23CA1896 Peo in Interest of AH-A 04-30-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1896 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 22JD575 Honorable Laurie Clark, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner-Appellee,
In the Interest of A.H-A.,
Juvenile-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE WELLING Tow and Lipinsky, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 30, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Grant R. Fevurly, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Casey Mark Klekas, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant ¶1 A.H-A., a juvenile, appeals his delinquency adjudication for
unlawful sexual contact and harassment. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 A.H-A. and N.H. are cousins. In the fall of 2022, they attended
the same school. A.H-A. had just turned fourteen years old, and
N.H. was twelve years old. On November 2, 2022, N.H. was found
vaping at school. Afterward, she asked to talk to Joseph Kidane,
the school’s dean of culture. She told him that A.H-A. had touched
her without her consent twice. Thereafter, Cherie Nuanes, a
“physician associate,” evaluated N.H. N.H. repeated the allegations
to her. Cori Harris, a forensic interviewer, interviewed N.H. about
the incidents. N.H. repeated the two allegations to Harris and
added a third.
¶3 First, N.H. reported that A.H-A. pointed near her chest and
asked, “Can I touch?” She felt uncomfortable; replied, “No. You’re
weird”; and walked away. The prosecution didn’t charge A.H-A. in
relation to this first incident.
¶4 Second, following the first incident, N.H. said that, while at
A.H-A.’s house, he told her that they needed to go grab something
for his parents from his mother’s bedroom. When they were alone
1 in the bedroom, A.H-A. came up behind her and put his hands
under her bra. She tried to elbow him and left the room. The
prosecution charged A.H-A. with unlawful sexual contact in relation
to this incident.
¶5 Third, after the second incident, when N.H. was at A.H-A.’s
house again, she went to get a charger from A.H-A.’s bedroom.
Once there, he put his hands on her waist and pulled her towards
his body. She then ran out of A.H-A.’s bedroom. The prosecution
charged A.H-A. with harassment in relation to this third incident.
¶6 The case proceeded to a one-day bench trial. A.H-A.’s defense
at trial was that N.H. had falsely accused him and that he didn’t
commit the alleged offenses. Specifically, he argued that N.H. made
up the allegations to get out of trouble after she was caught vaping.
Five witnesses testified for the prosecution — Kidane, Harris,
Nuanes, N.H., and the investigating detective. A.H-A.’s sister and
mother testified for the defense. The juvenile court adjudicated
A.H-A. delinquent on both counts.
II. Issues on Appeal
¶7 A.H-A. raises three issues on appeal. First, he contends that
the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a
2 reasonable doubt that he acted with the required mens rea for both
offenses. Second, he contends that the juvenile court violated his
statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial when it
continued the trial over his objection. Third, he contends that the
juvenile court reversibly erred by admitting child hearsay through
three witnesses at trial. For the reasons set forth below, we reject
all three contentions and therefore affirm.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶8 A.H-A. first contends that the prosecution didn’t present
sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had
the required mens rea for the two offenses. As for the sexual
contact offense, he contends that there wasn’t sufficient evidence
presented at trial to prove that he touched N.H. for the purpose of
sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse. As for the harassment
offense, he contends that there wasn’t sufficient evidence at trial to
prove that he intended to harass, annoy, or alarm N.H.
1. Additional Facts
¶9 The prosecution presented the following evidence at trial in
support of the sexual contact charge:
3 • N.H. testified that she and A.H-A.
were at his house and since his dad sells corn and they have all their supplies in his mom’s room, he told me that we had to go grab some chips, I think. And that’s when we went, and he came up behind me and put his hands in my shirt, and I felt uncomfortable. So I tried to, like, elbow him, and then I left the room.
• N.H. testified that A.H-A. put his hands under her bra.
• N.H. testified that only she and A.H-A. were in his mother’s
room when the incident occurred.
• Kidane testified that N.H. told him that A.H-A. fondled her
by touching her breast area under her shirt.
• Nuanes testified that N.H. told her that A.H-A.’s hands
touched her breasts underneath her shirt.
¶ 10 The prosecution presented the following evidence regarding
the harassment charge:
• N.H. testified that A.H-A. made her uncomfortable three
times.
• First, N.H. testified that A.H-A. pointed at her shirt, near
her chest, and asked, “Can I touch?” N.H. responded, “No,
you’re weird.” N.H. then left the room.
4 • Second, as mentioned above, N.H. testified that A.H-A. put
his hands under her bra. She said she tried to elbow him
and then left the room.
