Premium Plus Partners, L.P. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.

648 F.3d 533, 80 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 259, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16148, 2011 WL 3418275
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedAugust 5, 2011
Docket09-4010, 10-1118, 10-1119
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 648 F.3d 533 (Premium Plus Partners, L.P. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Premium Plus Partners, L.P. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 648 F.3d 533, 80 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 259, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16148, 2011 WL 3418275 (7th Cir. 2011).

Opinion

EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge.

Attending a meeting at the Treasury Department on October 31, 2001, Peter J. Davis, Jr., learned that the government was suspending the sale of new 30-year bonds. The meeting ended at 9:25 am; attendees were told that the information was embargoed until 10 am, when the news would be announced to the public. Defying the embargo, Davis swiftly passed the information to some of his clients, including John M. Youngdahl, an economist who worked for Goldman Sachs. Youngdahl relayed the information to Goldman Sachs’s traders, who at 9:35 am began to buy futures contracts for 30-year Treasury securities, which they expected would rise in price. (There is no perfect substitute for their risk-return combination.) At 9:43 am the Treasury posted the news on its web site, and word spread among traders. Goldman Sachs had an eight-minute head start and reaped substantial profits. It had been right: the price did rise, the largest one-day increase in 14 years. The Treasury did not issue 30-year bonds again until February 2006.

Abnormal trading in the minutes before the news was generally available led the SEC to open an investigation a few days later. Davis, Youngdahl, and Goldman Sachs received formal notices (known as Wells notices), and the investigation became public knowledge. On September 4, 2003, the agency filed a civil complaint against Davis, Youngdahl, and a third person. See SEC Litigation Release No. 18322. Goldman Sachs settled with the Commission to avoid litigation; Release 18322 describes that settlement. Goldman Sachs denied that its traders knew that the information was embargoed, but Davis and Youngdahl had no such defense. Youngdahl was indicted for fraud, on the theory that he misappropriated the value of information he did not have a right to use. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 117 S.Ct. 2199, 138 L.Ed.2d 724 (1997). He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 33 months’ imprisonment; Davis, who cooperated with the prosecutors, avoided indictment but was barred from the securities industry.

In March 2004 Premium Plus Partners filed a suit against Goldman Sachs and Youngdahl seeking to represent a class of all traders who held short positions in futures contracts when Goldman Sachs took the long side. Shorts lose when the price rises. Premium Plus had taken its short position before October 31, 2001. Economists would say that the reason for the price increase was the fact that a desirable asset, the 30-year Treasury bond, had become scarcer. But Premium Plus blamed the increase on Goldman Sachs’s trading, which it described as giving Goldman Sachs market power through an excessively large position. As far as the record reveals, Goldman Sachs never exceeded the maximum holdings allowed *535 by regulators and the futures exchanges. Contrast Kohen v. Pacific Investment Management Co., 571 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2009). But the district court never reached the merits of the dispute.

Resolution of the litigation was delayed by the fact that the judge initially assigned to the case resigned, and it took a while for Judge Der-Yeghiayan, to whom the case came next, to get up to speed. Premium Plus proposed a class of all investors who held short positions on October 31, 2001, no matter when they sold or closed those positions — a time that could be as long as nine months from the date of Goldman Sachs’s trading. Judge Der-Yeghiayan concluded that such a class would be almost entirely unrelated to the trading that occurred during eight minutes of October 31, 2001. Any losses suffered during the next nine months by investors who had held short positions before trading began on October 31, 2001, would be the result of general market movements, not the fact that one trader got valuable news ahead of others. 2008 WL 3978340, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 83799 (N.D.I11. August 22, 2008).

Once the district court’s decision denying the motion for class certification was released, the statute of limitations resumed running. (It had been suspended by the class allegations of the complaint. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974); Sawyer v. Atlas Heating & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 642 F.3d 560 (7th Cir.2011).) George Tomlinson and four other investors (collectively Tomlinson), all of whom held short positions during the eight minutes, then filed then-own suit, which was assigned to Judge Bucklo. She dismissed it on the pleadings, 682 F.Supp.2d 845 (N.D.Ill.2009), after concluding that the two-year statute of limitations, see 7 U.S.C. § 25(c), had expired before Tomlinson sued — indeed, had expired before Premium Plus sued. Judge Bucklo observed that the time starts with injury, which all shorts suffered on October 31, 2001. She rejected Tomlinson’s argument that investors’ claims did not accrue until September 2003, when the SEC filed its complaint.

Meanwhile Premium Plus tried again before Judge Der-Yeghiayan. It proposed a class limited to investors who held short positions on October 31, 2001. One problem with that class was that it would have been composed entirely of non-traders, creating a serious obstacle under the purchaser-seller rule that applies to implied private rights of action for securities and commodities fraud. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975). Once again Judge Der-Yeghiayan declined to reach the merits. He denied Goldman Sachs’s motion for summary judgment, 653 F.Supp.2d 855 (N.D.Ill.2009), but also denied the renewed motion to certify a class. That left Premium Plus as the only remaining plaintiff.

In response to an interrogatory, Premium Plus estimated its loss at approximately $200,000, plus interest since October 31, 2001. Goldman Sachs made an offer of judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 for the amount Premium Plus wanted, plus interest. Premium Plus accepted the offer— and it also proposed to carry on with the suit in order to have a class certified. It contends that a certified class would allow it to spread the costs of litigation to other investors. The district court was unimpressed and entered judgment on the Rule 68 offer. Tomlinson then sought to intervene in the Premium Plus suit in order to carry on as the class representative now that Premium Plus has settled its own suit. The district court denied that motion.

These decisions have led to three appeals: (1) by Premium Plus, seeking to *536 have itself certified as representative of a class of investors who held short positions on October 31, 2001; (2) by Tomlinson, seeking to overturn Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s order denying his motion to intervene in the Premium Plus suit; and (3) by Tomlinson, contesting Judge Bucklo’s order dismissing his own suit as untimely. We start with appeal # 3, because it effectively resolves the second as well.

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Bluebook (online)
648 F.3d 533, 80 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 259, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16148, 2011 WL 3418275, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/premium-plus-partners-lp-v-goldman-sachs-co-ca7-2011.