JOHNSON, Judge:
Robert V. Polito (Husband) appeals from the order directing him to pay $225 per week in alimony to' Dorothy A. Polito (Wife). In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in directing that an alimony order be entered in favor of Wife after she had obtained a divorce decree in a foreign jurisdiction that did not provide for such orders.
Husband and Wife were married in 1978 in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. In January, 1981, Husband and Wife entered into a property settlement agreement (the Agreement) indicating that they had been separated for six months and stating their intention to make arrangements for the settlement of their property rights.
Paragraph three of the Agreement states:
3. SUPPORT. ROBERT V. POLITO agrees to pay to DOROTHY A. POLITO and DOROTHY A. POLITO agrees to receive from ROBERT V. POLITO the sum of Two Hundred Twenty Five Dollars ($225.00) a week for her support and maintenance. The parties hereto are contemplating a divorce under the Ño-Fault Divorce Code of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania effective July 1, 1980. The parties hereto agree that if a divorce is instituted between [331]*331the parties, that this sum shall be entered as alimony in that proceeding and shall be subject to all the incidences thereof. The entry of that Order as alimony shall supersede any further provisions of this paragraph.
Wife then traveled to the Dominican Republic to obtain a divorce. On 'February 16, 1981, the Court of First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, issued a decree of divorce. The pertinent portion of the divorce decree states:
SECOND: That the agreement entered into between the parties dated the 28th day of January of 1981, shall survive and shall not be merged in this Judgment of divorce and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision of the said agreement.
It is undisputed that the law of the Dominican Republic does not provide for alimony following divorce. Accordingly, no order directing Husband to pay alimony was entered.
Nevertheless, Husband paid Wife $225 per week until December 1, 1992. In February, 1993, after Husband ceased making weekly payments, Wife filed a Petition for Relief under 23 Pa.C.S. § 3105 (Effect of agreement between parties). Wife then filed an Amended Petition for Relief under 23 Pa.C.S. § 3705 (Enforcement of foreign decrees). Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order awarding alimony to Wife. Husband now appeals.
On appeal, Husband, in essence, asserts that the trial court erred when it (1) interpreted the Agreement; (2) awarded alimony even though the law of the Dominican Republic does not provide for post-divorce alimony; (3) asserted subject matter jurisdiction over the alimony claim; and, (4) entered an award for alimony rather than limiting Wife to contractual remedies.
It is well-established that “[t]he role of an appellate court in reviewing alimony orders is limited; we review only to determine whether there has been an error of law or abuse of discretion by the trial court.” Lee v. Lee, 352 Pa.Super. 241, 245, 507 A.2d 862, 865 (1986). Such “[a]n abuse ... does [332]*332not necessarily imply a willful abuse, but if, in reaching a conclusion, the law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is then abused and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct the error.” Id.
First, Husband argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the Agreement. Husband asserts that the language of the Agreement required that an alimony order be entered in the divorce proceeding. However, because the Dominican court was not authorized to enter such an order, Husband argues that the trial court could not have entered an alimony order pursuant to the Agreement. We disagree.
“The paramount goal of contract interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the parties’ intent.” Laudig v. Laudig, 425 Pa.Super. 228, 233, 624 A.2d 651, 653 (1993). It is clear from the language of the Agreement that the parties intended that Wife receive alimony. In fact, Husband made payments in the agreed-upon amount for eleven years following the parties’ divorce. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court’s interpretation of the Agreement.
Second, Husband asserts that the trial court erred in awarding Wife alimony because the law of the Dominican Republic does not provide for post-divorce alimony. In making this argument, Husband relies on Doyle v. Doyle, 355 Pa.Super. 384, 513 A.2d 483 (1986). In Doyle, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement (PSA) in Texas and were divorced in that state. Although Texas law does not provide for alimony, the PSA, which included an agreement to pay alimony, was incorporated into the divorce decree. The parties then moved to Pennsylvania, where Wife filed a petition to enforce, register and adopt a foreign divorce decree. Our Court reasoned that, because Texas did not provide a method for enforcement of support obligations other than through a suit in contract, we could not transform the parties’ contract into an alimony award enforceable under the Divorce Code.