• Third, N.H. testified that, after she went into A.H-A.’s
bedroom to get a charger, he put his hands on her waist.
Kidane also testified that N.H. told him that A.H-A.
approached her from behind and pulled her waist closer to
his waist.
• N.H. testified that she never told A.H-A. “it was okay for him
to touch [her] the way that he did.”
• Kidane testified that, based on his conversation with N.H.,
he concluded the touching was nonconsensual,
unwarranted, and unwanted.
• Nuanes testified that N.H. told her that A.H-A. touched her
breasts under her bra and grabbed her waist.
2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 11 “We review the record de novo to determine whether the
evidence presented was sufficient in both quantity and quality to
sustain a defendant’s conviction.” McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44,
¶ 63; see also People in Interest of J.R., 216 P.3d 1220, 1221 (Colo.
5 App. 2009) (“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting an adjudication of juvenile delinquency, the standards
are the same as those used in a criminal case.”).
¶ 12 We employ a “substantial evidence test,” in which we ask if the
evidence, “when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a
conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the
charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” Clark v. People, 232 P.3d
1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010) (quoting People v. Bennett, 515 P.2d 466,
469 (Colo. 1973)). “[I]t is the fact finder’s function in a criminal
case to consider and determine what weight should be given to all
parts of the evidence and to resolve conflicts, testimonial
inconsistencies, and disputes in the evidence.” People v. McIntier,
134 P.3d 467, 471 (Colo. App. 2005). It doesn’t matter if we would
have reached a different conclusion as the trier of fact; we must
“give the prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference
which might be fairly drawn from the evidence.” Gorostieta v.
People, 2022 CO 41, ¶ 17 (quoting People v. Harrison, 2020 CO 57,
¶ 32).
6 ¶ 13 Section 18-3-404(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025, provides that a person
can commit unlawful sexual contact by (1) knowingly subjecting a
victim to any sexual contact (2) if the person knows that the victim
doesn’t consent. As relevant here, sexual contact means “[t]he
knowing touching of the victim’s intimate parts by the actor . . . if
that sexual contact is for the purposes of sexual arousal,
gratification, or abuse.” § 18-3-401(4)(a), C.R.S. 2025 (emphasis
added). “Intimate parts” includes the “buttocks . . . or the breast of
any person.” § 18-3-401(2).
¶ 14 And “[a] person commits harassment if, with intent to harass,
annoy, or alarm another person, the person . . . [s]trikes, shoves,
kicks, or otherwise touches a person or subjects [them] to physical
contact.” § 18-9-111(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025 (emphasis added).
3. Unlawful Sexual Contact
¶ 15 A.H-A. contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove
that he acted with the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or
abuse when he touched N.H. on her breasts underneath her bra.
We disagree.
¶ 16 To prove unlawful sexual contact, “there must be other
evidence of the juvenile’s sexual purpose beyond the sexual contact
7 itself.” People in Interest of J.O., 2022 COA 65M, ¶ 29. Here, there
was such evidence. Specifically, the prosecution presented evidence
that A.H-A. brought N.H. to his mother’s room where they were
alone. A reasonable fact finder could infer that, by doing so, A.H-A.
was trying to isolate her and was thereby “attempting to avoid
detection.” Id. This fact, in combination with the evidence that
A.H-A. placed his hands up N.H.’s shirt and under her bra is
substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion that A.H-A. acted
with the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse. See id.
at ¶ 20 (“[W]hether a defendant acted with the requisite mental
state to sustain a conviction for unlawful sexual contact can be
inferred from the nature of and the circumstances surrounding the
sexual touching.”).
¶ 17 Notwithstanding this evidence, A.H-A. contends that this case
is similar to J.O., when a division of this court held that the
evidence wasn’t sufficient to prove that a juvenile had the requisite
intent for his unlawful sexual contact adjudication. But the facts in
J.O. are readily distinguishable. J.O. involved an eleven-year-old
boy who “touched the clothing covering the intimate parts of
an eleven-year-old girl in a classroom and in a crowded school
8 hallway in front of classmates and at least one teacher.” Id. at ¶ 33.
The division concluded that this evidence was insufficient to
establish that the juvenile acted for the purpose of sexual arousal,
gratification, or abuse. Id.
