Pillsbury v. United Engineering Co.

342 U.S. 197, 72 S. Ct. 223, 96 L. Ed. 2d 225, 1952 U.S. LEXIS 2636

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: January 7, 1952
• Docket: 229
• Status: Published

Opinions

Mr. Justice Minton

delivered the opinion of the . Court.

These four cases present the same question, namely, the construction and application of the statute of limitations provision of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424, § 13 (a), 33 U. S. C. § 913 (a), which provides in pertinent part as follows:

“The right to compensation for disability under this Act shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within one year after the injury . . . .”

The claims here involved were filed from eighteen to twenty-four months from the dates the employees were injured. The Deputy Commissioner held that the claims were nevertheless timely, since they had been filed within one year after the claimants had become disabled because of their injuries. The District Court vacated the awards, 92 F. Supp. 898, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the claims were barred because not “filed within one year after the injury,” 187 F. 2d 987, 990. We granted certiorari, 342 U. S. 847, because of a conflict between circuits,¹ identical to the present conflict between the holdings of the Deputy Commissioner and the Court of Appeals, as to the construction to be given the limita-, tions provision. This same question was before us in 1940 in Kobilkin v. Pillsbury, 103 F. 2d 667, affirmed by an equally divided Court, 309 U. S. 619.

Petitioners contend that the word “injury” as used in the statute should be construed to mean “disability.” This contention is premised on petitioners’ conclusion that § 6 (a) of the Act, which provides that “No compensation shall be allowed for the first seven days of-the disability,” ² (“disability” is elsewhere defined in the Act as “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment”) ³ and § 19 (a), which provides that “a claim . . . may be filed ... at any time after the first seven days of disability following any injury,”⁴ operate to prevent the filing of a claim before seven days of disability have occurred. Since, as was the case of each of the claimants here, an injured employee may fail to accrue seven days’ “disability” within a year after his injury, petitioners argue that such an employee will be barred from filing his claim before his right to file it arises, if “injury” is construed to mean “injury.” Thus, petitioners conclude that the limitation should not be made to run until the injury becomes compensable, i. e., after seven days’ “disability.”

But the right to recover for disability is one thing, and the right to file a claim is another. It has long been the practice of the Deputy Commissioner to permit filing' to avoid the running of the one-year limitation period here involved. A proper interpretation of §§ 6 (a) and 19 (a) does not prohibit the filing of a claim before the accrual of seven days’ disability. ' Each of the claimants here was immediately aware of his injury, received medical treatment, and suffered continuous pain. We are npt here dealing with a latent injury or an occupational disease.

We are not free, under the guise of construction, to amend the statute by inserting therein before the word “injury” the word “compensable” so as to make “injury” read as if it were “disability.” Congress knew the difference between “disability” and “injury” and used the words advisedly. This view is especially compelling when it is noted that the two words are used in the same sentence of the limitations provision; therein “disability” is related to the right to compensation, while- “injury” is related to the period within which the claim must be filed. Furthermore, Congress defined both “disability” and “injury” in the Act,⁵ and its awareness of the difference is apparent throughout. Thus, we think that when Congress used “disability” and “injury” in the same sentence, making each word applicable to a different thing, it did not intend the carefully distinguished and separately defined words to mean the same thing. Congress meant what it said when it limited recovery to one year from date of injury, and “injury” does not mean “disability.”

We are aware that this is a humanitarian Act, and that it should be construed liberally to effectuate its purposes; but that does hot give us the power to rewrite the statute of limitations at will, and make what was intended to be a limitation no limitation at all. Petitioners’ construction would have the effect of extending the limitation indefinitely if a claim for disability had not been filed; the provision would then be one of extension rather than limitation. While it might be desirable for the statute to provide as petitioners contend, the power to change the statute is with Congress, not us.

The judgments are

Affirmed.

1 The conflict is between the instant decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Great American Indemnity Co. v. Britton, 86 U. S. App. D. C. 44, 179 F. 2d 60.

2 44 Stat. 1426, 33 U. S. C. § 906 (a). .

3 44 Stat. 1426, 33 U. S. C. § 902 (10).

4 44 Stat. 1435, 33 U. S. C. § 919 (a).

5 “Sec. -2. When used in this Act—

“(2) The term ‘injury’ means accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment, and such occupational disease or infection as arises naturally out of-such employment or as naturally or unavoidably results from such accidental injury, and includes an injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee because of his employment.

“(10) ‘Disability’ means incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the- employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” 44 Stat. 1424-1425, 33 U. S. C. § 902 (2), (10).