[333]*333However, Doyle is distinguishable from the present case. Doyle is limited to situations in which we are asked to enforce an agreement entered into in a foreign jurisdiction and incorporated in a foreign decree where that jurisdiction’s law does not allow for the terms of the agreement. Here, the parties entered into the Agreement in Pennsylvania, in contemplation of a Pennsylvania divorce. In their Agreement, the parties expressly provided for the entry of an order for support and maintenance consistent with the public policy of this Commonwealth. Thus, because the agreement was entered into in Pennsylvania, it remains enforceable here.
Third, Husband asserts that the trial court erred in asserting jurisdiction over the alimony claim. In pertinent part, 23 Pa.C.S. § 3104 provides:
§ 3104. Bases of Jurisdiction
(a) Jurisdiction. The courts shall have original jurisdiction on cases of divorce ... and shall determine, in conjunction with any decree granting a divorce ... the following matters, if raised on the pleadings, and issue appropriate decrees or orders with reference thereto, and may retain continuing jurisdiction thereof:
(1) The determination and disposition of property rights and interests between spouses, including any rights created by any antenuptial, postnuptial, or separation agreement and including ... the order of any spousal support, alimony, alimony pendente lite, counsel fees or costs authorized by law.
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(d) Foreign Forum. After the dissolution ... of a marriage in a foreign forum where a matter under subsection (a) has not been decided, a court in this Commonwealth shall have jurisdiction to determine a matter under subsection (a) to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States.
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JOHNSON, Judge:
Robert V. Polito (Husband) appeals from the order directing him to pay $225 per week in alimony to' Dorothy A. Polito (Wife). In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in directing that an alimony order be entered in favor of Wife after she had obtained a divorce decree in a foreign jurisdiction that did not provide for such orders.
Husband and Wife were married in 1978 in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. In January, 1981, Husband and Wife entered into a property settlement agreement (the Agreement) indicating that they had been separated for six months and stating their intention to make arrangements for the settlement of their property rights.
Paragraph three of the Agreement states:
3. SUPPORT. ROBERT V. POLITO agrees to pay to DOROTHY A. POLITO and DOROTHY A. POLITO agrees to receive from ROBERT V. POLITO the sum of Two Hundred Twenty Five Dollars ($225.00) a week for her support and maintenance. The parties hereto are contemplating a divorce under the Ño-Fault Divorce Code of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania effective July 1, 1980. The parties hereto agree that if a divorce is instituted between [331]*331the parties, that this sum shall be entered as alimony in that proceeding and shall be subject to all the incidences thereof. The entry of that Order as alimony shall supersede any further provisions of this paragraph.
Wife then traveled to the Dominican Republic to obtain a divorce. On 'February 16, 1981, the Court of First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, issued a decree of divorce. The pertinent portion of the divorce decree states:
SECOND: That the agreement entered into between the parties dated the 28th day of January of 1981, shall survive and shall not be merged in this Judgment of divorce and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision of the said agreement.
It is undisputed that the law of the Dominican Republic does not provide for alimony following divorce. Accordingly, no order directing Husband to pay alimony was entered.
Nevertheless, Husband paid Wife $225 per week until December 1, 1992. In February, 1993, after Husband ceased making weekly payments, Wife filed a Petition for Relief under 23 Pa.C.S. § 3105 (Effect of agreement between parties). Wife then filed an Amended Petition for Relief under 23 Pa.C.S. § 3705 (Enforcement of foreign decrees). Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order awarding alimony to Wife. Husband now appeals.
On appeal, Husband, in essence, asserts that the trial court erred when it (1) interpreted the Agreement; (2) awarded alimony even though the law of the Dominican Republic does not provide for post-divorce alimony; (3) asserted subject matter jurisdiction over the alimony claim; and, (4) entered an award for alimony rather than limiting Wife to contractual remedies.
It is well-established that “[t]he role of an appellate court in reviewing alimony orders is limited; we review only to determine whether there has been an error of law or abuse of discretion by the trial court.” Lee v. Lee, 352 Pa.Super. 241, 245, 507 A.2d 862, 865 (1986). Such “[a]n abuse ... does [332]*332not necessarily imply a willful abuse, but if, in reaching a conclusion, the law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is then abused and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct the error.” Id.
