1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARK A. GRANT, Case No. 2:20-cv-01963-TLN-JDP (PS) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DISCHARGING MAY 3, 2021 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 13 v. ECF No. 27 14 LUIS MARTINEZ, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15 Defendants. THAT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS BE DENIED 16 ECF No. 37 17 OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN 14 DAYS 18 19 Plaintiff Mark Grant, proceeding without counsel, alleges that he was driving on Air Base 20 Parkway at Travis Air Force Base (“Travis AFB”) when defendant Luis Martinez—operating a 21 vehicle owned by defendant Coffman Specialties, Inc.—abruptly turned left from the right lane 22 and struck his vehicle, shoving it into a concrete barrier and causing physical injury to plaintiff. 23 ECF No. 35 at 7. Plaintiff proceeds on his third amended complaint.1 ECF No. 35. Defendants 24 filed the instant motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing that plaintiff’s allegations fail for 25
1 Defendants previously moved to dismiss plaintiff’s second amended complaint. ECF 26 No. 26. After plaintiff failed to timely respond to that motion, I ordered him to show cause why 27 the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. ECF No. 27. Since plaintiff subsequently filed an opposition to defendants’ earlier motion, ECF No. 30, I will discharge the 28 May 3, 2021 order to show cause. 1 lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 37. In the alternative, they seek limited discovery to 2 determine whether the court in fact has subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants also seek to 3 dismiss plaintiff’s request for punitive damages under Rule 12(b)(6). 4 Legal Standard 5 A jurisdictional challenge under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can 6 be facial or factual. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a 7 facial challenge, the moving party asserts that the allegations in the complaint are “insufficient on 8 their face” to establish federal jurisdiction. Id. “Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists 9 therefore does not depend on resolution of a factual dispute, but rather on the allegations in [the] 10 complaint.” Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). The court must presume the 11 truth of plaintiff’s factual allegations “and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.” Doe v. 12 Holy, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009). 13 In a factual challenge, the moving party “disputes the truth of the allegations that, by 14 themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. The court 15 does not simply accept the allegations in the complaint as true. Id. Instead, “when challenged on 16 allegations of jurisdictional facts, the parties must support their allegations by competent proof,” 17 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96-97 (2010), and the court makes findings of fact, resolving 18 any material factual disputes by independently evaluating the evidence, Friends of the Earth v. 19 Sanderson Farms, Inc., 992 F.3d 939, 944-45 (9th Cir. 2021). 20 “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however 21 inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 22 lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nevertheless, plaintiff bears the burden of 23 establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 24 375, 377 (1994). 25 Discussion 26 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 27 Defendants Martinez and Coffman bring a facial attack, arguing that plaintiff’s allegations 28 do not establish subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 37-2. Defendants contend that federal 1 question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is lacking.2 ECF No. 37-2 at 6. They argue that the 2 complaint’s reference to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)—the only federal claim—does 3 not confer jurisdiction. Id. 4 Defendants are correct that plaintiff cannot sue them under the FTCA.3 See F.D.I.C. v. 5 Craft, 157 F.3d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The FTCA is the exclusive remedy for tortious 6 conduct by the United States, and it only allows claims against the United States.”). The 7 allegations in the third amended complaint are, however, sufficient to plead federal enclave 8 jurisdiction.4 9 Congress has the power to legislate exclusively over federal enclaves under Article I, § 8, 10 clause 17, of the United States Constitution, “which grants to the United States ‘exclusive 11 legislation’ over forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards and other needful buildings, when lands 12 therefor are acquired with the consent of the legislature of the state of their situs.” Mater v. 13 Holley, 200 F.2d 123, 123 (5th Cir. 1952). “Federal courts have federal question jurisdiction over 14 tort claims that arise on ‘federal enclaves.’” Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 15 1250 (9th Cir. 2006). 16 Plaintiff alleges that the incident at issue occurred on “Air Base Parkway in Fairfield, 17 California at Travis [AFB].” ECF No. 35 at 7. Later, he adds that “‘Doe number One’ (a federal 18 entity subject to the Tort Claims Act) owned, leased, occupied, or controlled the property known 19 as Travis [AFB].” Id. at 26. Liberally construing plaintiff’s pleadings and drawing all reasonable 20 inferences in his favor, his allegations are sufficient at this stage—in the context of a facial 21 2 As defendants note, plaintiff has not alleged diversity of citizenship. See ECF No. 35 at 22 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 23 3 To proceed with his FTCA claim, which currently is alleged against a Doe defendant, plaintiff would need to amend the complaint to name a proper defendant and allege compliance 24 with the FTCA’s requirements, including its exhaustion requirement and applicable time limitations. See United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 405 (2015) (“The [FTCA] provides that a 25 tort claim against the United States ‘shall be forever barred’ unless it is presented to the ‘appropriate federal agency within two years after such claim accrues’ and then brought to federal 26 court ‘within six months’ after the agency acts on the claim” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)).). 27 4 In light of this finding, it is unnecessary to address the possibility that the court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims. See ECF No. 39 at 1; ECF 28 No. 35 at 25-28. 1 challenge to jurisdiction—to plead federal enclave jurisdiction.5 See Durham v. Lockheed Martin 2 Corp., No. C03-4326 TEH, 2003 WL 25739368, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2003) (finding 3 “allegations that [a plaintiff] was exposed to asbestos while working on several U.S. Air Force 4 bases . . . sufficient to put all Defendants on notice that there was a basis for federal enclave 5 jurisdiction”), rev’d on other grounds, Durham, 445 F.3d at 1250; see also Andrews v.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARK A. GRANT, Case No. 2:20-cv-01963-TLN-JDP (PS) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DISCHARGING MAY 3, 2021 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 13 v. ECF No. 27 14 LUIS MARTINEZ, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15 Defendants. THAT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS BE DENIED 16 ECF No. 37 17 OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN 14 DAYS 18 19 Plaintiff Mark Grant, proceeding without counsel, alleges that he was driving on Air Base 20 Parkway at Travis Air Force Base (“Travis AFB”) when defendant Luis Martinez—operating a 21 vehicle owned by defendant Coffman Specialties, Inc.—abruptly turned left from the right lane 22 and struck his vehicle, shoving it into a concrete barrier and causing physical injury to plaintiff. 23 ECF No. 35 at 7. Plaintiff proceeds on his third amended complaint.1 ECF No. 35. Defendants 24 filed the instant motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing that plaintiff’s allegations fail for 25
1 Defendants previously moved to dismiss plaintiff’s second amended complaint. ECF 26 No. 26. After plaintiff failed to timely respond to that motion, I ordered him to show cause why 27 the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. ECF No. 27. Since plaintiff subsequently filed an opposition to defendants’ earlier motion, ECF No. 30, I will discharge the 28 May 3, 2021 order to show cause. 1 lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 37. In the alternative, they seek limited discovery to 2 determine whether the court in fact has subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants also seek to 3 dismiss plaintiff’s request for punitive damages under Rule 12(b)(6). 4 Legal Standard 5 A jurisdictional challenge under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can 6 be facial or factual. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a 7 facial challenge, the moving party asserts that the allegations in the complaint are “insufficient on 8 their face” to establish federal jurisdiction. Id. “Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists 9 therefore does not depend on resolution of a factual dispute, but rather on the allegations in [the] 10 complaint.” Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). The court must presume the 11 truth of plaintiff’s factual allegations “and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.” Doe v. 12 Holy, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009). 