(PS) Singh Randhawa v. Dept. of Homeland Security

Opinion

VRINDER SINGH RANDHAWA, et al., Case No. 2:24-cv-01540-DAD-CSK Plaintiffs, v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS SECURITY, et al., (ECF Nos. 25, 29, 32, 33, 35) Defendants. Pending before the Court is the United States of America’s1 motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint.2 (ECF No. 25). Plaintiffs Vrinder Singh Randhawa, Mandeep Sandhu Randawa and AKR, a minor, are appearing without counsel. Pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), the Court submitted the motion upon the record and briefs on file and vacated the April 15, 2025 hearing. (ECF No. 28.) For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends GRANTING the United States’ motion to dismiss. The Court further DENIES without prejudice Plaintiffs’ miscellaneous requests (ECF Nos. 29, 32, 35) and the United States’ request for administrative relief pursuant to Local Rule 233(a)(5) (ECF

1 The United States is not a named defendant in this action. See generally First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (ECF No. 11). The United States indicates it was served but is not a named Defendant in this case. See USA Mot. at 2 (ECF No. 25-1) (citing ECF No. 24). 2 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c). No. 33), in light of the Court’s recommendation to dismiss this action without leave to amend. A. Factual Background3 Plaintiffs bring this action in pro per against Defendants Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), and Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”). FAC at 1, 2. Plaintiffs allege the following four causes of action: (1) violation of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”); (2) violation of the Federal Tort Claims Act; (3) violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress. FAC at 4. Plaintiffs generally allege “systematic procedural misconduct, bad faith in immigration adjudication, retaliation though repeated delays, obstructive responses, and racial profiling.” Id. at 1. Plaintiffs allege Defendant DHS has delayed responses to Plaintiffs’ “claims, FOIA requests, and complaints” and has failed to ensure its “sub-agencies, including CBP, USCIS, and TSA” are adhering to fair procedures and that the lack of oversight by Defendant DHS has allowed “each sub-agency to engage in harmful practices, including racial profiling, and improper screenings.” Id. at 2-3. Plaintiffs further allege Defendant DHS has “repeatedly denied Plaintiffs’ emergency travel requests, including for family health crises, leading to irreparable emotional damage.” Id. at 4. For relief, Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief, damages, and other forms of relief. Id. at 5. / / / / / /

3 These facts primarily derive from the First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 1), which are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs as the non-moving party. Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013). However, the Court does not assume the truth of any conclusory factual allegations or legal conclusions. Paulsen v. CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009). B. Procedural Background Plaintiffs initiated this action on May 31, 2024. (ECF No. 1.) On July 22, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a “motion for more time to respond and memorandum to various issues raised.” (ECF No. 9.) On July 26, 2024, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion without prejudice noting, in part, that Plaintiffs’ deadline to properly complete service of the initial complaint was August 29, 2024 and warning Plaintiffs that pro se litigants are expected to know and comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, the Local Rules of the Eastern District of California, and Judge Kim’s Civil Standing Orders. 7/26/2024 Order at 3- 4 (ECF No. 10). On November 18, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint, which is the operative complaint in this action, against Defendants DHS, USCIS, CBP, and TSA. See FAC. Concurrently with their FAC, the following four motions were filed: (1) Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa’s motion to “permit delivery of complaint summary” (ECF No. 13); (2) Plaintiffs motion for “alternative service or reduced service requirements” (ECF No. 14); (3) Plaintiffs motion to compel disclosure of certain documents (ECF No. 15); and (4) Plaintiffs motion to expedite proceedings (ECF No. 16). The Court denied all four motions. 6/26/2025 Order (ECF No. 34). The Court also instructed Plaintiffs that a motion brought by all Plaintiffs must be signed by each Plaintiff while they remain unrepresented pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a) and Local Rule 183(b) and that failure to do so is improper. Id. at 2-4. Instead of rejecting the motions brought by all Plaintiffs, but only signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa, the Court reviewed the motions as being filed by the plaintiff who signed the motions, Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa. Id. On February 4 and 5, 2025, the United States and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) were served with summons and the FAC, but neither is a named defendant in this action. See FAC; Summons (ECF No. 24 at 3-8); USA Mot. at 2. On February 18, 2025, the United States filed the instant motion to dismiss. USA Mot. The United States moves to dismiss the entire action without leave to amend on multiple grounds, including (1) dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1); (2) dismissal for insufficient service of process pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5); and (3) dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. at 12-14. Plaintiffs were served with the instant motion on February 18, 2025. (ECF No. 25-3.) Plaintiffs did not file an opposition to the motion within the