Police Protective Ass'n of Casper v. City of Casper

575 P.2d 1146, 98 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2113, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 272

• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court
• Decided: March 9, 1978
• Docket: 4789
• Status: Published

Opinions

ROSE, Justice.

This appeal from a declaratory judgment concerns the construction and validity of a collective-bargaining agreement voluntarily entered into by the City of Casper and the Police Protective Association of Casper (hereinafter the Association). We will affirm the decision of the district court, which declares the contract between the parties null and void and of no force and effect.

The City had, for a number of years, voluntarily entered into agreements with the Association regarding the terms of employment for the City’s police officers. The last of such agreements became effective on July 1, 1975, and was to continue

“until June 30, 1976, and thereafter from year to year until altered or modified by collective bargaining, or by mediation, conciliation or fact-finding.”

Pursuant to renewal provisions, the Association notified the City of its desire to enter into collective bargaining for the purpose of amending the agreement in several particulars. The City’s response was to the effect that it lacked authority to enter into such a collective-bargaining agreement and refused to discuss amending the existing agreement.

On May 19, 1976, the Association filed a declaratory-judgment action, seeking a declaration that the agreement was binding and enforceable. The City answered, restating its lack of authority to enter into a collective-bargaining agreement with the Association, and further asserting its lack of authority

“to continue an agreement from year to year to be modified only by collective bargaining, mediation, conciliation or fact-finding.”

In declaring the agreement to be null and void and of no force and effect, the judgment of the district court stated in relevant part:

" .. . the parties have heretofore voluntarily engaged in collective bargaining which has resulted in contracts such as that stipulated into evidence in this case; that the parties would now engage in collective bargaining if permitted to do so; that it is unlawful for The City of Casper and the Police Protective Association to voluntarily engage in collective bargaining and to make a Contract such as that in evidence in this case, and that such Contract therefore is null and void and of no force and effect.”

The record and arguments on appeal disclose that we are asked to resolve

(1) whether, under the agreement, the City had the right to terminate its contractual relationship with the Association; and

(2) whether the City had authority to voluntarily enter into the collective-bargaining agreement in the first instance.

Our response to the first question makes it unnecessary to decide the second.

The Association sought a declaratory judgment that the agreement was binding and enforceable, but the district court held

“that it is unlawful for The City of Cas-per and the Police Protective Association to . make a Contract such as that in evidence in this case, . . ."

If there is any legal ground in the record to sustain that judgment, it will be affirmed. In re Romer, Wyo., 436 P.2d 956, 958. In this respect, we are reminded that the declaratory-judgment vehicle cannot be utilized for the purpose of obtaining an advisory opinion, and thus the issue concerning which judgment is sought must be justicia-ble. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hallmark Insurance Co., Wyo., 561 P.2d 706, 709. Under the facts here, the right of the City to refuse to negotiate a new or amended collective-bargaining agreement clearly structures a jus-ticiable controversy. If we are to determine that the City has this right of refusal because of applicable law and the contract provisions — or lack of them — then it becomes unnecessary to go on and decide whether or not the City also had the authority to enter into such an agreement in the first instance. This last-mentioned inquiry may be addressed through declaratory judgment as a justiciable issue only in circumstances in which there is a controversy over the operation of the substantive aspects of an existing contract.¹ Since this type of dispute is not now before the court, we will, therefore, render no opinion as to whether the City is empowered to voluntarily enter into a collective-bargaining agreement with the Association.

Turning to the issue which is properly here for decision, we observe that several of the contract provisions are relevant. First, as noted previously, the document in question provides in Article XIX that

“This Agreement shall become effective the 1st day of July, 1975, and shall remain in force and effect until June 30, 1976, and thereafter from year to year until altered or modified by collective bargaining, or by mediation, conciliation or factfinding.”

With respect to renewal and amendments to the agreement, Article XVII provides that:

“Either party desiring to amend this Agreement shall notify the other in writing, no sooner than one hundred thirty (130) days, and no less than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the first of July of each year. Whenever notice is given, the nature of the amendments must be specified in such notice, and until satisfactory conclusion is reached in the matter of such amendments, the original provisions shall remain in full force and effect.”

