Plastronics Socket Partners Limited v. Highrel Incorporated

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: January 23, 2020
• Docket: 2:18-cv-03201
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Plastronics Socket Partners Limited, et al., No. CV-18-03201-PHX-SMB

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 Highrel Incorporated, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs Plastronics Socket Partners, Limited and 16 Plastronics H-Pin, Limited’s (“Plaintiffs”) Motion for Leave to Voluntarily Dismiss the 17 Second Amended Complaint Without Prejudice and Memorandum in Support. (Doc. 76, 18 “Mot.” or “Motion.”) Defendants HighRel, Incorporated, HiCon USA LLC, Dong Weon 19 Hwang, and Paul Schubring (“Defendants”) responded and Plaintiffs replied. (Doc. 77, 20 “Resp.”; Doc. 80, “Repl.”) Plaintiffs “for strategic reasons respectfully move . . . for leave 21 to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) without prejudice pursuant to Federal 22 Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). (Mot. at 2.) Neither party requested oral argument and 23 the Court elects to resolve the Motion without it. LRCiv 7.2(f). Having considered the 24 pleadings and procedural history of the case, the Court grants the Motion as explained 25 below. 26 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 27 Plaintiffs initially filed this action on October 5, 2018. (Doc. 1.) They amended their 28 complaint five days later. (Doc. 11, “FAC.”) Defendants then moved to dismiss the FAC 1 for failure to state a claim and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (Docs. 20, 31, 41.) The 2 Court partially granted the first two motions and fully granted the third. (Docs. 58, 59). 3 After the motions were resolved, Plaintiffs amended the FAC on June 21, 2019. (Doc. 60, 4 “SAC.”) Almost a month later, Plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, to which 5 Defendants opposed. (Docs. 65, 66.) After opposing their notice of voluntary dismissal, 6 Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 67.) Shortly 7 thereafter, the Court deemed Plaintiffs’ notice of voluntary dismissal withdrawn and 8 ordered them to submit a motion for voluntary dismissal by September 6, 2019.1 (Doc. 72.) 9 Two days before that deadline, Plaintiffs simultaneously responded to Defendants’ motion 10 to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and moved for voluntary dismissal again, 11 but under Rule 41(a)(2).2 (Doc. 76, Mot. at 2). 12 Because Defendants have answered and not stipulated to dismissal, Plaintiffs can 13 voluntarily dismiss this case only with the Court’s permission. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). 14 With these facts in mind, the Court turns to Plaintiffs’ request. 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 Rule 41(a)(2) provides that “an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request 17 only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.” Id. “Unless the order states 18 otherwise,” as the Rule states, “a dismissal under this paragraph (2) is without prejudice.” 19 Id.; see United States v. Berg, 190 F.R.D. 539, 543 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (noting how, under 20 this Rule, “the suit may be dismissed with or without prejudice, and the dismissal may be 21 conditioned on terms that are proper and necessary to avoid prejudice to the defendant.”). 22 In a nutshell, Rule 41(a)(2) requires a two-step analysis: (1) whether to dismiss; and if so, 23 (2) whether to do so with or without prejudice and on what terms. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). 24 III. DISCUSSION 25 A. All Parties Agree Dismissal Is Appropriate. 26 Whether to dismiss under Rule 41(a)(2) is committed to the trial court’s sound

