(PS) Martinez v. FP Store, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedSeptember 24, 2019
Docket1:19-cv-00487
StatusUnknown

This text of (PS) Martinez v. FP Store, Inc. ((PS) Martinez v. FP Store, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PS) Martinez v. FP Store, Inc., (E.D. Cal. 2019).

Opinion

4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 ANGELICA MARTINEZ, Case No. 1:19-cv-00487-LJO-EPG 10 Plaintiff, ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO:

11 v. (1) FILE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT OR; 12 FP STORE, INC.,

13 Defendant. (2) NOTIFY THE COURT THAT SHE WISHES TO STAND ON HER 14 COMPLAINT, SUBJECT TO THIS COURT ISSUING FINDINGS AND 15 RECOMMMENDATIONS TO THE DISTRICT JUDGE CONSISTENT WITH 16 THIS ORDER

17 (ECF NO. 1) 18 THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE 19

20 21 Pro se Plaintiff Angelica Martinez (“Plaintiff”) brings this suit against Defendant FP 22 Store, Inc., (“Defendant”) alleging a cause of action under the Federal Labor Standards Act of 23 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“FLSA”). Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated the FLSA by failing 24 to pay her accrued vacation hours after it went bankrupt and shut down the store at which she 25 worked. As described below, however, the Court finds that the FLSA does not regulate accrued vacation time. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint, as drafted, fails to state a claim. 26 The Court provides the relevant legal standards below. If Plaintiff believes she can state a 27 claim within this Court’s jurisdiction after reviewing these standards, she can file an amended 28 1 complaint within thirty days. If Plaintiff disagrees with this order, Plaintiff can inform the Court 2 that she wishes to stand on her Complaint, in which case the Court will issue findings and 3 recommendations to the District Judge consistent with this order. 4 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 5 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must conduct a review of a complaint brought in 6 forma pauperis to determine whether it “state[s] a claim on which relief may be granted,” is 7 “frivolous or malicious,” or “seek[s] monetary relief against a [party] who is immune from such 8 relief.” If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, it must be dismissed. Id. 9 An action is frivolous if it is “of little weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact” and 10 malicious if it was filed with the “intention or desire to harm another.” Andrew v. King, 398 F.3d 11 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). Leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of 12 the complaint can be cured by amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 13 1995). 14 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 15 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 16 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 17 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 18 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 19 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 20 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this 21 plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not 22 required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 23 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff’s legal 24 conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 25 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 26 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 27 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). 28 /// 1 II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 2 Plaintiff filed this suit on April 15, 2019. (ECF No. 1.) The allegations are as follows: 3 Plaintiff accumulated 234.89 hours of vacation time after 8 years of employment with 4 Defendant that total “2583.79.” (Id. at p.5.) Defendant went bankrupt and “closed down” the store 5 at which Plaintiff worked. (Id.)1 Plaintiff now seeks her “vacation hours that [she] work[ed] for 8 6 year [sic] and the total is 234.89 hours.” (Id.) 7 III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 8 “The FLSA sets a national minimum wage[]…and requires overtime pay of one and a half 9 times an employee’s hourly wage for every hour worked over 40 hours in a week…” Probert v. 10 Family Centered Servs. Of Alaska, Inc., 651 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations 11 omitted); see also 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (minimum wage); 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (overtime). 12 The FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime wage provisions apply only to “employees” 13 who are “employed” by “employers.” See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a)(1). Only those 14 employees who are “engaged in commerce or in the production of good for commerce,” or who 15 are “employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 16 commerce” may seek recovery under the FLSA’s minimum and overtime wage provisions. See 17 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) and 207(a)(1). 18 “If a covered employee is not paid a statutory wage, the FLSA creates for that employee a 19 private cause of action against his employer for the recovery of unpaid overtime wages and back 20 pay.” Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 2011) 21 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). The elements of an FLSA claim are: (1) plaintiff was employed by a 22 defendant during the relevant period; (2) plaintiff was [a covered employee]; and (3) the 23

24 1 Under the automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code, “[a petition in bankruptcy] operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of (1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a 25 judicial…action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under the title.” 11 U.S.C. § 362. The Court is not able to tell from Plaintiff’s Complaint whether an 26 automatic stay is in effect as to Defendant that would enjoin the commencement of this suit. See In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1082 (9th Cir.

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(PS) Martinez v. FP Store, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ps-martinez-v-fp-store-inc-caed-2019.