Proper v. United States

154 F. Supp. 317, 139 Ct. Cl. 511, 1957 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 108
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 12, 1957
Docket203-54
StatusPublished
Cited by66 cases

This text of 154 F. Supp. 317 (Proper v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Proper v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 317, 139 Ct. Cl. 511, 1957 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 108 (cc 1957).

Opinions

LITTLETON, Judge.

Plaintiff sues to recover disability retired pay from May 1, 1948, on the ground that the Secretary of the Army acted arbitrarily, capriciously and unlawfully when, on November 28, 1955, on the basis of the recommendation of a military officer of the Army, and contrary to the recommendation of the civilian board for the Correction of Military Records, he denied plaintiff’s application for correction of his military record.

On the basis of the pleadings and documents submitted by the parties, plaintiff [318]*318and defendant have filed cross motions for summary judgment.

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the petition is based on two grounds: (1) that the claim, if any, accrued on April 27, 1948, the date on which plaintiff was released to inactive duty, not by reason of physical disability, and is therefore barred by the six-year statute of limitations under a petition filed on May 28, 1954; and (2) that in any event plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted because the Secretary of the Army was not required to act through civilian boards or employees in granting ■or denying plaintiff a correction of his military record.

On the matter of the statute of limitations, defendant urges that proceedings before a Correction Board will not necessarily toll the running of the statute of limitations nor will an alleged arbitrary decision by such Board give rise to a fresh cause of action since resort to that Board is permissive and hot mandatory. In the instant case, because of the peculiar facts and circumstances which will be discussed later herein, Correction Board proceedings were the only ■ones open to this plaintiff, and the only administrative action ever taken on his claim for disability retirement with pay was in connection with his application to ■that Board. Furthermore, plaintiff’s cause of action is not based on the alleged arbitrary action of the Correction Board but rather on the alleged arbitrary action of the Secretary of the Army in 1955, acting not through the Correction Board but independently and in fact contrary to the findings, conclusions and recommendations of such Board. As we said in our recent decision in the case of Furlong v. United States, 152 F.Supp. 238 this court acquired jurisdiction of a claim for disability retired pay

“* * * after the * * * Secretary * * * acted, or failed or refused to act * * * arbitrarily or capriciously or contrary to law; * -x- -x- »

Accordingly, we hold that plaintiff’s claim based on the alleged arbitrary action of the Secretary.of the,Army is not barred by the statute of limitations.1

The facts, which are unusual, are not in dispute. Plaintiff, a former commissioned officer of the Army of the United States and the Officers’ Reserve Corps, contracted multiple sclerosis while serving on extended active duty between 1936 and 1948. The first symptoms of this disease were manifested in 1938 during plaintiff’s enlisted service in the Regular Army while serving at Fort Missoula, Montana, at which time he began to experience periods of double vision which ultimately required his giving up his favorite Army sport of baseball at which he was very expert.2 Plaintiff reported to the station hospital where the difficulty with his vision was found to be incorrectible with glasses. Later, there was a spontaneous remission of the double vision, but there .were mild periodic recurrences thereafter. At about the same time, plaintiff began to experience an uncontrollable tremor of the head when he became excited. He also began to experience difficulty in using his hands when attempting to write. From 1938 plaintiff has never been completely free for any considerable length of time from the above symptoms.

[319]*319. Although plaintiff consulted Army medical officers concerning his symptoms, his disease was not recognized and, on September 21, 1942, during a period of remission of all symptoms, he was commissioned a second lieutenant, Infantry, AUS. In November 1942, plaintiff went to the China-Burma-India Theatre where he remained until February 1945, having by that time achieved the rank of captain. During the period from 1940 through 1945, plaintiff experienced periodic recurrences of double vision and tremors of hands and head. The Army medical officers did not recognize the disease, and since the symptoms did not increase in frequency or intensity during this period, plaintiff was able to perform his military duties in an outstanding manner. The period 1942-1945 covered plaintiff’s combat service overseas and his attitude toward his symptoms is best explained in his own words:

“* * * At this time, I did not know the source of the trouble. I wished to retain my commission and I did not want to be returned to the United States as a casualty. The normal, daily events of the service in which I participated, notably the Myitkyina campaign with the Marauders, were such as to minimize minor troubles like double vision and tremors. At times, we all had tremors. In the light of my later experience, however, I feel that the excessive humidity of the jungle climate may have helped to hold my infirmities in restraint for a time.”

Immediately upon his return to the United States in February 1945, plaintiff had a violent attack of hand tremors. Upon his release to inactive duty the following December 1945, plaintiff described his symptoms to the medical officers, but no diagnosis was reached and plaintiff was released, not by reason of physical disability.

After plaintiff’s release from active duty he was employed by the Chevrolet Division of General Motors where in 1946 he suffered an attack of double vision and blurring of vision which was more intense and prolonged than any previous attack. The Company doctor referred plaintiff to a Veterans’ Administration eye specialist and, after extensive examination, plaintiff was told that his vision was 20/200 and was ineorrectible with glasses. Later, this attack subsided and plaintiff’s vision returned to normal. He was recalled to active duty on October 15, 1946, and was accepted for extended active duty.

During plaintiff’s second tour of active duty he began experiencing further symptoms consisting of periods of becoming emotionally upset over minor matters which theretofore had never upset him, periods of lack of control of elimination of kidneys and bowels, periods of pronounced sexual impoteney. Although plaintiff sought the advice of civilian and military doctors, no diagnosis was reached and, on April 27,1948, plaintiff was again released to inactive duty, not by reason of physical disability. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff began to experience numbness in his legs after exercise, and soon he lost all feeling in his legs from the hips down. Plaintiff’s double vision then became permanent, and by 1958 plaintiff was no longer able to> work. By that time plaintiff could walk only with his feet wide apart and with a bad stagger. It was impossible for him to walk on an uneven surface. He had lost all depth perception and could not focus his eyes even for the brief period required to insert a key in a lock.

In June 1953, a private specialist in neurology made an examination of plaintiff and diagnosed plaintiff’s disease as; multiple sclerosis. On October 14, 1953,, the Veterans’ Administration rated plaintiff 100 percent disabled by reason of multiple sclerosis.

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Bluebook (online)
154 F. Supp. 317, 139 Ct. Cl. 511, 1957 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 108, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/proper-v-united-states-cc-1957.