SAMUEL R. SPENCER, No. 2:20-cv-01266 TLN AC Plaintiff, v. ORDER and FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ROBERT F. SINCLAIR, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and the case was accordingly referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(21). ECF No. 1. Before the court are four fully briefed motions to dismiss from separate defendants (ECF Nos. 6, 9, 11, 13); a fifth such motion has recently been filed (ECF No. 25). Upon review of the motions, the original complaint (ECF No. 1) and the first amended complaint (ECF No. 16), the undersigned finds that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and cannot hear this case. The lack of subject matter jurisdiction is clear from the face of plaintiff’s pleadings and could be determined sua sponte. Because the motions at ECF Nos. 6, 9 and 13 plainly identify the jurisdictional defect, the undersigned will recommend those motions be GRANTED and that this case be dismissed without leave to amend. The remaining motions (ECF Nos. 11 and 25) will be STRICKEN as MOOT. //// //// Plaintiff filed his complaint in this court on June 24, 2020. ECF No. 1. The 232-page complaint identifies the “primary objective” of the action as the invalidation of a declaratory judgment issued by the Nevada County Superior Court, Case No. CU13-079381. ECF No. 1 at 11. That action involved a promissory note between plaintiff and defendants Brian and Patricia Warren, related to a piece of property. ECF No. 1 at 12-13. Plaintiff contends the Nevada County Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 15. The motion to dismiss brought by defendant W. Steven Shumway at ECF No. 13 sheds light on the background of this case, stating the facts as follows. In September of 2004, the Warrens purchased approximately 70 acres of unimproved land located in Nevada County, California pursuant to a purchase agreement in which plaintiff financed most of the purchase price by a promissory note secured by deed of trust encumbering the property. ECF No. 13-1 at 1-2. The note provided that the interest rate for the last seven years would be negotiated by the parties but would not exceed 9%. Id. at 2. In 2008 the Warrens filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy and, in their plan, sought to fix the interest rate on the note at 7%. Id. In 2012, plaintiff set the interest rate at 9%. Id. The Warrens disputed this and filed a motion in bankruptcy court. Id. The bankruptcy court declined to set the rate and the bankruptcy judge informed the parties they were entitled to take dispute to California state court. Id. In 2012, plaintiff started foreclosure proceedings, claiming an inter-spousal transfer of the property triggered the note’s “due on sale” clause. Id. On March 20, 2013, the Warrens filed suit in Nevada County Superior Court to enjoin the foreclosure and for declaratory relief regarding the interest rate of the note. Id. In November of 2013, while the Nevada County action was pending, plaintiff sold his interest in the promissory note, the deed of trust, and the Nevada County action to Highland Crofters, LLC. Id. at 3. The Nevada County court decided the foreclosure was wrongful but that the holder of the note had the right to set the interest rate at 9%. Id. On November 6, 2015, plaintiff sued the Warrens and several other defendants in Placer County Superior Court claiming abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from the Nevada County action. Id. The Placer County court dismissed the case based on California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16. Id. Plaintiff appealed to the Third District Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the Placer County court. Plaintiff petitioned the California Supreme Court, which denied the petition on March 18, 2020. Id. Plaintiff then filed this action. After several defendants filed motions to dismiss, plaintiff filed an unauthorized 472-page amended complaint. ECF No. 16. Upon review of the filing, the court construed it as an opposition to the several motions to dismiss with a request for leave to amend. ECF No. 17. Like the original complaint, the purported amended complaint requests relief in the form of a ruling that the decision in Nevada County Court case No. CU13-07931 is void. ECF No. 16 at 8. A. Motion and Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Multiple defendants have filed motions to dismiss based, at least in part, on the theory that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. ECF Nos. 6-1 at 8, 9 at 2, and 13-1 at 5. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. A federal court generally has jurisdiction over a civil action only when: (1) a federal question is presented in an action “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” or (2) there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a). Absence of subject matter jurisdiction requires a federal court to dismiss a case. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (recognizing that “Article III generally requires a federal court to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the subject matter before it considers the merits of a case”). Thus, “a court may raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction, sua sponte, at any time during the pendency of the action.” Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002). B. This Case is Barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) and plaintiff’s purported first amended complaint (ECF No. 16) ask this court to overturn the judgment of the Nevada County Superior Court. ECF No. 1 //// //// at 11; ECF No. 16 at 58. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine1 prohibits federal district courts from hearing cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). To determine if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a case, a court must first determine if the federal action contains a forbidden de facto appeal of a state court judicial decision. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). If it does not, “the Rooker-Feldman inquiry ends.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013). If a court determines that the action is a “forbidden de facto appeal,” however, the court cannot hear the de facto appeal portion of the case and, [a]s part of that refusal, it must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158; see also Bell, 709 F.3d at 897 (“The ‘inextricably intertwined’ language from Feldman is not a test to determine whether a claim is a de facto appeal, but is rather a second and distinct step in the Rooker-Feldman analysis.”). A complaint is a “de facto appeal” of a state court decision where the plaintiff “complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163. Here plaintiff seeks to have the decision of the Nevada County court invalidated, and all of the facts and requests for relief presented in this case are intertwined with that primary goal. See ECF No. 16 at 58. In seeking a remedy by which th
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
SAMUEL R. SPENCER, No. 2:20-cv-01266 TLN AC Plaintiff, v. ORDER and FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ROBERT F. SINCLAIR, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and the case was accordingly referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(21). ECF No. 1. Before the court are four fully briefed motions to dismiss from separate defendants (ECF Nos. 6, 9, 11, 13); a fifth such motion has recently been filed (ECF No. 25). Upon review of the motions, the original complaint (ECF No. 1) and the first amended complaint (ECF No. 16), the undersigned finds that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and cannot hear this case. The lack of subject matter jurisdiction is clear from the face of plaintiff’s pleadings and could be determined sua sponte. Because the motions at ECF Nos. 6, 9 and 13 plainly identify the jurisdictional defect, the undersigned will recommend those motions be GRANTED and that this case be dismissed without leave to amend. The remaining motions (ECF Nos. 11 and 25) will be STRICKEN as MOOT. //// //// Plaintiff filed his complaint in this court on June 24, 2020. ECF No. 1. The 232-page complaint identifies the “primary objective” of the action as the invalidation of a declaratory judgment issued by the Nevada County Superior Court, Case No. CU13-079381. ECF No. 1 at 11. That action involved a promissory note between plaintiff and defendants Brian and Patricia Warren, related to a piece of property. ECF No. 1 at 12-13. Plaintiff contends the Nevada County Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 15. The motion to dismiss brought by defendant W. Steven Shumway at ECF No. 13 sheds light on the background of this case, stating the facts as follows. In September of 2004, the Warrens purchased approximately 70 acres of unimproved land located in Nevada County, California pursuant to a purchase agreement in which plaintiff financed most of the purchase price by a promissory note secured by deed of trust encumbering the property. ECF No. 13-1 at 1-2. The note provided that the interest rate for the last seven years would be negotiated by the parties but would not exceed 9%. Id. at 2. In 2008 the Warrens filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy and, in their plan, sought to fix the interest rate on the note at 7%. Id. In 2012, plaintiff set the interest rate at 9%. Id. The Warrens disputed this and filed a motion in bankruptcy court. Id. The bankruptcy court declined to set the rate and the bankruptcy judge informed the parties they were entitled to take dispute to California state court. Id. In 2012, plaintiff started foreclosure proceedings, claiming an inter-spousal transfer of the property triggered the note’s “due on sale” clause. Id. On March 20, 2013, the Warrens filed suit in Nevada County Superior Court to enjoin the foreclosure and for declaratory relief regarding the interest rate of the note. Id. In November of 2013, while the Nevada County action was pending, plaintiff sold his interest in the promissory note, the deed of trust, and the Nevada County action to Highland Crofters, LLC. Id. at 3. The Nevada County court decided the foreclosure was wrongful but that the holder of the note had the right to set the interest rate at 9%. Id. On November 6, 2015, plaintiff sued the Warrens and several other defendants in Placer County Superior Court claiming abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from the Nevada County action. Id. The Placer County court dismissed the case based on California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16. Id. Plaintiff appealed to the Third District Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the Placer County court. Plaintiff petitioned the California Supreme Court, which denied the petition on March 18, 2020. Id. Plaintiff then filed this action. After several defendants filed motions to dismiss, plaintiff filed an unauthorized 472-page amended complaint. ECF No. 16. Upon review of the filing, the court construed it as an opposition to the several motions to dismiss with a request for leave to amend. ECF No. 17. Like the original complaint, the purported amended complaint requests relief in the form of a ruling that the decision in Nevada County Court case No. CU13-07931 is void. ECF No. 16 at 8. A. Motion and Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Multiple defendants have filed motions to dismiss based, at least in part, on the theory that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. ECF Nos. 6-1 at 8, 9 at 2, and 13-1 at 5. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. A federal court generally has jurisdiction over a civil action only when: (1) a federal question is presented in an action “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” or (2) there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a). Absence of subject matter jurisdiction requires a federal court to dismiss a case. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (recognizing that “Article III generally requires a federal court to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the subject matter before it considers the merits of a case”). Thus, “a court may raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction, sua sponte, at any time during the pendency of the action.” Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002). B. This Case is Barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) and plaintiff’s purported first amended complaint (ECF No. 16) ask this court to overturn the judgment of the Nevada County Superior Court. ECF No. 1 //// //// at 11; ECF No. 16 at 58. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine1 prohibits federal district courts from hearing cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). To determine if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a case, a court must first determine if the federal action contains a forbidden de facto appeal of a state court judicial decision. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). If it does not, “the Rooker-Feldman inquiry ends.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013). If a court determines that the action is a “forbidden de facto appeal,” however, the court cannot hear the de facto appeal portion of the case and, [a]s part of that refusal, it must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158; see also Bell, 709 F.3d at 897 (“The ‘inextricably intertwined’ language from Feldman is not a test to determine whether a claim is a de facto appeal, but is rather a second and distinct step in the Rooker-Feldman analysis.”). A complaint is a “de facto appeal” of a state court decision where the plaintiff “complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163. Here plaintiff seeks to have the decision of the Nevada County court invalidated, and all of the facts and requests for relief presented in this case are intertwined with that primary goal. See ECF No. 16 at 58. In seeking a remedy by which this court invalidates a state court decision and amends the state court record, plaintiff is clearly asking this court to “review the final determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings,” which lies at the core of Rooker- Feldman’s prohibition. In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, plaintiff’s action, on its face, clearly constitutes a “forbidden de facto appeal” and the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider it. //// 1 See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). wOASe 2 OU UV TRIN MUU POO VI Ee OY VI
C. Leave to Amend Plaintiffs appearing in pro se are to be given leave to amend unless it is clear that amendment would be futile. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1449 (9th Cir. 1987). Because plaintiffs’ complaint is clearly barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, amendment would be futile. il. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that defendants motions to dismiss at ECF Nos. 6, 9 and 13 be GRANTED, and that plaintiffs’ complaint be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without leave to amend. It is further ORDERED that the remaining pending motions (ECF Nos. 11 and 25) are STRICKEN and removed from the court’s calendar as the ruling on ECF Nos. 6, 9 and 13 will render them moot. These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty-one days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id.; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). DATED: September 3, 2020 ~ Chthien—Chare ALLISON CLAIRE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE