Polite v. VIP Community Services

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided October 13, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-07631·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DERRICK POLITE, Plaintiff, 20-CV-7631(LLS) -against- ORDERTO AMEND VIP COMMUNITY SERVICES, Defendant. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se,brings this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), alleging that his former employer discriminated and retaliated against him by not providing him with equal pay andbyterminating his employment. By order datedOctober 2, 2020,the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP).For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss anIFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude”in pro se cases,id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim,pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plainstatement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to

state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570(2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S.at 555.After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible –not merely possible –that the pleader is entitled to relief.Id. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this employment discrimination action against his former employer, the VIP Community Services (VIP) located in the Bronx. The complaint is not a model of clarity, but Plaintiff asserts that he is bringing claims under Title VII for VIP’s failure to provide him with equal pay and retaliationagainst him.(See ECF No. 2, at 2.) He provides the following statement as the facts in support of his case: During my initial complaint I failed to provide the witness to the event which lead VIP to terminate my employment. It was recommended, I submit this claim in efforts to honor the request of my retroactive pay along with my reasons for termination. Lastly, along with the age difference of the previous Clinical Director there was no reason to decrease my pay, especially with both parties having the same credentially. In closing, under the Ryan White program all parties were paid according to the salary aside from me. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff also attaches to the complaint a letter addressed to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in which he asserts additional facts. He states in the letter that he was employed by VIP as the Clinical Director of the Ryan White Program and that his employment was terminated after he reported a coworker’s inappropriate touching of two staff members, and anothercoworker’s calling of staff members byracist and other derogatory names. (See id. at 11-12.) Plaintiff also asserts that he was subjected to age discrimination because the former Clinical Director, who was younger, was paid more than him. DISCUSSION A. Claims under Title VII and the ADEA Plaintiff brings claims under Title VII,and his assertions that he was subjected to age

discrimination suggest a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Similarly, the ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to “discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). These antidiscrimination provisions prohibit employers from mistreating an

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