Popowsky v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission

683 A.2d 958, 1996 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 421
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania·Decided October 17, 1996·Published·Cited by 8 cases

Opinion

PELLEGRINI, Judge.

Irwin A. Popowsky and the Office of Consumer Advocate (OCA) petitions for review of the decision of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) approving a non-general rate increase for Equitable Gas Company (Equitable) to recover the current costs of complying with a change in accounting standards.

Equitable is a regulated public utility engaged in the purchase, distribution, sale and transportation of natural gas and serves approximately 250,000 customers in southwestern Pennsylvania. In December of 1990, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the body which sets accounting standards for businesses in the United States, issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 106. SFAS 106 changed the generally accepted accounting principles to be used by large companies, including utilities, in accounting for post-retirement benefits other than pensions (termed “other post-employment benefits” or OPEBs), effective December 15,1992.1

On November 10, 1994, Equitable filed Supplement No. 133 to its tariff requesting recovery of the incremental costs associated [960] with complying with SFAS 106.2 The tariff supplement proposed a revenue increase, of over $1.7 million, to be recovered from core customers, and constituted a non-general rate filing.3 Of the proposed increase, over $800,000 represented the accumulated incremental costs from January 1, 1993, through July 1, 1995, amortized over a three-ypar period. The other over $800,000 proposed represented the annual amount required on a going-forward basis under the accrual method.4 The OCA filed a complaint.

After extended negotiations, the Office of Trial Staff and Equitable reached a settlement stipulation to which the OCA would not join. The settlement stipulation stated that Equitable should recover in rates, applicable to non-competitive customers, the annual going-forward amount of SFAS 106 expenses as soon after July 1, 1995, as possible. They also agreed that Equitable should carry on the books a regulatory asset in the amount of the accumulated incremental costs up to the effective date of recovery of the going-forward amount to be deferred to be considered in the next general rate proceeding. Under the settlement stipulation, the total bill for an average Equitable residential customer would increase approximately $3.18, or less than one cent per day. A new tariff supplement, proposing what was agreed upon in the settlement stipulation, was written to replace Supplement No. 133.

Because of the OCA’s continued objection, hearings were held before the PUC’s Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The OCA contended that no increase in rates was needed because the SFAS 106 costs are offset by Equitable’s savings on health care coverage and other items. It argued that Equitable has the burden to prove that it is not earning a reasonable return and that their rates were, in their entirety, just and reasonable.

The ALJ held that the standards for a non-general rate case under Section 1308(b) are not the same as the standards for a general rate case under Section 1308(d), stating:

The OCA contends that the Commission must first determine that the rates proposed in the Joint Settlement are “just and reasonable” before they may be approved. We do not disagree with this basic proposition. However, the gravamen of the OCA’s contention is that the Commission cannot determine that rates are just and reasonable unless the full panoply of Section 1308(d) revenue/expense and rate base/rate of return supporting data and testimony is provided. We concur with the Stipulating Parties that this is not the case. As demonstrated above, nothing in the Public Utility Code or the Commission’s regulations supports the evidentiary standard proposed by the OCA for a Section 1308(b) non-general rate filing.

(ALJ’s decision, p. 34).

[961] The ALJ recommended approval of the settlement, which found an amount of $2,617,244 as Equitable’s accumulated incremental SFAS 106 expense for January 1, 1998, through July 1,1995, and permitted the recovery of an annual going-forward amount for incremental SFAS 106 costs of $876,206 through an increase in non-competitive rates. The PUC adopted the recommended decision of the ALJ as its own and denied the OCA’s exceptions. The OCA then filed this appeal.

It is uncontested that every rate charged by a public utility, whether through a tariff or supplement filing with the PUC, must be “just and reasonable”. Section 1301 of the Code, 66 Pa.C.S. § 1301.5 The PUC has broad discretion in determining whether rates are reasonable. City of Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 42 Pa.Cmwlth. 242, 400 A.2d 672 (1979). Moreover, the PUC is vested with discretion to decide what factors it will consider in setting or evaluating a utility’s rates. Popowsky v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 669 A.2d 1029, 1040 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995). This court’s scope of review is limited to determining whether the PUC’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether the PUC made an error of law or whether constitutional rights were violated. Popowsky, 642 A.2d at 650.

Non-general rate filings are addressed in Section 1308(b) of the Code, while general rate filings are dealt with in Section 1308(d) of the Code. Both sections set forth the procedure for changing rates, the time limitations for the suspension of new tariffs and the PUC’s actions. Section 1308(b) of the Public Utility Code (Code), 66 Pa.C.S. § 1308(b), provides:

Whenever there is filed with the commission by any public utility any tariff stating a new rate, the commission may, either upon complaint or upon its own motion upon reasonable notice, enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, and pending such hearing and the decision thereon, the commission, upon filing with such tariff and delivering to the public utility affected thereby a statement in
writing of its reasons therefor, may, at any time before it becomes effective, suspend the operation of such rate for a period not longer than six months from the time such rate would otherwise become effective, and an additional period of not more than three months pending such decision.... This subsection shall not apply to any tariff stating a new rate which constitutes a general rate increase as defined in subsection (d). (Emphasis added).

Section 1308(d) of the Code provides:

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Popowsky v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 683 A.2d 958, 1996 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 421 (Pa. Ct. App. 1996).

683 A.2d 958 (Popowsky v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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