UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Presby Environmental, Inc.
v. Civil No. 13-cv-355-LM Opinion No. 2014 DNH 212 Advanced Drainage Systems, Inc. (Corrected Opinion Number)
O R D E R
Presby Environmental, Inc. (“Presby”) has sued Advanced
Drainage Systems, Inc. (“ADS”) based on ADS’s alleged violation
of a settlement agreement previously entered into by the
parties. Now pending before the court are ADS’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings and Presby’s Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint. For the reasons that follow, the Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART and the
Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint is DENIED.
Factual Background1
This dispute is the latest iteration in a long-running
legal feud between Presby and ADS. Presby is a New Hampshire-
based company that develops, manufactures, tests and sells
products for septic systems. Compl. ¶ 2. ADS is a Delaware
corporation and occupies a similar niche in the market. ADS
manufactures pipe that is used in agricultural, commercial and
1 The facts are summarized from Presby’s Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (Document No. 1; cited as “Compl.”). highway drainage systems, as well as septic and leaching
systems. Id. ¶ 3.
Presby has developed an in-ground waste treatment disposal
system known as “Enviro-Septic.” Id. ¶ 7. ADS competes with
Presby by marketing and selling its own in-ground septic system
known as “GEO-Flow.” Id. ¶ 8. Both Enviro-Septic and GEO-Flow
are innovative products designed to replace traditional septic
systems, and both are subject to regulation by certain
environmental authorities. Id. ¶ 10.
Presby and ADS first found themselves on opposite sides of
a courtroom in the mid-1990s in a patent infringement dispute
brought by ADS. Id. ¶ 11. Then, in 2008, Presby brought a suit
of its own (the “2008 Litigation”).2 Id. ¶ 12. Presby alleged
that ADS was securing approvals for the GEO-Flow system from
various state environmental regulators by improperly relying on
testing that Presby had conducted on its own Enviro-Septic
system. Id. In essence, Presby alleged that ADS was seeking to
avoid the cost of conducting its own tests of GEO-Flow, and
instead was bootstrapping Presby’s test results by falsely
representing to regulators that Enviro-Septic and GEO-Flow were
functionally equivalent. Id. ¶ 13. Presby also alleged that
2 See Presby Envtl., Inc. v. Advanced Drainage Sys., Inc., No. 08-cv-434-JL (D.N.H.).
2 ADS infringed several of its copyrights by including Presby’s
materials in certain product manuals. Id. ¶ 14.
The 2008 Litigation came to a close in May 2009 when the
parties entered into a Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release
(the “Settlement Agreement”). Id. ¶ 16. Two provisions of the
Settlement Agreement are of central importance to this dispute.
First, the Settlement Agreement provided that “ADS will not
represent in the marketplace that GEO-Flow is the ‘functional
equivalent’ of Enviro-Septic.” Id. ¶ 17. Second, it provided
that “[w]ith respect to any regulatory or approval processes
regarding the use and approval of [GEO-Flow], ADS agrees that it
will not use any test data relative to Enviro-Septic, as though
such data were applicable to [GEO-Flow].” Id. ¶ 18.
The instant dispute involves alleged breaches of the
Settlement Agreement by ADS. Specifically, Presby alleges that,
in 2009, an individual by the name of Dick Batchelder
(“Batchelder”), on behalf of ADS, made a series of
representations to the Vermont Department of Environmental
Conservation (the “Vermont DEC”) regarding the functional
equivalence of GEO-Flow and Enviro-Septic. Id. ¶¶ 19-31. These
representations included providing the Vermont DEC with a copy
of a document prepared by the New Hampshire Department of
3 Environmental Services (the “NH DES”) that compared the two
systems. Id. ¶ 21.
Also in 2009, Batchelder (again allegedly acting on behalf
of ADS) provided a copy of the NH DES report to the Indiana
State Department of Health in connection with regulatory
proceedings there. Id. ¶¶ 32-34. Batchelder also allegedly
made various additional statements to Vermont and Indiana
regulators suggesting that GEO-Flow and Enviro-Septic were
similarly-sized and functionally equivalent. Id. ¶¶ 33-34.
Finally, the complaint alleges that ADS provided similar
information to environmental regulators in Massachusetts and New
York. Id. ¶¶ 36-37. Presby has brought this action seeking
damages for breach of the Settlement Agreement and violation of
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 et seq.
Presby’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint
Presby has moved for leave to amend its complaint in order
to add several allegations, including those relating to
additional statements made by employees and other
representatives of ADS regarding the functional equivalence of
Enviro-Septic and GEO-Flow. Many of these statements were
allegedly made at an industry “field day” event in New Hampshire
in October 2013.
