Poppleton Now Community Association, Inc. v. La Cite Development, LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: May 4, 2026
• Docket: 25-1770
• Status: Published

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 25-1770 Doc: 49 Filed: 05/04/2026 Pg: 1 of 16

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-1770

POPPLETON NOW COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC.; CURTIS EADDY, SR.; SONIA EADDY; STERLING WALKER; FRANCINA WALKER; WILLIAM H. GUNN, JR.; YVONNE BROOKS GUNN,

Plaintiffs – Appellants,

v.

LA CITE DEVELOPMENT, LLC; LA CITE, LLC; POPPLETON DEVELOPMENT I, LLC; PSH 1B, LLC; DAN BLYTHEWOOD, JR.; MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE; BRANDON SCOTT; ALICE KENNEDY; HOUSING AUTHORITY OF BALTIMORE CITY; JANET ABRAHAMS; SHEILA DIXON,

Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Adam B. Abelson, District Judge. (1:24-cv-02420-ABA)

Argued: January 28, 2026 Decided: May 4, 2026

Before GREGORY, HARRIS, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Vacated in part and remanded with instructions by published opinion. Judge Harris wrote the opinion, in which Judge Gregory and Judge Richardson joined.

ARGUED: Thomas K. Prevas, SAUL EWING LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Anthony J. Phillips, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP, Washington, USCA4 Appeal: 25-1770 Doc: 49 Filed: 05/04/2026 Pg: 2 of 16

D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Katherine S. Barrett Wiik, SAUL EWING LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Appellants. Thomas L. Howard III, Jake B. Mitchell, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Developer Appellees. Thomas Webb, Hanna Marie C. Sheehan, BALTIMORE CITY LAW DEPARTMENT, Baltimore, Maryland, for Baltimore Appellees.

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PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:

Roughly two decades ago, the City of Baltimore entered into an agreement with a

property developer to redevelop 13.8 acres of land in the city’s Poppleton neighborhood.

Pursuant to this agreement, the city acquired the land at issue – much of it by using eminent

domain. But in the intervening years, the redevelopment project suffered myriad

complications and delays, and very little of the promised development ever occurred.

Large portions of this land now sit vacant and neglected.

The plaintiffs in this case – six individuals who own property adjacent to the land

at issue and a non-profit community organization – sued the developer and various

Baltimore City defendants, challenging both the development agreement and subsequent

actions (and inactions) of the defendants. Two of the plaintiffs’ claims are now before this

court: their Fifth Amendment takings claim, which alleges that the use of eminent domain

to take their neighbors’ land was unconstitutional because the property was not taken for

public use, and a state law private nuisance claim. The district court dismissed both,

finding that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to bring their takings claim and that

they failed to state a private nuisance claim under Maryland law.

We agree with the district court that both claims must be dismissed. Because we

reach that conclusion for different legal reasons, however, we vacate the district court’s

judgment in part and remand with instructions to (1) dismiss the plaintiffs’ takings claim

for failure to state a claim and (2) decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

plaintiffs’ private nuisance claim and dismiss it without prejudice.

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I.

A.

This case arises out of long-running efforts by the City of Baltimore to redevelop

the city’s Poppleton neighborhood – portions of which have been designated as an urban

renewal area since 1975. 1 Beginning in 2004, the city initiated a process to redevelop 13.8

acres of land in the neighborhood. And in September 2006, the city entered into a Land

Disposition and Development Agreement (“LDDA”) with the developer selected for this

project.

The 13.8 acres chosen for redevelopment encompassed a number of existing city

blocks with more than 500 individual homes. As part of the LDDA, the city agreed to “use

its best efforts and all legal authority” – including its “power of condemnation” where

necessary – to acquire all the properties within the project area. J.A. 109. Once acquired

by the city, these properties were sold to the developer at what the plaintiffs allege was a

highly preferential price.

But the redevelopment project soon became mired in delays and complications, and

litigation between the city and the developer ensued. Starting in 2013, the parties to the

LDDA amended the agreement five separate times in an effort to resolve these ongoing

issues and get the project back on track. Nonetheless, little progress was made. By the

time this lawsuit was filed in August 2024, only a single apartment complex had been

1 Because the district court dismissed this case at the pleading stage, we describe the facts as alleged in the complaint and its attachments. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448 (4th Cir. 2011); Episcopal Church in S.C. v. Church Ins. Co. of Vt., 997 F.3d 149, 154–55 (4th Cir. 2021). 4 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1770 Doc: 49 Filed: 05/04/2026 Pg: 5 of 16

completed, and the project area still contained hundreds of vacant plots of land. The

plaintiffs describe the site as largely abandoned and overrun by weeds, rats, trash, and other

environmental nuisances.

