JUSTICE ERICKSON
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, P.V., a minor child, seeks a writ of prohibition and mandamus directing the respondent court to dismiss a pending charge of juvenile delinquency for failure to comply with the speedy trial provisions of Crim. P. 48(b)(1) and section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8). We issued a rule to show cause, and now make that rule absolute.
On May 8, 1978, a juvenile delinquency petition was filed charging P.V. with being a delinquent child for committing the crime of theft of less than $50. Section 18-4-401, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8). The petitioner entered a denial and a plea of not guilty to the charge on June 26, 1978, and the case was set for trial as an alternate on October 12, 1978. Due to a docket conflict, the respondent court vacated the original trial date and rescheduled it for January 18, 1979. When a docket conflict arose on January 18, 1979, the trial court again rescheduled the trial to June 7, 1979.
On February 8, 1979, the petitioner filed a motion with the respondent court to dismiss the theft charge for failure to accord the petitioner a trial within the six month period required by Crim. P. 48(b)(1) and section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S. 1973. The trial court denied the motion holding that the speedy trial provisions were not applicable to juvenile proceedings. In reaching its decision, the court declined to follow People v. S.E. (No. [359]*359J9179, Tenth Judicial District, Division F, announced January 23, 1979) which held that the right to a speedy trial was fundamental and must be applied in juvenile proceedings.
Section 18-1-405, C.R.S. 1973 expresses the General Assembly’s conviction that, absent specified exceptions, all persons charged with a criminal offense must be brought to trial within six months of the time a not guilty plea is entered. The provision parallels the guarantees to a speedy trial afforded by both the Colorado and United States Constitutions, and, in effect, it provides a reasonable guideline for the implementation of that constitutional right. In Re Schechtel, 103 Colo. 77, 82 P.2d 762 (1938); Henwood v. People, 57 Colo. 544, 143 P. 373 (1914). Indeed, the right to a speedy trial has always been considered “one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution.” Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). See People ex rel. Coca v. District Court, 187 Colo. 280, 530 P.2d 958 (1975) (the right to a speedy trial is one of the most cherished of our constitutional rights).
In considering the rationale underlying the right to a speedy trial, the United States Supreme Court stated in Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969):
“[T]his constitutional guarantee has universally been thought to protect at least three basic demands of criminal justice in the Anglo-American legal system: ‘(1) to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, (2) to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and (3) to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.’” (Citations omitted.)
This Court has similarly found an intent “to foster more effective prisoner treatment and rehabilitation by eliminating, as expeditiously as possible, the uncertainties surrounding outstanding criminal charges” to be inherent in the right to a speedy trial. Simakis v. District Court, 194 Colo. 436, 577 P.2d 3 (1978). We have also recognized that it is in the public interest “that an early determination of guilt be made, so that the innocent may be exonerated and the guilty punished.” Jarmillo v. District Court, 174 Colo. 561, 484 P.2d 1219 (1971).
The question to be addressed in this case is whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial, which is mandated for every adult, must also be made available to a juvenile who is tried in a juvenile proceeding. In People in the Interest of C.B., 196 Colo. 362, 585 P.2d 281 (1978), and People in the Interest of R.A.D., 196 Colo. 430, 586 P.2d 46 (1978), we held that certain judicially created rules and legislative enactments which are premised on fundamental constitutional rights must, as a matter of fundamental fairness, be applied to juveniles. Those cases required, respectively, that a juvenile receive the same right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt where he is charged with the commission of a criminal [360]*360offense in a probation revocation proceeding, and the same right to challenge a potential juror for cause in a trial proceeding, that would be accorded to an adult defendant under similar circumstances. Although neither right was specifically provided for by the Colorado Rules of Juvenile Procedure, we held in both cases that minimal due process guarantees of a fundamentally fair procedure required no less. As we explained in People in the Interest of R.A.D.:
“Despite the technical classification of a juvenile proceeding as ‘civil,’ the proceeding has many characteristics of a criminal prosecution. A juvenile may be charged with acts which would constitute a crime if done by an adult, a jury trial may be held, and the child may be represented by counsel .... A juvenile who is adjudicated as a delinquent, like an adult criminal, is subject to involuntary incarceration .... Though the purpose of incarceration is rehabilitative, not punitive, the juvenile is nonetheless deprived of liberty.”
