Puleo v. Masonic Med. Rsch. Inst.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: January 8, 2025
• Docket: 23-7589
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23-7589 Puleo v. Masonic Med. Rsch. Inst.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 8th day of January, two thousand twenty-five.

PRESENT: RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, STEVEN J. MENASHI, MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

COLLEEN T. PULEO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 23-7589

MASONIC MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, JOHN S. ZIELINSKI, MARIA I. KONTARIDIS,

Defendants-Appellees. _____________________________________ For Plaintiff-Appellant: ZACHARY C. OREN, Law Office of Zachary C. Oren, Utica, NY.

For Defendants- HANNAH K. REDMOND (Adam P. Appellees: Mastroleo, on the brief), Bond, Schoeneck & King PLLC, Syracuse, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern

District of New York (Thomas J. McAvoy, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the September 28, 2023 judgment of the

district court is AFFIRMED.

Colleen T. Puleo appeals from the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of her former employer, Masonic Medical Research Institute

(“MMRI”), its chief financial officer, and director of research (together,

“Defendants”) on her claims that she was fired from her position at Defendants’

animal-testing laboratory on account of her sex and age, in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq., the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (the “ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.,

and New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. 1 We

1 Puleo does not appeal the district court’s dismissal of her related retaliation claims.

2 assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and issues on

appeal.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and view

the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party below. See James

v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 233 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is

appropriate “only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” Id. A

dispute is “genuine” when the evidence on the issue “would permit a reasonable

juror to find for the party opposing the motion.” Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89,

98 (2d Cir. 2016).

I. Title VII Sex Discrimination

When assessing a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII, we apply the

familiar three-step McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Brown v.

City of Syracuse, 673 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying McDonnell Douglas Corp.

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) to Title VII claims). To start, the plaintiff must

“establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1) she is a member

of a protected class; (2) she is qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse

employment action; and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of

discrimination.” Bart v. Golub Corp., 96 F.4th 566, 570 (2d Cir. 2024) (internal

3 quotation marks omitted). If “the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the

burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its adverse action.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the

employer articulates such a reason, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to

show at the third step either “that the employer’s stated justification for its adverse

action was nothing but a pretext for discrimination” or “that[] even if the employer

had mixed motives, the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class was at least one

motivating factor in the employer’s adverse action.” Id. at 567.

The district court below expressed skepticism that Puleo had established a

prima facie case of sex discrimination. But even assuming that Puleo had made

such a case, the court determined that she failed to carry her burden at step three

of the McDonnell Douglas framework. We agree.

With respect to Puleo’s sex discrimination claims, Defendants asserted two

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating her from the animal

laboratory – (1) that Puleo’s role as an Animal Care Administrator was eliminated

after MMRI transitioned from a large- to small-animal research laboratory, and

she lacked the necessary experience for the post-renovation Animal Care Assistant

4 position; and (2) that a lack of grant funding made it impossible for MMRI to retain

her in a temporary research assistant role.

Puleo has not shown that MMRI’s restructuring and transition to small

animal research was a pretext for discrimination. It is undisputed that MMRI

decided to invest significant resources in building a new vivarium to conduct

research primarily on transgenic or genetically modified mice. Puleo’s

arguments that MMRI continued to have a need for her large animal skills because

it maintained some plans to build a large animal facility in the future are

unavailing. The record shows that at the time of the decision to terminate Puleo,

MMRI believed that Puleo’s skills were no longer necessary because large animal

research would not be conducted for the foreseeable future.

As to the newly created Animal Care Assistant job, Puleo argues that

experience with small animals – specifically, transgenic or genetically modified

mice – was not essential to the position and that, in any event, she did have some

experience with genetically modified mice prior to 2015. But the record indicates

that the Animal Care Assistant position required applicants to have familiarity

caring for and breeding genetically modified mice and that the director of research,

who was responsible for hiring the person to fill the position, understood Puleo to

5 lack that experience. Moreover, the record makes clear that Puleo never actually

applied for the job of Animal Care Assistant after MMRI’s transition, even though,

Defendants contend, she was told that MMRI was hiring for the position.

But even if Puleo had applied for the position and been rejected, the record

is devoid of evidence suggesting that her credentials were “so superior to the

credentials of the person selected for the job that no reasonable person, in the

exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected” absent

an exercise of discrimination. Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93,

103 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). In fact, Puleo confirmed in

her deposition that she lacked experience with transgenic mice in particular.

Her arguments concerning the temporary research position fare no better.