B.

The plaintiffs in this case are six Baltimore residents (three couples) who live and

own property directly adjacent to the redevelopment project area, as well as a non-profit

community organization that advocates for current and former Poppleton residents. None

of them owns property that is part of the LDDA or was taken for the redevelopment

project. 2

The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in federal court, invoking federal question

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and naming as defendants the property developer

(including four corporate entities and the individual who serves as their principal officer),

the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, the Housing Authority of Baltimore City, and

various current and former city officials. The five substantive counts 3 in the complaint

challenge the constitutionality of the LDDA and Baltimore’s land use policies more

2 Property owned by one of the couples was formerly on the LDDA acquisition list and subject to eminent domain proceedings. But the city voluntarily withdrew this property from those proceedings in 2022 and removed it from the LDDA acquisition list as part of one of the amendments to the agreement. In the complaint, these plaintiffs expressly disclaim any claims they might have had for the past inclusion of their property on the acquisition list or in eminent domain proceedings, resting their claims solely on the present status of their property as adjacent to the redevelopment project area.

The complaint also includes a separate count seeking a declaratory judgment. See 3

infra Part II.C. 5 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1770 Doc: 49 Filed: 05/04/2026 Pg: 6 of 16

generally, as well as the impacts of the redevelopment project on the Poppleton

neighborhood and its residents.

Only two of these claims are at issue in this appeal. Count I alleges that the use of

eminent domain to acquire the plaintiffs’ neighbors’ property for the redevelopment project

constituted an unlawful “taking” under both the Fifth Amendment and the Maryland

Constitution because the property was not taken for public use. And Count IV claims that

the blighted condition of the still-vacant land in the redevelopment project area amounts to

a private nuisance under Maryland law.

C.

In six separate motions, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, and the

district court dismissed all the plaintiffs’ claims. Poppleton Now Cmty. Ass’n v. La Cite

Dev., LLC, 2025 WL 1707254 (D. Md. June 17, 2025).

The district court first dismissed the takings claim for lack of Article III standing,

finding that the plaintiffs failed to allege “a cognizable injury in fact” to support this claim.

Id. at *7–9. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the district court explained,

“provides that ‘private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just

compensation.’” Id. at *8 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V). 4

Importantly, none of the individual plaintiffs alleged that any of their own property was

taken. Id. And the taking of property belonging to their neighbors, the district court

4 The Maryland Constitution’s provision governing eminent domain “ha[s] the same meaning and effect” as the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Litz v. Md. Dep’t of Env’t, 131 A.3d 923, 930 (Md. 2016) (citing Md. Const. art. III, § 40).

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reasoned, did not constitute an actual injury to the plaintiffs that would allow them to

challenge as unconstitutional the use of eminent domain. Id. Similarly, the community

organization plaintiff lacked standing because the complaint never alleged “that any of its

members had their properties taken.” Id. The district court also rejected the plaintiffs’

reliance on Maryland state law standing doctrines, explaining that state statutes conferring

additional types of standing could not alter Article III’s minimum standing requirements

for federal courts. Id. at *7–8.

After dismissing the plaintiffs’ other federal law claims, see id. at *9–11, the district

court turned to the state law private nuisance claim, id. at *12. Here, the district court

concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to sue most of the defendants. 5 Id. The plaintiffs

satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement for this claim, the district court reasoned, by

alleging that they had suffered reductions in their property values and the loss of use and

enjoyment in their homes. Id. At least some of these injuries, the district court found, were

“related” to the condition of the abandoned land in the redevelopment project area, which

in turn had at least “some causal connection” to actions taken by the developer and the city,

including the decision to take that land in the first place. Id. And these injuries, moreover,

were, “at least in theory, redressable.” Id.

But on the merits, the district court found that the complaint failed to state a private

nuisance claim against any of the remaining defendants. Id. at *12–13. Maryland law

5 The plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the Housing Authority as well as its President and CEO, the district court found, because the complaint did not allege any causal connection between these defendants’ actions and the plaintiffs’ injuries. Poppleton Now, 2025 WL 1707254, at *12. The plaintiffs do not challenge that holding on appeal. 7 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1770 Doc: 49 Filed: 05/04/2026 Pg: 8 of 16

defines a private nuisance as “a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private

use and enjoyment of land” that is “substantial and unreasonable.” Id. at *13 (first quoting

Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., 642 A.2d 180, 190 (Md. 1994), and then quoting Gorman v. Sabo,

122 A.2d 475, 477 (Md. 1956)). Here, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs offered

only conclusory allegations that their use and enjoyment of their property had been

impacted. Id. And the district court determined that the plaintiffs’ allegations of

interference with the use and enjoyment of their property – which largely related to the

condition of the neighborhood around the plaintiffs’ homes – were “not comparable” to the

types of interference actionable under Maryland private nuisance law. Id.

After the district court dismissed the complaint, the plaintiffs timely appealed.

Before this court, they challenge only the dismissal of their takings and private nuisance

claims, as well as the district court’s failure to address their separately pled claim seeking

a declaratory judgment.

II.

The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ takings claim for lack of Article III

standing, finding that they failed to allege a cognizable injury in fact because they did not

allege that they owned any taken property. Poppleton Now, 2025 WL 1707254, at *7–9.

We review a district court’s dismissal for lack of standing de novo. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s v.

Hudson, 144 F.4th 582, 589 (4th Cir. 2025). “When, as here, standing is challenged on the

pleadings, we accept as true all material allegations of the complaint and construe the

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complaint in favor of the complaining party, so long as the allegations state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

We agree with the district court that the plaintiffs’ takings claim cannot proceed.

We also think the district court correctly identified this claim’s fatal flaw: The plaintiffs

do not allege that any of their own property was taken. But we conclude that this omission

is better characterized as the failure to allege an essential element of a takings claim on the

merits, rather than the lack of a cognizable injury in fact for Article III standing purposes.

In other words, the plaintiffs fail to state a takings claim.

1.

To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show “(i) that he suffered an injury

in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely

caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial

relief.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021). The purpose of this

inquiry is to ensure the plaintiff has a “personal stake” in the case, id., and not merely a

“generally available grievance about government,” Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. 48, 54

(2018).

Here, the individual plaintiffs each allege that property they own has diminished in

value as a result of the LDDA and the related use of eminent domain. These allegations,

we conclude, are sufficient to establish that the plaintiffs have a “personal stake” in – and

thus Article III standing to bring – their takings claim. See TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 423.

Consider first the injury-in-fact requirement, where the district court focused its

analysis. The injury alleged by each individual plaintiff is a reduction in the value of their

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property. See, e.g., J.A. 25, 39, 50; Poppleton Now, 2025 WL 1707254, at *6, *12. As we

have explained, “past monetary loss is a quintessential injury in fact.” Penegar v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 115 F.4th 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2024). This type of “monetary harm[]”

constitutes a “traditional tangible harm[]” that “readily qualif[ies]” as a concrete injury

under Article III. TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425. The loss of property value, as alleged in

the complaint, is an injury that affected these plaintiffs “in a personal and individual way”

– as owners of property adjacent to the redevelopment project area – and is not merely a

“generalized grievance” or a “general legal, moral, ideological, or policy objection” to the

project. See FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 381 (2024). And the loss

they claim is “actual,” not “conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The plaintiffs’ alleged loss of property value therefore satisfies all the requirements

for a cognizable injury in fact, as the district court itself concluded when analyzing the

plaintiffs’ private nuisance claim. See Poppleton Now, 2025 WL 1707254, at *12. That is

all we require at this stage of the litigation. “With regard to the injury-in-fact prong of the

standing test, [the plaintiffs] need not prove the merits of [their] case in order to

demonstrate that [they] ha[ve] Article III standing.” Pitt Cnty. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 553

F.3d 308, 312 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 239 (4th Cir.

2013) (“[F]or purposes of standing, we must assume the Plaintiffs’ claim has legal

validity.”). By alleging they suffered an injury that is “concrete, particularized, and

actual,” the plaintiffs have satisfied their burden at the first step of the standing inquiry.

See TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 423.