We now hold that trial courts are bound by the statutory and constitutional speedy trial requirements in juvenile as well as adult proceedings. Fundamental fairness requires no less. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).
In reaching our decision, we are persuaded by the forceful reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals in United States v. Furey, 500 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1974):
“The same policies which precipitated the enactment of rules providing for the prompt disposition of criminal proceedings are applicable whether the person charged is an adult or juvenile. Thus, the deterrence afforded by prompt disposition, the potential prejudice to any defense arising from delay as well as the disruption and anxiety created by a criminal charge, are present whether the accused be a juvenile or an adult.” (Citations omitted.)
See also Piland v.
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JUSTICE ERICKSON
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, P.V., a minor child, seeks a writ of prohibition and mandamus directing the respondent court to dismiss a pending charge of juvenile delinquency for failure to comply with the speedy trial provisions of Crim. P. 48(b)(1) and section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8). We issued a rule to show cause, and now make that rule absolute.
On May 8, 1978, a juvenile delinquency petition was filed charging P.V. with being a delinquent child for committing the crime of theft of less than $50. Section 18-4-401, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8). The petitioner entered a denial and a plea of not guilty to the charge on June 26, 1978, and the case was set for trial as an alternate on October 12, 1978. Due to a docket conflict, the respondent court vacated the original trial date and rescheduled it for January 18, 1979. When a docket conflict arose on January 18, 1979, the trial court again rescheduled the trial to June 7, 1979.
On February 8, 1979, the petitioner filed a motion with the respondent court to dismiss the theft charge for failure to accord the petitioner a trial within the six month period required by Crim. P. 48(b)(1) and section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S. 1973. The trial court denied the motion holding that the speedy trial provisions were not applicable to juvenile proceedings. In reaching its decision, the court declined to follow People v. S.E. (No. [359]*359J9179, Tenth Judicial District, Division F, announced January 23, 1979) which held that the right to a speedy trial was fundamental and must be applied in juvenile proceedings.
Section 18-1-405, C.R.S. 1973 expresses the General Assembly’s conviction that, absent specified exceptions, all persons charged with a criminal offense must be brought to trial within six months of the time a not guilty plea is entered. The provision parallels the guarantees to a speedy trial afforded by both the Colorado and United States Constitutions, and, in effect, it provides a reasonable guideline for the implementation of that constitutional right. In Re Schechtel, 103 Colo. 77, 82 P.2d 762 (1938); Henwood v. People, 57 Colo. 544, 143 P. 373 (1914). Indeed, the right to a speedy trial has always been considered “one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution.” Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). See People ex rel. Coca v. District Court, 187 Colo. 280, 530 P.2d 958 (1975) (the right to a speedy trial is one of the most cherished of our constitutional rights).
In considering the rationale underlying the right to a speedy trial, the United States Supreme Court stated in Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969):
“[T]his constitutional guarantee has universally been thought to protect at least three basic demands of criminal justice in the Anglo-American legal system: ‘(1) to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, (2) to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and (3) to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.’” (Citations omitted.)
This Court has similarly found an intent “to foster more effective prisoner treatment and rehabilitation by eliminating, as expeditiously as possible, the uncertainties surrounding outstanding criminal charges” to be inherent in the right to a speedy trial. Simakis v. District Court, 194 Colo. 436, 577 P.2d 3 (1978). We have also recognized that it is in the public interest “that an early determination of guilt be made, so that the innocent may be exonerated and the guilty punished.” Jarmillo v. District Court, 174 Colo. 561, 484 P.2d 1219 (1971).
