Powell v. Airstream, Inc.

2019 Ohio 3034
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJuly 29, 2019
Docket17-18-17
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2019 Ohio 3034 (Powell v. Airstream, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Powell v. Airstream, Inc., 2019 Ohio 3034 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

[Cite as Powell v. Airstream, Inc., 2019-Ohio-3034.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT SHELBY COUNTY

DAVID POWELL, CASE NO. 17-18-17 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

v.

AIRSTREAM, INC., OPINION

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

Appeal from Shelby County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 17CV000145

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: July 29, 2019

APPEARANCES:

Elizabeth Ahern Wells for Appellant

James L. Thieman and Cameron C. Downer for Appellee Case No. 17-18-17

WILLAMOWSKI, J.

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant David Powell (“Powell”) brings this appeal from the

judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Shelby County granting summary

judgment to defendant-appellee Airstream, Inc. (“Airstream”). For the reasons set

forth below, the judgment is affirmed.

{¶2} On June 12, 2016, Powell purchased a new 2016 Airstream Flying

Cloud RV (“the RV”) that was built and warranted by Airstream in Jackson Center,

Ohio. Doc. 1. Powell purchased the RV from Airstream Adventures (“AA”) in

Covington, Washington. Id. Soon after the purchase, the RV allegedly began to

have several issues and spent a significant amount of time being repaired. Id.

Powell lost confidence in the vehicle and filed a complaint with a jury demand in

Shelby County, Ohio on July 19, 2017. Id. In the complaint, Powell alleged that

Airstream had breached the express warranties, breached the contract, violated the

Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and violated the Washington Consumer Protection

Act (“WCPA”). Id. On August 24, 2017, Airstream filed its answer denying the

alleged violations and raising several defenses including lack of privity of contract,

limitation of damages, and failure of conditions precedent. Doc. 7.

{¶3} On April 19, 2018, Airstream filed a motion for summary judgment.

Doc. 23. Airstream claimed that without privity of contract, the implied warranty

and breach of contract claims must fail. Id. Airstream further asserted that the

breach of the express warranties and violations of the Magnuson-Moss act must also

-2- Case No. 17-18-17

fail because Airstream complied with the warranties by complying with the Repair

Remedy. Id. Airstream also alleges that Powell failed to exhaust his remedies by

not complying with the “Back-Up Remedy”. Id. Finally, Airstream claimed that

the WCPA claim fails because there was no underlying statutory violation or a

public interest to support the claim. Id. Powell filed his memorandum in opposition

to the motion on May 23, 2018. Doc. 37. Airstream then filed its reply to the

memorandum on June 19, 2018. Doc. 45. On October 1, 2018, the trial court

granted Airstream’s motion for summary judgment. Doc. 95. Powell filed a timely

notice of appeal from this judgment. Doc. 101. On appeal, Powell raises one

assignment of error.

The trial court erred when it granted Airstream’s motion for summary judgment on all claims.

{¶4} The sole assignment of error in this case raises the question as to

whether the lower court erred in granting summary judgment.

An appellate court reviews a trial court’s summary judgment decision de novo, independently and without deference to the trial court's decision. Ohio Govt. Risk Mgt. Plan v. Harrison, 115 Ohio St.3d 241, 2007-Ohio-4948, 874 N.E.2d 1155, at ¶ 5, citing Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-Ohio-4559, 833 N.E.2d 712, at ¶ 8. Summary judgment is appropriate only “when the requirements of Civ.R. 56(C) are met.” Adkins v. Chief Supermarket, 3d Dist. No. 11-06-07, 2007-Ohio-772, at ¶ 7. The party moving for summary judgment must establish: (1) that there are no genuine issues of material fact; (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, said party being entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor.

-3- Case No. 17-18-17

Id., citing Civ.R. 56(C); Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 679, 653 N.E.2d 1196, at paragraph three of the syllabus. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court may not “weigh evidence or choose among reasonable inferences * * *.” Id., at ¶ 8, 653 N.E.2d 1196, citing Jacobs v. Racevskis (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 1, 7, 663 N.E.2d 653. Rather, the court must consider the above standard while construing all evidence in favor of the non-movant. Jacobs, at 7, 663 N.E.2d 653.

The party moving for summary judgment must identify the basis of the motion to allow the non-movant a “meaningful opportunity to respond.” Mitseff v. Wheeler (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 116, 526 N.E.2d 798. In its motion, the moving party “must state specifically which areas of the opponent’s claim raise no genuine issue of material fact and such assertion may be supported by affidavits or otherwise as allowed by Civ.R. 56(C).” Id. at 115, 526 N.E.2d 798, citing Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375 N.E.2d 46, citing Hamlin v. McAlpin Co. (1964), 175 Ohio St. 517, 519-520, 196 N.E.2d 781; Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293, 662 N.E.2d 264. If the moving party fails to meet its burden, summary judgment is inappropriate; however, if the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-moving party has a “reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial * * *.” Dresher, at 294, 662 N.E.2d 264.

Lillie v. Meachem, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-09-09, 2009-Ohio-4934, ¶21-22. This court

notes that the parties agree that Washington law applies to the substantive

arguments. As the standard of review is de novo, we will review whether reasonable

minds could reasonably reach a verdict in favor of Powell based upon the claims set

forth in the complaint.

{¶5} A review of the repair records for this RV provided as exhibits for

Powell’s memorandum contra the motion for summary judgment show the

following history of repairs. See Doc. 27, Ex. 8, 10, and 11. Prior to the delivery

-4- Case No. 17-18-17

of the vehicle, AA conducted a pre-delivery inspection report and repaired or noted

issues found. See also Lamb Dep. at 32. The inspection noted eight issues: 1)

rock dings on the rock guard, 2) a rivet missing about the entry door, 3) chips in

bedroom closet door, 4) gaps in the sealant in various locations, 5) a scratch in the

wall by the bathroom door, 6) a scratch on the range cover, 7) a noisy bathroom fan,

and 8) a small divot in the linoleum at the entrance. The records produced by Powell

indicate that new rock guards were ordered, the missing rivet was replaced, the chips

in the bedroom door were repaired, the areas missing sealant were resealed, the

scratch on the range cover was removed and repolished, and the bathroom fan was

adjusted to run properly. The scratch on the wall and the divot in the linoleum had

no noted repairs.1 Powell was notified on June 20, 2016, that the vehicle was ready

for pickup.

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