deadline, which was March 4, 2025. See Docket. On March 14, 2025, the United States filed a “confirmation of no opposition to motion to dismiss” requesting the Court to grant its motion as unopposed or, in the alternative, based on the grounds presented in its motion. (ECF No. 26.) On March 19, 2025, the Court found the matter suitable for decision without oral argument and vacated the hearing date of April 15, 2025. (ECF No. 28.) On March 21, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a 98-page document seeking miscellaneous relief. (ECF No. 29.) The following was filed: (1) a motion signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa for “judicial recognition of proper FTCA service” (ECF No. 29 at 1-4); (2) a motion signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa to “compel Defendants to provide a substantive response to SF-95 before any procedural dismissals” (ECF No. 29 at 5-8); (3) a motion signed by Plaintiffs Mandeep Sandhu Randhawa and Vrinder Singh Randhawa for an “extension of time beyond April 15, 2025, to complete services and to ensure government response to SF-95 claim in good faith” (ECF No. 29 at 9-12); (4) a motion signed by Plaintiffs Mandeep Sandhu Randhawa in “pro per and as guardian ad litem for AKR” and Vrinder Singh Randhawa for “sanctions against DOJ attorneys for improper disclosure of minor’s full name and violation of privacy protections” (ECF No. 29 at 13-15); (5) a motion signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa for “judicial oversight on FOIA & evidence compliance before dismissal consideration” (ECF No. 29 at 16-19); (6) a notice of appearance by Plaintiff Mandeep Sandhu Randhawa as a self- represented litigant (ECF No. 29 at 20-23); (7) an “opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss and request for stay” signed by Plaintiffs Mandeep Sandhu Randhawa in “pro per and as guardian ad litem” and Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 29 at 24-26); (8) a “proposed plan” signed by Plaintiffs Mandeep Sandhu Randhawa and Vrinder Singh Randhawa for “judicial oversight & remedy” (ECF No. 29 at 27-31); (9) an “initial list of summons and subpoenas” signed by Plaintiffs Mandeep Sandhu Randhawa in “pro per and as guardian ad litem for AKR” and Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 29 at 32-48); (10) a “jurisdictional statement despite services issues & justification for stay approach” signed by Plaintiffs Mandeep Sandhu Randhawa in “pro per and as guardian ad litem for AKR” and Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 29 at 49-52); (11) an “opposition to motion to dismiss & demand for full disclosure of USCIS selective enforcement policies & cover- up” signed by Plaintiffs Mandeep Sandhu Randhawa and Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 29 at 53-56); (12) an “opposition to motion to dismiss & demand for full disclosure of the U.S. Government’s soft religious pogrom against Sikhs & authoritarian Nazi coding in DOJ responses” signed by Plaintiffs Mandeep Sandhu Randhawa and Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 29 at 57-60); (13) proofs of service by the United States Postal Service (ECF No. 29 at 61-63); (14) a “FOIA additional evidence against dismissal” unsigned by Plaintiffs (ECF No. 29 at 64-67); (15) a “FOIA noncompliance, legalized fraud, and the Government’s state-sanctioned cover-ups” signed by Plaintiffs Mandeep Sandhu Randhawa in “pro per and as guardian ad litem for AKR” and Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 29 at 68-76); (16) “the Government’s failure to respond to the FOIA appeal triggers constructive exhaustion” signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 29 at 77-80); (17) affidavits of process server (ECF No. 29 at 81-88); and (18) a “response to Defendants filings docket 26: a Masterclass in obfuscation, delay, and legal nihilism” signed by Plaintiffs Mandeep Sandhu Randhawa in “pro per and as guardian ad litem for AKR” and Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 29 at 89-98). On the same day, on March 21, 2025, Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa filed and signed a separate 194-page document titled “Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim - notice of submission of SF-95.” (ECF No. 30.) On March 26, 2025, the United States filed a response to Plaintiffs’ miscellaneous filings (ECF No. 29) opposing Plaintiffs’ requests and arguing the requests fail to address all the grounds for dismissal raised in the United States’ motion to dismiss and opposing Plaintiffs’ request for a stay. (ECF No. 31.) On June 6, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a 68-page “legal brief in support of Plaintiffs’ claim for damages and declaratory relief,” which included an “index of documents,” including: (1) a motion to voluntarily withdraw Plaintiffs Mandeep Randhawa and AKR as parties from the action signed by Plaintiff Mandeep Randhawa (ECF No. 32 at 7-8); (2) an unsigned “order to compel production and coordination partial disposition under justice and administrative exhaustion” (ECF No. 32 at 9-10); (3) a “notice of post-denial correspondence by ICE and request for judicial disregard” signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 32 at 11-15); (4) a “supplemental motion on non-claim statute and court’s duty to determine jurisdiction over civil and Bivens claims” signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 32 at 16-20); (5) a “supplemental filing – FTCA administrative denial and response from CBP finance director, based on no legal standing” signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 32 at 21-26); (6) a “formal response to CBP’s request for additional documentation” signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 32 at 27-33); (7) an affidavit of process service (ECF No. 32 at 34); (8) a “formal administrative complaint regarding FOIA