Poe v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: July 1, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-3086
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEONARD POE,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24-03086 (AHA) v.

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al.,

Defendants.

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Leonard Poe sues the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”) and

a WMATA bus driver, for negligence that caused a bus door to close on his leg. WMATA moves

for summary judgment, arguing Poe cannot establish the applicable standard of care without expert

testimony, the incident cannot have occurred as alleged, and Poe cannot recover future medical

expenses. The court grants in part and denies in part WMATA’s motion for summary judgment.

I. Background 1

According to Poe, as he was boarding a bus in D.C., the bus door closed on his leg, and the

bus moved about 60 to 75 yards while his leg was still stuck in the door. ECF No. 21-6 at 3–6. Poe

sued WMATA, claiming it is responsible for the bus driver’s negligence and asserting the bus

driver “negligently failed to maintain control of [the] vehicle, operated [the] vehicle at an

unreasonable rate of speed for the conditions then existing, negligently failed to dedicate full time

1 As required at this stage, the court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to Poe and draws all reasonable inferences in Poe’s favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). and attention to the operation of [the] vehicle, negligently disobeyed the vehicular laws and

regulations of the District of Columbia, and negligently closed the bus door on Mr. Poe’s left leg.”

ECF No. 13 ¶ 8. He alleges the negligence caused injuries and seeks damages for both past and

future medical expenses. Id. ¶¶ 9–10; ECF No. 21-2 ¶ 26.

WMATA moves for summary judgment, arguing that Poe cannot establish the standard of

care without expert testimony and cannot show there is a genuine and material issue as to whether

the bus driver closed the door on his leg and then drove the bus because WMATA’s expert

witness’s testimony forecloses Poe’s version of what happened. ECF No. 21. WMATA also argues

that Poe has not shown he needs future medical treatment. Id.

II. Discussion

The court concludes that Poe does not need an expert to establish the standard of care and

that he has raised a triable issue as to whether the incident occurred as alleged but that he has not

raised any triable issue about damages for future medical care.

Summary judgment is proper when the moving party shows “there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). In reviewing the record, the court “must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves

v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The party opposing summary

judgment must point to evidence that “a reasonable jury could credit in support of each essential

element of [his] claims.” Grimes v. District of Columbia, 794 F.3d 83, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The

moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the opposing party “fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

2 A. Poe Does Not Need Expert Testimony To Establish The Standard Of Care

WMATA argues Poe cannot show a prima facie case of negligence because he has not

provided expert testimony about the standard of care for operating a public transit bus. ECF No.

21-1 at 5–12. But, while there may be circumstances related to bus operation that need expert

testimony, it is not needed here, where the issue—closing the door while someone is still in the

doorway and then driving forward—can be decided based on common knowledge and everyday

experience. There is, of course, a dispute as to whether the bus driver closed the door on Poe’s leg

and drove while his leg was still stuck in the first place, and that is for the jury to resolve.

The parties appear to agree WMATA is directly liable for a bus driver’s negligence. See

D.C. Code § 9-1107.01(80) (“The Authority shall be liable for its contracts and for its torts and

those of its Directors, officers, employees and agent committed in the conduct of any proprietary

function, in accordance with the law of the applicable signatory.”). And the parties also appear to

agree that Poe’s negligence claim is governed by D.C. law, requiring him to show “(1) the

defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the defendant breached that duty; and (3) the

defendant’s breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s harm.” Whiteru v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit

Auth., 25 F.4th 1053, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (citing Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Ferguson,

977 A.2d 375, 377 (D.C. 2009)); see Robinson v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 774 F.3d 33,

37–38 (D.C. Cir. 2014); ECF No. 21-1 at 4. A plaintiff’s failure to establish the standard of care is

“fatal to a negligence claim.” Briggs v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 481 F.3d 839, 841, 848

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

“Ordinarily, the applicable standard of care is the traditional reasonable person standard,

which the jury can ascertain without the aid of expert testimony.” Robinson, 774 F.3d at 39

(cleaned up). But a plaintiff must offer an expert to show the standard of care “if the subject in

question is so distinctly related to some science, profession or occupation as to be beyond the ken

3 of the average layperson,” unless it is “‘within the realm of common knowledge and everyday

experience’ of the jurors.” Godfrey v. Iverson, 559 F.3d 569, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting District

of Columbia v. Arnold & Porter, 756 A.2d 427, 433 (D.C. 2000)).

Poe’s claim involves the kind of standard of care that the jury can ascertain from its own

experience, without an expert. According to Poe’s evidence, the bus driver closed the door on his

leg when he was entering the bus and then drove forward about 60 to 75 yards while his leg was

still stuck in the door. ECF No. 22-3 at 44–47. Poe has also offered evidence that he yelled at the

bus driver about his leg being stuck, but the bus driver didn’t do anything about it. Id. at 47–49,

51; see also ECF No. 22-5 at 30–31, 38. The critical questions here—whether it is reasonable to

close the door when someone is in the doorway or drive forward while someone’s leg is stuck in

the door—are the sort that jurors have an understanding of from their own experience driving cars

and riding buses. Montgomery v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 25-7044, 2026 WL 880250,

at *2 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 31, 2026) (“A juror is likely to have driven a car before and therefore has

some understanding of the standard of care for driving buses” (cleaned up)); Walls v. Wash. Metro.