4 Certain aspects of the procedural posture are of relevance
to this discussion. First, the court previously issued a
scheduling order that gave Presby until December 30, 2013, to
amend its pleadings. Second, however, Presby’s motion for leave
to amend was not filed until May 2014, after ADS had filed its
dispositive motion for judgment on the pleadings.
I. Legal Standard
The parties dispute the applicable standard of review.
Presby contends that the matter should be governed by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Rule 15(a)(2) provides that “a
party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s
written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely
give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
And, Rule 15(d) further provides that “[o]n motion and
reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms, permit a party
to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction,
occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the
pleading to be supplemented.” Id. at 15(d). Rule 15 generally
presents a favorable standard for parties seeking to amend a
pleading, as “leave to amend is to be freely given unless it
would be futile or reward . . . undue or intended delay.”
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gold, 30 F.3d 251, 253 (1st Cir. 1994)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5 Unfortunately for Presby, Rule 15 no longer governs these
proceedings, because “[o]nce a scheduling order is in place, the
liberal [Rule 15 standard] is replaced by the more demanding
‘good cause’ standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b).” Steir v. Girl
Scouts of the USA, 383 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 2004); see also
O’Connell v. Hyatt Hotels, 357 F.3d 152, 155 (1st Cir. 2004)
(holding the same and noting that “[f]or Rule 16(b) to operate
effectively, litigants cannot be permitted to treat a scheduling
order as a frivolous piece of paper idly entered, which can be
cavalierly disregarded without peril”) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Presby’s motion for
leave to amend must be governed by Rule 16(b)(4), which provides
that “[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and with
the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4).
This good cause standard represents a high hurdle. As an
initial matter, a court “may extend a scheduling order deadline
on a showing ‘of good cause if the [deadline] cannot reasonably
be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the
extension.’” O’Connell, 357 F.3d at 154 (quoting Advisory
Committee Notes to the 1983 Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(b)). And, the hurdle to show good cause becomes even higher
where it can be demonstrated that the party seeking leave to
amend knew (or should have known) about the facts at issue prior
6 to the deadline for amendments. See, e.g., Trans-Spec Truck
Serv. v. Caterpillar Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 327 (1st Cir. 2008).
Finally, a showing of good cause is made even more difficult
where the opposing party has filed a dispositive motion prior to
the motion for leave to amend, or amendment would otherwise
result in prejudice to the opposing party. See Steir, 383 F.3d
at 12.
II. Discussion
Presby has failed to demonstrate the good cause necessary
to amend its complaint at this late hour. A review of Presby’s
proposed amended complaint reveals that Presby seeks to add
allegations regarding the following:
Practices whereby ADS surreptitiously encouraged contractors to install GEO-Flow instead of Enviro-Septic, without the homeowner’s knowledge.
Batchelder’s statement, sometime fairly soon after execution of the Settlement Agreement, that “ADS never should have signed the [] Settlement Agreement.”
Statements made by ADS employees and representatives at the October 2013 industry field day event likening GEO-Flow to Enviro- Septic.
Presby had information about each of these issues at the
time it filed its initial complaint and, in any event, as of the
December 30, 2013, deadline to amend its pleadings. In support
7 of its motion for leave to amend, Presby included a series of
affidavits from, among others, several of its employees and
officers. In one of these affidavits, David Presby, Presby’s
president, states that “[o]ver the years, my employees and I
have gone to several sites where homeowners have called us with
problems regarding their Enviro-Septic systems. . . . However,
upon arrival . . . we found that in fact [GEO-Flow] had been
substituted and installed without their knowledge.” See Aff. of
David Presby ¶¶ 7, 9, Exh. 3 to Presby’s Mot. for Leave to Amend
Compl. Mr. Presby’s characterization of these events as having
taken place “over the years” suggests that Presby has long known
about this situation.
Mr. Presby’s affidavit also establishes that Presby was
long-aware of Batchelder’s statements regarding the Settlement
Agreement. It states that “[s]ometime in the year or two after
signing the [Settlement Agreement in May 2009] . . . I attended
an industry conference where Dick Batchelder told me that ADS
never should have signed the Settlement Agreement.” Id. ¶ 5.
Thus, these statements must have been made in 2010 or 2011, in
either case long before these proceedings.
Finally, Presby concedes – on page two of its motion for
leave to amend, no less – that “[a]t the time Presby initially
brought suit, it had second- and third-hand information about
8 [ADS’s] breaches of the Settlement Agreement, principally via
statements allegedly made by ADS employees and representatives
at training seminars, classes, trade shows and similar places
attended by industry professionals.” See Presby’s Mot. for
Leave to Amend Compl. ¶ 5. Presby attempts to explain that it
took time to obtain detailed information about these alleged
breaches. But, not only does the complaint fail to even allude
to these issues, but a full three months passed between the
industry field day event in early October 2013 and the deadline
to amend the pleadings on December 30, during which Presby could
have amended the complaint to lodge these allegations.
Presby had substantial knowledge of all of the allegations
that it now seeks to add prior to the deadline for amending its
pleadings, and Presby’s motion to amend was filed subsequent to
a dispositive motion. What is more, allowing Presby’s proposed
amendments would prejudice ADS by imposing added discovery costs
and causing a delay in trial. In light of these considerations,
Presby has failed to demonstrate the good cause necessary under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) to merit amendment of
its complaint. Therefore, Presby’s motion for leave to amend is
denied.
9 ADS’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
ADS has moved for judgment on the pleadings with respect to
both the breach of contract and Lanham Act claims.
A party may move for judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the
pleadings are closed [] but early enough not to delay trial
. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “The standard for evaluating a
Rule 12(c) motion . . . is essentially the same as that for
deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Pasdon v. City of Peabody,
417 F.3d 224, 226 (1st Cir. 2005). The plaintiff must make
factual allegations sufficient to “state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when it pleads
“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). In
deciding such a motion, the court views the facts contained in
the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and
draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Zipperer v.
Raytheon Co., Inc., 493 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 2007). “Judgment
10 on the pleadings is proper ‘only if the uncontested and properly
considered facts conclusively establish the movant’s entitlement
to a favorable judgment.’” Id. (quoting Aponte-Torres v. Univ.
of P.R., 445 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2006)).
A. Count 1: Breach of Contract
ADS seeks judgment in its favor on Presby’s claim for
breach of the Settlement Agreement. As an initial matter, the
Settlement Agreement is governed by New Hampshire law. See
Settlement Agreement ¶ 7 (Document No. 14). And, accordingly,
its interpretation is a question of law. Audette v. Cummings,
82 A.3d 1269, 1273 (N.H. 2013). Courts are to “give the
language used by the parties its reasonable meaning, considering
the circumstances and the context in which the agreement was
negotiated, and reading the document as a whole.” Id.
Two provisions of the Settlement Agreement are principally
at issue. The full text of those provisions reads as follows:
ADS will not represent in the marketplace that [GEO-Flow] is the “functional equivalent” of Enviro-Septic. Provided, however, ADS is not otherwise limited in advertising or marketing [GEO-Flow] or responding, consistent with applicable law, to competitive claims of [Presby]. ADS will send a letter to each of its distributors (copying [Presby]) instructing each distributor that it is not to represent to purchasers or potential purchasers of [GEO- Flow] that [GEO-Flow] is the “functional
11 equivalent” of Enviro-Septic. ADS will provide a copy of this letter to [Presby] prior to its distribution.
. . .
With respect to any regulatory or approval processes regarding the use and approval of [GEO-Flow], ADS agrees that it will not use any test data relative to Enviro-Septic, as though such data were applicable to [GEO-Flow]. Where ADS has not conducted independent testing of [GEO-Flow], ADS will not claim to any regulatory or approving agency that, had ADS performed such testing, it would have equaled, surpassed, or compared favorably to test results for Enviro-Septic. To the extent testing is required by a particular regulatory or approving agency, ADS will rely on test results relating specifically to [GEO-Flow] or test results available in the public domain other than test data relative to Enviro-Septic. If a regulatory or approving agency conducts or sponsors testing of both Enviro-Septic and [GEO-Flow], nothing in this paragraph shall bar the use of the data generated and results of such testing in any other context or for any other purpose.
Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 1, 3 (emphasis added). Presby alleges
that ADS’s disclosures and representations to state regulators
in Vermont, Indiana, New York and Massachusetts constitute
breaches of these two provisions.
i. Representations of Functional Equivalence “In the Marketplace”
Presby has not stated a plausible claim for breach of the
provision related to marketplace representations of functional
equivalence, because the plain meaning of this provision would
12 exclude representations made solely to government regulators.
The complaint describes the parties’ 2008 Litigation as
involving ADS’s alleged use of Presby’s test results in seeking
regulatory approval, and the infringement of Presby’s copyrights
in several product manuals. See Compl. ¶¶ 13-14.
