NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1411-24
PROTEST FILED BY B&L TIRE SERVICE INC., T/A B&L TOWING REGARDING PREQUALIFICATION OF NOLL BROTHERS INC. FOR ROUTINE TOWING SERVICES IN ZONE 10 ON THE GARDEN STATE PARKWAY. ______________________________
Submitted December 8, 2025 – Decided March 11, 2026
Before Judges Walcott-Henderson and Bergman.
On appeal from the New Jersey Turnpike Authority.
Fox Rothschild LLP, attorneys for appellant Noll Brothers Towing, LLC (Fruqan Mouzon and Bridget Sykes on the briefs).
Decotiis Fitzpatrick Cole & Giblin LLP, attorneys for respondent New Jersey Turnpike Authority (John Profita and Hannah Cunning Valente, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Noll Brothers Inc. ("Noll"), a towing company, appeals from a December
3, 2024 final decision of respondent the New Jersey Turnpike Authority's
("Authority"), rescinding Noll's prequalification status to submit a bid to
perform towing services on a portion of the Garden State Parkway ("GSP").
Because the Authority's determination relied upon findings and conclusions that
were not supported by substantial evidence in the record, we reverse and
remand.
I.
The relevant facts are not in dispute, except where specifically mentioned.
On August 16, 2022, the Authority issued a Prequalification of Contractors for
Routine Towing Services on the New Jersey Turnpike and Routine Towing
Services and Emergency Services on the Garden State Parkway to provide
towing services within Zone 10 of the GSP.
Prequalification candidates were required to meet criteria outlined in
section III of the Authority's prequalification document,1 which provided in
relevant part:
A. Experience of Applicants/Personnel for Services
1. Applicant must have a minimum of three (3) years of general towing
1 The prequalification criteria are found in section III of the preprinted form completed by Noll, entitled "Prequalification Applicant Information." 2 A-1411-24 experience at the [g]arage [f]acility for which this [a]pplication is submitted, and a minimum of three (3) years towing experience at the [g]arage [f]acility on one or more of the following Interstate highways within New Jersey: I-80, I-280, I-287, I-295, I-195, I-78, I-676, New Jersey State Routes 18, 30, 40, 50, 72 and 47, the Atlantic City Expressway, the New Jersey Turnpike or the [GSP]. The Authority may also consider any other experience, within the past five years, as a towing contractor for the New Jersey State Police. At the discretion of the Authority, the requirement of three (3) years of towing experience at that [g]arage [f]acility may be satisfied by similar towing experience at another location.
....
D. Garage Facility
FOR ROUTINE TOWING SERVICES AND EMERGENCY SERVICES ON THE [GSP] (only)
6. The [g]arage [f]acility must be capable of safely storing at least fifty (50) passenger vehicles and one (1) bus. The [g]arage [f]acility must also be zoned accordingly to allow for these storage requirements. Satellite (off-site) storage yards will not be considered. All storage must be at the [g]arage [f]acility listed on the [a]pplication. Under no circumstance will patron's vehicles be stored on city streets or in an unsecured location. . . . 3 A-1411-24 [(Emphasis added).] Noll sought prequalification by submitting a timely application, and in
January 2023, the Authority inspected Noll's garage facility and determined that
it satisfied the prequalification requirements. 2 Noll was subsequently advised
via letter from the Authority's Director of Procurement and Materials
Management that it was prequalified to submit a bid for services. Noll had been
operating as a towing business since 1976, servicing both private customers and
municipalities, and maintains a tow facility in Iselin, Woodbridge Township.
Bidding for the towing services opened on August 1, 2024, at which time
prequalified applicants were able to ascertain the identity of competing bidders.
The Authority subsequently issued a request for bids, which were received and
publicly opened on August 1, 2024. Among the companies submitting bids were
Noll and B&L Tire Service, Inc. ("B&L").
Shortly thereafter, B&L protested Noll's prequalification status, asserting
it was not a responsive bidder because "Noll abjectly fail[ed] to meet [the]
minimum of three (3) years towing experience on any of the listed highways or
with the New Jersey State Police," and "Noll's storage facility is deficient and
2 The inspector of Noll's facility was William G. McDonough, the manager of Emergency Services and members of his staff.
4 A-1411-24 fails to meet the [Authority's] [p]requalification [r]equirements [of safely
storing at least fifty vehicles and one bus]."3
B&L claimed Noll's facility was inadequately zoned to accommodate fifty
passenger vehicles and one bus, as it was zoned for "police towing [and fifty
vehicle?] car storage."