¶ 18 The circumstances surrounding A.H-A.’s conduct were
materially different from those in J.O. The prosecution presented
other evidence beyond the contact itself that wasn’t present in
J.O. — namely, that A.H-A. touched N.H. when they were isolated in
A.H-A.’s mother’s room and that he touched her breast under her
clothing. This evidence was sufficient to prove the requisite mental
state beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 19 Finally, A.H-A. contends that the juvenile court didn’t
sufficiently explain its findings on the intent element and
improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defense. But “[o]n
review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, . . . we are
not bound by what the juvenile court articulated as the basis for its
finding.” Id. at ¶ 19. Instead, “we must consider all the evidence to
determine whether any rational trier of fact might accept it as
sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
9 Id. As explained above, there was sufficient evidence to support
A.H-A.’s adjudication for unlawful sexual contact.
4. Harassment
¶ 20 A.H-A. next contends that the evidence was insufficient to
prove that he intended to harass, annoy, or alarm N.H. during the
third incident. Again, we disagree.
¶ 21 The evidence showed that A.H-A. had previously pointed at
N.H.’s chest area and asked, “Can I touch?” and that she said no
and walked away. On a separate occasion, A.H-A. touched N.H.
underneath her bra; N.H. elbowed him and left the room. So, when
A.H-A. later grabbed N.H.’s waist and pulled her towards his own
waist, a reasonable fact finder could infer that A.H-A. intended to
harass, annoy, or alarm N.H. given her prior rejections of his
physical contact. Indeed, N.H. had made it clear on two prior
occasions that A.H-A. wasn’t welcome to touch her in these ways.
Therefore, given N.H.’s repeated rebuffing of A.H-A., a reasonable
fact finder could infer the requisite mental state of intending to
harass, annoy, or alarm when A.H-A. again touched her by
grabbing her waist.
10 B. Speedy Trial
¶ 22 A.H-A. next contends that the juvenile court violated his
statutory and constitutional right to a speedy trial when it
erroneously found good cause to continue the trial at the People’s
request and over his objection. We conclude that he waived his
statutory speedy trial claim and reject his constitutional speedy
trial claim on the merits.
¶ 23 The People formally filed charges against A.H-A. via summons
on November 18, 2022. On April 13, 2023, A.H-A. entered a not
guilty plea, and the juvenile court set the case for a bench trial on
June 26, 2023. Because his statutory speedy trial right deadline
would have expired on June 13, 2023, he waived this right to
accommodate the June 26 trial date. The court accepted this
waiver and recalculated A.H-A.’s new speedy trial deadline to be
June 27, 2023.
¶ 24 On June 15, 2023, the People filed a motion to continue the
trial, explaining that Nuanes, the physician associate — an
essential witness — would be out of town on June 26. They also
requested a continuance because they hadn’t been able to contact
11 N.H. or her family, leaving them unable to effectively prepare for
trial. A.H-A. objected to the continuance, arguing that there wasn’t
good cause under the applicable statutes to continue the trial past
the speedy trial deadline of June 27, 2023. He also argued that a
continuance would violate his constitutional speedy trial right
under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
¶ 25 On June 26, the juvenile court heard argument on the People’s
motion to continue. The People reiterated their request for a
continuance under the good cause exception because Nuanes was
out of town. The juvenile court found good cause to continue the
trial over A.H-A.’s objection and rescheduled it for August 7, 2023.
The case went to trial on that date.
2. Statutory Speedy Trial Right
¶ 26 A juvenile’s right to a speedy trial is governed by section
18-1-405, C.R.S. 2025, and Crim. P. 48(b). § 19-2.5-904(1), C.R.S.
2025. Although section 18-1-405(1) guarantees a defendant the
right to a speedy trial, to obtain relief based on a violation of this
statute, a defendant must move for dismissal of the case before trial
commences. § 18-1-405(5); see People v. McMurtry, 122 P.3d 237,
242 (Colo. 2005). “Failure to so move is a waiver of the defendant’s
12 rights under [the speedy trial statute].” § 18-1-405(5). A.H-A.
didn’t move to dismiss his case on speedy trial grounds before his
trial began. He filed only an objection to the continuance of the
trial. But he didn’t — either in the objection, at the hearing where
the juvenile court granted the People’s request for a continuance, or
at any other time before trial — move to dismiss the case based on
a violation of his statutory speedy trial right. Therefore, A.H-A.
waived his statutory speedy trial claim, and we decline to address it
on the merits.1 See Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355, 1362
(Colo. 1993).