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As to causation and redressability, the plaintiffs claim their property value losses

resulted from the condemnation of properties in their neighborhood and the subsequent

condition of the vacant land in the redevelopment project area, which is adjacent to their

homes. See, e.g., J.A. 25, 39, 50. In analyzing standing for the plaintiffs’ private nuisance

claim, the district court found that there was “some causal connection” between the

“alleged reduction” in the plaintiffs’ property values and the defendants’ actions, including

that “some of the complained-of neighborhood conditions came about after the City listed

homes in the neighborhood for condemnation.” Poppleton Now, 2025 WL 1707254, at

*12. We agree that the connections identified by the district court are sufficient to satisfy

the “relatively modest” causation standard at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Id. (quoting

DiCocco v. Garland, 52 F.4th 588, 592 (4th Cir. 2022)). And we also agree that this injury

is, “at least in theory, redressable,” including by “a financial judgment.” Id.

Because the plaintiffs have satisfied each of the Article III standing requirements,

they have standing to bring their takings claim.

2.

That the plaintiffs have standing to bring their takings claim, however, does not

mean they can succeed on the merits of that claim. Again, as the district court correctly

identified, the individual plaintiffs “all maintain ownership over their properties and . . . do

not contend that any of their properties have been taken,” either physically or by regulation.

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Poppleton Now, 2025 WL 1707254, at *8. 6 This fact does not preclude the plaintiffs from

establishing standing, as we have explained. But it does prevent them from succeeding on

the merits. As our precedents make clear, the Takings Clause does not provide the

plaintiffs with a mechanism to challenge the taking of their former neighbors’ properties

because holding a protected property interest in taken property is an essential element of

any takings claim.

The Takings Clause “provides that ‘private property’ shall not ‘be taken for public

use, without just compensation.’” Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 163–64

(1998) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V). This provision, we have explained, “protects

private property.” Quinn v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 862 F.3d 433, 439 (4th Cir. 2017). For

that reason, “[t]he analysis in a takings case necessarily begins with determining whether

the government’s action actually interfered with” the plaintiff’s property rights. Sunrise

Corp. of Myrtle Beach v. City of Myrtle Beach, 420 F.3d 322, 330 (4th Cir. 2005). And we

have found that plaintiffs fail to state a takings claim when they “fail[] to show” that they

hold “a sufficient property interest” in the thing they allege the government took. Quinn,

862 F.3d at 439; see also, e.g., Chollet v. Brabrand, 137 F.4th 241, 247 (4th Cir. 2025)

(affirming dismissal of a takings claim because the plaintiffs did not hold a “private

property” right in public education); accord, e.g., Degan v. Bd. of Trs. of Dall. Police &

6 In their appellate briefing, the plaintiffs assert that members of the community organization plaintiff had their property taken as part of the LDDA. But that allegation is not made in the complaint, which states only that the organization “advocates” for current and former residents of the neighborhood. See J.A. 27, 51; Poppleton Now, 2025 WL 1707254, at *8. 12 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1770 Doc: 49 Filed: 05/04/2026 Pg: 13 of 16

Fire Pension Sys., 956 F.3d 813, 815 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[T]o allege a takings claim,

Plaintiffs must have a property interest . . . .”); Zeyen v. Bonneville Joint Dist., # 93, 114

F.4th 1129, 1139 (9th Cir. 2024) (explaining that, to state a takings claim, “the plaintiff

must own ‘private property’” that was “taken”); Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. Ammon, 209 F.3d

1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“A takings claim calls for a two-step analysis” where, in the

first step, “a court determines whether the plaintiff possesses a valid interest in the property

affected by the governmental action[.]”).

In many cases, deciding whether the plaintiff has alleged a property interest that is

sufficient to state a takings claim requires examining whether the interest claimed is

protected “private property” within the meaning of the Takings Clause. See, e.g., Chollet,

137 F.4th at 245–47; Quinn, 862 F.3d at 439–40. Our task is much simpler here, however,

because the plaintiffs have not claimed any property interest in anything taken by the

government. Nor have they identified any cases holding that someone other than the owner

of the taken property may bring a takings claim. As explained above, caselaw from our

court and other circuits makes clear why: A protected property interest in the taken

property is an essential element of a takings claim. The plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy this

element means their takings claim fails as a matter of law. 7

7 Though it may seem far afield, when it comes to the distinction between lack of standing and failure to state a claim, there is a helpful analogue in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Fourth Amendment rights are “personal rights,” which means that only individuals with “a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place” can challenge a search. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34, 143 (1978). This restriction is sometimes referred to colloquially as Fourth Amendment “standing.” But caselaw makes clear that it is not jurisdictional and “should not be confused with Article III standing.” Byrd v. United (Continued) 13 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1770 Doc: 49 Filed: 05/04/2026 Pg: 14 of 16

For these reasons, we agree with the district court that the plaintiffs’ takings claim

must be dismissed. To align this dismissal with our reasoning, however, we vacate the

portion of the judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ takings claim for lack of standing and

remand to the district court with instructions to dismiss this claim for failure to state a

claim.

