OPINION
MATTHEWS, Justice.
Appellants are the Public Safety Employees Association, a union of state troopers and fish and wildlife protection officers, and several individual union members who reside in bush housing owned by the state. Appellees are the state, which is the employer of the individual appellants, and officials involved in the administration of the bush housing program for state employees. PSEA and the state are parties to a collective bargaining agreement containing mandatory grievance-arbitration provisions.
In July of 1979, the State Department of Administration took control of the state’s bush housing and reassessed rents in accordance with its housing regulations. Many PSEA members were faced with substantial rent increases as a result. Because of allegedly poor conditions in the rental units,
fifteen members refused to pay the increase, and four stopped paying rent altogether.
The rent withholding dispute continued unresolved after the 1978-79 PSEA-State collective bargaining agreement expired. During negotiations for a new contract, the parties could not reach agreement on the issue of bush housing. This issue, along with others not relevant here, was submitted to interest arbitration in May 1980.
Before the arbitrator, PSEA argued that its members “should not be required to pay rent until the housing [was] brought up to reasonable standards and an adequate maintenance program ... initiated.” The arbitrator rejected PSEA’s argument and adhered instead to the state’s position by incorporating the Department of Administration’s housing regulations, which had been the basis for the rent reassessments, into the 1980-81 collective bargaining agreement.
Subsequently, the Department of Administration notified all employees who had withheld rent that, beginning September 1, 1980,10% of their salaries would be deducted until past amounts due were fully paid. On September 18, PSEA filed the present suit, alleging that (1) the “occupancy factor”
for determining rental amounts under the incorporated state regulations violated the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution
and state statutory protec
tions against discrimination in housing,
(2) the 10% deduction violated constitutional and statutory provisions governing the garnishment of wages,
and (3) various actions by the state violated provisions of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA).
The trial court dismissed the case on April 23, 1981, on the ground that the exclusive remedy for PSEA’s claims lay in the grievance-arbitration procedure of the collective bargaining agreement. PSEA now appeals this decision. We reverse, holding that there is no remedy under the contract for the claims, except as to certain of those which arise under URLTA. As to the latter, we hold that the right to a judicial remedy afforded by URLTA cannot be prospectively contracted away.
II
Under the collective bargaining agreement all that can be arbitrated, apart from individual disciplinary actions, are disputes involving “the meaning or application of the express terms of the Agreement.” The contract also provides:
The arbitrator shall not be empowered to rule contrary to, to amend, or add to, or to eliminate any of the provisions of this Agreement.
These provisions are in accord with section 200(e) of the Public Employment Relations Act, AS 23.40.070- 260, allowing arbitration of “a dispute arising from interpretation or application of a collective bargaining agreement.”
Thus, as to each claim presented in this case we must determine whether it involves a dispute as to the meaning or application
of the collective bargaining agreement. If such a dispute is involved, or if it is reasonably arguable that such a dispute is involved,
then the claim would be arbitrable. The question in such ease then becomes whether arbitration is the exclusive remedy. If, oh the other hand, a dispute as to the meaning or application of the agreement is not involved, the claim is not arbitrable at all. If there is no arbitration remedy, no question as to whether arbitration is the exclusive remedy arises.
The first count of PSEA’s complaint charges that the occupancy factor of the rental formula discriminates against PSEA members on the basis of marital status and number of family members denying them equal rights in violation of article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution and in violation of AS 18.80.200 and AS 18.80.240.
This claim does not call into question the meaning of a contract term or whether the contract has been correctly applied. Instead, the claim challenges the legality of a clearly expressed and plainly applicable contract formula. If the arbitrator were to uphold PSEA’s claim the effect would be to strike the formula from the agreement. Such an action would clearly be beyond the powers that the Agreement grants to an arbitrator. We hold, therefore, that under the terms of the arbitration clause, this claim was not arbitrable and must be decided judicially.