First, Husband argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the Agreement. Husband asserts that the language of the Agreement required that an alimony order be entered in the divorce proceeding. However, because the Dominican court was not authorized to enter such an order, Husband argues that the trial court could not have entered an alimony order pursuant to the Agreement. We disagree.
“The paramount goal of contract interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the parties’ intent.” Laudig v. Laudig, 425 Pa.Super. 228, 233, 624 A.2d 651, 653 (1993). It is clear from the language of the Agreement that the parties intended that Wife receive alimony. In fact, Husband made payments in the agreed-upon amount for eleven years following the parties’ divorce. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court’s interpretation of the Agreement.
Second, Husband asserts that the trial court erred in awarding Wife alimony because the law of the Dominican Republic does not provide for post-divorce alimony. In making this argument, Husband relies on Doyle v. Doyle, 355 Pa.Super. 384, 513 A.2d 483 (1986). In Doyle, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement (PSA) in Texas and were divorced in that state. Although Texas law does not provide for alimony, the PSA, which included an agreement to pay alimony, was incorporated into the divorce decree. The parties then moved to Pennsylvania, where Wife filed a petition to enforce, register and adopt a foreign divorce decree. Our Court reasoned that, because Texas did not provide a method for enforcement of support obligations other than through a suit in contract, we could not transform the parties’ contract into an alimony award enforceable under the Divorce Code.
[333]*333However, Doyle is distinguishable from the present case. Doyle is limited to situations in which we are asked to enforce an agreement entered into in a foreign jurisdiction and incorporated in a foreign decree where that jurisdiction’s law does not allow for the terms of the agreement. Here, the parties entered into the Agreement in Pennsylvania, in contemplation of a Pennsylvania divorce. In their Agreement, the parties expressly provided for the entry of an order for support and maintenance consistent with the public policy of this Commonwealth. Thus, because the agreement was entered into in Pennsylvania, it remains enforceable here.
Third, Husband asserts that the trial court erred in asserting jurisdiction over the alimony claim. In pertinent part, 23 Pa.C.S. § 3104 provides:
§ 3104. Bases of Jurisdiction
(a) Jurisdiction. The courts shall have original jurisdiction on cases of divorce ... and shall determine, in conjunction with any decree granting a divorce ... the following matters, if raised on the pleadings, and issue appropriate decrees or orders with reference thereto, and may retain continuing jurisdiction thereof:
(1) The determination and disposition of property rights and interests between spouses, including any rights created by any antenuptial, postnuptial, or separation agreement and including ... the order of any spousal support, alimony, alimony pendente lite, counsel fees or costs authorized by law.
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(d) Foreign Forum. After the dissolution ... of a marriage in a foreign forum where a matter under subsection (a) has not been decided, a court in this Commonwealth shall have jurisdiction to determine a matter under subsection (a) to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States.
The trial court found, and we agree, that the Dominican court did not decide the issue of alimony. While the Dominican court declared that the parties’ Agreement “shall survive [334]*334and shall not be merged in this Judgment of divorce” and ordered the parties to “comply with each and every provision of the said agreement,” it did not, and indeed could not, enter an order of alimony or specifically direct Husband to pay alimony. Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue of alimony and enter an appropriate order. The parties expressly agreed that should they divorce, an alimony order would be entered in favor of Wife in the amount of $225 per week. The trial court, without any modification of the parties’ agreement, directed that an alimony order be entered. Accordingly, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion when it effectuated the clear intent of the parties.
Finally, Husband asserts that, because the Agreement was executed prior to 1988, it cannot be enforced under 23 Pa.C.S. § 3105(a), but must be enforced through contractual remedies. The trial court properly directed that an alimony order be entered. Husband concedes in his Brief that “[i]n the court below, [Wife] did not offer any argument for the application of § 3105(a); nor did the trial court mention or base its decision on this section.” Accordingly, we need not consider nor determine whether § 3105 is applicable in this case.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court order directing Husband to pay alimony to Wife in the sum of $225 per week.
Order Affirmed.
OLSZEWSKI, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion.