Powell v. Airstream, Inc.

2019 Ohio 3034
Ohio Court of Appeals·Decided July 29, 2019·No. 17-18-17·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

SHELBY COUNTY

DAVID POWELL, CASE NO. 17-18-17

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

v.

AIRSTREAM, INC., OPINION DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

Appeal from Shelby County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 17CV000145

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: July 29, 2019

APPEARANCES:

Elizabeth Ahern Wells for Appellant James L. Thieman and Cameron C. Downer for Appellee

WILLAMOWSKI, J.

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant David Powell (“Powell”) brings this appeal from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Shelby County granting summary judgment to defendant-appellee Airstream, Inc. (“Airstream”). For the reasons set forth below, the judgment is affirmed.

{¶2} On June 12, 2016, Powell purchased a new 2016 Airstream Flying Cloud RV (“the RV”) that was built and warranted by Airstream in Jackson Center, Ohio. Doc. 1. Powell purchased the RV from Airstream Adventures (“AA”) in Covington, Washington. Id. Soon after the purchase, the RV allegedly began to have several issues and spent a significant amount of time being repaired. Id. Powell lost confidence in the vehicle and filed a complaint with a jury demand in Shelby County, Ohio on July 19, 2017. Id. In the complaint, Powell alleged that Airstream had breached the express warranties, breached the contract, violated the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and violated the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“WCPA”). Id. On August 24, 2017, Airstream filed its answer denying the alleged violations and raising several defenses including lack of privity of contract, limitation of damages, and failure of conditions precedent. Doc. 7.

{¶3} On April 19, 2018, Airstream filed a motion for summary judgment.

Doc. 23. Airstream claimed that without privity of contract, the implied warranty and breach of contract claims must fail. Id. Airstream further asserted that the breach of the express warranties and violations of the Magnuson-Moss act must also

fail because Airstream complied with the warranties by complying with the Repair Remedy. Id. Airstream also alleges that Powell failed to exhaust his remedies by not complying with the “Back-Up Remedy”. Id. Finally, Airstream claimed that the WCPA claim fails because there was no underlying statutory violation or a public interest to support the claim. Id. Powell filed his memorandum in opposition to the motion on May 23, 2018. Doc. 37. Airstream then filed its reply to the memorandum on June 19, 2018. Doc. 45. On October 1, 2018, the trial court granted Airstream’s motion for summary judgment. Doc. 95. Powell filed a timely notice of appeal from this judgment. Doc. 101. On appeal, Powell raises one assignment of error.

The trial court erred when it granted Airstream’s motion for summary judgment on all claims.

{¶4} The sole assignment of error in this case raises the question as to whether the lower court erred in granting summary judgment.

An appellate court reviews a trial court’s summary judgment decision de novo, independently and without deference to the trial court's decision. Ohio Govt. Risk Mgt. Plan v. Harrison, 115 Ohio St.3d 241, 2007-Ohio-4948, 874 N.E.2d 1155, at ¶ 5, citing Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-Ohio-4559, 833 N.E.2d 712, at

¶ 8. Summary judgment is appropriate only “when the requirements of Civ.R. 56(C) are met.” Adkins v. Chief Supermarket, 3d Dist. No. 11-06-07, 2007-Ohio-772, at ¶ 7. The party moving for summary judgment must establish: (1) that there are no genuine issues of material fact; (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, said party being entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor.

Id., citing Civ.R. 56(C); Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 679, 653 N.E.2d 1196, at paragraph three of the syllabus. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court may not “weigh evidence or choose among reasonable inferences * * *.” Id., at ¶ 8, 653 N.E.2d 1196, citing Jacobs v. Racevskis (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 1, 7, 663 N.E.2d 653. Rather, the court must consider the above standard while construing all evidence in favor of the non-movant. Jacobs, at 7, 663 N.E.2d 653.

The party moving for summary judgment must identify the basis of the motion to allow the non-movant a “meaningful opportunity to respond.” Mitseff v. Wheeler (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 116, 526 N.E.2d 798. In its motion, the moving party “must state specifically which areas of the opponent’s claim raise no genuine issue of material fact and such assertion may be supported by affidavits or otherwise as allowed by Civ.R. 56(C).” Id. at 115, 526 N.E.2d 798, citing Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co.

(1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375 N.E.2d 46, citing Hamlin v.

McAlpin Co. (1964), 175 Ohio St. 517, 519-520, 196 N.E.2d 781;

Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293, 662 N.E.2d 264. If the moving party fails to meet its burden, summary judgment is inappropriate; however, if the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-moving party has a “reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial * * *.” Dresher, at 294, 662 N.E.2d 264.

Lillie v. Meachem, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-09-09, 2009-Ohio-4934, ¶21-22. This court notes that the parties agree that Washington law applies to the substantive arguments. As the standard of review is de novo, we will review whether reasonable minds could reasonably reach a verdict in favor of Powell based upon the claims set forth in the complaint.

{¶5} A review of the repair records for this RV provided as exhibits for Powell’s memorandum contra the motion for summary judgment show the following history of repairs. See Doc. 27, Ex. 8, 10, and 11. Prior to the delivery

of the vehicle, AA conducted a pre-delivery inspection report and repaired or noted issues found. See also Lamb Dep. at 32. The inspection noted eight issues: 1) rock dings on the rock guard, 2) a rivet missing about the entry door, 3) chips in bedroom closet door, 4) gaps in the sealant in various locations, 5) a scratch in the wall by the bathroom door, 6) a scratch on the range cover, 7) a noisy bathroom fan, and 8) a small divot in the linoleum at the entrance. The records produced by Powell indicate that new rock guards were ordered, the missing rivet was replaced, the chips in the bedroom door were repaired, the areas missing sealant were resealed, the scratch on the range cover was removed and repolished, and the bathroom fan was adjusted to run properly. The scratch on the wall and the divot in the linoleum had no noted repairs.1 Powell was notified on June 20, 2016, that the vehicle was ready for pickup.

{¶6} On July 21, 2016, Powell’s son Dan and sister-in-law Teresa (collectively known as “the customers”), who were the ones using the RV, took the vehicle to George Sutton RV (“Sutton”) claiming six alleged issues: 1) the Velcro was pulling off the seat cushions, 2) the dinette table was not releasing from the brackets, 3) the Sothco had pulled out of the cabinet door below the stove, 4) the shower leaked at the bottom of the door when used, 5) the USB port was pushed in at the bedroom cabinet, and 6) the rear awning arm was hard to retract. Sutton

1 Although there was no noted repair to the linoleum, the warranty claim to Airstream showed that AA billed them for labor in regard to the linoleum. Doc. 37, Ex. 11.

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Powell v. Airstream, Inc., 2019 Ohio 3034 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019).

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