The 10% payroll offset for past due rent is attacked as an illegal garnishment of wages, primarily on due process grounds. No term of the agreement authorizes this deduction. The state argues that this claim is arbitrable because the arbitrator would be authorized to rule that the offset is an unreasonable implementation of the agreement. We do not believe that this is a reasonably arguable position, for the offset is not an implementation of the agreement in any respect.
The arbitration clause only applies to questions which involve “the meaning or application of the express terms of the Agreement.” We have been referred to no terms of the agreement that arguably bear on the right of offset. Moreover, no argument is made that the collective bargaining agreement impliedly restricts the right of the state to exercise an offset, and, since the agreement does not touch on the subject, we do not believe that such an argument could reasonably be offered. For these reasons we conclude that the claim concerning the legality of the offset for past due rent is not amenable to arbitration.
The third count of the complaint alleges that the state violated provisions of URLTA. Particularly, PSEA alleges that the failure of the state to adequately maintain the dwellings violated the landlord’s obligations to maintain fit premises under AS 34.03.100;
that the state had unlawfully entered rented premises for the purpose of harassment of tenants in violation of AS 34.03.140(c);
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OPINION
MATTHEWS, Justice.
Appellants are the Public Safety Employees Association, a union of state troopers and fish and wildlife protection officers, and several individual union members who reside in bush housing owned by the state. Appellees are the state, which is the employer of the individual appellants, and officials involved in the administration of the bush housing program for state employees. PSEA and the state are parties to a collective bargaining agreement containing mandatory grievance-arbitration provisions.
In July of 1979, the State Department of Administration took control of the state’s bush housing and reassessed rents in accordance with its housing regulations. Many PSEA members were faced with substantial rent increases as a result. Because of allegedly poor conditions in the rental units,
fifteen members refused to pay the increase, and four stopped paying rent altogether.
The rent withholding dispute continued unresolved after the 1978-79 PSEA-State collective bargaining agreement expired. During negotiations for a new contract, the parties could not reach agreement on the issue of bush housing. This issue, along with others not relevant here, was submitted to interest arbitration in May 1980.
Before the arbitrator, PSEA argued that its members “should not be required to pay rent until the housing [was] brought up to reasonable standards and an adequate maintenance program ... initiated.” The arbitrator rejected PSEA’s argument and adhered instead to the state’s position by incorporating the Department of Administration’s housing regulations, which had been the basis for the rent reassessments, into the 1980-81 collective bargaining agreement.
Subsequently, the Department of Administration notified all employees who had withheld rent that, beginning September 1, 1980,10% of their salaries would be deducted until past amounts due were fully paid. On September 18, PSEA filed the present suit, alleging that (1) the “occupancy factor”
for determining rental amounts under the incorporated state regulations violated the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution
and state statutory protec
tions against discrimination in housing,
(2) the 10% deduction violated constitutional and statutory provisions governing the garnishment of wages,
and (3) various actions by the state violated provisions of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA).
The trial court dismissed the case on April 23, 1981, on the ground that the exclusive remedy for PSEA’s claims lay in the grievance-arbitration procedure of the collective bargaining agreement. PSEA now appeals this decision. We reverse, holding that there is no remedy under the contract for the claims, except as to certain of those which arise under URLTA. As to the latter, we hold that the right to a judicial remedy afforded by URLTA cannot be prospectively contracted away.
II
Under the collective bargaining agreement all that can be arbitrated, apart from individual disciplinary actions, are disputes involving “the meaning or application of the express terms of the Agreement.” The contract also provides:
The arbitrator shall not be empowered to rule contrary to, to amend, or add to, or to eliminate any of the provisions of this Agreement.
These provisions are in accord with section 200(e) of the Public Employment Relations Act, AS 23.40.070- 260, allowing arbitration of “a dispute arising from interpretation or application of a collective bargaining agreement.”
Thus, as to each claim presented in this case we must determine whether it involves a dispute as to the meaning or application
of the collective bargaining agreement. If such a dispute is involved, or if it is reasonably arguable that such a dispute is involved,
then the claim would be arbitrable. The question in such ease then becomes whether arbitration is the exclusive remedy. If, oh the other hand, a dispute as to the meaning or application of the agreement is not involved, the claim is not arbitrable at all. If there is no arbitration remedy, no question as to whether arbitration is the exclusive remedy arises.