27 1 The Court withdrew Plaintiffs’ notice because Defendants already answered and the parties did not stipulate to dismissal. (See Docs. 65, 66, 72.) 28 2 Defendants also later moved for a protective order “seek[ing] protection from [ ] needless discovery.” (Doc. 79 at 5.) 1 discretion. Sams v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 625 F.2d 273, 277 (9th Cir. 1980). A court should 2 grant a Rule 41(a)(2) motion for voluntary dismissal “unless a defendant can show that it 3 will suffer some plain legal prejudice as a result [of dismissal].” Smith v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 4 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). “‘[L]egal prejudice’ means ‘prejudice to some 5 legal interest, some legal claim, some legal argument.’” Id. at 976 (quoting Westlands 6 Water Dist. v. United States, 100 F.3d 94, 97 (9th Cir. 1996)). “[P]lain legal prejudice does 7 not result merely because the defendant will be inconvenienced by having to defend in 8 another forum or where a plaintiff would gain a tactical advantage by that dismissal.” 9 Lenches, 263 F.3d at 976 (citing Hamilton v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 679 F.2d 143, 10 145-46 (9th Cir. 1982)). Moreover, no legal prejudice results just because “the threat of 11 future litigation . . . causes uncertainty” or “a dispute remains unresolved.” Westlands, 100 12 F.3d at 96-97. The mere “inconvenience of defending another lawsuit or the fact that the 13 defendant has already begun trial preparations [also] does not constitute prejudice.” Hyde 14 & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Hamilton, 679 F.2d at 145). 15 Here, “Defendants do not dispute that dismissal of this action is appropriate.” (Resp. 16 at 2.) In other words, Defendants make no argument that they would suffer legal prejudice 17 as a result of dismissal. Smith, 263 F.3d at 975. Because all parties agree dismissal is 18 appropriate, the Court likewise finds it appropriate. The only pending question is whether 19 to do so with or without prejudice. This is the principal issue before the Court. 20 B. Dismissal Without Prejudice Is Appropriate. 21 “Rule 41 vests the district court with discretion to dismiss an action at the plaintiff’s 22 instance upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.” Hargis v. Foster, 312 23 F.3d 404, 412 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted). Such a “broad grant of discretion does 24 not contain a preference for one kind of dismissal or another.” Id. Although “Rule 41 25 provides that orders that fail to specify whether dismissal is with or without prejudice are 26 to be interpreted as dismissals without prejudice[,] . . . this default position applies to the 27 interpretation of a silent order, not to the district court’s discretionary decision in the first 28 instance.” Id.; see Semtek Int’l v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001) 1 (construing Rule 41(b)’s similar text as “nothing more than a default rule for determining 2 the import of a dismissal”). 3 Plaintiffs request dismissal without prejudice for unidentified “strategic reasons.” 4 (Mot. at 2.) They present three main reasons for why dismissal without prejudice is 5 appropriate. (Id. at 3-5.) First, they claim dismissal without prejudice “will not deprive 6 Defendants of any legal claim or argument.” (Id. at 4.) In other words, they claim the 7 “arguments and claims presently available to Defendants . . . would still be available to 8 them in any subsequent suit Plaintiffs might bring.” (Id.) Second, they claim “Defendants 9 have not asserted any counterclaims.” (Id.) Lastly, they claim Defendants have only “thus 10 far litigated this case solely on threshold issues such as standing or dismissal[.]” (Id.; see 11 Repl. at 9 (“[t]his litigation has not progressed too far”).) 12 Additionally, Plaintiffs claim only dismissal without prejudice is appropriate 13 because they lack standing to bring suit. (See Repl. at 2 (“Lack of Standing Warrants Only 14 Dismissal Without Prejudice”).) Setting aside the fact that Plaintiffs concede they lack 15 standing, they seek to voluntarily dismiss their SAC, and the Court does not decide the 16 merits of whether they have standing to bring their claims here. (See id. at 2-5; see also 17 Resp. at 3-4.) Nevertheless, Plaintiffs cite caselaw concerning dismissal without prejudice 18 for lack of standing to argue their SAC should be dismissed without prejudice.3 (See Repl.