On its face, then, the agreement provides only for alteration or modification of its terms. It does not give either party the right to terminate upon reasonable notice, as do most collective-bargaining agreements. In consequence, the contract contains no limitations upon the duration of its underlying provisions. This condition of things calls into question the ability of a municipal corporation to contractually bind itself in perpetuity. It is said in 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 979b, p. 534:

“Contracts to continue for an unlimited time, if construed to continue in perpe-tuo, are generally considered invalid, although some courts have held such contracts valid in the absence of any constitutional limitations. Contracts for an indefinite time are sustained where construed as continuing in force only at the will of the parties or for a reasonable time only, and in some jurisdictions the reasonable time for which such contracts are allowed to run is determined by analogy to constitutional provisions limiting the terms of franchises.” [Footnotes omitted and emphasis supplied]

In light of these rules, two conclusions are available to the court with respect to the instant agreement. First, it may be regarded as being invalid because it could properly be construed to continue in perpe-tuo. Second, if we were to regard the agreement as not being perpetual by its terms and were to further find that it is not susceptible to the implication of a specific period of duration, then, in such case, the agreement would be terminated at will upon the giving of reasonable notice. 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 398, pp. 478-480. According to either alternative, the agreement before the court must be held to be unenforceable.

The contract indicates that the parties intended it to continue “until altered or modified.” Those words do not conceive of termination. “Alter” means “to change some of the elements or ingredients or details without substituting an entirely new thing or destroying the identity of the thing affected;” and “modification” similarly means “an alteration which introduces new elements into the details, or cancels some of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect of the subject-matter intact.” Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968), pp. 103 and 1155. Since neither party had a right to terminate this agreement, we hold that the district court was correct in declaring the agreement null and void.

Perhaps we should add that, notwithstanding any language of the district court judgment which might appear to enlarge upon what is said here, and notwithstanding the charge contained in Justice Raper’s specially concurring opinion — and in disagreement with Justice Thomas’ specially concurring opinion — we restrict the majority opinion to the proposition that the contract is null and void because, by its terms, the parties did not provide for its termination and, therefore, substantive contractual issues cannot be reached.

We have heretofore said that a declaratory-judgment action will not lie unless there is an enforceable contract right — that is— the contract must be a valid agreement before a justiciable issue concerning its provisions may be framed for declaratory-judgment purposes. Footnote 1, supra. Having held that the contract itself is null and void, we cannot then go inside its four corners to decide substantive issues therein contained. In this case, one such issue is whether or not the City may voluntarily enter into a collective-bargaining agreement with its employees. Contrary to the accusation made by Justice Raper in his specially concurring opinion, the Justices constituting the majority are not “ducking the only real issue in this case.”

Our only reason for not considering the collective-bargaining question is because we find and hold that there is no contractual justiciable collective-bargaining issue for this court’s decision, in view of the fact that we are confronted with a void contract. There being no enforceable contract rights where a contract is null and void, a justicia-ble issue does not, in such case, present itself.

We reject, out of hand, the implication of Justice Raper’s charges that we are in any way avoiding an issue properly before this court for decision. On the other hand, we find Justice Raper’s specially concurring opinion to be guilty of reaching outside the issues properly framed and necessary to orderly disposition in order to decide a proposition that is not here for decision.

Our refusal to decide the collective-bargaining question cannot be taken by anyone as an indication of how we of the majority, collectively or individually, might ultimately stand should the issue properly come before the court.

For the reasons set out herein, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

1 . It is said in 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 54, p. 151:

“An action for declaratory relief to construe or apply a contract will not lie in the absence of an enforceable contract right, . ."

In Greer v. Kentucky Health and Geriatric Authority, C.A.Ky.1971, 467 S.W.2d 340, 343, where an agreement between the parties was not meant to be final or legally enforceable, it was said:

“. . .It would be futile for the court to make pronouncements purporting to interpret an admittedly nonfinal, nonenforceable ‘agreement.’ Neither should the court render a declaratory judgment in the absence of an actual controversy. KRS 418.040. The provisions of KRS'418.045, respecting the right of any person interested in a contract to have a declaratory judgment, relate to a binding contract, not a mere ‘plan of action.’ . . ”