Area Transit Auth., No. 19-cv-02623, 2021 WL 8875534, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2021) (holding

that an expert was “not required to establish the standard of care” where the plaintiff claimed that

“WMATA’s bus driver was negligent for completely shutting down the bus, and thereby disabling

a safety sensor, without checking that passengers were clear of the doors, which caused her arm to

become trapped in closed doors”).

WMATA says that Poe needs an expert because this case involves “bus operation,” but

that sweeps too broadly. ECF No. 21-1 at 8–9. To be sure, courts have required expert testimony

in cases involving motor vehicles where the standard of care at issue goes beyond the realm of

common experience. See Thomas v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 22-cv-3097, 2024 WL

4 4103706, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2024) (holding expert testimony was needed to establish the

standard of care for “how close a Metrobus driver must get to the curb for a disabled passenger to

safely disembark”); Bush v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 19-cv-930, 2020 WL 921419,

at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2020) (holding expert testimony was needed to show the standard of care

when deboarding a passenger from a paratransit van because the “added responsibility” of

transporting “passengers with disabilities or special needs” takes the “operations even further

outside the realm of common knowledge”). And WMATA may be correct that, without an expert,

Poe could not advance certain theories of negligence related to a bus door—for example, that

WMATA did not adequately maintain bus systems related to the door or that there were defects in

WMATA’s door sensors—that are “beyond the ken of the average layperson.” Godfrey, 559 F.3d

at 572 (citation omitted).

It is also true, as our circuit has observed, that “[t]he D.C. Court of Appeals has required

expert testimony in a number of cases that, on first blush, appear to be within the realm of common

knowledge.” Briggs, 481 F.3d at 845. But, as the circuit has explained, “expert testimony is not

always necessary to prove negligence in the operation of public transit buses,” specifically because

“jurors likely have experience driving similar vehicles, such as cars.” Montgomery, 2026 WL

880250, at *2. Indeed, the circuit has suggested that an expert may not be necessary to show the

standard of care a bus driver must exercise concerning checking that passengers are secure before

leaving a bus stop. Robinson, 774 F.3d at 36–37, 39. The court expressed “serious[] doubt that

determining whether it is reasonable to start a motor vehicle without checking to make sure one’s

passengers are secure is outside ‘the realm of common knowledge and everyday experience’ of

average jurors.” Id. at 39 (quoting Godfrey, 559 F.3d at 572). The same is true if, as Poe claims,

the bus driver closed the door on Poe’s leg and then drove while his leg was still stuck in the

5 doorway. Therefore, the court cannot grant summary judgment to WMATA simply because Poe

has not had an expert show the standard of care.

B. Poe Has Raised A Triable Issue As To Whether The Bus Driver Closed The Door On His Leg And Then Drove The Bus

WMATA also argues there is no genuine and material dispute as to whether the bus driver

closed the door on Poe’s leg and drove the bus while his leg was stuck in the door. ECF No. 21-1

at 12–17. But Poe has pointed to evidence that “a reasonable jury could credit” in support of his

version of the facts. Grimes, 794 F.3d at 94. Poe testified in his deposition that the bus driver

closed the door on his leg as he was boarding the bus and then drove the bus for approximately 60

to 75 yards while his leg was still stuck in the door before stopping. ECF No. 22-3 at 44–47. Poe

also testified that he yelled at the driver while his leg was stuck, and the driver asked what he

wanted her to do, looked at him, and continued to drive. Id. at 47–51, 53–54. And a witness,

Chantrel Carter, testified that she was on the bus and heard Poe complaining that the door closed

on his leg. ECF No. 22-5 at 22–23, 31, 38. Poe also points to a record showing that he reported the

incident to WMATA the day after it occurred. See ECF No. 22-2; ECF No. 22-4 ¶ 7.

WMATA asks the court to conclude these events never happened, dismissing Poe’s

testimony as self-serving and insufficient to give rise to a factual dispute and dismissing Carter’s

testimony because she heard, but did not see, the incident, and her testimony has inconsistencies.

ECF No. 21-1 at 14–16; ECF No. 23 at 8–9. But while a party’s testimony “will usually, in some

sense, be ‘self-serving,’” parties, “like other fact witnesses, are legally competent to give material

testimony” and in many cases “are the key, or even sole, witnesses.” Johnson v. Perez, 823 F.3d

701, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2016). WMATA argues that Carter’s testimony lacks foundation and is

therefore inadmissible because Carter testified that she did not see the incident and did not hear

what was said between Poe and the bus driver, she provided a timeline inconsistent with Poe’s

6 account, and there was no activity on Carter’s metro card on the day in question. ECF No. 21-1 at

15–16; ECF No. 23 at 8–9. But Carter testified that she was on the bus when the incident occurred

and heard Poe complaining that the door had closed on his leg, which is sufficient at this stage.

