Pirkle v. Gurr

Supreme Court of Georgia

Pirkle v. Gurr

128 S.E.2d 490, 218 Ga. 424, 1962 Ga. LEXIS 520

CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

DecidedOctober 1, 1962

Docket21788

StatusPublished

Cited by19 cases

This text of 128 S.E.2d 490 (Pirkle v. Gurr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Pirkle v. Gurr, 128 S.E.2d 490, 218 Ga. 424, 1962 Ga. LEXIS 520 (Ga. 1962).

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Opinions

Mobley, Justice.

Does a petition for cancellation alleging fraud in the procurement fail to state a cause of action because it shows that plaintiff, a blind person, failed to have someone read the instrument to her before she signed it?

“There are numerous decisions of this court to the effect that one signing an instrument without reading it is bound by its terms, unless it appears that he could not read and was for this reason imposed upon, or that the signing was under some emergency which excused the failure to read, or that the failure to read was brought about by some fraud or misleading device of the other party.” Grimsley v. Singletary, 133 Ga. 56, 58 (65 SE 92, 134 ASR 196). “A party to a contract who can read must read, or show a legal excuse for not doing so, and that fraud which will relieve a party who can read must be such as prevents him from reading.” Lewis v. Foy, 189 Ga. 596, 598 (6 SE2d 788). These and other full-bench decisions of this court establish a clear-cut distinction between a person who can read and one who can not. “Where, however, one who can not read is induced to sign an instrument by the misrepresentations of the other party as to its character or contents, he is not bound thereby. He may, ordinarily, rely upon the representation of the other party as to what the instrument is or as to what it contains; and his mere failure to request the other party, or some one else, to read it to him will not generally be such negligence as will make the instrument binding upon him.” Grimsley v. Singletary, 133 Ga. 56, 58, supra. “Ordinarily the question whether the complaining party could have ascertained the falsity of the representations by proper diligence is for determination by the jury.” Elliott v. Marshall, 179 Ga. 639, 640 (176 SE 770).

In the Grimsley case, supra, the defendant, an illiterate negro, was induced to sign a deed by the representation that she was signing a note. In the present case the plaintiff, a blind person, was induced to sign a warranty deed by the representation that the [427]*427instrument was a deed creating a revocable trust. In each case the party in question was unable to read, though for a different reason, and in each case the party was induced to sign the instrument by a misrepresentation as to the character of the instrument. The Grimsley case is therefore controlling of the issue here presented and we hold that whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to rely on the representations of defendants’ attorney as to the nature of the instrument and whether or not she was negligent in failing to have the instrument read to her before she signed it are questions for the determination of a jury.

In arriving at this conclusion, we are not unmindful of the full-bench decision of this court in the case of West v. Carolina Housing &c. Corp., 211 Ga. 789 (89 SE2d 188). In that case a petition alleging that plaintiffs were ignorant colored people, practically illiterate, and totally incapable of reading and understanding the nature of the papers presented to them for their signature was held subject to general demurrer. The court relied upon Truitt-Silvey Hat Co. v. Callaway & Truitt, 130 Ga. 637 (2) (61 SE 481), and Lewis v. Foy, 189 Ga. 596, 598, supra, both of which involved a party who could read but failed to read, for the proposition that “one having the capacity and opportunity to read a written contract, and who signs it, not under any emergency, and whose signature is not obtained by any trick or artifice of the other party, can not afterwards set up fraud in the procurement of his signature to the instrument.” For more recent cases applying this rule to persons who can read, see: Budget Charge Accounts v. Peters, 213 Ga. 17, 18 (3) (96 SE2d 887); Adams v. Perry, 213 Ga. 479, 480 (2) (99 SE2d 881); Martin v. Alford, 214 Ga. 4, 7 (1) (102 SE2d 598); DeLong v. Cobb, 215 Ga. 500, 505 (111 SE2d 89).

The present case is on all fours with the full-bench decision of this court in Grimsley v. Singletary, 133 Ga. 56, supra. We are bound by that decision and follow it in making the present one. Anything in West v. Carolina Housing &c. Corp., 211 Ga. 789, supra, which is contrary to the Grimsley case is not binding and we decline to follow it.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Duck-worth, C. J., Candler and Grice, JJ., who dissent.