Following notice to Noll and B&L, the Authority convened a hearing on
B&L's protest of Noll's prequalification before hearing officer John La Bella,
the Authority's Director of Toll Collections.4 The hearing commenced with
McDonough testifying regarding the basis upon which Noll's prequalification
was approved, followed by testimony from the protester, B&L and then Noll.
More particularly, McDonough testified repeatedly that Noll's storage
facility satisfied the prequalification requirement based on his inspection.
Mark Margiotta, B&L's representative, challenged Noll's ability to meet
the prequalification requirement as to zoning, arguing "what wasn't pointed out
in the testimony, and what is contained in the prequalification requirement, is
that the garage facility be zoned accordingly to allow what is required , [fifty]
3 Under N.J.A.C. 19:9-2.12, "[a]ny actual or prospective bidder . . . who is aggrieved in connection with the solicitation . . . of a contract or its prequalification status or classification may protest to the Authority." 4 The hearing was informal and non-adversarial; witnesses were neither sworn nor cross-examined, and the rules of evidence did not apply. 5 A-1411-24 vehicles and a bus." He further argued Noll's zoning permit clearly stated that
it's zoned for police storage, and did not have the capacity at its facility to add
fifty cars and a bus and satellite locations were impermissible. B&L further
challenged Noll's towing experience through the testimony of its owner, Sean
Cody, who testified that on the GSP alone, B&L tows "approximately 30 to 40
vehicles" on a single weekend.
Jeffrey Noll, owner of Noll, also testified about Noll's towing experience,
stating that Noll had "occasionally" towed on the GSP, New Jersey Turnpike,
and I-287, and that the last such occurrence was about a month before the
hearing, when the Woodbridge Police Department requested Noll tow a vehicle
from the GSP that had crashed after a high-speed police chase. Noll confirmed
he had the ability to store a minimum of fifty cars and room for additional buses
for the Parkway, and clarified that he is "maintaining a business right now
running used cars. But in the event [that he] got the Parkway [contract], [he]
own[s] [eleven] acres in Old Bridge for [his] other stuff."
On December 2, 2024, the hearing officer issued a decision recommending
rescission of Noll's prequalification status, effectively removing Noll from
consideration for the Authority's towing services contract for which it had
submitted a bid. The hearing officer found Noll lacked the requisite three-years'
experience, stating that Noll's towing from I-287 was "limited, sporadic and
6 A-1411-24 incidental to [Noll's] municipal towing services," and that Jeffrey Noll's
testimony regarding his own experience "falls far short of three years[']
experience on the [GSP]." He further concluded that "while Noll may have
significant experience at the municipal level, it lacks experience necessary to
tow on a major, limited access high-speed roadway such as the [GSP]."
The hearing officer also found that while McDonough determined Noll's
storage facility was adequate for prequalification, Noll in fact "had not
possessed the necessary zoning approval to use the [s]torage [a]rea in the manner
required by the [p]requalification [d]ocuments." More particularly, the hearing
officer found:
the zoning permit issued by the Township of Woodbridge limited Noll's storage capacity to "police storage and [fifty] car storage." . . . . Given Noll's municipal towing contract with Woodbridge, the reference to "police storage" can only relate to vehicles towed at the request of the Woodbridge Police Department. Thus, only "[fifty] car storage" was left to accommodate vehicles towed from or at the direction of another jurisdiction—such as the Authority here. Accordingly, [he found] that Noll did not have zoning approval to store a bus, in addition to [fifty] passenger vehicles, as required by the [p]requalification [d]ocuments.
On December 3, 2024, the Authority's Executive Director adopted the
hearing officer's recommended decision, without modification, and invalidated
Noll's prequalification status. Noll appealed.
7 A-1411-24 II.
Our State Constitution provides for judicial review of administrative
agency actions as of right. In re Protest Filed by El Sol Contr. & Constr. Corp.,
260 N.J. 362, 373 (2025) (citing N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, ¶ 4); see also R. 2:2–
3(a)(2). Although our review of an administrative agency's legal conclusions is
de novo, our role in reviewing agency actions is otherwise limited. Ibid. (first
citing Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992); then
citing In re Musick, 143 N.J. 206, 216 (1996)).
The judicial role is restricted to four inquiries: (1) whether the agency's decision offends the State or Federal Constitution; (2) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies; (3) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (4) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 137 N.J. 8, 27 (1994).]
"The 'fundamental consideration' in reviewing agency actions 'is that a
court may not substitute its judgment for the expertise of an agency . . . . '" In re
Distrib. of Liquid Assets upon Dissolution of Reg'l High Sch. Dist., No. 1 , 168
N.J. 1, 10 (2001) (quoting Williams v. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 116 N.J. 102, 107
(1989)). "When an agency's decision meets those criteria, then a court owes
8 A-1411-24 substantial deference to the agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a
particular field." In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007). Therefore, "[a]n
administrative agency's final [] decision will be sustained unless there is a clear
showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair
support in the record." Id. at 27-28. "Deference controls even if the court would
have reached a different result in the first instance." Id. at 28.
"The burden of demonstrating that the agency's action was arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable rests upon the [party] challenging the administrative
action." Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014) (alteration in original)
(quoting In re J.S., 431 N.J. Super. 321, 329 (App. Div. 2013)). "Arbitrary and
capricious action of administrative bodies means willful and unreasoning action,
without consideration and in disregard of circumstances." Worthington v.
Fauver, 88 N.J. 183, 204 (1982) (citing Bayshore Sewerage Co. v. Dep't, Env't,
Prot. 122 N.J. Super. 184, 199 (Ch. Div. 1973)). "Only when the agency's
findings are clearly mistaken and 'so plainly unwarranted that the interests of
justice demand intervention and correction' should a reviewing court 'make its
own findings and conclusions.'" In re Adamar of N.J., Inc., 401 N.J. Super. 247,
265 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)); see
also Campbell v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 169 N.J. 579, 587-88 (2001).
9 A-1411-24 Prequalification requirements and bidding specifications are the type of
matters within the Authority's area of technical expertise and are thus entitled to
deference. See In re Protest of Award of On-Line Games Prod. & Operation
Servs. Cont., Bid No. 95-X-20175, 279 N.J. Super. 566, 593 (App. Div. 1995)
("Treasurer's decisions as to responsibility of the bidder and bid conformity are
to be tested by the ordinary standards governing administrative action."). "The
underlying and foundational purpose of public bidding in New Jersey is 'to guard
against favoritism, improvidence, extravagance and corruption, and . . . to secure
for the public the benefits of unfettered competition.'" El Sol, 260 N.J. at 374
(quoting Keyes Martin & Co. v. Dir., Div. of Purchase & Prop., Dep't of
Treasury, 99 N.J. 244, 256 (1985) (modification in original)). "The conditions
and specifications must apply equally to all prospective bidders. Otherwise,
there is no common standard of competition." Hillside Twp., Union Cnty. v.
Sternin, 25 N.J. 317, 322 (1957).
Likewise, a "bid[] must not materially deviate from the specifications and
requirements set forth by the local contracting unit." Ernest Bock & Sons-
Dobco Pennsauken Joint Venture v. Twp. of Pennsauken, 477 N.J. Super. 254,
264 (App. Div. 2023) (citing Meadowbrook Carting Co. v. Borough of Island
Heights, 138 N.J. 307, 314 (1994)). Therefore, "[a]ny material departure
10 A-1411-24 invalidates a nonconforming bid as well as any contract based upon it." Ibid.
(citing Meadowbrook, 138 N.J. at 314); see also Hillside, 25 N.J. at 323.
The Authority's procurement of routine towing services is controlled by
N.J.A.C. 19:9-2.13, the objective of which is to "establish procedures for the
award of contracts for routine towing services on the . . . [New Jersey] Turnpike
and [GSP], to be provided on a rotational basis, utilizing a competitive bid
process open to prequalified bidders," with "[o]nly bids submitted by contractors
who have been prequalified pursuant to a prequalification process . . .
considered." N.J.A.C. 19:9-2.13(b), (c). The code further provides that:
[t]he criteria to be used by the Authority in determining prequalification shall include the following, the specific requirements of which shall be set forth in the request for prequalification: reliability, experience, response time, . . . ; equipment; location and condition of storage facilities to safeguard the personal property of patrons and their towed and stored vehicles; . . . and such other factors as the Authority may deem relevant and which shall be specified in the request for prequalification.