13 In a factual challenge, the moving party “disputes the truth of the allegations that, by 14 themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. The court 15 does not simply accept the allegations in the complaint as true. Id. Instead, “when challenged on 16 allegations of jurisdictional facts, the parties must support their allegations by competent proof,” 17 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96-97 (2010), and the court makes findings of fact, resolving 18 any material factual disputes by independently evaluating the evidence, Friends of the Earth v. 19 Sanderson Farms, Inc., 992 F.3d 939, 944-45 (9th Cir. 2021). 20 “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however 21 inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 22 lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nevertheless, plaintiff bears the burden of 23 establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 24 375, 377 (1994). 25 Discussion 26 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 27 Defendants Martinez and Coffman bring a facial attack, arguing that plaintiff’s allegations 28 do not establish subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 37-2. Defendants contend that federal 1 question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is lacking.2 ECF No. 37-2 at 6. They argue that the 2 complaint’s reference to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)—the only federal claim—does 3 not confer jurisdiction. Id. 4 Defendants are correct that plaintiff cannot sue them under the FTCA.3 See F.D.I.C. v. 5 Craft, 157 F.3d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The FTCA is the exclusive remedy for tortious 6 conduct by the United States, and it only allows claims against the United States.”). The 7 allegations in the third amended complaint are, however, sufficient to plead federal enclave 8 jurisdiction.4 9 Congress has the power to legislate exclusively over federal enclaves under Article I, § 8, 10 clause 17, of the United States Constitution, “which grants to the United States ‘exclusive 11 legislation’ over forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards and other needful buildings, when lands 12 therefor are acquired with the consent of the legislature of the state of their situs.” Mater v. 13 Holley, 200 F.2d 123, 123 (5th Cir. 1952). “Federal courts have federal question jurisdiction over 14 tort claims that arise on ‘federal enclaves.’” Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 15 1250 (9th Cir. 2006). 16 Plaintiff alleges that the incident at issue occurred on “Air Base Parkway in Fairfield, 17 California at Travis [AFB].” ECF No. 35 at 7. Later, he adds that “‘Doe number One’ (a federal 18 entity subject to the Tort Claims Act) owned, leased, occupied, or controlled the property known 19 as Travis [AFB].” Id. at 26. Liberally construing plaintiff’s pleadings and drawing all reasonable 20 inferences in his favor, his allegations are sufficient at this stage—in the context of a facial 21 2 As defendants note, plaintiff has not alleged diversity of citizenship. See ECF No. 35 at 22 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 23 3 To proceed with his FTCA claim, which currently is alleged against a Doe defendant, plaintiff would need to amend the complaint to name a proper defendant and allege compliance 24 with the FTCA’s requirements, including its exhaustion requirement and applicable time limitations. See United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 405 (2015) (“The [FTCA] provides that a 25 tort claim against the United States ‘shall be forever barred’ unless it is presented to the ‘appropriate federal agency within two years after such claim accrues’ and then brought to federal 26 court ‘within six months’ after the agency acts on the claim” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)).). 27 4 In light of this finding, it is unnecessary to address the possibility that the court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims. See ECF No. 39 at 1; ECF 28 No. 35 at 25-28. 1 challenge to jurisdiction—to plead federal enclave jurisdiction.5 See Durham v. Lockheed Martin 2 Corp., No. C03-4326 TEH, 2003 WL 25739368, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2003) (finding 3 “allegations that [a plaintiff] was exposed to asbestos while working on several U.S. Air Force 4 bases . . . sufficient to put all Defendants on notice that there was a basis for federal enclave 5 jurisdiction”), rev’d on other grounds, Durham, 445 F.3d at 1250; see also Andrews v. Pride 6 Industries, 2:14-CV-02154-KJM, 2015 WL 1014133, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2015) (observing 7 that “the land designated officially as Travis [AFB] qualifies for federal enclave status”). 