Although Puleo makes much of the fact that Defendants cut funding for her

position after previously predicting that her salary would be included in the

upcoming budget, she has not presented evidence to suggest that the budget

shortfall that prevented her retention was a pretext for sex discrimination. Puleo

counters that five women were terminated under the chief financial officer and

that MMRI retained a man in the position of research assistant. But the

unrebutted evidence shows that, regardless of his involvement in other

6 terminations, the chief financial officer played no role in Puleo’s termination.

And while it is true that MMRI retained a male research assistant at the time Puleo

was terminated, the record reveals that the other research assistant retained by

MMRI was female. Puleo provides no other information about the makeup of

MMRI’s workforce that would permit a factfinder to conclude the existence of a

sex-based disparity, much less that Puleo’s termination gave “rise to an inference

of discrimination.” Bart, 96 F.4th at 570 (internal quotation marks omitted).

For all these reasons, we agree with the district court that summary

judgment in Defendants’ favor was warranted on Puleo’s Title VII claim.

II. ADEA Discrimination

Puleo’s claim for age discrimination under the ADEA is subject to the same

three-part McDonnell Douglas framework, with one exception. See Gorzynski v.

JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010). At step three, an ADEA

plaintiff “must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the but-

for cause of the challenged adverse employment action and not just a contributing

or motivating factor.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We agree with the

district court that Puleo has not made such a showing here.

7 To rebut Defendants’ nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination, Puleo

relies primarily on the fact that the man who filled the Animal Care Assistant

position was thirty-three years younger than she was. But without more, the

mere fact that the person hired was younger is not enough to establish that

MMRI’s stated reason for firing was pretextual. See Fagan v. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas

Corp., 186 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The replacement of an older worker with

a younger worker or workers does not itself prove unlawful discrimination.”).

Moreover, as noted above, Puleo does not dispute that the person hired as the

Animal Care Assistant was qualified for the position and that Puleo herself did

not even apply for the job after MMRI’s transition to a small-animal testing facility.

Considering the record as a whole, we cannot say that Puleo has met her burden

at step three to create a genuine dispute that age discrimination was the but-for

cause of her termination.

With respect to the research assistant position, Puleo’s evidence is even

thinner. Although she insists that all of the women terminated during the chief

financial officer’s tenure at MMRI were over the age of forty, she again overlooks

the fact that the chief financial officer played no role in her termination. She

likewise provides no evidence about the composition of MMRI’s workforce as a

8 whole, thus preventing a reasonable factfinder from drawing any inference of age

discrimination. More specifically, the record is silent as to the ages of the two

research assistants who were retained instead of her. Given this dearth of

evidence, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that MMRI’s stated reasons for

firing Puleo were pretextual and that age discrimination was the but-for cause of

her termination. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009) (“Unlike

Title VII . . . a plaintiff may [not] establish [ADEA] discrimination by showing that

age was simply a motivating factor.”). Accordingly, we agree with the district

court that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Puleo’s age

discrimination claims.

III. NYSHRL

Before turning to Puleo’s state-law claims, we must first determine whether

the district court properly exercised supplemental jurisdiction over those claims

in light of the dismissal of Puleo’s federal claims. See Motorola Credit Corp. v.

Uzan, 388 F.3d 39, 56 (2d Cir. 2004). Congress has provided that “in any civil

action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall

have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims

in the action . . . that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C.

9 § 1367(a). Claims form part of the same case or controversy when they “derive

from a common nucleus of operative fact.” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons,

522 U.S. 156, 165 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although the district court did not explain its exercise of supplemental

jurisdiction over Puleo’s state-law claims, there can be no doubt that both the

federal and state claims derive from a common nucleus of fact – namely, Puleo’s

termination from MMRI. We therefore have little difficulty concluding that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction

over Puleo’s NYSHRL claim, particularly since the case is no longer “at a relatively

early stage and the remaining claims [do not] involve[] issues of state law that [a]re

unsettled.” Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 306 (2d Cir. 2003).

Turning to the merits of Puleo’s state-law claims, we agree with the district

court that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment for the same reasons

discussed above in connection with Puleo’s federal claims. See Leibowitz v. Cornell

Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 498 n.1 (2d. Cir 2009) (“Age discrimination claims brought

pursuant to the NYSHRL . . . are analyzed under the ADEA framework . . . just as

gender discrimination claims brought pursuant to the NYSHRL . . . are analyzed

under the Title VII framework.”).

10 * * *

We have considered Puleo’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court