The question to be addressed in this case is whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial, which is mandated for every adult, must also be made available to a juvenile who is tried in a juvenile proceeding. In People in the Interest of C.B., 196 Colo. 362, 585 P.2d 281 (1978), and People in the Interest of R.A.D., 196 Colo. 430, 586 P.2d 46 (1978), we held that certain judicially created rules and legislative enactments which are premised on fundamental constitutional rights must, as a matter of fundamental fairness, be applied to juveniles. Those cases required, respectively, that a juvenile receive the same right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt where he is charged with the commission of a criminal [360]*360offense in a probation revocation proceeding, and the same right to challenge a potential juror for cause in a trial proceeding, that would be accorded to an adult defendant under similar circumstances. Although neither right was specifically provided for by the Colorado Rules of Juvenile Procedure, we held in both cases that minimal due process guarantees of a fundamentally fair procedure required no less. As we explained in People in the Interest of R.A.D.:
“Despite the technical classification of a juvenile proceeding as ‘civil,’ the proceeding has many characteristics of a criminal prosecution. A juvenile may be charged with acts which would constitute a crime if done by an adult, a jury trial may be held, and the child may be represented by counsel .... A juvenile who is adjudicated as a delinquent, like an adult criminal, is subject to involuntary incarceration .... Though the purpose of incarceration is rehabilitative, not punitive, the juvenile is nonetheless deprived of liberty.”
We now hold that trial courts are bound by the statutory and constitutional speedy trial requirements in juvenile as well as adult proceedings. Fundamental fairness requires no less. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).
In reaching our decision, we are persuaded by the forceful reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals in United States v. Furey, 500 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1974):
“The same policies which precipitated the enactment of rules providing for the prompt disposition of criminal proceedings are applicable whether the person charged is an adult or juvenile. Thus, the deterrence afforded by prompt disposition, the potential prejudice to any defense arising from delay as well as the disruption and anxiety created by a criminal charge, are present whether the accused be a juvenile or an adult.” (Citations omitted.)
See also Piland v. Clark County Juvenile Court Services, 85 Nev. 489, 457 P.2d 523 (1969); State v. Henry, 78 N.M. 573, 434 P.2d 692 (1967). It is our view that the speedy resolution of juvenile proceedings brings about more significant benefits to a child and to society than are accrued through application of speedy trial rules in adult proceedings. Certainly the average juvenile is far more vulnerable to psychological harm during the pretrial period than be the average adult would be. In addition, it cannot be denied that a juvenile suffers equally with an adult when the delay of proceedings impairs his ability to present his defense. Finally, we endorse the concerns raised in the commentary to section 7.1 at 125 (Priorities in Scheduling Juvenile Court Cases) of the Juvenile Justice Standards Relating to Pretrial Court Proceedings (approved 1979):
[361]*361“Because juveniles have a ‘built-in time sense based on the urgency of their instinctual and emotional needs,’ . . . special attention must be given to speedy decision making in the juvenile court. Juveniles are less . . . able than adults to anticipate the future and cope with delays. Thus, undue delays in the processing of juvenile court cases give rise to feelings of impatience and frustration which can be psychologically harmful to the young person.
“Stigmatization of the juvenile can also result from long delay before the adjudication. A juvenile, whether innocent or not, who has charges outstanding can be expected to suffer anxiety concerning negative reactions in the community, in school, and perhaps at home. Prompt and speedy processing of cases can alleviate this strain.” (Citations omitted.)
As we stated in People in the Interest of R.A.D., supra, the goal of our juvenile system “is to reform and rehabilitate, not merely to punish the child.” Any delay of juvenile proceedings, particularly beyond the limits of the speedy trial statute and rule, is injurious if not inimical to the purposes underlying that very system. Cf. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971).
Accordingly, the rule is made absolute.
JUSTICE ROVIRA and JUSTICE LOHR dissent.
JUSTICE GROVES does not participate.