[N.J.A.C. 19:9-2.13(d).]
The Authority, however, "does not have 'unbridled power to reject bids,
even where such right is served in the invitation for bidding' because such power
would violate public policy and competitive-bidding laws." George Harms, 137
N.J. at 20 (quoting Cardell, Inc. v. Woodbridge, 115 N.J. Super. 442, 450 (App.
Div. 1971)). 11 A-1411-24 III.
Before us, Noll raises two principal arguments. First, it challenges the
Authority's decision to "count" as experience towing services on some but not
all roadways and routes, including "well-traveled highways . . . Route[s] 1 [and]
9" and to vacate Noll's prequalification on the basis of inexperience operating
on Routes 13, 30, 40, 50, 72 or 47. Second, Noll contests the Authority's finding
it was unqualified based on its interpretation of the Woodbridge's zoning permit,
which stated that Noll was authorized for "police storage and fifty (50)
passenger vehicles"; and the hearing officer's conclusion that Noll would violate
the zoning ordinance if it were to house fifty cars and a bus. We address these
arguments seriatim.
A.
Noll maintains the Authority's exclusion of Routes 1 and 9 from the list
of roadways on which a bidder must have sufficient towing experience and its
finding that towing from I-287 was insufficient to satisfy the prequalification's
experience requirement is not supported by substantial credible evidence. Noll
highlights its more than forty years of experience picking up and towing vehicles
from Routes 1 and 9, "dealing consistently with congestion, speeding vehicles,
and the restriction on access from either direction," as indicative of its
experience and qualifications.
12 A-1411-24 Additionally, Noll maintains that Routes 1 and 9 are comparable to Route
18, which is expressly included in the Authority's prequalification list, and
further argues that its experience on Routes 1 and 9 "should count for
something."
On the other hand, the Authority urges us not to be persuaded by Noll's
arguments, which are rooted in the similarity of Routes 1 and 9 to those
mentioned in the prequalification list, arguing instead that it is "certainly in the
best position to determine what qualifications are necessary to provide routing
towing services." And, "[p]roviding routine towing services on the [GSP] is a
highly dangerous task, and is critical to the efficient functioning of the
Authority." Relying on In re Distrib. of Liquid Assets, 168 N.J. at 10-11, the
Authority posits that its prequalification requirements and bidding
specifications are the type of matters within the Authority's area of technical
expertise and thus are entitled to deference. And, it concludes that Noll's
recitation of its towing experience on Routes 1 and 9 is "of no moment, as these
roadways were not on the list of roadways enumerated in the Prequalification
Documents."
The hearing officer rejected Noll's argument highlighting its experience
on Routes 1 and 9, concluding that "none of those roadways were on the list of
enumerated roadways in the [p]requalification [d]ocument."
13 A-1411-24 On this point, we are satisfied that the Authority's prequalification criteria
requiring towing experience on specifically enumerated roadways falls within
the scope of its authority and reflects a proper exercise of its discretion. Stated
differently, the Authority is well within its right to determine the criteria
necessary to achieve its ultimate goal of contracting with qualified applicants.
See Campbell, 169 N.J. at 588 (citing Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599
(1965)) (granting deference to agency expertise on technical matters); In re N.J.
Transit, 473 N.J. Super. 261, 275-76 (recognizing the Authority's broad
discretion in its decision-making). Such an exercise of discretion includes
establishing "requirements . . . in bidding specifications [that] by their nature
may be relinquished without there being any possible frustration of the policie s
underlying competitive bidding." Terminal Constr. Corp. v. Atlantic Cty.
Sewerage Auth., 67 N.J. 403, 412 (1975) (upholding agency authority to set and
enforce material bid conditions as a means to promote fairness and integrity in
public contracts).
Nevertheless, we note that the prequalification criteria expressly permits
the Authority to also consider any experience, within the past five years, as a
towing contractor for the New Jersey State Police. Although Noll does not assert
experience particularly with the State Police, he does explain his lengthy
experience towing for local police on roadways including the Turnpike. We are
14 A-1411-24 satisfied that a broad reading of the experience provision of the prequalification
criteria is warranted, consistent with the Legislative purpose of promoting
fairness and integrity in the awarding of public contracts. Ibid. We further
recognize that to conclude otherwise, would be to the perpetual advantage of
those companies who are already qualified, chilling competition and effectively
removing from consideration other tow operators no matter how long they have
been in operation; the proverbial cat chasing its tail scenario.