19 3 These cases include: (1) Schmier v. United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding district court’s dismissal with prejudice appropriate 20 because appellant “could not have possibly amended his complaint to allege [Article III] injury in fact”); (2) Terraspan, LLC v. Rave, LLC, No. C 12-06298 JSW, 2014 WL 21 12644018, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2014) (dismissing without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) where both parties sought to dismiss plaintiff’s claims “based on its lack of 22 standing”); (3) Joint Marketing Int’l, Inc. v. L&N Sales and Marketing, Inc., No. 05-CV- 4818 (DLI)(VVP), 2006 WL 1995130, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2006) (granting Rule 23 12(b)(7) motion to dismiss for failure to join indispensable party, which obviated plaintiff’s standing to sue); (4) Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Varian Med. Sys., Inc., 569 F.3d 1328, 1333 24 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (reviewing district court’s dismissal with prejudice for lack of standing); (5) Raniere v. Microsoft Corp., 887 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (analyzing whether 25 dismissal with prejudice for lack of standing meant appellees were “prevailing parties” under 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012)); (6) Fieldturf, Inc. v. Southwest Recreational Indus., Inc., 26 357 F.3d 1266, 1269-70 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (remanding issue of whether dismissal for lack of standing should be with or without prejudice and noting that dismissal for lack of 27 standing is ordinarily without prejudice); (7) Fulfillium, Inc. v. ReShape Med., Inc., Case No. CV 17-08419-RGK-PLA, 2018 WL 6131162, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2018) 28 (dismissing claims without prejudice sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); and (8) FlowRider Surf, Ltd. v. Pacific Surf Designs, Inc., No.: 3:15-cv-01879-BEN-BLM, 1 at 2-3.) Although the Court is not dismissing for lack of standing, these cases are instructive 2 given Plaintiffs’ concession and Defendants’ argument that no standing exists.4 (See Repl. 3 at 2; see also Resp. at 3-4.) 4 On the other hand, Defendants assert five main reasons for why dismissal with 5 prejudice is appropriate. (Resp. at 4-6.) First, they argue Plaintiffs “seek[] a voluntary 6 dismissal to avoid a near-certain adverse ruling” on their pending Rule 12(b)(1) motion to 7 dismiss. (Id. at 4-5.) Second, they argue “dismissal with prejudice will enable [Plaintiffs] 8 to engage in forum shopping.” (Id. at 5.) Third, they claim dismissal with prejudice is 9 necessary to deny Plaintiffs “the continued opportunity to threaten litigation and abuse the 10 justice system.” (Id.) Fourth, they argue Plaintiffs have no viable patent-infringement or 11 trade secret claims. (Id. at 6-7.) Lastly, they claim the litigation has progressed too far to 12 not warrant dismissal with prejudice.5 (Id. at 7-8.) The Court finds none of Defendants’ 13 arguments persuasive. 14 Instead, the Court finds dismissal without prejudice more appropriate for three 15 reasons. First, Defendants have not established they will suffer plain legal prejudice if the 16 SAC is dismissed without prejudice. Smith, 263 F.3d 975-76. Their theory that Plaintiffs 17 only filed this Motion to avoid a near certain adverse ruling is entirely speculative, 18 especially when the Court has not yet adjudicated whether the SAC states a claim. 19 Furthermore, Defendants have not asserted any counterclaims and the case is still in its 20 early stages. Lastly, the threat of future litigation or the fact that Defendants have expended 21 effort in defending this case, still in its early stages, is not legal prejudice. Westlands, 100 22 F.3d at 96, 97; Hyde & Drath, 24 F.3d at 1169. Absent any manifest harm to Defendants 23 by permitting Plaintiffs’ the possibility of refiling, dismissal without prejudice is warranted 24 and in the interests of justice. Hargis, 312 F.3d at 412. 25 2017 WL 2349031, at *9 (S.D. Cal. May 26, 2017) (dismissing without prejudice for lack 26 of subject matter jurisdiction). 4 Plaintiffs also cite to Rule 41(b) for the proposition that dismissal should be without 27 prejudice because even the default reading of an involuntary dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is without prejudice. (Repl. at 4.) 28 5 Plaintiffs deny they are seeking to avoid an adverse ruling or forum shop, or that they have been dilatory in pursing their claims. (See Repl. at 5-9.) 1 Second, Defendants do not oppose Plaintiffs’ request for voluntary dismissal. (See 2 Resp. at 2.) Instead of opposing dismissal, Defendants consent to dismissal in an effort to 3 obtain a possible dismissal with prejudice (i.e. an adjudication on the merits). If Defendants 4 desire a merits-based adjudication, they should have opposed voluntary dismissal in the 5 first instance. 6 Third, and relatedly, the Court has yet to rule on the merits of this case. In fact, 7 Plaintiffs concede they currently lack standing to sue, which generally requires dismissal 8 without prejudice because it is not an adjudication on the merits.6 See Univ. of Pittsburgh, 9 569 F.3d at 1332 (discussing that because dismissal for lack of standing is not an 10 adjudication on the merits, it should usually be without prejudice). Because both parties 11 seem to agree Plaintiffs lack standing, and dismissal for lack of standing is ordinarily 12 without prejudice, this concession favors dismissing without prejudice. To close the 13 Court’s doors and prevent Plaintiffs from ever bringing these claims again in the future is 14 unwarranted, even considering this Court’s broad discretion to do so. Hargis, 312 F.3d at 15 412. 16 Accordingly, 17 IT IS ORDERED GRANTING Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Voluntarily 18 Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint Without Prejudice and Memorandum in Support. 19 (Doc. 76.) The Second Amended Complaint, (Doc. 60), is dismissed without prejudice 20 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2); 21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING AS MOOT Defendants’ Motion to 22 Dismiss Claims Against Highrel and Hicon USA for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 23 and Memorandum in Support, (Doc. 67), and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Protective Order; 24 Memorandum in Support, (Doc. 79); 25 26 27

28 6 Relatedly, that the default reading of Rule 41(b) dismissals for lack of jurisdiction is without prejudice also favors dismissal without prejudice here. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). 2 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court enter judgment of 3 || dismissal and terminate this action. 4 Dated this 21st day of January, 2020. 5 —_>

7 Alonorable Susan M,Brnovich 3 United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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