water and sewer authorities to “establish and revise a schedule of rates . . . for the services furnished or to be furnished”); id. § 162A-14(3) (enabling certain “governing bod[ies]” to “fix . . . charges . . . for the services furnished or to be furnished by any water system or sewer system of the authority”); id. § 162A-49 (2015) (same for district boards of metropolitan water districts). Accord id. §§ 162A-53(3), -72, -73(3), -85.13(a), -85.19(a)(3) (2015).
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language into a statute where it does not exist. N.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd.,
363 N.C. 189, 201, 675 S.E.2d 641, 649 (2009) (We “presum[e] that the legislature
carefully chose each word used.” (citation omitted)); Carlyle v. State Highway
Comm’n, 193 N.C. 36, 47, 136 S.E. 612, 619 (1927) (“If the courts attempt to read into
the law words of their own . . . , then this would amount to erecting a legislative
despotism of five men . . . .”).
The language of the impact fee ordinances plainly points to future services,
thus requiring Carthage to invoke prospective charging power. Both ordinances
contemplate “expanding” the systems, including “plant” and “storage expansion,” and
the water impact fee is assessed on property that is “to be served” by the water system.
The fees are not assessed at the time of actual use, but are payable in full at the time
of “final [subdivision] plat approval”—a time when water, sewer, or other
infrastructure might not have been built and only a recorded plat exists. Moreover,
Carthage charges the impact fees in addition to tap fees, which are assessed when a
property owner actually connects to the system. Indeed, plaintiffs were required to
pay some impact fees before improving or establishing a need for services on their
property. Cf. Bissette, 305 N.C. at 251-52, 287 S.E.2d at 853 (concluding that an
increased rate on all customers to fund a new treatment plant “did not reflect any
services yet to be furnished, but merely the same service which had previously been
furnished”).
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Municipalities routinely seek and obtain enabling legislation from the General
Assembly to assess impact fees. E.g., Act of June 28, 1988, ch. 996, sec. 1, 1987 N.C.
Sess. Law (Reg. Sess. 1988) 178, 178 (enabling Rolesville to “provide by ordinance for
a system of impact fees”); Act of June 23, 1987, ch. 460, sec. 13, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws
609, 613 (same for Pittsboro); Act of July 8, 1986, ch. 936, sec. 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws
(Reg. Sess. 1986) 221, 221 (same for Chapel Hill); see also Mills v. Bd. of Comm’rs of
Iredell Cty., 175 N.C. 215, 218, 95 S.E. 481, 482 (1918) (noting that county demands
for additional authority, such as “raising of proper funds . . . for improvements in
some fixed place or in restricted territory . . . can only be conferred by legislative
enactment” (citations omitted)). Yet it appears that Carthage has elected not to
pursue such legislation.
Furthermore, Carthage has the authority to charge tap fees and to establish
water and sewer rates to fund necessary improvements and maintain services to its
inhabitants, which is sufficient to address its expansion needs. See Bissette, 305 N.C.
at 251-52, 287 S.E.2d at 853 (concluding that the town validly increased rates on all
customers to pay for “a necessary improvement to the already existing sewer system
without which the Town could not continue to provide sewer service”).
While the Public Enterprise Statutes at issue here enable Carthage to charge
for the contemporaneous use of its water and sewer systems, the statutes clearly and
unambiguously fail to give Carthage the essential prospective charging power
necessary to assess impact fees. Because the legislature alone controls the extension
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of municipal authority, the impact fee ordinances on their face exceed the powers
delegated to the Town by the General Assembly, thus overstepping Carthage’s
rightful authority. See Smith Chapel, 350 N.C. at 812, 517 S.E.2d at 879 (holding
that “the [town’s] ordinance on its face exceeds the express limitation of the plain and
unambiguous reading of” the applicable Public Enterprise Statutes).
The ordinances are therefore invalid and, accordingly, we reverse the decision
of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
for the Town of Carthage. We conclude that discretionary review was improvidently
allowed as to the remaining issues on appeal and remand this case to the Court of
Appeals for consideration of the unresolved issues.
REVERSED AND REMANDED; DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
IMPROVIDENTLY ALLOWED IN PART.
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