(PS) McDonald v. Department of Motor Vehicles

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedMay 9, 2022
Docket2:21-cv-01561
StatusUnknown

This text of (PS) McDonald v. Department of Motor Vehicles ((PS) McDonald v. Department of Motor Vehicles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PS) McDonald v. Department of Motor Vehicles, (E.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MITCHEL MCDONALD, No. 2:21-cv-1561 KJM DB PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND 14 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS MOTOR VEHICLES IN SACRAMENTO 15 COUNTY, 16 Defendant. 17 18 Plaintiff Mitchel McDonald is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was referred 19 to the undersigned in accordance with Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Pending 20 before the court are plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 21 motion for extension of time to file an amended complaint, an amended complaint, a request to 22 remove the undersigned from this action, and a request to appoint a special master.1 (ECF Nos. 2, 23 5-8.) The amended complaint alleges that the defendant discriminated against plaintiff by 24 enacting policies in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 25 The court is required to screen complaints brought by parties proceeding in forma 26 pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 27 1 Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to file an amended complaint will be granted nunc 28 pro tunct. 1 2000) (en banc). Here, the undersigned finds that plaintiff’s amended complaint is deficient. 2 Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, the undersigned will recommend that plaintiff’s 3 amended complaint be dismissed without further leave to amend. 4 I. Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 5 Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application makes the financial showing required by 28 6 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). However, a determination that a plaintiff qualifies financially for in forma 7 pauperis status does not complete the inquiry required by the statute. “‘A district court may deny 8 leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed 9 complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.’” Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 10 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. First Nat. Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th 11 Cir. 1987)); see also McGee v. Department of Child Support Services, 584 Fed. Appx. 638 (9th 12 Cir. 2014) (“the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying McGee’s request to proceed 13 IFP because it appears from the face of the amended complaint that McGee’s action is frivolous 14 or without merit”); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) (“It is the duty of the 15 District Court to examine any application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis to determine 16 whether the proposed proceeding has merit and if it appears that the proceeding is without merit, 17 the court is bound to deny a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”). 18 Moreover, the court must dismiss an in forma pauperis case at any time if the allegation of 19 poverty is found to be untrue or if it is determined that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to 20 state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune 21 defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is legally frivolous when it lacks an 22 arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. 23 Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). Under this standard, a court must dismiss a 24 complaint as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the 25 factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 26 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to 27 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 28 570 (2007). In considering whether a complaint states a cognizable claim, the court accepts as 1 true the material allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most 2 favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. 3 Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 4 (9th Cir. 1989). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by 5 lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true 6 conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western 7 Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 8 The minimum requirements for a civil complaint in federal court are as follows: 9 A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s 10 jurisdiction depends . . . , (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for 11 judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. 12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 13 II. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint 14 Here, plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to contain a short and plain statement of a claim 15 showing that plaintiff is entitled to relief. In this regard, the amended complaint alleges that 16 plaintiff “is a qualified individual with a disability” and an employee of the defendant, working at 17 an office in Sacramento, California. (Am. Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 2, 5.) The amended complaint 18 alleges that the defendant “regards plaintiff as having a disability” because defendant enacted 19 policies in response to COVID-19 and that such policies discriminated against plaintiff. (Id.) 20 “Congress enacted the ADA ‘to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards 21 addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.’” Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. 22 Harkins Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 23 12101(b)(2)).

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital
425 U.S. 738 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Hishon v. King & Spalding
467 U.S. 69 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Western Mining Council v. Watt
643 F.2d 618 (Ninth Circuit, 1981)
Harry Franklin v. Ms. Murphy and Hoyt Cupp
745 F.2d 1221 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)
Anant Kumar Tripati v. First National Bank & Trust
821 F.2d 1368 (First Circuit, 1987)
Mark Duckworth v. Pratt & Whitney, Inc.
152 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 1998)
Scott v. Napolitano
717 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (S.D. California, 2010)
Stephanie McGee v. Department of Child Support Se
584 F. App'x 638 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo
592 U.S. 14 (Supreme Court, 2020)
Ryan Klaassen v. Trustees of Indiana University
7 F.4th 592 (Seventh Circuit, 2021)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Love v. United States
915 F.2d 1242 (Ninth Circuit, 1989)

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Bluebook (online)
(PS) McDonald v. Department of Motor Vehicles, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ps-mcdonald-v-department-of-motor-vehicles-caed-2022.