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Mobley, Justice.

Does a petition for cancellation alleging fraud in the procurement fail to state a cause of action because it shows that plaintiff, a blind person, failed to have someone read the instrument to her before she signed it?

“There are numerous decisions of this court to the effect that one signing an instrument without reading it is bound by its terms, unless it appears that he could not read and was for this reason imposed upon, or that the signing was under some emergency which excused the failure to read, or that the failure to read was brought about by some fraud or misleading device of the other party.” Grimsley v. Singletary, 133 Ga. 56, 58 (65 SE 92, 134 ASR 196). “A party to a contract who can read must read, or show a legal excuse for not doing so, and that fraud which will relieve a party who can read must be such as prevents him from reading.” Lewis v. Foy, 189 Ga. 596, 598 (6 SE2d 788). These and other full-bench decisions of this court establish a clear-cut distinction between a person who can read and one who can not. “Where, however, one who can not read is induced to sign an instrument by the misrepresentations of the other party as to its character or contents, he is not bound thereby. He may, ordinarily, rely upon the representation of the other party as to what the instrument is or as to what it contains; and his mere failure to request the other party, or some one else, to read it to him will not generally be such negligence as will make the instrument binding upon him.” Grimsley v. Singletary, 133 Ga. 56, 58, supra. “Ordinarily the question whether the complaining party could have ascertained the falsity of the representations by proper diligence is for determination by the jury.” Elliott v. Marshall, 179 Ga. 639, 640 (176 SE 770).

In the Grimsley case, supra, the defendant, an illiterate negro, was induced to sign a deed by the representation that she was signing a note. In the present case the plaintiff, a blind person, was induced to sign a warranty deed by the representation that the [427]*427instrument was a deed creating a revocable trust. In each case the party in question was unable to read, though for a different reason, and in each case the party was induced to sign the instrument by a misrepresentation as to the character of the instrument. The Grimsley case is therefore controlling of the issue here presented and we hold that whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to rely on the representations of defendants’ attorney as to the nature of the instrument and whether or not she was negligent in failing to have the instrument read to her before she signed it are questions for the determination of a jury.

In arriving at this conclusion, we are not unmindful of the full-bench decision of this court in the case of West v. Carolina Housing &c. Corp., 211 Ga. 789 (89 SE2d 188). In that case a petition alleging that plaintiffs were ignorant colored people, practically illiterate, and totally incapable of reading and understanding the nature of the papers presented to them for their signature was held subject to general demurrer. The court relied upon Truitt-Silvey Hat Co. v. Callaway & Truitt, 130 Ga. 637 (2) (61 SE 481), and Lewis v. Foy, 189 Ga. 596, 598, supra, both of which involved a party who could read but failed to read, for the proposition that “one having the capacity and opportunity to read a written contract, and who signs it, not under any emergency, and whose signature is not obtained by any trick or artifice of the other party, can not afterwards set up fraud in the procurement of his signature to the instrument.” For more recent cases applying this rule to persons who can read, see: Budget Charge Accounts v. Peters, 213 Ga. 17, 18 (3) (96 SE2d 887); Adams v. Perry, 213 Ga. 479, 480 (2) (99 SE2d 881); Martin v. Alford, 214 Ga. 4, 7 (1) (102 SE2d 598); DeLong v. Cobb, 215 Ga. 500, 505 (111 SE2d 89).

The present case is on all fours with the full-bench decision of this court in Grimsley v. Singletary, 133 Ga. 56, supra. We are bound by that decision and follow it in making the present one. Anything in West v. Carolina Housing &c. Corp., 211 Ga. 789, supra, which is contrary to the Grimsley case is not binding and we decline to follow it.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Duck-worth, C. J., Candler and Grice, JJ., who dissent.

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128 S.E.2d 490, 218 Ga. 424, 1962 Ga. LEXIS 520, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pirkle-v-gurr-ga-1962.

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