Noncompliance” signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 32 at 36-38); (9) a “motion to object to uncoordinated CBP delay and violation of statutory obligations” signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 32 at 39-41); (10) a “submission of motion to extend time to service/reissue summons” signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 32 at 42-43); (11) a “motion to extend time to effect service and/or issue new summons in light of defendants’ delays and vacated hearing” signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 32 at 44-46); (12) a “motion for tax-structured settlement plan and request for judicial findings on tax status of damages” signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 32 at 47-50); (13) a “submission of correspondence from CBP, and Plaintiff’s formal response” signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 32 at 51-62); (14) “Plaintiff’s proposed scheduling order (compressed litigation calendar)” signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 32 at 62-64); and (15) a “FTCA and constitutional claims – offer to settle remains open” signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 65-68). On June 20, 2025, the United States filed a request for administrative relief pursuant to Local Rule 233(a)(5) requesting a response to Plaintiffs’ filing (ECF No. 32) need not be required in light of the pending motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 33.) On July 10, 2025, Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa filed an opposition to the United States’ request for administrative relief. (ECF No. 35.) Included in Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa’s opposition were additional filings including: (1) a “notice in response to Order at Docket 34” signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 35 at 14-15); (2) a “supplemental notice of developments in civil rights jurisprudence and agency conduct” signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 35 at 16-17); (3) a “supplemental notice: request for judicial clarification and consolidation of satisfied and duplicative issues” signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 35 at 18-19); (4) a “supplemental statement of clarification and notice of procedural error” signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 35 at 20-21); and (5) a “supplemental declaration regarding loss of employment and emotional distress” signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa (ECF No. 35 at 22-24). A. Pro Se Pleadings, Construction and Amendment Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed and afforded the benefit of any doubt. Chambers v. Herrera, 78 F.4th 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 2023). Upon dismissal of any claims, the court must tell a pro se plaintiff of a pleading’s deficiencies and provide an opportunity to cure such defects. Garity v. APWU Nat'l Lab. Org., 828 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2016). However, if amendment would be futile, no leave to amend need be given. Lathus v. City of Huntington Beach, 56 F.4th 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 2023). To determine the propriety of a dismissal motion, the court may not consider facts raised outside the complaint (such as in an opposition brief), but it may consider such facts when deciding whether to grant leave to amend. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1026 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). B. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a party may challenge a claim for relief for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). A factual attack can rely on extrinsic evidence in arguing that subject-matter jurisdiction does not exist. Id. (citation omitted). Once the moving party presents evidence properly brought before the court, the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). C. Insufficient Service of Process under Rule 12(b)(5) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), a defendant may move to dismiss the action where the plaintiff has failed to effect proper service of process in compliance with the requirements set forth under Rule 4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). Federal courts only acquire jurisdiction over a defendant after the defendant is properly served under Rule 4. See Omni Capital Int'l Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987). When a defendant challenges service, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that service was valid under Rule 4. See Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2004). If service of process is found insufficient under Rule 4, “[t]he choice between dismissal and quashing service of process is in the district court's discretion.” S.J. v. Issaquah Sch. Dist. No. 411, 470 F.3d 1288, 1293 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Stevens v. Sec. Pac. Nat. Bank, 538 F.2d 1387, 1389 (9th Cir. 1976)). D. Failure to State a Claim under Rule 12(b)(6) A claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint fails to state a claim if it either lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). When considering whether a claim has been stated, the court must accept the well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non- moving party. Id. However, the court is not required to accept as true conclusory factual allegations contradicted by documents referenced in the complaint, or legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Paulsen v. CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009). Prior to addressing the United States’ motion to dismiss, the Court first addresses three preliminary issues related to Plaintiffs’ attempt to represent a minor child, Plaintiff AKR, in pro se; Plaintiffs’ failure to sign their filings; and Plaintiffs’ late opposition to the motion to dismiss. A. Pro Se Plaintiffs Cannot Represent Minor Child Plaintiff Mandeep Sandhu Randhawa, who is in pro per, attempts to represent Plaintiff AKR, who appears to be a minor, as her guardian ad litem. See ECF No. 29 at 13-15 (signed by Plaintiff Mandeep Sandhu Randhawa in “pro per and as guardian ad litem for AKR”); id. at 24-26 (same); id. at 42-48 (same); id. at 49-52 (same); id. at 68-76 (same); id. at 89-98 (same). The Ninth Circuit has held “a parent or guardian cannot bring an action on behalf of a minor child without retaining a lawyer.” Johns v. Cty. of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit has also held that in such instances where the guardian ad litem does not have counsel, the case should be dismissed without prejudice. Id. This rule remains the law of the Circuit. Grizzell v. San Elijo Elementary School, 110 F.4th 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2024) (“Our panel, however, is bound by Johns, which holds that a parent may not proceed pro se on her children's behalf.”), cert. denied sub nom. Grizzell v. San Elijo Elementary, 2025 WL 1426678 (U.S. May 19, 2025); see also Gabriel Charles Reed v. Eugene School District 4j, 2025 WL 1779779, at *1 (9th Cir. June 27, 2025) (“The district court properly dismissed Reed's action because ‘a parent or guardian cannot bring an action on behalf of a minor child without retaining a lawyer.’”). As such, pro se plaintiffs cannot bring a lawsuit on behalf of a minor without retaining a lawyer. This is so because the minor's right to trained legal assistance is greater than the parent's right to appear pro se. See Johns, 114 F.3d at 876. To the extent Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa seeks to represent minor Plaintiff AKR, that also fails for the same reasons. Accordingly, the FAC should be dismissed without prejudice as to Plaintiff AKR because Plaintiff AKR is a minor and lacks legal representation in this case. See Gabriel Charles Reed, 2025 WL 1779779, at *1; Johns, 114 F.3d at 877. Because the Court also finds alternative grounds for dismissal is appropriate as explained below, the Court recommends dismissal without leave to amend. B. Personal Signature Requirement for Pro Se Parties All of Plaintiffs’ filings, including the FAC, have not been signed by each of the Plaintiffs. See FAC at 5, 8 (signed only by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa); ECF No. 29 (completely unsigned, or signed either by Plaintiffs Mandeep Sandhu Randhawa in “pro per and as guardian ad litem for AKR” and/or Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a) requires that if a party is not represented by an attorney, "[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed" by the party personally. Plaintiffs were also warned of their requirement to each personally sign every pleading, motion and other paper they submit to the Court while they remain unrepresented. See 6/26/2025 Order. Because the FAC has not been signed by all Plaintiffs, it is deficient and the Court may strike the FAC and provide Plaintiffs an opportunity to file a signed complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; E.D. Cal. Local Rule 131(b). Though the Court finds the FAC could be stricken on this ground, because the Court finds dismissal is appropriate as explained below, the Court recommends dismissal of this action without leave to amend rather than striking the FAC. C. Plaintiffs’ Late Oppositions Plaintiffs attempted to file multiple late oppositions to the motion to dismiss that were contained within their single miscellaneous filling filed on March 21, 2025. See ECF No. 29 at 24-26 (Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa’s “opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss and request for stay” signed by Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa) (first opposition); id. at 53-56 (“opposition to motion to dismiss & demand for full disclosure of USCIS selective enforcement policies & cover-up” with unidentified signature(s)) (second opposition); id. at 57-60 (“opposition to motion to dismiss & demand for full disclosure of the U.S. Government’s soft religious pogrom against Sikhs & authoritarian Nazi coding in DOJ responses” with unidentified signature(s)) (third opposition). The first opposition is the only opposition that is signed by an identified plaintiff (Vrinder Singh Randhawa) and the only opposition that actually addresses issues raised in the motion to dismiss. Though Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa’s first opposition is untimely where it was due on March 4, 2025, but filed on March 21, 2025, the Court will consider the first opposition filed at ECF No. 29 at 24-26 in the Court’s review of the motion to dismiss the FAC. The Court will not, however, consider the second and third oppositions, which contain unidentified signatures making it unclear as to which plaintiff(s) the opposition is filed on behalf, appear to request other relief and make various allegations unrelated to the motion to dismiss, and do not appear to address the motion to dismiss.4 D. Insufficient Service of Process The United States seeks dismissal for insufficient service of process pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5). USA Mot. at 4-6. The United States argues Plaintiffs have failed to serve the FAC on all named defendants (DHS, USCIS, CBP, and TSA) as required by Rule 4. Id. at 5. The United States argues Plaintiffs have only served the United States and ICE with the FAC, both of which are not named defendants in this action. Id. at 5. Further, the United States argues Plaintiffs cannot show good cause for the delay and that dismissal of the FAC is appropriate on this ground. Id. at 5-6. In his opposition, Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa does not respond to the service arguments and instead focuses his argument to oppose dismissal of the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) claim. (ECF No.

