Puerto Rico Soccer League NFP, Corp. v. Federacion Puertorriquena de Futbol

District Court, D. Puerto Rico·Decided September 23, 2025·No. 3:23-cv-01203·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

PUERTO RICO SOCCER LEAGUE NFP, CORP., et al.,

Plaintiffs, CIVIL NO. 23-1203 (RAM) v.

FEDERACIÓN PUERTORRIQUEÑA DE FUTBOL, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, United States District Judge Pending before the Court are Defendants Confederation of North, Central America, and Caribbean Football’s (“CONCACAF”) CONCACAF’s Application for Attorneys’ Fees in Compliance with Order at Docket No. 206 (Unredacted) (“CONCACAF Motion”) (Docket No. 229), Federation Internationale de Football Association’s (“FIFA”) FIFA’s Application for Attorney Fees (“FIFA Motion”)(Docket No. 230), and Federacion Puertorriquena de Futbol’s (“FPF”), Iván Rivera-Gutierrez’s, José Martinez’s, Gabriel Ortiz’s, and Luis Mozo Cañete’s (collectively, “FPF Defendants”) Motion Submitting Itemized Request for Attorneys’ Fees (“FPF Motion”) (Docket No. 233). Defendants’1 Motions are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs’ counsel, Jose R.

1 “Defendants” is used to refer collectively to CONCACAF, FIFA, FPF, and the FPF Defendants. Olmo-Rodriguez and Ibrahim Reyes, are hereby ordered to pay Defendants $24,492.10 in attorneys’ fees and costs. I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In response to various motions by Defendants, Plaintiffs2 submitted four filings on March 9 and 13, 2025: (1) Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Joint Motion to Disqualify

Plaintiffs’ Counsel (Docket No. 174); (2) Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Joint Motion for Protective Order Limiting the Scope of Discovery (Docket No. 175); (3) Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Joint Motion for Entry of a Protective and Confidentiality Order and Rule 502(d) Order (Docket No. 176); and (4) Plaintiffs’ Supplement to Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Joint Motion for Entry of a Protective and Confidentiality Order and Rule 502(d) Order (Docket No. 177). On March 17, 2025, Defendants sought leave to reply to these four motions. (Docket Nos. 178; 179 and 180). In their replies, Defendants claimed that Plaintiffs had made multiple citation

errors and alleged that they had used generative artificial intelligence to write these motions. See id. On March 18, 2025, this Court issued the Order to Show Cause, which was amended the following day and asked Plaintiffs to show cause “as to why sanctions should not be levied against them for

2 “Plaintiffs” is used to refer collectively to Puerto Rico Soccer League NFP, Corp., Marria Larracuente, Joseph Marc-Seralta-Ives, and Futbol Boricua, Inc. violations” of Rules 1.1 and 3.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). (Docket Nos. 181 and 187). Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Compliance on March 21, 2025. (Docket No. 190). On April 10, 2025, the Court issued an Opinion and Order finding that Plaintiffs had not adequately shown cause and that sanctions were warranted. (Docket No. 206). The Court

ordered Plaintiffs’ counsel to pay the attorneys’ fees incurred by Defendants in relation to Plaintiffs’ filings at Docket Nos. 174, 175, 176, and 177. Id. at 10. Defendants were granted twenty-one days to file an itemized application for attorneys’ fees. Id. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 22, 2025, which the Court denied the same day. (Docket Nos. 217 and 219). The Defendants subsequently filed their associated motions for attorneys’ fees, providing both redacted and unredacted versions of the motions. (Docket Nos. 228; 229; 230; 233 and 235). II. ANALYSIS The Court begins by determining an appropriate amount of

attorneys’ fees before addressing the reasonableness of Defendants’ requested costs. A. Reasonable attorneys’ fees Defendants request a significant amount of attorneys’ fees: CONCACAF seeks $20,927.50 in attorneys’ fees; FIFA seeks $52,053.00 in attorneys’ fees; and FPF and the FPF Defendants seek $14,992.50 in attorneys’ fees. (Docket Nos. 229; 230 and 233). In support of their requests, Defendants submitted time sheets from each attorney and, for some, summaries of his or her professional qualifications and unsworn declarations under penalty of perjury certifying the contents of the time sheets. (Docket Nos. 229; 229- 1; 229-2; 230; 230-1; 230-2; 233 and 233-1). The lodestar method is the predominant method of calculating

reasonable attorney’s fees. See, e.g., Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 551 (2010) (lodestar is the “guiding light” for fee-shifting jurisprudence) (citation omitted); Gay Officers Action League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 295 (1st Cir. 2001); Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 937 (1st Cir. 1992) (lodestar is the “starting point” when calculating fees); Skytec, Inc. v. Logistic Sys., Inc., Civil No. 15-2104, 2019 WL 2246775, at *1 (D.P.R. May 23, 2019) (“The First Circuit applies the lodestar method to calculate attorney’s fees.”) (citations omitted). The lodestar method requires two steps. First, a court must determine “the number of hours reasonably expended.” Pérez-Sosa v.

Garland, 22 F.4th 312, 321 (1st Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). Second, the court should “identify a reasonable hourly rate or rates.” Id. (citation omitted). Multiplying the reasonable number of hours by the reasonable rate results in a lodestar, or a presumptively reasonable fee award. See Lipsett, 975 F.2d at 937 (citation omitted). The Court may then make upward or downward adjustments to account for special circumstances. See Pérez-Sosa, 22 F.4th at 321 (citations omitted). Throughout this calculation, the task of a district court “is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.” Id. at 322 (citation omitted). Courts “may take into account their overall sense of a suit[] and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney’s time.” Id. (citation omitted).

i. Number of hours reasonably expended To determine the number of hours reasonably expended by the attorneys seeking payment, a court excludes or discounts “those hours that are ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary’” from the actual amount of hours spent on the litigation. Cent. Pension Fund of the Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs & Participating Emps. et al. v. Ray Haluch Gravel Co. et al., 745 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)); see also Grendel’s Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 950 (1st Cir. 1984) (hours that are “duplicative, unproductive, excessive, or otherwise unnecessary” should be discounted)

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Puerto Rico Soccer League NFP, Corp. v. Federacion Puertorriquena de Futbol, (prd 2025).

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