ECF No. 22-5 at 22–23, 31, 38; see Gleklen v. Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., Inc., 199

F.3d 1365, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (explaining that, at summary judgment, evidence is properly

considered if it is “capable of being converted into admissible evidence”); Fed. R. Evid. 602 (“A

witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that

the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may

consist of the witness’s own testimony.”). And WMATA’s concerns about the inconsistencies in

Carter’s testimony sound in credibility, not admissibility—that is, they are issues for the jury to

decide. See Barnett v. PA Consulting Grp., Inc., 715 F.3d 354, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Credibility

determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the

facts are jury functions, not those of a judge at summary judgment.” (citation omitted)).

WMATA also asks the court to conclude that Poe’s version of events never happened

because WMATA’s expert says it couldn’t have happened. ECF No. 21-1 at 12–15. According to

the expert, the bus’s electrical system architecture logic and operating code would not permit the

bus to move if the front doors could not close, and the bus maintenance records reveal no issues

with the system. ECF No. 21-13 ¶¶ 4–8. Because Poe has not offered any evidence that the bus

system malfunctioned or was overridden, WMATA says, he cannot show that the events he

testified about ever happened. ECF No. 21-1 at 17; ECF No. 23 at 7. But that too misunderstands

the court’s role at this stage. WMATA’s expert testimony may undermine Poe’s and his witness’s

accounts, but that does not mean the court can simply credit it in place of the jury. Drawing all

reasonable inferences in Poe’s favor, as the court must, a reasonable jury could conceivably find

7 in Poe’s favor on the issue of whether the bus door closed on his leg and the bus drove while his

leg was stuck in the door. 2

C. Poe Has Not Shown A Triable Issue As To Damages For Future Medical Care

Although Poe has shown there is a genuine and material issue as to whether the incident

occurred as alleged, he has not shown a triable issue as to whether he may obtain damages for

future medical care.

To recover future damages caused by a tort, a plaintiff must show the future consequences

of the tort are “reasonably certain.” Wilson v. Johns–Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119

(D.C. Cir. 1982). “Unless there is nonspeculative evidence demonstrating that future suffering,

additional medical expense, and loss of income will occur, the question should not be submitted

to the jury.” Croley v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 759 A.2d 682, 690 (D.C. 2000) (quoting Curry v.

Giant Food Co. of D.C., 522 A.2d 1283, 1291 (D.C. 1987)).

WMATA argues Poe has not offered evidence that, if true, shows a reasonable certainty

that he will need future medical care, and the court agrees. See ECF No. 21-1 at 17–19. Poe’s own

medical expert, Dr. Evan Argintar, testified that Poe is “at maximum medical improvement and

requires no further medical treatment.” ECF No. 21-12 at 2; see ECF No. 22-7 at 5. While Dr.

2 WMATA argues Poe has admitted the facts in its statement of material facts by failing to rebut them in his own statement. ECF No. 23 at 2–4; see Local Civ. R. 7(h)(1). But WMATA’s statement of material facts does not say that the bus doors could not have closed on Poe’s leg. See ECF No. 21-2. Indeed, as described in the statement of material facts, WMATA’s expert testified only that the bus could not have driven while the door was closed on Poe’s leg, not that the door could not have closed on his leg in the first place. Id. ¶¶ 9–15; ECF No. 21-13 ¶¶ 4–7. In any event, the court exercises its discretion not to treat WMATA’s factual assertions as admitted. See Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that Local Civil Rule 7(h) “permits, but does not require,” courts to treat facts identified by the moving party in a statement of material facts as admitted where the nonmoving party does not controvert those facts in a statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion). While WMATA’s expert testimony may be used as a basis to undermine Poe’s testimony at trial, it is not a basis for overlooking his sworn testimony at summary judgment.

8 Argintar also testified that Poe may experience some permanent discomfort in his leg, that does

not create a genuine and material dispute as to whether Poe needs future medical treatment—

especially next to Dr. Argintar’s specific testimony that Poe will not. See ECF No. 21-12 at 2; ECF

No. 22-7 at 5. Poe does not point to any evidence that could otherwise raise a genuine dispute on

the question and, to the contrary, appears to acknowledge that his expert’s testimony “may narrow

Plaintiff’s future-medical-damages theory,” leaving this as a case about “underlying liability” and

“past-damages.” ECF No. 22 at 9.

The court therefore grants WMATA summary judgment as to damages for future medical

care.

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part WMATA’s motion for

summary judgment, ECF No. 21. WMATA is not entitled to summary judgment as to whether an

expert is needed to establish the standard of care and whether the incident occurred as alleged but

is entitled to summary judgment as to damages for future medical treatment.

AMIR H. ALI United States District Judge

Date: July 1, 2026