4 The Court notes that even if it considered the second and third oppositions in its review of the motion to dismiss, the second and third oppositions would not change the analysis and the Court’s recommendation to dismiss without leave to amend would remain. 29 at 24-26.) “[S]ervice of summons is the procedure by which a court having venue and jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit asserts jurisdiction over the person of the party served.” Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1946). Federal courts do not have jurisdiction over a defendant unless the defendant has been served properly under Rule 4. Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir. 1982). Rule 4 governs service of process for all suits in federal court and likewise governs the sufficiency of service of process. See generally Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 4. Rule 4(c)(1) requires that “[a] summons must be served with a copy of the complaint.” The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “[s]ervice of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999). Although courts have also held that Rule 4 is flexible and should be liberally construed if a party receives sufficient notice of the complaint and the defects in service are minor, United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Alpha Beta Co., 736 F.2d 1371, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984), absent substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 4, “neither actual notice nor simply naming the defendant in the complaint will provide personal jurisdiction.” Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1986). Rule 4 sets forth the requirements for the manner of service. Rule 4(c)(1) requires that “[a] summons must be served with a copy of the complaint.” Rule 4(i) governs service of process on an agency or officer of the United States. “To serve a United States agency or corporation, or a United States officer or employee sued only in an official capacity, a party must serve the United States and also send a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail to the agency, corporation, officer, or employee.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2). “If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). On February 4 and 5, 2025, the United States and ICE were served with the summons and the FAC, but neither is a named defendant in this action. See FAC; ECF No. 24 at 3-8; USA Mot. at 2. Defendants DHS, USCIS, CBP and TSA were not served with the summons and the FAC as required pursuant to Rule 4. See Docket. Plaintiffs have also failed to establish good cause for their failure to serve Defendants within the appropriate period. Here, Plaintiffs have failed to comply with Rule 4 and the time period to serve Defendants has expired. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c), 4(i), 4(m). Though not required to do so, counsel for the United States informed Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa that Plaintiffs failed to properly effect service, and included the relevant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governing service of federal defendants and the 60-day deadline for a federal defendant’s response to a complaint. U.S. Notice at 1-2 (ECF No. 8). The Court also informed Plaintiffs of service requirements in its July 26, 2024 order, including the deadline for completing service, the requirement to include the entire complaint and summons when serving each defendant, and the requirement to follow Rule 4(i) to serve the United States, its agencies, corporations, officers, or employees. 7/26/2024 Order at 3. Failure to serve a summons together with the complaint renders service of process ineffective. Omni Capital, 484 U.S. at 104. Plaintiffs’ pro se status does not excuse their failure to effectuate service. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”). Pro se litigants are expected to know and comply with the rules of civil procedure. See American Ass'n of Naturopathic Physicians v. Hayhurst, 227 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000). As described above, the Court also expressly instructed and warned Plaintiffs regarding the timeline for service, to “take careful note of the rules regarding proper service of the United States,” and to carefully review the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules for the Eastern District of California, and the undersigned’s Civil Standing Orders. 7/26/2024 Order at 3-4. Accordingly, the Court recommends granting the United States’ motion to dismiss on this ground without leave to amend. E. Failure to State a Claim and Lack of Jurisdiction The United States also seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. USA Mot. at 7-17. The Court addresses the FAC generally, defendants against whom no specific allegations are raised, Plaintiffs’ claims, and leave to amend. 1. FAC and Rule 8 Pleading Requirements Plaintiffs’ filings are confusing and unclear. The FAC is five pages long and primarily consists of general allegations about DHS, various “maxims,” and general statements. FAC (ECF No. 11 at 1-5). The FAC also has 83 pages attached to it, including receipts, documents with sometimes illegible handwritten notes, letters, claim forms, emails, statements from non-parties, and other various documents (ECF No. 11 at 6-14, 25-98).5 The Court is not required to sift through the voluminous attachments to the FAC to try to decipher what Plaintiffs are alleging, piece together Plaintiffs’ claims, and identify which facts, if any, go with which claims. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178-80 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of complaint where “one cannot determine from the complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide discovery”); Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming dismissal of complaint because the complaint, including attachments, exceeded 70 pages, was confusing and conclusory and not in compliance with Rule 8 requiring a short and plain statement of the claims). The FAC does not contain “a short and plain statement” of Plaintiffs’ claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While the FAC is five pages long, it does not clearly state what happened showing that Plaintiffs are

5 The document filed at ECF No. 11 also includes various motions, which are not included in the 83 pages of attachments to the FAC, appear to be duplicative of other motions filed, and were separately addressed in the Court’s 6/26/2025 Order. See ECF No. 11 at 15-24; 6/26/2025 Order. entitled to relief. Further, the FAC fails to allege the wrongful conduct allegedly committed by each of the defendants. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (a court’s acceptance of a complaint’s allegations as true is inapplicable to “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements[.]”) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Therefore, the Court recommends the FAC be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 8. 2. Defendants USCIS, CBP, and TSA There are no allegations raised against Defendants USCIS, CBP, and TSA in the FAC. See generally FAC. Defendants USCIS, CBP, and TSA are only identified in Plaintiffs’ FAC as it generally relates to Defendant DHS’ failure “to ensure its sub- agencies, including CBP, USCIS, and TSA, adhered to fair procedures.” FAC at 3. However, the FAC does not contain any allegations as to how Defendants USCIS, CBP, and TSA each harmed Plaintiffs in connection with each of Plaintiffs’ claims. Therefore, dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants USCIS, CBP, and TSA is appropriate for failure to comply with Rule 8’s minimum pleading standard. See McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178-80. The Court notes that Plaintiffs received notice of this defect as it was raised in the United States’ motion. USA Mot. at 18-19. The United States argued the FAC failed to allege any facts against Defendants USCIS, CBP, and TSA. USA Mot. at 18. Plaintiffs’ opposition does not address this defect. Leave to amend would be futile where USCIS, CBP, and TSA would not be proper defendants for any of Plaintiffs’ claims, as described below. Therefore, the Court recommends claims against Defendants USCIS, CBP, and TSA be dismissed without leave to amend. 3. Freedom of Information Act Cause of Action Plaintiffs’ first cause of action alleges “DHS’s refusal to respond fully to Plaintiffs’ FOIA requests constitutes a violation under 5 U.S.C. § 552.” FAC at 4. The FOIA provides for a civil action when “an agency has (1) improperly; (2) withheld; (3) agency records.” Luis v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 2016 WL 80631, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2016) (quoting Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 150 (1980)) (internal marks omitted); see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). The United States moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ FOIA claim for failure to allege sufficient facts to provide Defendant DHS notice of its alleged violation. USA Mot. at 8-9. The United States also argues the FAC establishes that Defendant DHS promptly responded to Plaintiffs’ FOIA demands and that no actionable FOIA claim is available. USA Mot. at 8-9 (citing FAC at 10). The Court agrees. Plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to establish a basis for relief. For example, the FAC does not allege what information Plaintiffs sought in their FOIA request, whether documents were provided in response to the FOIA request, or how DHS’s response was inadequate. See FAC at 1-5. Plaintiffs’ vague and conclusory two-sentence FOIA allegations are insufficient to establish a cognizable legal theory. See FAC at 4; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A court is not required “to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Sciences Securities Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Furthermore, “it is not…proper, to assume that the [plaintiff] can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated ... laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Therefore, the FAC should be dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 4. Federal Tort Claims Act Cause of Action Plaintiffs’ second cause of action alleges a violation of the FTCA based on “negligence, retaliation, and bad faith processing” due to Defendant DHS’ “conduct, including unwarranted delays, excessive screenings, and profiling” that have “obstructed Plaintiffs’ rights and hampered their lives, justifying relief under the FTCA.” FAC at 4. The Federal Tort Claims Act “gives federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the United States for ‘injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission’ of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment.” Levin v. United States, 568 U.S. 503, 506 (2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)). The only proper defendant in a Federal Tort Claims Act is the United States. Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Woods v. United States, 720 F.2d 1451, 1452 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983)). Here, Plaintiffs have not named the United States as a defendant to this action. See FAC at 2 (listing defendants). This is concerning because another federal district court previously informed Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa6 twice that the failure to name the United States as a defendant for a FTCA action is a sufficient ground for dismissing the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Randhawa I, No. 1:20-cv-3200 DLF, 2022 WL 823067, at *1 (“Here, this Court lacks jurisdiction because Randhawa sued the wrong defendant. The United States of America is the only proper defendant in a suit under the FTCA.[…] Randhawa’s failure to name the United States as the defendant is a sufficient ground for dismissing his complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Randhawa II”, No. 1:22-cv-03291 DLF, 2024 WL 578957, at * 3 (“In Randhawa I, however, the Court specifically instructed Randhawa that his failure to name the United States as the defendant [was] a sufficient ground for dismissing his complaint.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The FAC in this action was filed on November 18, 2024, after the Randhawa I and Randhawa II district court decisions. In addition, Plaintiffs do not dispute that the United States was not named as a defendant in the FAC. See ECF No. 29 at 24-26. See FAC at 4. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ FTCA claim fails and should be dismissed for

6 In Randhawa v. DHS, et al. (“Randhawa I”), No. 1:20-cv-3200 DLF, Plaintiffs Vrinder Singh Randhawa, Mandeep Sandhu Randhawa, and AKR were named in the complaint. See ECF No. 25-2, Exh. 1. The court’s dismissal order, however, is only addressed to Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa. See Randhawa I, No. 1:20-cv-3200 DLF, 2022 WL 823067, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2022). In Randhawa v. DHS, et al. (“Randhawa II”), No. 1:22-cv-03291 DLF, Plaintiffs Vrinder Singh Randhawa, Mandeep Sandhu Randhawa, and AKR were named in the complaint. See ECF No. 25-2, Exh. 2. The court’s dismissal order addresses Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa only because Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Rrandhawa “cannot appear on behalf of another person.” See Randhawa II, No. 1:22-cv- 03291 DLF, 2024 WL 578957, at * 1 n.1 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2024) (citation omitted). lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In addition, the FAC fails to state a FTCA claim because though the FTCA claim is based on alleged negligence, the FAC fails to plead facts supporting the negligence elements of duty, breach, or causation. See FAC at 1-5; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 292 (1988) (to prove a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must show “defendant had a duty to use due care, that he breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The United States also argues that the FAC fails to allege Plaintiffs exhausted their administrative remedies for their FTCA claim. In opposition, Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa argues that the government had actual notice of Plaintiff’s claim, the FAC was not prematurely filed, and Plaintiff properly exhausted. See ECF No. 29 at 24-26. Alternatively, Plaintiff requests a stay until after the six-month administrative exhaustion requirement is satisfied. See id. Given the Court’s determination that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the FTCA claim and the claim is not sufficiently pled, the Court need not reach the exhaustion issue. 5. Bivens Cause of Action Plaintiffs’ third cause of action alleges Defendant DHS violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights under Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392, in its “excessive screenings and detentions” and its “retaliatory, discriminatory and bad faith actions.” FAC at 4. A Bivens claim can only be brought against a federal officer or employee named in their individual capacity, and cannot be brought against the United States, agencies of the United States, or federal officers or employees in their official capacity. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994); Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007); Morgan v. United States, 323 F.3d 776, 780 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, Plaintiffs allege a Bivens claim against a federal agency, DHS. See FAC at 4. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Bivens claim fails and should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See DaVinci Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.3d 1117, 1128 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that the district court properly dismissed Bivens claims against the government for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). In addition, the FAC does not include factual allegations regarding the allegedly wrongful conduct underlying the Bivens claim, when such conduct occurred, or by whom. Instead, the FAC alleges conclusory and vague allegations for Plaintiffs’ Bivens claim. See FAC at 4. The conclusory Bivens allegations are insufficient to establish a cognizable legal theory.7 See FAC at 4; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 6. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Cause of Action Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action is for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendant DHS. An intentional infliction of emotional distress claim must be brought under the FTCA and as described above, FTCA claims cannot be brought against federal agencies and the United States has not been named as a defendant. See Lance, 70 F.3d at 1095. The Court therefore lacks jurisdiction over the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. In addition, even if the United States had been named as a defendant, the intentional infliction of emotional distress is not sufficiently pled. The FAC alleges Defendant DHS’ actions “including unjustified profiling, delays in adjudication, and inappropriate denial of emergency travel—are extreme and outrageous” and that Plaintiffs have suffered “severe psychological trauma and emotion distress due” to Defendant DHS’ conduct. FAC at 4. To prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under California law, a plaintiff must show: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) severe emotional suffering; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress. Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 946 (1979).