We next turn to the plaintiffs’ state law private nuisance claim. We review a

dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo. Meridian Invs., Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan

Mortg. Corp., 855 F.3d 573, 580 (4th Cir. 2017).

Here, the district court considered the private nuisance claim after it had dismissed

each of the plaintiffs’ federal law claims. See Poppleton Now, 2025 WL 1707254, at *12.

As discussed, the district court found that the plaintiffs had standing as to most of the

defendants but failed to state a private nuisance claim under Maryland law. Id. at *12–14.

On appeal, we do not reach the district court’s substantive analysis. Instead, we conclude

that the district court skipped an important step by considering the merits of this claim

without first deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

When, as here, a district court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331, “it also has supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims.” Kovachevich

States, 584 U.S. 395, 410–11 (2018). Instead, it operates as part of the Fourth Amendment merits analysis, to “captur[e] the idea that a person must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest in the place searched before seeking relief.” Id. at 410. So too here: As described above, a plaintiff must have a protected property interest in taken property to raise a Takings Clause challenge. And while that might sound like an Article III standing rule, it actually tests whether the plaintiff has a cognizable claim to relief. 14 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1770 Doc: 49 Filed: 05/04/2026 Pg: 15 of 16

v. Nat’l Mortg. Ins. Co., 140 F.4th 548, 556 (4th Cir. 2025). But if it dismisses all the

federal claims, and no other basis for jurisdiction over the state law claims exists, the

district court must decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining

state law claims. Id.

As a general rule, “when a district court dismisses all federal claims in the early

stages of litigation . . . it should decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining pendent

state law claims by dismissing those claims without prejudice.” Henderson v. Harmon,

102 F.4th 242, 251 (4th Cir. 2024); see also Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger,

604 U.S. 22, 32 (2025) (explaining that district courts “ordinarily should” decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction to “kick the case to state court”). The district court

should have done so here. All the plaintiffs’ federal claims were dismissed when this

litigation was still in its “early stages” – at the motion-to-dismiss stage – and no discovery

had yet occurred. See Henderson, 102 F.4th at 251. Moreover, the issues in this case

implicate particularly strong state interests, and there is no substantial caselaw applying

Maryland private nuisance law to claims analogous to this one. See United Mine Workers

of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (explaining that one reason not to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction is to avoid “[n]eedless decisions of state law”).

We therefore vacate the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ private nuisance claim for failure

to state a claim, and remand to the district court with instructions to decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over this claim and dismiss it without prejudice. See Oneida

Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Madison Cnty., 665 F.3d 408, 436–40, 444 (2d Cir. 2011).

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Finally, we briefly consider the plaintiffs’ contention that the district court erred by

not specifically addressing their separately pled claim for a declaratory judgment.

This was not error. The Declaratory Judgment Act “does not create an independent

cause of action.” Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 244–45 (2d Cir. 2012). It “is

remedial only” and does not “create[] any substantive rights.” CGM, LLC v. BellSouth

Telecomms., Inc., 664 F.3d 46, 55 (4th Cir. 2011); accord 22A Am. Jur. 2d Declaratory

Judgments § 163, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2026) (“Under the Federal Declaratory

Judgment Act, a count for declaratory relief is not cognizable as [a] separate cause of

action, but it is more properly included in [the] prayer for relief[.]”); id. § 162 (“A

complaint for a declaratory judgment must state a claim on which relief can be granted or

[a] cause of action, meaning that the plaintiff must plead substantive claims for which

declaratory relief may be granted.”). Thus, when all the plaintiffs’ substantive claims were

dismissed, their declaratory judgment claim also necessarily failed. CGM, 664 F.3d at 56.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the district court in part, and

remand with instructions for the district court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ takings claim for

failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ private nuisance claim, and dismiss

that claim without prejudice.

VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS