Porch v. Farmer

122 S.E. 557, 158 Ga. 55, 1924 Ga. LEXIS 77
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedApril 18, 1924
DocketNo. 3853
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 122 S.E. 557 (Porch v. Farmer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Porch v. Farmer, 122 S.E. 557, 158 Ga. 55, 1924 Ga. LEXIS 77 (Ga. 1924).

Opinion

Hill, J.

(After stating the foregoing facts.) The controlling question under the evidence in the case is whether the paper offered by the executor as propounder of the purported will of Mrs. Celia R. Seay was so mutilated by her before her death as to amount to a revocation of the will, or whether it was done by some one else, and whether the will as originally executed should be set up and established as the will of the testatrix. The general rule is that the burden of proof is upon the person attacking a paper offered for probate as a will to sustain the grounds of his caveat. But our Civil Code provides (§ 3919), that “An express revocation may be effected by any destruction or obliteration of the original will, or a duplicate, done by the testator, or by his direction, with an intention to revoke; such intention will be presumed from the obliter[58]*58ation or canceling of a material portion of tlie will; but if the part canceled be immaterial, such as the seal, no such presumption arises.” In all cases of revocation the intention to revoke is necessary to make it effectual. Civil Code (1910), § 3920. It thus appears that where a will has been canceled or obliterated in a material part, a presumption of revocation arises, and the burden is on the propounder to show that no revocation was intended. In McIntyre v. McIntyre, 120 Ga. 67 (47 S. E. 501, 102 Am. St. R. 71, 1 Ann. Cas. 606), it was ruled as follows: “Where a paper found among a decedent’s papers is offered for probate as a will, and appears to have been canceled or obliterated in a material part, a presumption arises that the cancellations or obliterations were made by the deceased, and that he intended them to operate as a revocation.” Also: “Joint operation of act and intention is necessary to revoke a will.”

In a note to Graham v. Burch, 28 Am. St. R. 339, 349 (47 Minn. 171, 49 N. W. 697), it is said that “It has been held that if a will, though found in a tin box belonging to the testator, has its seal torn off and his name and the names of the attesting witnesses obliterated, a presumption of its revocation arises, which cannot be overcome by proving a conversation between the executor and the testator shortly before the death of the latter, with respect to fulfilling a bequest made in the will. In re White, 25 N. J. Eq. 501.” In the same case in discussing the question of presumptions arising from mutilation, the same author says: “The tearing, obliterating, or mutilating of a will, or some portion thereof, may, of course, be done after as well as before the testator’s death, and by another person as well as by him; and the danger always exists that it may have been done by some other person, if any one besides the testator had access to the will and an opportunity to obliterate or mutilate it. But after the death of the testator there is rarely any evidence accessible to show when or how the will came to be in the condition in which it was found, and the law must therefore indulge the presumption that such evidence of mutilation or obliteration as it bears resulted from the testator’s act done with revocatory intent, or it must deny all effect of such evidence, except when it is aided and supplemented by other means of proof. In this dilemma, the courts have adopted the rule that when a will was in the custody of the decedent, and is found after his death, [59]*59bearing upon it evidence of such acts of mutilation or of obliteration as are requisite and sufficient to revoke it, its condition will be presumed to have been the work of the testator, done with intent to effect its revocation. This presumption must prevail unless overcome by satisfactory and competent evidence. In Goods of Dallow, 31 L. J. P. & D. 128; Elms v. Elms, 1 Swab. & T. 155; 4 Jur. N. S. 765; 27 L. J. P. & D. 96; Wolf v. Bollinger, 62 Ill. 368; Succession of Muh, 35 La. Ann. 394, 48 Am. R. 242.”

The question therefore arises, has the presumption raised by reason of the fact that the will was found in the possession of testatrix at the time of her death, mutilated in material parts, been overcome by the evidence produced by the propounder that the mutilations were caused by others than the testatrix herself? The propounder, in order to overcome this presumption, offered the evidence of the three witnesses to the will, showing that the testatrix executed the will after it had been read to her, in which she had devised the bulk of her estate to her afflicted nephew, Willie Brittain; that the testatrix stated to all of these witnesses that she wanted her nephew to have her property; that the will was freely and voluntarily made, etc. The propounder, T. G. Farmer Jr., who is a lawyer and the nominated executor of the alleged will, testified that Mrs. Seay sent for him to write her will, which he did, and after it was properly executed she gave him the will to put in a box with other papers belonging to her, and requested him to keep the papers in his office. Later Mrs. Seay requested that he send her the box containing her papers, including the will; and he did so, the will not being mutilated at that time. He also testified that he kept a copy of the will as written by. him, and this was offered in evidence on the trial of the case. The alleged will in its mutilated condition was offered in evidence, the mutilated portions thereof being as follows:

“I, —of said State and County, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do make, declare and publish this my last will and testament. . .
“Item 3rd. I give, bequeath and devise to my nephew, Willie C. Brittain, absolutely and in fee simple all of the interest that I have in and to lot of land | the seventh district of Meriwether County, containing the same be[60]*60ing an undivided one half interest in s | land, the other half interest being owned by Ear | and Adam Porch. If said tract of land should be divided before my death, I give, bequeath and devise the 101-1/4 aeies of said tract that I receive, to my nephew Willie C. Brittain. . .
“Item 5th. I hereby constitute and app | testamentary guard | and here | authority to manage an | of the p | ch I have given to the said | ittain, in item 3rd of this my last will, giving her full authority to rent and collect the rents and the proceeds of same; and I expressly confer upon her the power as such guardian to control said property, excusing her from giving bond or making any returns to the ordinary.
“Item 6th. I hereby constitute and appoint T. sole executor of this my last will and testament, and essly confer upon him power as such to administer my estate, excusing him from giving any bond or making any returns to the ordinary; and I expressly confer upon him the full authority and power to sell any part of my estate hereinbefore especially devised and all of the property herein especially devised, at public or private sale, with or without notice as he may deem best, and without any order of the court, making good and sufficient conveyance to the purchaser and holding the proceeds in said sale to the same uses and trust as hereinbefore declared in the several items of this my I' I C I ~ '! eay. This May 21st, 1915.
“ Signed, and sealed, declared and published by Celia B. Seay, as her last will and testament in the presence of us, the undersigned, who subscribed our names hereto in the presence of said testator after she had signed her name thereto, and at her instance and request and in the presence of each other. This | 15.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
122 S.E. 557, 158 Ga. 55, 1924 Ga. LEXIS 77, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/porch-v-farmer-ga-1924.