7 The Court notes with approval the United States’ argument regarding the limitation of Bivens claims post-Abbasi and Egbert, but need not reach the issue given the Court’s other findings. See US Mot. at 14-16; Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 484 (2022); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 131 (2017). Conduct is “outrageous” when it is “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 209 (1983). The defendant’s conduct must be directed at, or occur in the presence of, the plaintiff, and defendant must have been aware of the plaintiff’s presence. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001-02 (1993). The FAC does not describe in detail or provide enough facts to show how Defendant DHS violated Plaintiffs’ rights, or the specific conduct Defendant DHS engaged in that was outrageous. See FAC. Plaintiffs’ allegations are vague and conclusory and are not supported by sufficient facts. See Associated General Contractors of California, Inc., 459 U.S. at 526. Therefore, the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim should also be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). F. Leave to Amend If a court finds that a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, it has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000). Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the defects in the complaint could be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. Id.; see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”). To determine the propriety of a dismissal motion, the court may not consider facts raised outside the complaint (such as in an opposition brief), but it may consider such facts when deciding whether to grant leave to amend. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1026 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). As outlined above, Plaintiffs’ FAC is fatally flawed because Plaintiffs do not state any claim upon which relief can be granted. Moreover, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction as to Plaintiffs’ FTCA claim, intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, which must be brought pursuant to the FTCA, and Bivens claim. Amendment would be futile because Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Randhawa was previously informed in two separate actions by another district court as to his failure to name the United States as a proper defendant for a FTCA claim, and repeated the error for a third time. See Randhawa I, No. 1:20-cv-3200 DLF, 2022 WL 823067, at *1; Randhawa II, No. 1:22-cv-03291 DLF, 2024 WL 578957, at * 3. Plaintiff Vrinder Singh Rrandhawa was also previously warned that he “cannot appear on behalf of another person.” See Randhawa II, No. 1:22-cv- 03291 DLF, 2024 WL 578957, at * 1 n.1. Despite these prior warnings, Plaintiffs continue to raise similar claims in this action, against similar defendants, as in their prior federal actions. Compare FAC, with ECF No. 25-2, Exhs. 1-2. As for the Bivens claim, even if a proper defendant (federal officer or employee in their individual capacity) was named, amendment would be futile given the Supreme Court’s clear guidance limiting Bivens actions. See Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 130-31; Egbert, 596 U.S. at 484. The Supreme Court has recognized a Bivens claim in only three contexts: (1) a Fourth Amendment claim based on a warrantless search in Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97; (2) a Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause claim against a Congressman for employment gender discrimination in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1979); and (3) an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to provide adequate medical care to a federal prisoner in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980). Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 130-31. The Supreme Court has not extended the Bivens remedy since Carlson, and has made clear that “expanding the Bivens remedy is now considered a disfavored judicial activity.” Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 130 (citation omitted). In 2022, the Supreme Court further restricted Bivens claims by rejecting a Fourth Amendment claim excessive force claim. See Egbert, 596 U.S. 482. As for the FOIA claim, even if Plaintiffs could allege additional allegations as to the information Plaintiffs sought in their FOIA request, whether documents were provided in response to their FOIA request, or how Defendant DHS’s response was inadequate, the FOIA claim appears to be moot where Plaintiffs do not contest that Defendant DHS promptly responded to and produced documents in response to Plaintiffs’ FOIA requests and do not contest that Plaintiffs have no actionable FOIA claim. See ECF No. 29 at 24- 26; USA Mot at 8-9; Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Though Plaintiffs did oppose dismissal of their FTCA claim as described above, Plaintiffs did not oppose dismissal of their FOIA claim and have therefore conceded dismissal. See Silva v. U.S. Bancorp, 2011 WL 7096576, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2011) (holding that plaintiff conceded to a dismissal of his claim for failing to oppose the motion to dismiss). Because Plaintiffs do not contest that the FOIA claim is moot and that they have no actionable FOIA claim, amendment would be futile. Finally, leave to amend as to Defendants USCIS, CBP, and TSA would be futile because they are not proper defendants for any of Plaintiffs’ claims, as described above. Accordingly, the Court finds that further leave to amend would be futile. G. Miscellaneous Motions In light of the Court’s recommendation to dismiss the FAC without leave to amend, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ miscellaneous motions and requests in their various filings (ECF Nos. 29, 32, 35), and the United States’ request for administrative relief (ECF No. 33) without prejudice. If this action is not dismissed, the parties may renew their motions for relief. Based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Plaintiffs’ miscellaneous motions and requests (ECF Nos. 29, 32, 35) are DENIED without prejudice; and 2. The United States of America’s request for administrative relief (ECF No. 33) is DENIED without prejudice. Further, based upon the findings above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 1. The United States of America’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 25) be GRANTED; 2. The First Amended Complaint be DISMISSED without leave to amend; and 3. The Clerk of the Court be directed to CLOSE this case. These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14 days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). Dated: 08/12/25 C iy s 43 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 4, sing1540.24 23