Pinney v. Pinney

Michigan Court of Appeals

Pinney v. Pinney

209 N.W.2d 467, 47 Mich. App. 290, 1973 Mich. App. LEXIS 1292

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals

DecidedMay 23, 1973

DocketDocket 13606

StatusPublished

Cited by13 cases

This text of 209 N.W.2d 467 (Pinney v. Pinney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Pinney v. Pinney, 209 N.W.2d 467, 47 Mich. App. 290, 1973 Mich. App. LEXIS 1292 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973).

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Opinions

Targonski, J.

The parties to this action were granted a no-fault divorce. The appellant has [292]*292raised three objections to the decree entered below, all of which allege an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

Although this Court hears a divorce case de novo on the record it will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Snyder v Snyder, 42 Mich App 573 (1972); Schaffer v Schaffer, 37 Mich App 711 (1972).

The appellant first contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the property among the parties. The trial court has wide discretion in dividing the property of the marital estate. Czuhai v Czuhai, 30 Mich App 208 (1971); Schamber v Schamber, 41 Mich App 589 (1972).

A review of the record and the trial court’s opinion reveals that the appellant was awarded property valued at $90,000 while the appellee was awarded property worth $116,000. The trial court, in reaching this result, found that the estate had been acquired through the efforts of the appellee and that the property awarded to the appellee was heavily encumbered while the appellant’s property was free of any encumbrances. Contribution towards the acquisition of the marital estate is clearly one of the factors to be considered when an equitable division of the property is attempted. Whittaker v Whittaker, 343 Mich 267 (1955). The fact that substantial property was awarded to one party while the other party’s property is heavily encumbered is a valid consideration. Schaffer v Schaffer, supra. A de novo review of the record in the instant case does not show any abuse of discretion by the trial court in . this regard.

The appellant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting her alimony of only $250 per month for a limited number of years [293]*293rather than $250 per week. Alimony payments are within the discretion of the trial court. Socha v Socha, 5 Mich App 404 (1966); Hutchins v Hutchins, 36 Mich App 675 (1971). A review of the background of the marriage, the distribution of the marital property, and the situation of the wife after the divorce does not indicate that this was inadequate. The substantial property award plus $250 per month is not an unacceptable alimony allowance under these circumstances. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The appellant further contends that the trial court erred in not awarding her attorney fees. Allbwance of attorney fees to the wife in a suit for divorce rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Ross v Ross, 24 Mich App 19 (1970); Clemens v Clemens, 39 Mich App 626 (1972). Considering that the only question was over the distribution of the property, and not the divorce itself or matters of custody, and that the proceedings were of a short duration, we find no abuse of discretion.

Affirmed.

Fitzgerald, P. J., concurred.

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Targonski, J.

The parties to this action were granted a no-fault divorce. The appellant has [292]*292raised three objections to the decree entered below, all of which allege an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

Although this Court hears a divorce case de novo on the record it will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Snyder v Snyder, 42 Mich App 573 (1972); Schaffer v Schaffer, 37 Mich App 711 (1972).

The appellant first contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the property among the parties. The trial court has wide discretion in dividing the property of the marital estate. Czuhai v Czuhai, 30 Mich App 208 (1971); Schamber v Schamber, 41 Mich App 589 (1972).

A review of the record and the trial court’s opinion reveals that the appellant was awarded property valued at $90,000 while the appellee was awarded property worth $116,000. The trial court, in reaching this result, found that the estate had been acquired through the efforts of the appellee and that the property awarded to the appellee was heavily encumbered while the appellant’s property was free of any encumbrances. Contribution towards the acquisition of the marital estate is clearly one of the factors to be considered when an equitable division of the property is attempted. Whittaker v Whittaker, 343 Mich 267 (1955). The fact that substantial property was awarded to one party while the other party’s property is heavily encumbered is a valid consideration. Schaffer v Schaffer, supra. A de novo review of the record in the instant case does not show any abuse of discretion by the trial court in . this regard.

The appellant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting her alimony of only $250 per month for a limited number of years [293]*293rather than $250 per week. Alimony payments are within the discretion of the trial court. Socha v Socha, 5 Mich App 404 (1966); Hutchins v Hutchins, 36 Mich App 675 (1971). A review of the background of the marriage, the distribution of the marital property, and the situation of the wife after the divorce does not indicate that this was inadequate. The substantial property award plus $250 per month is not an unacceptable alimony allowance under these circumstances. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The appellant further contends that the trial court erred in not awarding her attorney fees. Allbwance of attorney fees to the wife in a suit for divorce rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Ross v Ross, 24 Mich App 19 (1970); Clemens v Clemens, 39 Mich App 626 (1972). Considering that the only question was over the distribution of the property, and not the divorce itself or matters of custody, and that the proceedings were of a short duration, we find no abuse of discretion.

Affirmed.

Fitzgerald, P. J., concurred.

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Bluebook (online)

209 N.W.2d 467, 47 Mich. App. 290, 1973 Mich. App. LEXIS 1292, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pinney-v-pinney-michctapp-1973.

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