The first count of PSEA’s complaint charges that the occupancy factor of the rental formula discriminates against PSEA members on the basis of marital status and number of family members denying them equal rights in violation of article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution and in violation of AS 18.80.200 and AS 18.80.240.
This claim does not call into question the meaning of a contract term or whether the contract has been correctly applied. Instead, the claim challenges the legality of a clearly expressed and plainly applicable contract formula. If the arbitrator were to uphold PSEA’s claim the effect would be to strike the formula from the agreement. Such an action would clearly be beyond the powers that the Agreement grants to an arbitrator. We hold, therefore, that under the terms of the arbitration clause, this claim was not arbitrable and must be decided judicially.
The 10% payroll offset for past due rent is attacked as an illegal garnishment of wages, primarily on due process grounds. No term of the agreement authorizes this deduction. The state argues that this claim is arbitrable because the arbitrator would be authorized to rule that the offset is an unreasonable implementation of the agreement. We do not believe that this is a reasonably arguable position, for the offset is not an implementation of the agreement in any respect.
The arbitration clause only applies to questions which involve “the meaning or application of the express terms of the Agreement.” We have been referred to no terms of the agreement that arguably bear on the right of offset. Moreover, no argument is made that the collective bargaining agreement impliedly restricts the right of the state to exercise an offset, and, since the agreement does not touch on the subject, we do not believe that such an argument could reasonably be offered. For these reasons we conclude that the claim concerning the legality of the offset for past due rent is not amenable to arbitration.
The third count of the complaint alleges that the state violated provisions of URLTA. Particularly, PSEA alleges that the failure of the state to adequately maintain the dwellings violated the landlord’s obligations to maintain fit premises under AS 34.03.100;
that the state had unlawfully entered rented premises for the purpose of harassment of tenants in violation of AS 34.03.140(c);
that the state had been guilty of a retaliatory rent increase in violation of AS 34.03.310;
and that the
refusal of the state to allow tenants to deduct the cost of repairs amounted to a forced waiver of the statutory right to repair and deduct in violation of AS 34.03.-040(a)(1).
The landlord shall (1) make alf repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition; ...
We believe that the duty to maintain fit premises claim is one for which a contract remedy is available and is thus arbitrable. Article XIII of the agreement imposes a repair duty on the state and requires that repairs be expeditiously performed. The harassment claim may also be arbitrable, for the agreement requires the state “to implement a program of regular housing inspections.” It can be argued that irregular and unannounced inspections are an improper implementation of this obligation.
However, the retaliatory rent claim is not remediable under the agreement. It does not involve a dispute concerning the meaning of any terms of the agreement, or whether the agreement has been properly implemented. The rent to be charged is clearly formulated and no claim is made that the formula has been misapplied. Similarly, the waiver of the right to repair and deduct claim does not appear to be arbitra-ble. The agreement provides that the cost of essential repairs made by the employees on an emergency basis “shall be billed to the Employer,” language which plainly precludes the option of rent deduction. No question is raised concerning the implementation of this language.
We conclude therefore that the retaliatory rent and waiver of rights claims should not have been dismissed because they are not arbitrable. The duty to maintain fit premises and the harassment claims were arbitrable. As to them the question is whether the existence of the arbitration remedy precludes the exercise of the statutory remedy.
We have but little difficulty in answering this question in the negative. The legislature, in enacting URLTA, has granted to each tenant in the state the right to sue his landlord for violations specified in the act. Injunctive relief is available
and the act is replete with liquidated and special damage provisions,
remedies which the arbitrator under the parties’ agreement in this case would be powerless to provide.
The act contains an explicit non-waiver provision applicable to all “rights or remedies....”
(Emphasis added). It follows that the right
to sue under the act cannot be prospectively bargained away. Hence, the contract remedy here cannot displace that which is provided by the act.
