Powell v. Bergersen

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: November 13, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-2511
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TERRI POWELL,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-02511 (UNA)

JESSICA M. BERGERSEN, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on its initial review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1

(“Compl.”), and Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. At the

outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff has provided only a P.O. Box address, in contravention of

D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1). However, she has filed a Motion, ECF No. 4, seeking permission to use that

P.O. Box address, which the Court grants for good cause shown. The Court also grants the IFP

application. However, for the reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses the Complaint, and

this matter, without prejudice.

Plaintiff, a resident of the District, sues four individuals, all residents of Maryland, for a

“fraudulent scam to acquire money.” See Compl. at 2–4. More specifically, she contends that

Defendants “presented a scam of a building at a new address to the Plaintiff in order to acquire a

$25,000 loan which should have been paid back to the Plaintiff within a year to include 10% of

the loan for interest.” Id. at 4. She contends that she was owed the return of her $25,000, plus

10% interest––$2,500, by July 22, 2025, but Defendants have failed to reimburse her. See id. at

4–5. She demands the $27,500, plus 1% daily compound interest dated from July 22, and

unspecified damages for pain and suffering. See id. at 5.

1 Pro se litigants must comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. See Jarrell v. Tisch, 656

F. Supp. 237, 239–40 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires

complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction

[and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d

661, 668–71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of

the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and

determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498

(D.D.C. 1977).

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to provide Defendants or this Court with adequate notice of

Plaintiff’s intended claims. Although it provides some information giving rise to a potential breach

of contract or fraud claim, there are no supporting details; for example (aside from basic financials)

the terms or nature of any agreement, when or where it was executed, the specific roles of any of

the parties, any information regarding the “building” and “address” at issue, including its purpose

or location, or how Plaintiff has endured pain and suffering, for which damages are generally

unrecoverable in these circumstances. See Bond v. Dep’t of Justice, 828 F. Supp. 2d 60, 80–81

(D.D.C. 2011) (citing Asuncion v. Columbia Hosp. for Women, 514 A.2d 1187, 1190 (D.C. 1986)),

aff’d, No. 12–5296, 2013 WL 1187396 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 14, 2013) (per curiam). As here,

“threadbare recitals” that are “supported by mere conclusory statements” are insufficient to state a

claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although a pro se complaint “must be held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

(per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), it still “must plead ‘factual matter’

2 that permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of [defendant’s] misconduct,’”

Atherton v. D.C. Off. of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681–82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678–79); see Aktieselskabet AF 21. Nov.2001 v. Fame Jeans, Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 16 n.4 (D.C.

Cir. 2008) (“We have never accepted ‘legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations’

because a complaint needs some information about the circumstances giving rise to the claims.”

(quoting Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994))).

Plaintiff has also failed to establish this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See generally

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. The subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited

and is set forth generally at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under those statutes, federal jurisdiction

is available only when a “federal question” is presented, id. § 1331, or the parties are of diverse

citizenship and the amount in controversy “exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of

interest and costs,” id. § 1332(a). A party seeking relief in the district court must at least plead

facts that bring the suit within the court’s jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Failure to plead

such facts warrants dismissal of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Plaintiff purports to invoke federal question jurisdiction, see Compl. at 3, but she has not

stated a federal question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. She neither cites to any federal authority, nor can

the Court otherwise discern a federal question from the allegations as presented. Plaintiff has not

attempted to establish diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, nor could her Complaint

establish it. Although it appears that the parties may be of diverse citizenship, Plaintiff’s claimed

damages, even with the alleged interest and compound interest included, falls short of $75,000.

For these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. An Order consistent with this

Memorandum Opinion is issued separately.

3 DATE: November 13, 2025 CARL J. NICHOLS United States District Judge