8 In the alternative, defendants request “leave to conduct limited discovery to determine if 9 the accident occurred” within a federal enclave and to “resolve the jurisdiction issue, as a matter 10 of fact.” ECF No. 37-2 at 8. “A district court has broad discretion to permit or deny discovery to 11 establish subject matter jurisdiction.” Andrews, 2015 WL 1014133, at *4 (citing Laub v. U.S. 12 Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003)). Discovery “should ordinarily be granted 13 where pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more 14 satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary.” Butcher’s Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 15 788 F.2d 535, 540 (9th Cir. 1986)). Defendants contend that the complaint does not establish the 16 precise location of the accident, and they explain that “some tracts of land at or around Travis 17 may be subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction and some are not.” ECF No. 37-2 at 7 (citing 18 Andrews, 2015 WL 1014133, at *4-5). Because these facts are controverted and bear on the 19 question of jurisdiction, I will recommend granting defendants’ request for limited discovery 20 before proceeding with the merits of the case.6
21 5 Defendants argue that if the court finds jurisdiction under the federal enclave doctrine, “[p]laintiff needs to amend his claims to remove refence [sic] to state law claims,” ECF No. 37-2 22 at 7, but I am unconvinced. See 28 U.S.C. § 5001(b) (originally enacted at 16 U.S.C. § 457) (“In 23 a civil action brought to recover on account of an injury sustained . . . [‘in a place subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States within a State,’ 28 U.S.C. § 5001(a),] the rights of the 24 parties shall be governed by the law of the State in which the place is located.”); see also Mater, 200 F.2d at 124 (5th Cir. 1952) (holding that a state law cause of action for “personal injuries as a 25 result of negligence . . . remained operative as federal law”), accord, Willis v. Craig, 555 F.2d 724, 726 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977); Kerr v. Delaware N. Companies, Inc., 1:16-CV-01797-LJO-SAB, 26 2017 WL 880409, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2017) (explaining that “where a federal enclave is the 27 locus of an alleged personal injury or tort, federal courts have upheld jurisdiction without inquiring into the precise laws under which claims are made”). 28 6 If these recommendations are adopted, a scheduling conference will be held in due 1 B. Punitive Damages 2 Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s request for punitive damages under Rule 12(b)(6). 3 ECF No. 37-2 at 9. They argue that the third amended complaint fails to “allege facts sufficient 4 to show malice, oppression, or fraud,” as they argue would be necessary to support plaintiff’s 5 “claim for punitive damages against both Martinez and Coffman.” Id. (citing Ebaugh v. Rabkin, 6 11 Cal. App. 3d 891, 884 (1972)). 7 However, I conclude that “a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is [not] the appropriate 8 vehicle to challenge the sufficiency of a prayer for punitive damages.” Kirchenberg v. Ainsworth, 9 Pet Nutrition, Inc., 2:20-CV-00690-KJM-DMC, 2022 WL 172315, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 10 2022) (quoting Shabazz v. Beard, No. 15-881, 2018 WL 1071173, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 11 2018)). Rule 12(b)(6) only permits dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon with relief can be 12 granted,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and “[w]hether a plaintiff has stated a claim turns not on 13 whether he has asked for the proper remedy but whether he is entitled to any remedy,” City of Los 14 Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 131 (1983), accord Oppenheimer v. Sw. Airlines Co., No. 13-260, 15 2013 WL 3149483, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 17, 2013) (“[P]unitive damages are but a remedy 16 . . . [they] provide no basis for dismissal under [Rule] 12(b)(6).”). For this reason, I recommend 17 denying defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. 18 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the May 3, 2021 order to show cause, ECF No. 19 27, is discharged. 20 Further, it is RECOMMENDED that: 21 1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 37, be denied without prejudice; and 22 2. defendants’ request for limited discovery, ECF No. 37-2, be granted. 23 I submit these findings and recommendations to the district judge under 28 U.S.C. 24 § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, 25 Eastern District of California. The parties may, within 14 days of the service of the findings and 26 recommendations, file written objections to the findings and recommendations with the court. 27
28 course, at which point the scope of discovery will be addressed. 1 | Such objections should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 2 | Recommendations.” The district judge will review the findings and recommendations under 28 3 | U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: _ August 10, 2022 Q_——_. 7 JEREMY D. PETERSON 8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28