3. Constitutional Speedy Trial Right
¶ 27 Second, A.H-A. contends that the juvenile court violated his
constitutional right to a speedy trial. The People respond that
A.H-A. failed to preserve this claim, so we should review it for plain
error. We assume, without deciding, that by objecting to the
1 To the extent that A.H-A. suggests for the first time in a footnote
in his reply brief that we should review the juvenile court’s decision to grant the prosecution’s request for a continuance over his objection as the error (as opposed to the violation of the speedy trial statute), we decline to address this newly reframed argument. See People v. Czemerynski, 786 P.2d 1100, 1107 (Colo. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by, Rojas v. People, 2022 CO 8.
13 continuance on constitutional speedy trial grounds, A.H-A.
preserved this contention. So we address it on the merits.
¶ 28 A defendant in a criminal case has a right to a speedy trial
under the United States and Colorado Constitutions, U.S. Const.
amend. VI; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16, and a juvenile charged with
committing a delinquent act is entitled to the same constitutional
speedy trial protections as an adult charged with committing a
criminal offense, P.V. v. Dist. Ct., 609 P.2d 110, 111 (Colo. 1980).
Whether a juvenile’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was
denied is determined by an ad hoc balancing of four factors: (1) the
length of the trial delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the
defendant asserted their right to a speedy trial; and (4) any
prejudice to the defendant from the delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at
530. “Although these factors must be considered in combination,
the length of the delay must be at least presumptively prejudicial
before further inquiry into the other factors is warranted.” People v.
Glaser, 250 P.3d 632, 635 (Colo. App. 2010).
¶ 29 We review de novo the juvenile court’s analysis of the
constitutional right to a speedy trial. People v. West, 2019 COA
14 131, ¶ 7. But we review the juvenile court’s findings of fact for clear
error. Id.
¶ 30 Based on our review of the relevant factors, we conclude that
A.H-A.’s constitutional right to a speedy trial wasn’t abridged. As a
threshold matter, we consider whether the delay was presumptively
prejudicial. A.H-A. was brought to trial within nine months of being
charged.2 See Glaser, 250 P.3d at 635 (explaining that the
constitutional speedy trial right attaches at the time of arrest or
filing of a formal charge). The length of delay becomes
presumptively prejudicial as it approaches one year. West, ¶ 14.
So the delay in bringing A.H-A. to trial wasn’t presumptively
prejudicial. See id. (concluding that a delay of eight months and six
days wasn’t presumptively prejudicial). But even if we assume,
again without deciding, that the nearly nine-month delay A.H-A.
experienced was presumptively prejudicial, the other Barker factors
support our conclusion that A.H-A. wasn’t denied his constitutional
right to a speedy trial.
2 A.H-A. was charged on November 18, 2022, and he went to trial
on August 7, 2023, a delay of eight months and twenty days.
15 ¶ 31 With respect to the second Barker factor, although the reason
for the delay was attributable to the prosecution, it was justified
due to the unavailability of a critical witness. See People v. Jompp,
2018 COA 128, ¶ 31; see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 (“[A] valid
reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify
appropriate delay.”).
¶ 32 The third Barker factor weighs in A.H-A.’s favor because he
objected to the prosecution’s request to continue the trial. Indeed,
in his written objection, he cited Barker to argue that his
constitutional speedy trial right would be violated if the juvenile
court continued his trial.
¶ 33 The fourth Barker factor decidedly weighs against finding a
constitutional speedy trial violation, as we can discern no prejudice.
A.H-A. asserts that he was prejudiced due to the delay because it
impaired his defense, and, given his age, he suffered “continued
anxiety.” But his trial was continued only from June 26 to August
7, a delay of just six weeks. A.H-A. has failed to show how such a
short delay materially impaired his defense. He contends that
further delay increased the risk of witnesses “forgetting” the
incidents, but he points to nothing in the record that supports this
16 contention. Indeed, N.H.’s allegations remained consistent
throughout the case and trial. And while we recognize that A.H-A.
may have been anxious about the pending trial, we conclude that
this alone wasn’t sufficient prejudice attributable to the six-week
delay. Having reviewed these factors, we conclude that, on balance,
they weigh against finding a constitutional speedy trial violation.
Accordingly, we conclude that the court didn’t violate A.H-A.’s
constitutional right to a speedy trial by granting the continuance.
C. Child Hearsay
¶ 34 Last, A.H-A. contends that the juvenile court reversibly erred
by admitting child hearsay from three witnesses. We discern no
error.
