Puckett v. Agboli

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 6, 2025
• Docket: 23-3009
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 6 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DURRELL ANTHONY PUCKETT, No. 23-3009 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:14-cv-02776-DAD-DMC v. MEMORANDUM*

A. AGBOLI; LYNCH; DAYSON; LUIS; ROMEO VALLAR; D. YAROCH; R. BULAWIN,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 1, 2025 San Francisco, California

Before: HURWITZ, KOH, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Plaintiff Durrell Anthony Puckett raised

various claims against medical staff at the California Medical Facility

(“Defendants”). The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Puckett’s medical indifference and failure-to-protect claims, and dismissed

Puckett’s First Amendment retaliation claim at Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”) screening. Judgement was entered against Puckett on his remaining

Eighth Amendment excessive force claim after a jury trial. The district court also

denied Puckett’s requests for counsel and to call certain witnesses during trial. We

have jurisdiction over Puckett’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment and dismissal at

PLRA screening de novo. See Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261

F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001) (summary judgment); Barren v. Harrington, 152

F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (PLRA screening). We review a district court’s

denial of requests for counsel and to call witnesses for abuse of discretion. See

Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986) (requests for counsel);

United States v. Erickson, 75 F.3d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1996) (requests to call

witnesses). We review a district court’s determination that a complaint was not

based on personal knowledge for abuse of discretion. See Bliesner v. Commc’n

Workers of America, 464 F.3d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 2006).

1. “[D]eliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury” gives

rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105

(1976). A delay in providing medical treatment can only constitute deliberate

indifference if the prisoner demonstrates that the delay led to further injury. See

2 23-3009 McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992). Puckett alleges that he

was denied medical care for eleven days. But Puckett did not present any evidence

that this delay in treatment led to further injuries. So the district court did not err in

granting Defendants summary judgment on Puckett’s medical indifference claim.

2. Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials must take reasonable steps

to protect inmates from physical abuse. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833

(1994). A prison official violates this duty when: (1) “the official knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;” and (2) the official is

“aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

serious harm exists,” and “draw[s] the inference.” Id. at 837. Puckett alleges that

Defendant Lynch showed Puckett’s abstract of judgment to other inmates, which

created an excessive risk to Puckett’s safety. In a declaration, Lynch denied taking

those actions. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that

Puckett’s allegations were not based on personal knowledge. See Bliesner, 464

F.3d at 915. Because Puckett provided no evidence contradicting Lynch’s denial,

there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Lynch failed to protect

Puckett from an excessive risk of harm. See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454,

460 (9th Cir. 1995); Fed. R. Civ. P 56(e). So the district court did not err in

granting Defendants summary judgment on Puckett’s failure-to-protect claim.

3. Construing Puckett’s complaint liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551

3 23-3009 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), we assume that it plausibly stated a retaliation claim based on

the same allegations against Lynch. As discussed above, Puckett’s failure-to-

protect claim was properly dismissed at summary judgment. At oral argument,

Puckett’s counsel conceded that even if his retaliation claim had proceeded past

PLRA screening, he would have had no additional evidence to support it. Because

Puckett’s retaliation claim would have likewise been dismissed at summary

judgment, any error in dismissing the claim at PLRA screening did not affect

Puckett’s substantial rights and was harmless. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111.

4. When a pro se litigant requests assistance of counsel in a civil case, the

district court must consider whether “exceptional circumstances” favor

appointment of voluntary counsel. Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir.

1991); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). In determining whether “exceptional

circumstances” exist, this court must consider “both the likelihood of success on

the merits and the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of

the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331 (cleaned

up). Puckett’s demonstrated ability to file motions and his various interactions with

the district court indicate that he understood the legal issues and could coherently

present his arguments. So the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

his requests. See LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987).

5. The district court denied Puckett’s motions to issue writs of habeas corpus

4 23-3009 ad testificandum to prospective witnesses because Puckett did not provide the

witnesses’ last known addresses, as required by Eastern District of California

Local Rule 281(b)(10). On appeal, Puckett argues that Rule 281, as applied to

incarcerated parties, violates his due process rights. Prisoners have a constitutional

right to access the courts. See Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir.

2011) (overruled on other ground as recognized in Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d

1202, 1209 n.6 (9th Cir. 2015)). But this right does not include a constitutional

right to the aid of the court in preparing a case. See id. 1102–03 (explaining that

this right forbids states from erecting barriers that impede incarcerated persons

from accessing courts but does not require states “to provide affirmative assistance

in the preparation”). Because Puckett cannot show that his liberty or property

rights were violated, the district court did not violate his due process rights by

enforcing Rule 281.

AFFIRMED.

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