Platsky v. New York Police Department

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedDecember 20, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-09681
StatusUnknown

This text of Platsky v. New York Police Department (Platsky v. New York Police Department) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Platsky v. New York Police Department, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK HENRY PLATSKY, Plaintiff, -v- 22-CV-9681 (JPO) NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT; ORDER OF SERVICE OFFICER WONG TAKKEUNG; OFFICER JOHN DOE I; SUPERVISING OFFICER JOHN DOE III; JANE DOE, Defendants. J. PAUL OETKEN, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was falsely arrested on February 23, 2020, at 10:20 a.m., at the corner of Avenue C and Sixth Street in the East Village neighborhood of Manhattan. By order dated November 30, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits: To state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible—not merely possible—that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. DISCUSSION

A. New York Police Department Plaintiff’s claims against the New York Police Department (“NYPD”) must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007). See also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). The Court acknowledges that it may be Plaintiff’s intention to sue the City of New York. When a plaintiff sues a municipality under Section 1983, however, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality’s employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself

‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted). There are no facts in the complaint suggesting that a municipal policy, custom, or practice caused a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The Court therefore declines at this stage to

construe the complaint as asserting a claim against the City of New York. B. Jane Doe complainant A complainant cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for false arrest merely for seeking police assistance or providing information to the police, who are then free to exercise their own judgment as to whether an arrest is warranted. See Kraft v. City of New York, 696 F. Supp. 2d 403, 421-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Holley v. Cty. of Orange, New York, 625 F. Supp. 2d 131, 142-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). “To hold a defendant liable as one who affirmatively instigated or procured an arrest, a plaintiff must show that the defendant or its employees did more than merely provide information to the police.” King v. Crossland Sav. Bank, 111 F.3d 251, 257 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Rohman v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 215 F.3d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The mere reporting of a crime to police and giving testimony are insufficient [to initiate prosecution]; it must be shown that [the] defendant played an active role in the prosecution, such as giving advice and encouragement or importuning the authorities to act.”) (cleaned up). Here, Plaintiff does not allege facts indicating that the complainant did anything more than provide information

to the police.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Meilleur v. Strong
682 F.3d 56 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Holley v. COUNTY OF ORANGE, NY
625 F. Supp. 2d 131 (S.D. New York, 2009)
Kraft v. City of New York
696 F. Supp. 2d 403 (S.D. New York, 2010)
Emerson v. City of New York
740 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D. New York, 2010)
Cash v. County of Erie
654 F.3d 324 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Connick v. Thompson
179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (Supreme Court, 2011)
Jenkins v. City of New York
478 F.3d 76 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Jones v. Town of East Haven
691 F.3d 72 (First Circuit, 2012)

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Platsky v. New York Police Department, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/platsky-v-new-york-police-department-nysd-2022.