¶ 35 Although the juvenile court set the pretrial motions deadline
for April 28, 2023, on May 12, the People filed a notice of intent to
introduce child hearsay statements under section 13-25-129,
C.R.S. 2025, together with a request for leave to file that motion
late. In their motion, the People said they intended to introduce at
trial statements that N.H. made to three witnesses: Harris, Kidane,
and Nuanes. The People explained that the delay in filing the notice
17 was the result of a miscommunication due to a switch in
prosecutors. A.H-A. then filed his objection to the introduction of
child hearsay. After the juvenile court continued the trial, the court
scheduled a motions hearing for July 24, 2023, to address the
People’s child hearsay request.
¶ 36 At the hearing, after Kidane, Harris, and Nuanes testified, the
juvenile court’s ruling explained why it believed their statements
had sufficient indicia of reliability to be admissible under People v.
District Court, 776 P.2d 1083, 1089-90 (Colo. 1989). It later did the
same in a written order. Both in its oral ruling and order, the
juvenile court found that (1) the statements sought to be introduced
were spontaneous and weren’t the product of leading questions;
(2) N.H. and the witnesses had no motive to lie; and (3) N.H.’s
statements were consistent over time.
¶ 37 With respect to the assertion that N.H. lied because she got
caught vaping, the court found in its written order that “there [wa]s
no evidence to support that [N.H.] lied for the sole purpose of
explaining [her] concerning behavior.” Instead, the court found that
N.H.’s “concerning behavior” was the result of recent trauma. The
court also found that there was “no evidence to support that the
18 behavior or general character of [N.H.] would diminish the reliability
of [her] statements.” Based on these findings, the juvenile court
granted the People’s request to introduce the child hearsay
evidence.
2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 38 Hearsay is a statement other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered into evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. CRE 801(c). Hearsay isn’t
admissible unless it’s subject to an exception set forth in a rule or
statute. CRE 802.
¶ 39 One such exception is the child hearsay statute, section
13-25-129(1), which “allows certain out-of-court statements made
by child declarants, which would otherwise be hearsay, to be
admitted at trial.” People v. Phillips, 2012 COA 176, ¶ 87. As
relevant here, the child hearsay statute allows out-of-court
statements made by a person under fifteen years of age at the time
the statement was made to be admissible in a delinquency
proceeding when the declarant is alleged to have been a victim of
unlawful sexual behavior, including unlawful sexual contact. § 13-
25-129(2); see also § 16-22-102(9)(c)(I), C.R.S. 2025 (defining
19 unlawful sexual behavior to include unlawful sexual contact);
People v. Gookins, 111 P.3d 525, 528 (Colo. App. 2004) (“If the
legislature had intended to condition the admission of child hearsay
upon the age of the child victim at the time of trial, it could have so
stated.”). “The proponent of the statement shall give the adverse
party reasonable notice of the proponent’s intention to offer the
statement and the particulars of the statement.” § 13-25-129(7).
Such statements, however, are only admissible if the juvenile court,
after conducting a hearing, finds “that the time, content, and
circumstances of the statement[s] provide sufficient safeguards of
reliability.” § 13-25-129(5)(a).
¶ 40 A court may consider several nonexclusive factors to
determine whether the time, content, and circumstances of a
statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability. Dist. Ct., 776
P.2d at 1089-90. Those factors include the following:
(1) whether the statement was made spontaneously;
(2) whether the statement was made while the child was still
upset or in pain from the alleged abuse;
(3) whether the child used age-appropriate language;
(4) whether more than one person heard the statement;
20 (5) the general character of the child; and
(6) other factors such as bias against the defendant, the use
of leading questions, or intervening events that may raise
reliability concerns. Id.
¶ 41 We review the juvenile court’s decision to admit child hearsay
under section 13-25-129 for an abuse of discretion. Phillips, ¶ 91.
3. Analysis
¶ 42 Beyond contending that the trial court erred by admitting
unreliable child hearsay under the District Court factors, A.H-A.
separately raises three other contentions regarding the child
hearsay evidence. We address these first before addressing his
reliability contention.