The Settlement Agreement, which purported to resolve the
2008 Litigation, included two separate provisions to address
these distinct issues. The first above-cited provision bars
marketplace representations by ADS as to the functional
equivalence of GEO-Flow and Enviro-Septic. The language and
circumstances of this provision plainly denote its applicability
to representations made in the context of advertising and
marketing, and not to efforts by ADS to secure regulatory
approvals. The complaint alleges that ADS made representations
to environmental regulators in four states in order to seek
approval for the marketing and sale of GEO-Flow systems. It
does not allege, however, that ADS made any additional
representations “in the marketplace” or elsewhere.
Representations made to government regulators would be
captured under the second above-cited provision, relating to
“regulatory or approval processes.” Considering the reasonable
meaning of the Settlement Agreement, the circumstances of the
2008 Litigation under which it was negotiated, and reading the
13 document as a whole (including the two cited provisions),
Audette, 82 A.3d at 1273, the court finds that Presby has not
alleged facts suggesting that ADS made representations “in the
marketplace” in violation of the Settlement Agreement.
ii. Use of Test Data “With Respect to Any Regulatory or Approval Processes”
On the other hand, Presby has adequately alleged that ADS
violated the provision of the Settlement Agreement barring ADS
from using “test data relative to Enviro-Septic” in the context
of “regulatory or approval processes.” For example, the
complaint alleges that ADS submitted to the Vermont DEC a
document prepared by the NH DES comparing GEO-Flow and Enviro-
Septic.3 Compl ¶ 21. And, in subsequent conversations, ADS is
alleged to have represented to the Vermont DEC that other states
had approved GEO-Flow based on its similar sizing and functional
equivalence to Enviro-Septic. Id. ¶¶ 25, 26. ADS also
allegedly made similar representations to regulators in Indiana.
Id. ¶¶ 32-34. Thus, Presby has plausibly stated a claim that
ADS violated the Settlement Agreement when it made these
representations and disclosures to state regulators.
3 ADS maintains that it was required by law to provide these materials to Vermont regulators. Nothing in this Order bars ADS from using this defense at trial.
14 In sum, Presby may proceed with its claim for breach of the
Settlement Agreement solely as it relates to breach of the
provision barring ADS’s use of certain test data in regulatory
or approval processes. Presby is not entitled to proceed on its
claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement relating to
marketplace representations of functional equivalence.
B. Count 2: Lanham Act
Presby seeks relief under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Section 1125(a) “creates two distinct
bases of liability: false association and false advertising.”
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 1377, 1384 (2014). It is not immediately apparent whether
Presby seeks to proceed on a false association theory, a false
advertising theory, or both. But, regardless, ADS is entitled
to judgment because Presby has failed to state a plausible
Lanham Act claim under either theory.
i. False Association
The so-called “false association” provision of the Lanham
Act provides as follows: “[a]ny person who . . . uses in
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
15 representation of fact, which is likely to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person,
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person
. . . shall be liable in a civil action . . . .” 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Generally, claims brought under
the false association provision involve the alleged misuse of a
trade or servicemark by the defendant. See, e.g., Oriental Fin.
Group, Inc. v. Coop. De Ahorro Crédito Oriental, 698 F.3d 9, 16
(1st Cir. 2012); Shell Co. (P.R.) v. Los Frailes Serv. Station,
605 F.3d 10, 21 (1st Cir. 2010); Flynn v. AK Peters, Ltd., 377
F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2004).
But, regardless of the genesis of the claim, the
dispositive legal issue concerns customer confusion. WCVB-TV v.
Bos. Athletic Ass’n, 926 F.2d 42, 44 (1st Cir. 1991). “[T]he
law has long demanded a showing that the allegedly infringing
conduct carries with it a likelihood of confounding an
appreciable number of reasonably prudent purchasers exercising
ordinary care.” Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 200 (1st
Cir. 1996).
16 Review of the complaint reveals that Presby has not made a
single allegation regarding the confusing effect of ADS’s
actions on consumers (or on anyone else for that matter). The
only relevant allegations involve ADS’s representations to state
environmental regulators, but the complaint is silent as to
consumer confusion that might result from these actions.
Presby makes two arguments on this issue that must be
addressed. First, Presby contends that deliberately false
statements, made with an intent to deceive, do not require
accompanying allegations of consumer confusion. See Cashmere &
Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 311
(1st Cir. 2002) (“Where the advertisement is literally false, a
violation may be established without evidence of consumer
deception.”). In advancing this argument, Presby conflates the
legal requirements for a false association claim with those for
a false advertising claim. While a false advertising claim
involving a “literally” false statement may proceed in the
absence of allegations regarding consumer confusion, the First
Circuit has emphasized the need for evidence of confusion to
proceed on a theory of false association. Winship Green Nursing
Ctr., 103 F.3d at 200.
Second, Presby refers the court to the affidavit of David
Presby and its content regarding the surreptitious installation
17 of GEO-Flow instead of Enviro-Septic at certain job sites. As
an initial matter, having denied Presby’s motion for leave to
amend the complaint (to which Mr. Presby’s affidavit was
appended), the court declines Presby’s invitation to consider
these materials. See Collier v. City of Chicopee, 158 F.3d 601,
602-03 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that a motion for judgment on the
pleadings must be converted to one for summary judgment if the
court considers material outside the pleadings).
What is more, even if the court were to consider these
claims, it would do little to change the equation. Isolated
incidences of swapped septic systems are not tantamount to
“confounding an appreciable number of reasonably prudent
purchasers exercising ordinary care.” Winship Green Nursing
Ctr., 103 F.3d at 200. For all of these reasons, Presby has
failed to state a claim for false association.
ii. False Advertising
Presby would fare no better were it pursuing a false
advertising theory. The Lanham Act’s false advertising
provision provides that “[a]ny person who . . . uses in commerce
any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which . . . in commercial advertising or promotion,
18 misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods,
services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil
action . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). To prove a false
advertising claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: “(1) the
defendant made a false or misleading description of fact or
representation of fact in a commercial advertisement about his
own or another’s product; (2) the misrepresentation is material
. . . (3) the misrepresentation actually deceives or has the
tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its audience; (4)
the defendant placed the false or misleading statement in
interstate commerce; and (5) the plaintiff has been or is likely
to be injured as a result of the misrepresentation . . . .”
Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst., 284 F.3d at 310-11 (emphasis
added).
ADS is entitled to judgment because Presby has not pled
facts suggesting that ADS engaged in commercial advertising of
any kind. The complaint merely alleges that ADS made a series
of representations to environmental regulators in Vermont,
Indiana, Massachusetts and New York that compared GEO-Flow to
Enviro-Septic.
To constitute “commercial advertising” for purposes of the
Lanham Act, however, the representation in question must “(a)
19 constitute commercial speech (b) made with the intent of
influencing potential customers to purchase the speaker’s goods
or services (c) by a speaker who is a competitor of the
plaintiff in some line of trade or commerce and (d) disseminated
to the consuming public in such a way as to constitute
advertising or promotion.” Podiatrist Ass’n v. La Cruz Azul de
P.R., Inc., 332 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2003) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “To constitute advertising
or promotion, commercial speech must at a bare minimum target a
class or category of purchasers . . . not merely particular
individuals.” Id. “Thus, to pass the pleading threshold . . .
a plaintiff at the very least must identify some medium or means
through which the defendant disseminated information to a
particular class of consumers.” Id. at 19-20.
Courts have consistently found that statements made to
government regulators do not constitute commercial advertising.
See, e.g., Caldon, Inc. v. Advanced Measurement & Analysis Grp.,
Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d 565, 578-79 (W.D. Pa. 2007); Radolf v.
Univ. of Conn., 364 F. Supp. 2d 204, 222 (D. Conn. 2005). And,
this makes sense because statements made to regulators generally
are not intended to influence consumer choice. See In re
Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19555,
at *42 n.13 (D. Del. Dec. 7, 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 214
20 F.3d 395 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that petitions by the defendant
to several governmental agencies were not commercial speech
because they did not propose a commercial transaction).
Presby seeks to circumvent the commercial advertising
requirement by taking the position that the state environmental
regulators to which ADS made its representations are “gate
keepers,” whose approval is a necessary prerequisite to ADS’s
ability to market GEO-Flow in those states. Presby does not
cite – and the court has been unable to find – any authority
standing for this proposition. This being the case, Presby’s
false advertising claim must necessarily be dismissed because
Presby has not alleged facts suggesting that ADS engaged in
improper commercial advertising in violation of the Lanham Act.
Conclusion
For these reasons, Presby’s Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint (Document No. 20) is denied, and ADS’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings (Document No. 12) is granted in part
and denied in part. Judgment shall enter in favor of ADS on
Presby’s Lanham Act claim. And, while Presby may proceed with
its claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement relating to the
use of test data in regulatory and approval processes, Presby’s
21 representations of functional equivalence in the marketplace is
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________ Landya McCafferty United States District Judge
September 30, 2014
cc: David W. Alexander, Esq. Mark Sutherland Derby, Esq. Daniel J. Mullen, Esq. David W. Rayment, Esq. Heather L. Stutz, Esq.