We, therefore, part ways with the Authority's determination Noll's towing
experience on I-287 was insufficient to satisfy the prequalification requirements.
On this point, we discern that the hearing officer's reasoning and conclusion
reflect too narrow of a reading of the experience criteria and imposed additional,
unwarranted requirements.
In addressing this issue, the hearing officer determined that:
the fact that I-287 may traverse one or more of the local municipalities for which Noll's tows does not evidence three (3) years' towing experience on I-287. At best, even assuming Noll provided any towing service on I- 287 as a result of his municipal contracts, his experience on I-287 would be limited, sporadic and incidental to Noll[']s municipal towing services. Indeed, that tangential experience does not satisfy the requirements set forth in the [p]requalification [d]ocuments.
Jeffrey Noll, however, testified that in the forty-plus years of the
company's history, it has rescued vehicles from the GSP, Turnpike, and I-287, 15 A-1411-24 thereby satisfying the experience requirement. In addition, he further testified
that Noll has the requisite number of spaces available to store the minimum level
of cars with room for additional buses that satisfied the prequalification
requirements.
The hearing officer surmised that Noll had only limited, sporadic and
incidental experience towing on I-287, which he then categorized as "tangential"
and therefore insufficient to satisfy the three years' towing experience required
in the prequalification documents. We note, however, that the prequalification
document is silent as to the precise definition of experience necessary; and does
not quantify or otherwise elaborate on the extent of towing experience needed
to satisfy this criterion. In other words, nowhere in the record before us does
the Authority define experience in terms of number of hours, days, months or
years needed. Under these circumstances, the hearing officer's conclusion Noll's
experience was insufficient because it was "tangential" is without merit.
Therefore, in applying the deference we must accord to our review of agency
determinations, we are satisfied that the Authority's adoption of the hearing
officer's reasoning and conclusion regarding Noll's insufficient experience on I-
287 lacks support in the record.
16 A-1411-24 B.
We next turn to Noll's final argument that the Authority abused its
discretion in concluding that it did not have "the necessary zoning approval to
use [its] [s]torage [a]rea in the manner required by the [p]requalification
[d]ocuments."
The Authority requires its prequalification applicants to have a garage
facility, "capable of safely storing at least fifty [] passenger vehicles and one []
bus," and the facility "must . . . be zoned accordingly to allow for these storage
requirements. . . . "
In its decision, the Authority determined that Noll's facility met its
standards but was not zoned in accordance with the prequalification
requirements. The hearing officer stated:
[w]hile Noll's [s]torage [a]rea may have met the physical requirements for storage capacity, I cannot find that Noll unequivocally possessed the necessary zoning approval to use the [s]torage [a]rea in the manner required by the [p]requalification [d]ocuments. Specifically, the zoning permit issued by the Township of Woodbridge limited Noll's storage capacity to "police storage and [fifty] car storage."
And, further that:
Given Noll's municipal towing contract with Woodbridge, the reference to "police storage" can only relate to vehicles towed at the request of the Woodbridge Police Department. Thus, only "[fifty] car storage" was left to accommodate vehicles towed from 17 A-1411-24 or at the direction of another jurisdiction - such as the Authority here. Accordingly, I find that Noll did not have zoning approval to store a bus, in addition to [fifty] passenger vehicles, as required by the [p]requalification [d]ocuments.
[(Emphasis added).]
Although the Authority found that Noll met the "physical requirements
for storage capacity," consistent with the testimony provided by McDonough, 5
it misconstrued the language of the zoning permit, which states "POLICE
TOWING & 50 CAR STORAGE," effectively assuming Noll could only accept
storage for the Woodbridge Police Department. The prequalification
specification provides that the garage facility "must also be zoned accordingly
to allow for these storage requirements." In our view, Noll has the capability of
storing fifty vehicles and one bus, as required by the prequalification standards.
Thus, Noll satisfies the spatial and zoning requirements.
Because we conclude the Authority's determination that Noll lacked the
requisite experience, storage capability and necessary zoning approval is not
based on substantial evidence in the record, we reverse the decision to rescind
Noll's prequalification status. Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 27-28.
Reversed. We do not retain jurisdiction.
5 McDonough testified based upon his inspection of Noll's facility that it met the prequalification requirement for storage capability for fifty cars and one bus. 18 A-1411-24