¶ 43 First, A.H-A. contends that the juvenile court prejudged the
evidence because it presided over the pretrial hearing on the child
hearsay issue and then acted as the fact finder at trial. In support
of his contention that this was improper, A.H-A. cites section 13-
25-129(5)(a), which requires pretrial child hearsay hearings to be
conducted “outside the presence of the jury.” But A.H-A. cites no
cases to support his contention that a court can’t perform both
roles (i.e., gatekeeper and ultimate fact finder). Nor are we aware of
21 any. Furthermore, at the child hearsay hearing, the juvenile court
said that it wasn’t making a credibility determination that day and
was “only trying to determine whether it[ was] appropriate that
these statements bec[a]me part of the record.” See People v. Hall,
2021 CO 71M, ¶ 36 (“In a bench trial . . . ‘there is a presumption
that all incompetent evidence is disregarded by the court in
reaching its conclusions.’” (quoting Liggett v. People, 135 P.3d 725,
733 (Colo. 2006))). Accordingly, we reject this contention.
¶ 44 Second, A.H-A. contends that the prosecution violated the
“reasonable notice” section of the statute by filing its notice of its
intent to introduce child hearsay after the motions deadline had
passed. The court, however, has wide discretion to extend pretrial
deadlines for good cause, and we discern no abuse of that
discretion here. More importantly, A.H-A. doesn’t explain why the
delay of less than three weeks past the motions deadline didn’t
constitute “reasonable notice,” given that it was still more than six
weeks before the then-scheduled trial and nearly three months
before the case ultimately went to trial. Accordingly, we hold that
the juvenile court didn’t abuse its discretion by declining to exclude
22 the evidence based on the prosecution’s failure to give reasonable
notice as required by section 13-25-129(7).
¶ 45 Third, A.H-A. contends that, in admitting the child hearsay,
the juvenile court acted contrary to the purpose of the child hearsay
statute because N.H. was an older child — thirteen at the time of
trial — and she testified at trial. A.H-A. argues that the statute was
meant to protect children of a tender age who are too young to
testify from facing their abusers in court. A.H-A. construes the
statute too narrowly.
¶ 46 If the relevant statute does not define “child” — as is the case
here — the child hearsay statute expressly applies to statements
made by children who are under fifteen. § 13-25-129(2). N.H. was
twelve when she initially made the statements and thirteen when
she testified at trial. Moreover, the statute explicitly applies to both
situations when the child testifies and situations when they don’t.
§ 13-25-129(5)(b)(I). Indeed, the statute imposes additional
safeguards when the child doesn’t testify at trial. § 13-25-
129(5)(b)(II). The plain language of the statute, therefore, refutes
this contention.
23 ¶ 47 Last, A.H-A. contends that the statements didn’t meet the
requirements for reliability under District Court. Citing the factors
from District Court, he argues that N.H.’s statements weren’t
spontaneous because she made them only after she was caught
vaping at school, and therefore her motivation in making them was
to get out of trouble. He also argues that events that occurred
between the time of the unlawful contact and the time of the
statements rendered the statements unreliable. We conclude that
the juvenile court didn’t abuse its discretion by admitting the
statements under the child hearsay statute.
¶ 48 In both its oral ruling and written order, the juvenile court
carefully weighed the District Court factors to determine that the
statements were reliable. After noting that N.H.’s statements to all
three witnesses were consistent, it found that no evidence
supported the defense’s assertion that N.H. had lied to get out of
trouble. Instead, the court said that the stress of getting in trouble
for vaping led her to spontaneously disclose a secret she had been
maintaining. In other words, the court preliminarily found, based
on the testimony presented at the child hearsay hearing, that the
stress of keeping the abuse secret led to the vaping, not that getting
24 caught vaping provided a motive to fabricate. The court also
explained there was no evidence that N.H.’s general character would
diminish the reliability of the statements.
¶ 49 The testimony at the pretrial hearing supports these
conclusions. Both Harris and Nuanes testified at the hearing that
N.H. never indicated she had any bias or motive to lie about the
allegations. Nuanes also testified that it’s not uncommon for
children who have had traumatic experiences to exhibit behavioral
concerns at school. Given this testimony and the juvenile court’s
findings, the court didn’t abuse its discretion by admitting the child
hearsay.3
III. Disposition
¶ 50 We affirm the juvenile court’s delinquency adjudication.
JUDGE TOW and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.
3 Because it’s not necessary to our disposition, we don’t address
A.H-A.’s independent contention that the juvenile court erred by admitting N.H.’s statements to Nuanes under CRE 803(4), the medical diagnosis hearsay exception. Cf. Kelly v. Haralampopoulos, 2014 CO 46, ¶ 43 n.9 (explaining that because it found statements to be admissible under CRE 803(4), it didn’t need to “consider the district court's alternative rationale for admission under the residual hearsay exception”).