Pourchez v. Diatek, Inc.

265 F. Supp. 2d 192, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7934, 2003 WL 21220791
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 8, 2003
Docket03 CIV.0972 WHP
StatusPublished

This text of 265 F. Supp. 2d 192 (Pourchez v. Diatek, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pourchez v. Diatek, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 192, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7934, 2003 WL 21220791 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PAULEY, District Judge.

On December 14, 1999, the United States Patent and Trademark Office issued United States Patent No. 6,001,079 (the “’079 Patent”), titled “Multilumen Catheter, Particularly For Hemodialysis,” to Dr. Thierry Pourchez (“Pourchez”). 1 Bard Access Systems, Inc. (“Bard”) is the exclusive licensee of the ’079 Patent. Bard and Pourchez filed this patent infringement action on February 11, 2003, claiming that Diatek, Inc. (“Diatek”) and Arrow International, Inc. (“Arrow”) are selling infringing catheters under the trade names “Cannon Catheter” or “Cannon-Cath.” On April 16, 2003, this Court conducted a Markman hearing to construe three disputed claim terms from the ’079 Patent: (1) “substantially parallel;” (2) “rest position;” and (3) “flexible.” After considering the parties’ claim construction briefs and their Mark- *194 man presentations, the Court construes the three claims as set forth below.-

BACKGROUND

Pourchez, a French citizen, is the inventor and owner of the ’079 Patent. (CompLIffl 1, 8.) Bard, a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah, is engaged in the manufacture and sale of medical products. (Comply 2.) Bard is an exclusive licensee of the ’079 Patent, and has the exclusive right to bring actions for its infringement. (Comply 9.) Diatek, a North Carolina corporation with its principal place of business in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, is also engaged in the manufacture and sale of medical products. (Comply 3.) Arrow, a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Reading, Pennsylvania, acquired substantially all of the assets of Diatek on November 25, 2002. (Compl.f 4.)

As the exclusive licensee of Pourchez’s invention, Bard developed a “split-tip” catheter according to the ’079 Patent. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Dubbed the “Hemo-Split” catheter, Bard’s product is currently before the FDA for approval. (Comply 9.) Defendants manufacture and sell a “split-tip” catheter of their own, the “Cannon Catheter” or “Cannon Cath.” (Comply 10.) Plaintiffs allege that defendants’ “Cannon Catheter” or “Cannon-Cath” infringes on their rights under the ’079 Patent. (Comply 11.) Plaintiffs seek both injunc-tive and monetary relief for the alleged infringement.

DISCUSSION

I. General Principles Of Claim Construction

“[A] patent must describe the exact scope of an invention and its manufacture,” as defined by the claims. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). A basic patent action has two phases, “construing the patent and determining whether infringement occurred.” Markman, 517 U.S. at 385, 116 S.Ct. 1384. The first phase, claim construction, “is a question of law, to be determined by the court, construing the letters-patent, and the description of the invention and specification of claim annexed to them.” Markman, 517 U.S. at 385, 116 S.Ct. 1384. A district court’s purpose is to determine “what the words in the claim mean.” Markman, 517 U.S. at 374, 116 S.Ct. 1384.

In undertaking claim construction, “[i]t is well-settled that, in interpreting an asserted claim, the court should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.1996). Courts look first to the intrinsic evidence because it comprises the public record, and public policy mandates that competitors be able to ascertain the metes and bounds of patent claims by reviewing the public record. See Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed.Cir.2002); Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583; Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Berco, S.P.A, 714 F.2d 1110, 1115 n. 2 (Fed.Cir.1983).

In reviewing the intrinsic evidence to construe disputed claim terms, a court’s “analytical focus must begin and remain centered on the language of the claims themselves, for it is that language that the patentee chose to use to ‘particularly point[ ] out and distinctly claim[ ] the subject matter which the patentee regards as his invention.’” Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed.Cir.2001) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112); accord Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 326 F.3d *195 1215, 1220 (Fed.Cir.2003). Further, “a court must presume that the terms in the claim mean what they say, and, unless otherwise compelled, give full effect to the ordinary and accustomed meaning of claim terms.” Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989 (Fed.Cir. 1999); accord Brookhill-Wilk,. 326 F.3d at 1220; Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed.Cir.2002). Dictionaries hold a “special place” in this type of analysis, and although extrinsic to the patent are considered with intrinsic evidence to determine the ordinary meaning of claim terms. Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1202 (“categorizing [dictionaries] as ‘extrinsic evidence’ or even a ‘special form of extrinsic evidence’ is misplaced”); accord Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325; CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed.Cir.2002).

An exception to this “plain meaning” approach to claim construction arises where the patentee assigns a novel or special meaning to a term. See, e.g., Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc., 264 F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed.Cir.2001). However, while “a patentee is free to be his or her own lexicographer and thus may use terms in a manner contrary to or inconsistent with one or more of their ordinary meanings,” the patentee must clearly state the special definition of the term in the patent specification or history. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582; accord Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1204; Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1578 (Fed.Cir. 1996). The ’079 Patent does not evince any effort by Pourchez to act as his own lexicographer with respect to the three disputed claim terms.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Vitronics Corporation v. Conceptronic, Inc.
90 F.3d 1576 (Federal Circuit, 1996)
Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc.
264 F.3d 1358 (Federal Circuit, 2001)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
265 F. Supp. 2d 192, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7934, 2003 WL 21220791, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pourchez-v-diatek-inc-nysd-2003.