In circumstances involving coincident ar-bitral and statutory avenues of relief, federal courts have frequently held that arbitration does not afford an exclusive remedy.
See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.,
450 U.S. 728, 745, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 1447, 67 L.Ed.2d 641, 644, 656-57 (1981) (Fair Labor Standards Act:
In sum, the FLSA rights petitioners seek to assert in this action are independent of the collective bargaining process. They devolve on petitioners as individual workers, not as members of a collective organization. They are not waivable. Because Congress intended to give individual employees the right to bring their minimum wage claims under the FLSA in court, and because these congressionally granted FLSA rights are best protected in a judicial rather than in an arbitral forum, we hold that petitioners’ claim is not barred by the prior submission of their grievances to the contractual dispute-resolution procedures.);
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 50, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1020, 39 L.Ed.2d 147, 159 (1974) (Civil Rights Act: “The distinctively separate nature of ... contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the same factual occurrence.”);
Air Line Pilots Association International v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
627 F.2d 272, 277-78 (D.C.Cir.1980) (Employees Retirement and Income Security Act);
Marshall v. N.L. Industries, Inc.,
618 F.2d 1220, 1222-23 (7th Cir.1980) (Occupational Safety and Health Act);
Horne v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc.,
489 F.Supp. 465, 470 (D.Mass.1980)
(semble); Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc.,
487 F.Supp. 1343, 1344-46 (N.D.Tex.1980) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
Several state courts have similarly refused to require arbitration when statutory rights are at issue.
Moss-American, Inc. v. Fair Employment Practices Commission,
22 Ill.App.3d 248, 317 N.E.2d 343, 349 (1974) (arbitrator’s decision in the area of discrimination does not foreclose authority of the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission);
School Committee of Hanover v. Curry,
3 Mass.App. 151, 325 N.E.2d 282, 285 (arbitrator’s decision “does not preclude further judicial review where statutory policies have been affected.”),
aff’d,
369 Mass. 683, 343 N.E.2d 144 (1975);
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Commissioner of Labor,
608 P.2d 1047, 1061 (Mont.) (State Maternity Leave Act creates “uniquely personal” rights that are not proper subjects for arbitration),
appeal dismissed,
445 U.S. 921, 100 S.Ct. 1304, 63 L.Ed.2d 754 (1980);
Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co.,
40 Or.App. 427, 595 P.2d 829, 833 (1979) (claims under unlawful employment practices statute need not first be arbitrated “because plaintiff is not seeking a remedy for breach of the employment contract. Rather, she seeks enforcement of her statutory rights.... ”),
aff’d,
289 Or. 73, 611 P.2d 281 (1980);
Bridgeton Education Association v. Board of Education,
132 N.J.Super. 554, 334 A.2d 376, 378 (1975) (“the fact that an act may constitute [an arbitrable] grievance does not foreclose a court from deciding if the same act also violates a statute;” statutory relief is additional to that provided in the collective bargaining agreement).
See Barry v. Flint Fire Department,
44 Mich.App. 602, 205 N.W.2d 627, 629, 630 (1973) (when employment related constitutional equal protection claim is alleged, grievance procedure need not be utilized).
The only state case cited as contrary authority,
McGrath v. State,
312 N.W.2d 438 (Minn.1981), is distinguishable as its application seems limited to cases involving a general allegation of a violation of constitutional rights, where the violation is not clear and unambiguous; further, the court made it clear that following arbitration, adjudication of the constitutional claim in court should proceed. A similar policy of withholding court action pending arbitration rather than dismissal was expressed in
Lewiston Firefighters Association, Local 785
v.
City of Lewiston,
354 A.2d 154, 164-68 (Me.1976). Whether the superior court in this case could properly have taken similar action with respect to the arbitrable claims presented, and if so the effect to be given the arbitration decision, are questions on which we intimate no view for they have not been briefed or argued.
The judgment of the superior court is REVERSED.
CONNOR, J., not participating.
